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Fairness is an important concept that regulates many everyday transactions in human societies.
While a large literature on the subject of fairness exists within the social sciences, the subject of
fairness has not yet been explicitly addressed by researchers working in the area of computer-
supported cooperative work (CSCW). One reason for this is that fairness may not seem
especially critical for collaboration and, therefore, appears irrelevant to technological design.
Yet perceptions about what is ‘fair’ often influence decisions concerning the assignment of
tasks, the investment of effort, and the distribution of rewards during collaborative projects.
Additionally, making accurate judgements about fairness can be difficult in computer-mediated
settings where awareness of shared efforts is limited.
This thesis investigates the relationship between fairness and division of labour in collaborative
work. We adopt a mixed methods approach to explore the prevalence of fairness in initial,
distributive allocations of workload, as well as how fairness comes into play during the
enactment of collaborative tasks. Our first study finds that initial allocations of work are made
on the basis of fairness, and that perceptions about fairness in division of labour are linked
to overall satisfaction with group outcomes. We then introduce a novel model of workload
assignment based on the classic ‘ultimatum game’, and explore our model in a series of
empirical studies using collaborative search tasks. Our findings provide further evidence
of fairness norms in the allocation of work. We also report an emergent matching effect
in participants’ task completion times, which we take as further evidence of fairness in the
enactment of collaborative workloads. We then report a qualitative study of collaborative
search tool use in everyday tasks. This study draws attention to the importance of context in
determining the extent to which people police fairness, and provides numerous implications
for the design of collaborative search systems.
Our final thesis study explores the potential for supporting fairness during CSCW. We suggest
that designers should provide awareness about individual contributions and should allow
individuals to assess fairness via social comparisons. We report a study of how groups in
the online game World of Warcraft use awareness mechanisms to keep track of individual
contributions to the collective effort. Our study implies the potential utility of contribution
meters while also shedding light on potential side-effects. The thesis ends by considering the
implication of our results for current understandings of fairness. We propose a theoretical





The contribution of the work presented in this thesis has been recognised through peer-
reviewed publication in the following scholarly outlets:
• Kelly, R., and Payne, S. J. (2014). Collaborative web search in context: a study of
tool use in everyday tasks. In proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer
Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing (CSCW ’14). ACM, New York, NY,
USA, 807-819.
• Kelly, R., and Payne, S. J. (2013). Division of labour in collaborative information seek-
ing: current approaches and future directions. In proceedings of the 3rd International
Workshop on Collaborative Information Seeking: Consolidating the Past, Creating the
Future, at CSCW 2013.
Summaries of this work were presented at the following doctoral consortia:
• Kelly, R. (2013). Fairness in the division and completion of collaborative work. In
proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work
(CSCW ’13). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 65–68.
• Kelly, R. (2011). An economic approach to studying division of workload in collabo-
rative search tasks. In proceedings of the 25th BCS Conference on Human-Computer







List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Thesis Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Research Focus and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Scoping Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Scoping Division of Labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 Scoping Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Research Methods and Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.1 Research Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Thesis Outline and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Collaborative Work, Fairness, and Technology: Review and Synthesis 13
2.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Computer-Supported Cooperative Work: Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Taxonomies of CSCW Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Models of Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.3 The Second C of CSCW: Collaboration or Cooperation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Four Core Dimensions of Collaborative Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.2 Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.3 Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.4 Division of Labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 On Fairness: A Short Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.1 Defining Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.2 The Value of Fairness: A Basis for Cooperative Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Fairness and CSCW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
vii
CONTENTS
2.5.1 Studies Mentioning Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5.2 Other Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.3 Summary and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3 A Study of Division of Labour and Fairness in Collaborating Teams 37
3.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Thesis Study 1: Survey Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.1 Study Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.2 Survey Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.3 Survey Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.2 Survey Implementation and Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4.1 Correlational Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4.2 Qualitative Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5.1 Qualitative Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5.2 Study Limitations and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4 Modelling Division of Labour as an Economic Game: Background 57
4.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Towards a Model of Division of Labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2.1 Division of Labour as Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2.2 The Ultimatum Game: An Empirical Model of Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.3 A Division of Labour Ultimatum Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3 Factors Affecting Behaviour in Ultimatum Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.1 Probing Fear of Rejection: The Dictator Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3.2 Methodological and Structural Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.3 Descriptive Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.4 Demographic Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.5 Interpretation & Implications for this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4 Economic Games and Human-Computer Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.1 Prior Use of Economic Games in HCI Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4.2 Merits of our Approach for HCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5 Empirical Studies Using the Division of Labour Ultimatum Game 87
5.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 Foundations for the Present Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.1 Task Choice: Web-Based Collaborative Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.2 Remarks on Experimental Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3 Thesis Study 2: Division of Labour as an Economic Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
viii
CONTENTS
5.3.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.3.2 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.3.3 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3.4 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.7 Study 2 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 Thesis Study 3: The Impact of Search Topic in the DLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.1 Study Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.4.3 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4.4 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4.5 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4.8 Study 3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5 Thesis Study 4: Testing the Persistence of Equity in a Dictator Variant . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5.1 Study Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5.3 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5.4 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5.5 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.5.8 Study 4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.6 Thesis Study 5: Allocating in the Absence of the DLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6.1 Study Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6.2 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6.3 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6.4 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.6.5 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.6.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.6.8 Study 5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.7 General Discussion of Studies 2 to 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.7.1 DLUG Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.7.2 Coordination Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.7.3 Search Time Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.7.4 Task Completion Time and Quality of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.7.5 Limitations And Further Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
ix
CONTENTS
6 Collaborative Search in Context: A Real-World Study 147
6.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.2 Study Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.2.1 Understanding and Supporting Collaborative Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.3 Thesis Study 6: A Field Study of Collaborative Search Behaviour and Tool Use . . . . . 150
6.3.1 System Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.4.1 Study Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.4.2 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.4.3 Materials & Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.4.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.5.1 Search Process & Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.5.2 Appropriations & Afforded Behaviours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.5.3 Fairness Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.5.4 Interface Design Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.6.1 Implications for Collaborative Search Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.6.2 Division of Labour and Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.6.3 Study Limitations & Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
7 Fairness Through Awareness: Contributions in Collaborative Gaming 175
7.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.2.1 The Importance of Awareness in Collaborative Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.2.2 CSCW and the Problem of Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7.2.3 Towards Contribution Awareness: A Social Proxy for Effort? . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.3 Thesis Study 7: Awareness Meters in World of Warcraft Raid Groups . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.3.1 Warcraft Raiding: Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.3.2 Damage and Healing Meters: Simple Metrics for Contribution Awareness . . . . 186
7.3.3 Are Games ‘Work’? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
7.4.1 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.4.2 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.4.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.5.1 The Importance of Awareness in Raids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
7.5.2 How Meters Support Raid Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
7.5.3 Sociotechnical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
7.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.6.1 Meters and Awareness in World of Warcraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.6.2 Implications for Awareness Support in Collaborative Games . . . . . . . . . . . 200
7.6.3 Implications for Contribution Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
7.6.4 Study Limitations & Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202




8.1 Thesis Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
8.2 Integration and Implications of Thesis Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8.2.1 Theme 1: Fairness can be Critical in Collaborative Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
8.2.2 Theme 2: Context Affects Tolerance of Unfairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
8.2.3 Theme 3: Fairness as a Tricky Design Goal for Collaborative Systems . . . . . . 211
8.3 A Theoretical Model of Division of Labour and Fairness Judgements . . . . . . . . . . . 215
8.3.1 Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
8.3.2 Assessing Fairness in Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
8.3.3 Assessing Fairness in Enactment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
8.4 Thesis Limitations and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
8.4.1 Participants and Generalizability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
8.4.2 Fairness in Work: Definitions and Cultural Sensitivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
8.4.3 Factors Affecting Division of Labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
8.4.4 Task Choices, Work Settings, and Group Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
8.4.5 Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
8.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
References 228
Appendices 253
A Ethics Checklist 255
A.1 Completed Ethics Checklist: Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
B Study 1 Materials 257
B.1 Survey Transcript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
C Study 2 Materials 265
C.1 Consent Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
C.2 Study 2 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
C.2.1 Proposer Instructions for DLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
C.2.2 Responder Instructions for DLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
C.2.3 Web Search Task Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
C.3 Study 2 Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
C.3.1 Proposer Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
C.3.2 Responder Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
D Study 3 Materials 273
D.1 Study 3 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
D.1.1 Proposer Instructions for DLUG, Pop Music Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
D.1.2 Responder Instructions for DLUG, Pop Music Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
D.1.3 Proposer Instructions for DLUG, Slime Mold Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
D.1.4 Responder Instructions for DLUG, Slime Mold Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
D.1.5 Web Search Task Instructions, Both Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
D.2 Study 3 Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
D.2.1 Proposer Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
xi
D.2.2 Responder Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
E Study 4 Materials 283
E.1 Study 4 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
E.1.1 Dictator Instructions, Complete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
E.1.2 Dictatee Instructions, Complete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
E.1.3 Dictator Instructions, Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
E.1.4 Dictatee Instructions, Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
E.1.5 Web Search Task Instructions, Both Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
E.2 Study 4 Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
E.2.1 Dictator Questionnaire, Complete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
E.2.2 Dictatee Questionnaire, Complete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
E.2.3 Dictator Questionnaire, Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
E.2.4 Dictatee Questionnaire, Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
F Study 5 Materials 297
F.1 Study 5 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
F.1.1 Pop Music Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
F.1.2 Slime Mold Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
F.1.3 Art Crime Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
F.2 Study 5 Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
G Study 6 Materials 303
G.1 Interview Briefing Script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
G.2 Interview Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
H Study 7 Materials 307
H.1 List of Web Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
H.2 Interview Briefing Script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
H.3 Interview Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
I An Example Raid Encounter 311
J Photograph and Image Credits 313
J.1 Image Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 The ways in which group members interact, from Middup (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 A hierarchical model of collaboration, from Okada (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 A set based model of collaboration, from Shah (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 Correlation between perceived fairness in division and completion of work, study 1 . . . 45
3.2 Correlation between perceived fairness in division of work and process satisfaction, study 1 47
3.3 Correlation between perceived fairness in completion of work and equality in contributions,
study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Correlation between perceived fairness in completion of work and products satisfaction,
study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.1 Correlation between task completion times of proposers and responders, study 2 . . . . . 99
5.2 Correlation between task completion times of proposers and responders, study 3 . . . . . 107
5.3 Correlation between task completion times of proposers and responders, study 4 . . . . . 116
5.4 Correlation between task completion times of proposers and responders, study 5. . . . . 126
6.1 Screenshot of the Coagmento collaborative search system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2 Screenshot of the Diigo collaborative search system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.1 Screenshot of Babble, an example of socially translucent design . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
7.2 Screenshot of two damage meters from World of Warcraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187





2.1 Predictability of interaction in relation to time and place in CSCW systems, from Grudin
(1994a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 The Mechanics of Collaboration, adapted from (Pinelle et al., 2003, p. 288) . . . . . . . 21
3.1 Scale items used to gauge fairness, satisfaction, and equity in contributions, study 1 . . . 40
3.2 Scale items from established measures of group attributes, study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Correlations among variables, study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1 Payoff chart for a standard ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2 Payoff chart for a standard division of labour ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.1 Workload allocations, study 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Workload allocations, study 3, pop music topic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3 Workload allocations, study 3, slime mold search topic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.4 Workload allocations, study 4, complete information condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.5 Workload allocations, study 4, asymmetric information condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.6 Participants’ rationale for altering workrate, study 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.7 Workload allocations versus sources found, study 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.8 Frequency count of coordination strategies seen in studies 2 to 5, by search topic. . . . . 125
5.9 Participants’ rationale for altering workrate, study 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.1 Participants’ assigned system, task choices, distinct search sessions, number of items
saved, and total duration of use, study 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155






Working with others is a pervasive aspect of human life. Many endeavours are made easier by the
involvement of two or more individuals, and some tasks are intrinsically collaborative to the extent that
they simply cannot be completed alone (Roberts, 1991; Denning & Yaholkovsky, 2008). In the modern
era, organisations leverage the power of groups to produce many complex outputs, and much of the
work undertaken in pursuit of these outputs is mediated by computer systems. Yet developing systems to
support collaboration is a significant research challenge, and part of that challenge involves understanding
the nature of group work itself. For example, collaborative work has the potential be synergistic, in
that workers can achieve outcomes that would not be possible alone (Schmidt & Bannon, 1992; Shah &
Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez, 2011). However, groups often face challenges that lead to shortfalls in performance,
ranging from the inherent difficulty of managing distributed collaboration (Grinter et al., 1999; Gutwin
et al., 2004) through to coping with social phenomena including shortfalls in collective effort (Latane
et al., 1979) and conflicts between individual and collective goals (Symon et al., 1996). To compound
matters further, technology itself can pose a barrier to collaboration, especially when there is little to no
support for the behaviours that so naturally underpin work practices in face-to-face settings (Gutwin &
Greenberg, 2002; Pinelle et al., 2003).
The subfield of human-computer interaction (HCI) known as computer-supported cooperative work
(CSCW) seeks to alleviate some of the challenges that groups encounter in computer-mediated settings.
While CSCW is very much concerned with the functional properties of groups and how technologies can
help groups function (Ellis et al., 1991), the field also concerns itself with the design of tools that help
people to work in harmony (Kraut, 2003) and further aims to examine the interplay between computer
systems and organisational processes (e.g. Harper et al., 1991; Heath & Luff, 1992; Orlikowski, 1992;
Heath et al., 1995). Striving toward these aims has required that researchers attend to group interaction
and the processes that are integral to collaborative work more generally. For example, researchers have
recognised that collaboration is a cooperative activity requiring awareness of one’s colleagues (e.g. Gutwin
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& Greenberg, 2002), division of labour among group members (Gaver, 1991; Mark et al., 1996) and
coordination of efforts to avoid conflict and prevent redundancy (Malone & Crowston, 1994; Bayerl &
Lauche, 2008).
Although the need for CSCW systems to support constructs like awareness and division of labour
is well recognised, collaboration is a complicated subject and there are many other processes that can
influence the success of a group. One such issue, which has received very little attention from researchers
in CSCW, is that of fairness. Fairness is an important concept that regulates many everyday transactions in
human societies (cf. Binmore, 2010a). In the context of collaborative work, perceptions about what is ‘fair’
can influence individual decisions about how task components should be allocated; how much effort to
invest in a common project; and, later, how rewards from group efforts should be distributed (Hertel et al.,
2002). While such issues are naturally quite difficult to assess, judgements of each might be especially
difficult in computer-mediated environments where the visibility of one’s colleagues is low and knowledge
about efforts may be incomplete (Galegher & Kraut, 1990; Hertel et al., 2003).
Within the wider social sciences, particularly psychology and economics, the subject of fairness has
received considerable research attention. One reason for this is because human behaviour, in comforming
to norms of sharing and fairness, fails to adhere to behavioural models that take selfish, egoistic greed as
their most basic assumption. One such model is the neoclassical homo economicus model of economic
man, where the canonical prediction is that people should behave selfishly and strive towards utility-
maximisation above all else. However, hundreds of studies (see, e.g. Camerer, 2003, for a review) show
that, during the various group tasks and social dilemmas used to investigate these models, people tend to
prefer equity over selfish outcomes. In other words, people care about fairness and are content to punish
those who do not behave in a suitably cooperative manner. These findings have led to multiple theories
that attempt to reconcile fairness alongside other issues including reciprocity, competition, and rationality
(e.g. Bolton, 1991; Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levitt & List, 2007).
Despite this considerable body of work, researchers in CSCW have not yet addressed the subject of
fairness in an explicit fashion. This may be because fairness does not seem like an especially important
issue for technological design, yet a close reading of the CSCW literature reveals that fairness has arisen
as a topic of concern in several studies of collaborative work (e.g. Galegher & Kraut, 1990; Dong & Fu,
2012; Merritt & McGee, 2012). In addition, problems related to fairness can also become salient during
the design and evaluation of tools intended for collaboration (e.g. Morris & Horvitz, 2007). Other issues in
group work speak directly to fairness; for example, the ‘free-rider problem’ occurs when “one or more
members of a group do not do their fair share of work on a group project” (Brooks & Ammons, 2003, p.
1), a definition that in itself suggests non-compliance with fairness as the primary issue at hand. Taken
together, these issues imply that fairness may be worthy of further study and could be at the heart of a
potential design problem for CSCW systems.
This thesis explores fairness in collaborative work and CSCW by focusing on the division, and
subsequent completion, of labour during collaborative projects. As we have seen, division of labour is
an integral aspect of collaboration and groups need to make decisions about who will do how much, and
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of what, during a project. Such decisions may be taken in light of fairness preferences, and there may
also be an expectation that the effort invested in a shared project will meet some standard of fairness. As
mentioned above, striving for fairness may be especially difficult to manage in CSCW systems where
awareness is limited. This thesis, then, has three key goals: 1) to identify the importance of fairness
in collaboration through empirical studies of collaborative work, 2) to examine the extent to which the
allocation and completion of workloads are guided by fairness, and 3) to explore how CSCW systems might
be designed so as to allow groups to strive for fairness in the completion of their work. We address these
subjects through a variety of empirical studies that use a combination of research techniques including
questionnaires, interviews, and experiments.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 delineates topics that are, and are
not, considered within the scope of this thesis. We then offer an overview of questions that the present
work explores. These questions provide a backdrop to the topics that will be explored in later chapters.
Section 1.4 then describes the methods employed in this work. Finally, Section 1.5 outlines the chapters
that form this thesis, highlighting studies performed and the contributions made within each.
1.2 Research Focus and Scope
This thesis focuses on exploring fairness during the division, and subsequent completion, of work in
collaborative tasks. These are two areas in which fairness norms may come into play during collaborative
work. Given our focus, there are a number of aspects related to division of labour and fairness which will
not be considered in this thesis. Some of these pertain to issues that we simply do not consider—others
are more tenuous but may nevertheless be considered as potentially relevant to the issues of fairness and
technology. Below we first consider what is meant by fairness within the context of this thesis.
1.2.1 Scoping Fairness
Fairness is an elusive term, and while most people can intuitively sense when they have, and have not,
been treated fairly, many would struggle to articulate their understanding of fairness in precise terms. For
the purposes of this thesis, our definition of fairness is as follows:
The quality of treating people in such a way that each receives his or her due in accordance
with perceived entitlements, needs, and rights.
The rationale for this definition is elaborated in Chapter 2, but in the meantime it is important to
recognise that this definition is complemented by two issues. First, we argue that fairness involves a
basic expectation of equality if there is no clear reason to behave otherwise. This appears to be true of
Western cultures (Henrich et al., 2001), and means that, with all other things being equal, people expect
to be treated the same, to be rewarded identically, and have equitable access to goods and resources (cf.
Binmore, 2010b,a; Hobbs, 2010). The second issue is that equality is not the same as fairness. This is
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because true fairness is not about blindly following equality, but instead calls for consideration of other
factors that would legitimise deviations from equality. As encapsulated within the definition, such factors
might include an individual’s entitlements, needs, or rights. For division of labour, this might mean that
one individual has a legitimised right to do less work on a project, perhaps because he is in a position of
authority over subordinates and must therefore focus on other tasks. In more egalitarian settings, however,
there may be a basic expectation that each person contributes equally to the task—such a scenario is
explored within this thesis through a study of student workgroups, as reported in Chapter 3. The corollary,
then, is that the notionally ‘fair’ outcome in a given scenario is not necessarily the one that is most equal,
but is instead the one that takes other issues into account.
In addition, it is important to note that it is explicitly not the aim of this thesis to state what is, and is
not, fair. We take no moral standpoint on the subject of fairness because, in our view, fairness is in the
eye of the beholder (cf. Wilkinson, 2008). Moreover, fairness is subjective and, as hinted above, can be
influenced by cultural norms (e.g. Roth et al., 1991; Henrich et al., 2001; Buchan et al., 2004; Oosterbeek
et al., 2004; Chuah et al., 2007; Chen & Tang, 2009). This makes fairness all the more intriguing as a
design problem for CSCW systems. In Chapter 4, we review a body of work from experimental economics
that highlights the many ways in which fairness preferences are adjusted to legimitise unequal allocations
of goods.
Further to these considerations, fairness is a nuanced term and can refer to different patterns of
behaviour. We have stated that we are interested in the division and completion of workloads during
collaboration. The former of these constructs aligns broadly with the topic of distributional fairness. The
latter pertains to perceptions about whether the contributions made by each team member are perceived as
fair. This differs to the typical construction of procedural fairness, which has more to do with whether
or not an established set of procedures are fair and just (Lind et al., 1990). An example is that of due
process, referring to an established and consistent set of procedures that are followed in courts of law.
Such procedures are in place to ensure that each individual is treated equally irrespective of the crime for
which her or she may be on trial.
Additionally, this thesis shall not consider the topic of retributive fairness. Like other aspects of
fairness, retribution is related to the concept of justice but pertains to how individuals should be punished
for wrongdoings, i.e. whether or not a particular punishment is fair and whether an individual has been
‘paid back in kind’ (Miller & Vidmar, 1981). To use another example from law, it is commonly considered
fair for the punishment to fit the crime; sentences should be commensurate with the severity of the act,
the distress caused by the act, the extent to which the act was intentional, and perhaps also whether the
pepetrator demonstrates remorse. In the context of collaboration, this could be relevant for the sanctioning
of free-riding behaviours. While there is a large and ever-growing literature on social punishment of
non-cooperators (see, e.g. Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Chaudhuri, 2011), retributive fairness has not arisen as a
concern in the studies reported here and, therefore, will not be considered in this thesis.
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1.2.1.1 Other Fairness-Related Issues in HCI
In addition to the issues outlined above, which primarily concern the method by which fairness is defined
and the angle from which it is considered, there are some topics within HCI that could easily be regarded
as relevant to the concept of ‘fairness’. It is important to recognise that these will not be considered here.
Examples include:
• Social issues over fair or equitable access to information technology, such as ICT for economic de-
velopment and whether access to computer systems should more equitable irrespective of economic
or social status. This might also be extended to the inclusion of underrepresented or minority groups
in the development of technology, e.g. those with autism or other disorders (Benton et al., 2012).
• The role of gender in IT, as pertaining to issues surrounding gender equality and the potential
relevance of feminist theories to HCI (e.g. Bardzell, 2010).
• Ongoing debates regarding alleged tax evasion by large, multinational technology corporations (see,
e.g. Commons Select Committee Report, 2013). This deliberate avoidance of tax might be regarded
as unfair given the power of these corporations alongside their considerable influence on everyday
life.
• The impact of work platforms and practices on employees, e.g. platforms for crowdsourcing and
micro-taskwork like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.1 Recent work has considered these platforms
in terms of whether they are beneficial or detrimental to the professional development of remote
workers, and whether or not the payoffs for both parties are constructed fairly (O’Neill & Martin,
2013).
Of course, this is not an exhaustive list, but the topics mentioned above are representative of the subject
matter that might immediately come to mind when different members of the HCI community think about
the term ‘fairness’. This is again very much exemplary of the subjectivity associated with the word itself,
and thus it is important to recognise that such topics are not considered within this thesis.
1.2.2 Scoping Division of Labour
For this thesis we define division of labour as “the act of breaking up a task for distribution among members
of a group” (Foley & Smeaton, 2010). This definition does not entail that decisions have been made about
who is most suitable for a given task, as might be the case during task allocation. Here we constrain our
focus to the distribution of notional work units among members of a team. It is certainly true that the
allocation of work in real-world settings will be based on task-related properties, and will account for
issues such as skill, expertise, knowledge, and so forth. These issues are, in turn, very likely to influence




job roles, or status hierarchies (Bardram, 1997; Eason, 1996; Schmidt, 1994). However, the present studies
cannot account for all of these issues in detail and thus we consider these as areas for future work. We
restrict our focus to egalitarian settings that do not have predetermined methods for assigning work, as is
the case with the sorts of student workgroups we study in Chapter 3.
1.2.3 Scoping Summary
In summary, this thesis is scoped to consider the following issues:
• Fairness as it relates to the initial division of work among members of a collaborative group.
Hereafter we refer to this as fairness in the division of work.
• Fairness as it relates to the contributions made by members of a collaborative group during the
enactment of divided work. Hereafter we refer to this as fairness in the completion of work.
1.3 Research Questions
The research presented in this thesis is guided by the following high-level research questions. These are not
necessarily questions that we answer definitively; rather, we regard them as broad concerns that frame the
studies reported herein. Our first question is: RQ1: What is the relevance of fairness for collaboration
and collaborative systems? This question is explored broadly by all of the studies presented in this thesis.
To provide a foundation for our efforts, understandings of what is meant by both collaborative work and
fairness are developed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Relevant literature is reviewed with the aim of drawing
clear links between collaboration, fairness, and CSCW.
A second question we explore is: RQ2: To what extent do people strive for fairness in the division
of labour? This question is explored through the empirical studies reported in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of
this thesis. Chapter 5 is especially relevant in this regard, where we present results that suggest fairness
prevails in both the allocation and enactment of shared workloads. Additionally, a qualitative field study
reported in Chapter 6 furthers this research question via a study of collaboration in everyday tasks.
A final question we consider is: RQ3: How might collaborative systems be designed to account
for fairness preferences in division of labour? Our exploration of this question is based on two premises.
First, that collaborative groups do desire fairness in the division and completion of their work, and second,
that groups often find it difficult to ensure that work is completed fairly, due in part to a lack of awareness
about the efforts and contributions of their collaborators. RQ3 is primarily explored in Chapter 7, where
we aim to open a tentative design space for supporting fairness in CSCW systems.
In exploring these questions we also attend to various sub-concerns that arise as a result of our practical
studies. These concerns expand the contributions of this thesis to other areas within CSCW. For example,
the experiments reported in Chapter 5 use collaborative information seeking as an example task. By
examining the strategies collaborators employ to prevent redundancy, we are able to suggest ways in which
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collaborative search tools could be designed to facilitate division of labour. Then, in Chapter 6, we retain
the task of collaborative information seeking and explore real-world tool use as a major focus. This offers
a range of tractable implications for the design of search systems.
1.4 Research Methods and Approach
This research uses a mixed-methods approach that draws on quantitative and qualitative techniques.
Laboratory and field methods are employed, and several types of data are collected within each thesis
study. The exact choice of methods is defined by the concerns of each study and the issues that each
aims to explore. Our first study employs a survey to tap the opinions of students who recently engaged in
collaborative projects. We use Likert-type scales to collect quantitative data and free-text responses to
collect qualitative data. The approach of this study helps to ground this thesis in the concerns of real-world
groups for whom fairness is a salient emotional concern.
The second approach used in this thesis (studies 2–5) is the framing of division of labour using
an applied economic game. Such an approach is novel in the sense that it involves the application of
game-theoretic concepts and methods to CSCW situations. Economic games have considerable currency
in the social science literature; participants in such games are typically presented with decision scenarios
that pit their individual payoffs against those of a group (Camerer, 2003). Individual decisions are more
profitable in the short term but always have long-term negative consequences for the collective good, as
is the case with the classic ‘public goods game’ where participants decide how much wealth to place
into a common pool (Komorita & Parks, 1995). In our approach, we take one such game—the classic
‘ultimatum game’ (Gu¨th et al., 1982)—and apply it to the context of dividing labour. We use the model to
capture distributional allocations of workloads made by participants engaged in a simple collaborative
task. This approach offers a very clean exploration of fairness in the division of labour. And, like other
economic games, it abstracts away from other potentially influential factors while allowing for legitimate
between-study comparisons.
In exploring our economic game, we collect qualitative data that captures participants’ motivations for
dividing work and the strategies employed to avoid redundancy. Analysis of search protocols also provides
quantitative data in the form of participants’ task completion times.
Our third approach, as used in thesis study 6, comprises a field study that features real-world deploy-
ments of two tools designed to support collaborative information seeking. In contrast to our laboratory
work, this study aims for a more naturalistic perspective on collaboration. Key methodological decisions
in this regard were the recruitment of pairs of participants on the basis of existing information needs,
alongside our choice to allow these participants to choose their own tasks and complete them within their
own time. Thus, both information needs and the collaborative pairings themselves were pre-existing and
intrinsically collaborative, providing high external validity. Our study findings are based on interview
responses obtained from participants. This qualitative data is analysed using a grounded theory approach
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998) and undirected, inductive coding (Elo & Kyngas, 2007). We chose this approach
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because we aimed to elicit a bottom-up understanding of collaborative search based on the dataset itself,
rather than through confirmation of any pre-existing hypotheses. We had no particular preference for one
outcome over another, and thus we adopted an approach that allowed the data to ‘speak for itself’ in favour
of pre-existing classifications. Grounded theory was also beneficial in allowing us to maintain meaningful
links between participants’ work process and the way in which their assigned system was used to support
collaboration.
Our final study uses several methods to explore how collaborative systems could allow users to
make more accurate judgements about fairness. This is achieved through an examination of awareness
mechanisms in an existing context; in this case, collaborative grouping in the online game World of
Warcraft (WoW). Prior work identifies WoW as a context relevant to the core concerns of CSCW (Nardi
& Harris, 2006; Bardzell et al., 2008). We examine how players use meters, which visualise individual
contributions to the collaborative task, as a means of gathering the necessary information to make fairness
judgements. In terms of methods, the study is informed on three levels: first, the work draws on the
author’s own experiences of WoW—this approach is based on the premise that researchers should play
the games they study (Williams et al., 2006) and is an established procedure in studies of WoW (Bardzell
et al., 2008, 2012). Utilising the first-hand experiences of the researcher might be regarded as a variant of
‘virtual ethnography’ (Boellstorf, 2008), although it is important to note that the author’s experiences did
not enter into the dataset and merely served to inform the interpretation of said data. The study is further
informed by participant observation, achieved through inspection of live, public webstreams of players
engaged with current WoW content. This, combined with our earlier participation in the game world,
provides the knowledge necessary to interpret our final level: interviews with actual players of WoW.
Through our interviews we aimed to understand the derived experiences of players and the sociotechnical
issues that may arise when making judgements about the contributions of team members. Our interview
responses were again analysed via inductive coding, with codes shaped into high-level themes that allow
for coherent interpretation of players’ experiences.
In studies 6 and 7, all interviews were conducted, recorded, and transcribed by the author of this thesis.
This procedure was adopted in favour of automated or paid transcription services because transcription is
integral to the process of analysis; by coding the interview transcripts himself, the author was familiarised
with the data at an early stage (Riessman, 1993) and was able to interpret meaning conveyed by participants’
intonation and delivery (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This fed through into the transcription of interviews,
which were transcribed so as to give a verbatim account of participants’ statements for later interpretation,
as recommended by relevant literature (Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999; Braun & Clarke, 2006).
1.4.1 Research Ethics
The work in this thesis has been completed in line with the University of Bath’s Department of Computer
Science 13-point ethics checklist. The checklist was reviewed prior to each study to check for potential
violations. Appendix A provides an overview in this regard. While some of our procedures were relevant
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to items in the checklist, we did not identify any major problems, suggesting to us that our procedures and
processes were ethically sound.
1.5 Thesis Outline and Contributions
This section provides a summary of the content and contributions made within each chapter of thesis.
Chapter 1 - Introduction
This chapter has introduced the problem domain and briefly discussed a number of topics that will be
explored in later chapters. It has given rise to research topics that are explored within the thesis, and has
outlined the methods employed during our empirical work.
Chapter 2 - Collaborative Work, Fairness, and Technology
This chapter aims to situate the contributions of the thesis within the context of computer-supported
cooperative work (CSCW) while offering definitions of relevant terms. The chapter begins by introducing
CSCW and reviewing its scope and primary research goals. We discuss taxonomies relevant to CSCW,
and consider the difference between cooperative and collaborative work. Topics relevant to collaborative
work are then introduced and discussed. Fairness is motivated as a relevant concern for collaborative
work, particularly with regard to division of labour, and we review the concept of fairness at a broad (and
necessarily selective) level. We suggest that perceptions about what is fair can impact both the division
and and completion of collaborative tasks. Finally, the chapter is brought full circle by discussing CSCW
literature where fairness is mentioned as a concern. The main purpose of the chapter is to provide a
foundation for our empirical studies, and thus its primary contribution is an appraisal of topics relevant to
work reported later in the thesis.
Chapter 3 - A Survey Study of Division of Labour and Fairness in Collaborating Teams
This chapter aims to identify the importance of fairness in collaboration via a study of students working
on collaborative software development projects. Using a survey approach, thesis study 1 examines the
link between fairness and overall satisfaction by asking students to rate how fairly they believe work was
divided and completed within their groups. We observe a positive correlation between overall levels of
satisfaction, both with processes and products, and perceived fairness in the distribution and completion
of work tasks. The study also unveils some of the ways in which allocations can be adjusted from the
point of equality without breaking fairness norms. Not only do the findings of this study raise fairness as a




Chapter 4 - Modelling Division of Labour as an Economic Game: Background
This chapter draws heavily on the economic literature to intoduce a novel empirical model for exploring
fairness in division of labour. We begin by characterising division of labour as a process of negotiation,
which we then propose to model by specifying an applied version of an economic game; in this case, the
ultimatum game, a classic framing of negotiated exchange that has been used to study economic bargaining
and fairness in a large number of studies. We present an in-depth review of the ultimatum game and its
associated literature.
The contribution of this chapter is the distillation of our model alongside a review of the literature on
ultimatum games. Our review offers insight concerning the effect of various methodological, structural,
and demographic variables on fairness preferences. We also review prior use of economic games in HCI
research, before considering how our model can extend prior work and enable future developments.
Chapter 5 - Empirical Studies Using the Division of Labour Ultimatum Game
This chapter presents four laboratory studies (thesis studies 2–5) that explore our novel DLUG paradigm.
We draw on the review presented in Chapter 4 to inform our methodology and choices of independent
variables. The studies all involve participants bargaining over the allocation of 10 items in a collaborative
information seeking task, and we attempt to explore allocation behaviour through systematic manipulation
of particular variables (e.g. knowledge of search topic). As this work is highly novel, our approach is
incremental and begins with a very bare-bones scenario upon which we elaborate during each new study.
We report three main findings. First, the modal outcome of the work allocation is an even, notionally
fair split. This occurs in all four studies, and persists even in a situation where the person allocating
the work can behave entirely selfishly without the threat of punishment. Our second result concerns
the completion of work: participants display a strong, yet entirely serendipitous, concordance in task
completion times. That is, times are highly similar within pairs, but between pair times are often quite
different. We regard this finding as further evidence of a desire for fairness, but this time in the overall
completion of work. Finally, we examine the strategies used by participants to coordinate their work,
finding that the use of coordination strategies depends on cognitive properties of the task at hand. We
end the chapter by sketching some preliminary explanations for our results, and attempt to reconcile the
findings of our studies alongside the extant literatures on the ultimatum game and fairness during social
decision making.
Chapter 6 - Collaborative Search in Context: A Real-World Study
This chapter reports thesis study 6, a field study of division of labour and work completion during real-
world collaborative information seeking tasks. In the study, two existing collaborative search tools are
deployed to pairs of participants with pre-existing information needs. The study has dual contributions:
first, we explore the potential importance of fairness during division of labour in everyday tasks. Second,
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by identifying how our chosen tools are used during collaborative search, as well as describing issues that
embody particular design opportunities, we provide tractable implications for the design of collaboration
information seeking systems.
Chapter 7 - Supporting Fairness Through Awareness: Contributions in Collaborative
Gaming
This chapter brings together the results of our earlier studies to explore fairness as a design problem.
Specifically, we suggest that designers can support fairness in two ways: by providing sufficiently
detailed information about contributions, and by allowing individuals to engage in social comparisons
over said contributions. We review approaches to facilitating awareness in collaborative tools (e.g. social
translucence) and introduce the idea of contribution awareness. Then, in thesis study 7, we explore the use
of two existing tools used to promote group awareness in the collaborative online game World of Warcraft.
We report findings from interviews with players that offer two contributions: first, we detail how awareness
about contributions supports participation and equality in Warcraft groups. Second, we describe a variety
of sociotechnical consequences and corollaries that could impact the success of contribution awareness
mechanisms, as applied to other CSCW contexts.
Chapter 8 - Conclusion
This chapter consolidates the findings of this thesis and offers a review of our research contributions.
We integrate findings from across our studies to draw out three salient themes regarding fairness in
collaboration. We then present a theoretical model that aims to account for the decisions an individual
would take when making assessments of fairness. Finally, limitations of the thesis are identified and
potential directions for future work are discussed.
The following chapter presents a general review of literature relevant to the concerns of the present
thesis. The review focuses on three topics. First, we aim to understanding the nature of collaborative and
cooperative work alongside the need to design effective technological support for collaboration. Second,
we explore the meaning of fairness and its relevance to social interaction. Finally, we consider the link






AND TECHNOLOGY: REVIEW AND
SYNTHESIS
2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter reviews literature relevant to the concerns of this thesis. The aim of the chapter is to provide
the initial groundwork required to situate our research contributions within the agenda of computer-
supported cooperative work (CSCW). Here we begin by focusing on CSCW and the nature of collaborative
work—we introduce topics relevant to our exploration of fairness and division of labour, and consider
appropriate definitions of terms. We then introduce the subject of fairness as a potentially relevant concern
for CSCW, and review prior studies from the HCI literature that mention fairness as a topic of interest.
In addition to what is presented here, relevant literature is reviewed in the background sections of other
chapters: Chapter 4 offers an extensive literature review relevant to the ultimatum game, which then forms
the basis of the empirical studies reported in Chapter 5. Literature relevant to the topic of collaborative
information seeking is reviewed in Chapters 5 and 6, and the subject of ‘awareness’ in collaborative work
is given an in-depth treatment in Chapter 7.
This chapter proceeds as follows. We first consider the scope of CSCW and review several taxonomies
that allow us to introduce various phenomena relevant to collaboration. We articulate a basic distinction
between collaborative and cooperative work, and introduce the concepts of coordination, awareness,
common ground, and division of labour as relevant to this thesis. We then outline our position on the
subject of fairness, before considering how fairness might be relevant to the subject of collaborative work.
The chapter ends by examining relevant empirical studies and outlines a basic scheme for the rest of the
thesis.
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2.2 Computer-Supported Cooperative Work: Overview
The term computer-supported cooperative work, or ‘CSCW’ as it is now more commonly known, was
first coined in a 1984 workshop co-organised by Irene Greif, then of MIT, and Paul Cashman, of Digital
Equipment Corporation (Grudin, 1994b). CSCW initially focused on office automation systems and other
‘groupware’ platforms that were beginning to emerge at the time. Early definitions of CSCW reflected
these developments (Wilson, 1991; Kling, 1993), but as the proliferation of computing technology gathered
pace, so too did the need to understand the nature of group work itself. The early definition of CSCW
offered by Bannon & Schmidt (1991) reflects this change:
CSCW should be conceived as an endeavor to understand the nature and characteristics of
cooperative work with the objective of designing adequate computer-based technologies...The
focus is to understand, so as to better support, cooperative work. (Bannon & Schmidt, 1991,
p. 3)
Bannon & Schmidt’s emphasis on work, rather than technology, was progressive because designers
were all too often focused on building systems simply because the technology to do so was becoming
available (Grudin, 1994b). Such technologically deterministic approaches to development were suppressed
by an era of studies focused on the social context of the workplace. Examples of early contributions include
studies of air traffic control centres (Harper et al., 1991), public transport control rooms (Heath & Luff,
1992) and a securities trading floor in the City of London (Heath et al., 1995). Such studies were critical in
not only recognising the interplay between individual and cooperative activities (Schmidt, 2000) but also
served to highlight the nuanced relationship between work practices and collaborative technologies. For
example, Orlikowski (1992) reported an ethnographic investigation of one company’s adoption of Lotus
Notes, an application intended for the curation of organisational knowledge in a shared database. Her study
drew attention to conflicts between the assumptions of system designers and the organisational culture in
which Lotus Notes was used. Work in the company under study was broadly cooperative but, because
of an extremely high level of competition for promotions, there was little incentive to share information
when promotion was awarded on the basis of individual expertise. Other studies revealed the potential for
technologies to alter the outcomes of group work, both positively and negatively (e.g. Olson et al., 1992b).
The emphasis on understanding the nature of work has never left CSCW, but there has been a
marked shift in terms of what is considered relevant to the discipline. This shift is perhaps reflective of
technological proliferation more broadly. The early perception that CSCW was about “small, self-directed
professional teams” (e.g. Kling, 1993) has rescinded in line with technological developments that can
support collaborative work on a global scale (Grudin & Poltrock, 2012). Additionally, the definition of
what is meant by ‘work’ has been widened to encapsulate a range of social behaviours that include, and
are by no means limited to, volunteerism (Kittur, 2010), computer gaming (Brown & Baarkhuus, 2007),
the life of the family (Kazakos et al., 2013), and even the business of maintaining romantic relationships
(Scissors & Gergle, 2013). Nevertheless, while the scope of the field remains in flux, the focus on ‘work’ as
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the commodity of interest is still very much evident, and the fundamental research goals of understanding
and supporting group work remain the same, at least at a very broad level.
While the breadth and interdisciplinary nature of CSCW is one of its main strengths, it is also its
primary nadir in that it faces “the challenge of being multidisciplinary” (Grudin, 1994a). This partly relates
to integrating a diverse array of perspectives into a coherent framework. This challenge is, however, not
unique to CSCW and is true of HCI more broadly. A more pertinent bone of contention concerns the
meaning of each of the terms within the CSCW acronym, and whether any of these terms (or indeed all of
them) has lost its applicability in light of ongoing technological change (Grudin & Poltrock, 2012). In
particular, the meaning of the second ‘C’ of CSCW has been a topic of considerable debate—should it be
cooperative, collaborative, or something else? Grudin & Poltrock (2012) recount a 1988 panel session
at the CSCW conference, where one individual argued that organisational behaviour is more complex
than ‘cooperation’ and might be better described as ‘conflictual’ or ‘coercive’ work. While the latter
remarks are somewhat facetious (though may perhaps be true of certain work situations) there does remain
a need for precise terminology because the description of a given work situation “constrains the questions
which might be raised and the answers which might be given about it” (Holand & Danielsen, 1991, p.
17). This chapter will not attempt to resolve the wider debate but will consider basic distinctions between
cooperation and collaboration, a task that is important for the present thesis as we wish to consider the
role of fairness in collaborative interaction. Furthermore, there is also a need to consider dimensions
that influence group work more generally, e.g. whether work occurs in the same physical setting or is
distributed across multiple locations. The following subsection reviews basic taxonomies relevant to
CSCW. We then introduce various models of collaboration that allow us to introduce relevant terms and
consider theoretical distinctions.
2.2.1 Taxonomies of CSCW Systems
Within CSCW, researchers have often found it necessary to reflect on the dimensions that influence the
work of groups (Grudin & Poltrock, 2012). This has been achieved through the use of various taxonomies
to characterise work situations and identify the sorts of technologies that might be used within a given
setting. Perhaps the most basic of these taxonomies is the ‘Four-Square Map of Groupware Options’,
which classifies CSCW systems with respect to time and space (Johansen et al., 1991). The taxonomy is
comprised of a 2x2 grid, with two characteristics used to classify CSCW systems:
Time. The form of interaction (synchronous versus asynchronous working). This concerns whether or not
the contributions of participants are made in real-time, or at separate times.
Place. The geographical situation of the participants or users (distributed versus co-located working).
This concerns the physical proximity of participants and whether or not each person is immediately
accessible to others.
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Place
Same Different / Predictable Different / Unpredictable




Work shifts Electronic mail Forums
Different/ Un-
predictable
Team rooms Collaborative writing Workflow systems
Table 2.1: Predictability in relation to time and place in CSCW systems, from Grudin (1994a).
These distinctions are useful because the organisation of work across spatial and temporal boundaries
influences the way in which groups organise their activities (Grudin & Poltrock, 2012). In particular,
distributed collaboration is known to be difficult to manage due to issues including differences in timezones
(Grinter et al., 1999), a lack of visibility (or ‘awareness’) between colleagues (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002)
and increased feelings of social distance (Bradner & Mark, 2002). Such problems can impact the ability of
groups to achieve productive outcomes; for example, groups may fail to leverage the capabilities of their
team and unwittingly ignore distant collaborators (Bos et al., 2006). Additionally, temporal and spatial
boundaries have implications for the type of support designers might choose to include within a given
CSCW system. Asynchronous systems, for example, might provide persistent records of collaborators’
prior work sessions (e.g. Morris & Horvitz, 2007). Such features might, however, be less critical in systems
intended for short-term, synchronous use.
The basic framework offered by Johansen et al. was developed further by Grudin (1994b), who
sought to account for the predictability of collaboration with an extension shown in Table 2.1, which
features canonical examples of CSCW systems (Grudin, 1994b). Predictable collaboration can be highly
constrained, as when sending an email to a colleague and expecting it to be read within a day or so. On
the other hand, tasks like collaborative writing are less constrained and can be open-ended; collaborators
might know one another’s locations but contributions might be expected within an unspecified timeframe.
The predictability of work is important because it shapes the interactions that occur between colleagues
and, in turn, might further influence the types of behaviours a CSCW system needs to support.
In general, these taxonomies offer researchers a convenient method of ‘pigeonholing’ CSCW systems
(Grudin & Poltrock, 2012) and are useful for drawing attention to the arrangement of groups and their work
practices with respect to time and space. But ongoing technological developments make these taxonomies
less and less applicable. For example, it is not clear how these grids would account for mobile computing
systems. Furthermore, as CSCW has developed, researchers have become increasingly concerned with
understanding the nature of work itself rather than in categorising systems—this is because there is a
need to distinguish between different work situations and identify whether behaviour should qualify as
collaborative, cooperative, or indeed something else altogether.
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Figure 2.1: The ways in which group members interact, from Middup (2008, p. 39)
2.2.2 Models of Collaboration
As mentioned above, there is often a lack of consensus about the meaning of collaboration versus
cooperation, as well as the extent to which they are independent or interrelated. The terms are often used
interchangeably but, in our view, the two do not refer to the same behaviour. Here we consider some prior
attempts at mapping out the conceptual relationships between the various elements of collaborative work.
This allows us to segue into our own definitions, in turn providing deeper consideration of topics relevant
to this thesis. It should be noted that we do not necessarily agree with the models we review here—their
main benefit lies in introducing relevant terms and in identifying potential links among concepts.
Figure 2.1 displays a conceptual framework offered by Middup (2008). The model provides a
diagrammatic overview of the various elements that Middup claims are involved in defining what is, and
is not, involved in collaboration. Middup’s definition of collaboration is “group work where the group
members have some shared goal and the things that they need to do are strongly interdependent”. The
idea of a collaborative group as having a shared goal is one of the more consistent points of agreement
within the literature (e.g. Symon et al., 1996; Grudin & Poltrock, 2012) but the emphasis on collaboration
as only occuring when subtasks are interdependent is peculiar. In general, the idea of interdependency
refers to coupling, which pertains to “the degree to which people can work as individuals before needing
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Figure 2.2: A hierarchical model of collaboration, from Okada (2007) (cited in Grudin & Poltrock, 2012).
to interact with another member of the group” (Pinelle et al., 2003, p. 302). In tightly coupled work,
group members must communicate frequently about various aspects of the shared project, whereas loosely
coupled work “requires few interactions, and the communication that does exist is effortless, uncomplicated,
and straightforward” (Neale, Carroll, & Rosson, 2004). In this way, Middup’s definition precludes the
classification of any loosely coupled work as collaboration, a position that is questionable because, as
pointed out by (Olson & Olson, 2000, p. 162), collaborative projects are “not entirely tightly or loosely
coupled. Various stages of the work are tightly coupled, and often there are stages where it is loosely
coupled, where people... do the work in parallel”. Collaboration, then, is not merely a ‘state’ but is also a
process that is supported by division of labour—the act of decoupling tasks and distributing work among
members of a group (Foley & Smeaton, 2010). Interdependency is simply a feature of particular projects,
and we do not believe it is a prerequisite to collaboration. For example, searching and adding weblinks to
a shared document during travel planning is very loosely coupled work, but participants might still regard
themselves as collaborating because of their common goal.
A further problem with Middup’s model is that he views coordination and cooperation as distinct from
collaboration when, in fact, a majority of scholars regard the two as antecedent conditions that support
effective collaboration. Figure 2.2 displays a good example in this regard, as outlined by Okada (2007)
(cited in Grudin & Poltrock, 2012). Okada’s framework offers a hierarchical model of collaboration, and
is based on the idea that collaboration is strongly influenced by assertion and cooperation. Assertion
in this case means exercising authority (perhaps akin to ‘being competitive’), whereas cooperation can
be taken as ‘working harmoniously’ with one’s colleagues. Low levels of both “result in compromise;
more assertion than cooperation results in collision; more cooperation than assertion results in concession;
and high levels of both result in coordination” (Grudin & Poltrock, 2012, p. 19). Collaboration is then
underpinned by communication, as occurs when members of a group share opinions, knowledge, or
task-related information. The sharing layer is in turn underpinned by awareness of one’s colleagues, of the
environment in which work occurs, and of the various artefacts involved in the task. Awareness is then
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Figure 2.3: A set-based model of collaboration: “An inner set is essential to or supports an outer set”,
from (Shah, 2010, p. 6).
affected by temporal and spatial factors, as outlined in the earlier taxonomies by Johansen et al. (1991)
and Grudin (1994a). (See subsection 2.2.1 above.)
The framework offered by Okada (2007) considers how group members interact but lacks any consid-
eration of what collaborators actually do with the products of their individual work. Figure 2.3 displays a
set-based model of collaboration from Shah (2010). The model has five components, each of which, Shah
argues, supports the next. For example, coordination “is a subset of collaboration, which indicates that for
a meaningful collaboration, there has to be coordination of people and events.” (Shah, 2010, p. 6). The
model proceeds from the innermost set to the outer, but one thing that is interesting about this model is that
it incorporates the notion of contribution—the idea that individuals provide some meaningful input to a
shared project, as opposed to simply ‘working next to one another’. Shah also argues that progression from
the innermost concept (communication) to collaboration involves progressively higher levels of interaction,
intent, trust, involvement, and awareness. However, unlike the models described above, this framework
does not account for the issue of a shared goal, a property that is regarded as essential for a collaborative
group (Symon et al., 1996; Grudin & Poltrock, 2012).
The models we have reviewed here are certainly not the only characterisations of collaborative work,
but by this point it should be clear that the literature harbours no consensus about how the various
components of collaboration mesh together. There are, however, common notions about the behaviours it
encapsulates and the processes that it typically involves. For example, Pinelle et al. (2003) characterise
collaboration as involving a suite of low-level interaction primitives which, they claim, happen in co-located
collaboration irrespective of organisational practices, personalities of group members, or even task type.
They describe these behaviours as the ‘mechanics of collaboration’, which necessarily occur whenever
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two or more people work together. Table 2.2 presents a list of these behaviours. Examples include the
transmission of messages, keeping track of what others are doing, negotiating access to shared tools or
parts of the workspace, and exchanging or transferring objects and tools. These low-level actions then
support higher-level phenomena including the development and maintenance of awareness, coordination
of actions, communication, and division of labour. Pinelle et al. (2003) argue that a lack of support for
these basic activities is what often makes CSCW systems difficult to use.
2.2.3 The Second C of CSCW: Collaboration or Cooperation?
Having considered a selection of prior models, here we attempt to offer a basic distinction between
collaborative and cooperative work. Broadly, collaboration and cooperation can be taken to mean the
act of ‘working together’ and, as evidenced above, it is certainly true that collaboration and cooperation
share some common properties—most scholars identify that both involve communication and information
sharing, for example.
For the purposes of this thesis, we define collaborative work as “two or more individuals working
together, making productive contributions to a common good in the presence of a shared goal”. The need
for a shared goal is one of the more consistent points of agreement within the literature, and we too ascribe
to this notion. However, we would emphasise that the goal must be shared among team members, and
knowledge that there is a shared goal must be mutual. In other words, collaborators have to be aware of
the fact that they are collaborating, i.e. collaboration must be explicit. The shared goal itself can be more
or less refined, but a group must operate under the knowledge that there is one. This establishes clear
commonality of purpose (Bly et al., 1993) or what Tomasello (2009) refers to as shared intentionality.
Additionally, we believe that collaboration can be characterised by individuals making contributions
to a common good, and we suggest that these contributions must be productive in the sense that they
should be task-oriented and made in light of a group’s shared goal. This makes collaboration distinct
from situations in which people are merely working alongside one another, as might be the case in
an office environment where people utilise shared artefacts but ultimately complete unrelated tasks in
isolation (Rogers, 1993). We ascribe to the prior notions that collaboration is underpinned by cooperation
and coordination. Cooperation in this sense constitutes agreement to behave in accordance with the
behavioural norms or standards appropriate to the work situation. In other words, cooperation means
“playing in the same game with others according to a set of behaviour rules” (Denning & Yaholkovsky,
2008). Refusal to behave cooperatively signals conflict, a mismatch in goals, and a general unwillingness
to collaborate (Shah, 2010). Coordination is distinct from cooperation and refers to the job of “managing
interdependencies between activities” (Malone & Crowston, 1990, p. 90). Successful coordination makes
collaboration run smoothly by ensuring that contributions are appropriately timed, and that basic activities
like conversation and access to shared resources occur without collision (cf. Pinelle et al., 2003). It is
important to note that collaboration can still occur with poor coordination, but will be much less coherent
and will likely break down quickly if coordination is not established.
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Category Mechanic Typical Actions
Communication







Deictic references Pointing & conversation
Manifesting actions Stylized actions
Information gathering Basic awareness Observing who is in the workspace
Recognising what they are doing
Identifying where they are working
Feedthrough Changes to objects
Characteristic signs or sounds
Consequential Characteristic movement
communication Body position and location
Gaze direction
Overhearing Presence of talk
Appreciating context
Visual evidence Normal actions
Coordination
Shared access (to tools, Obtain resources Physically take objects or tools
objects, space, and time) Occupy space
Reserve resource Move to closer proximity
Notify others of intention
Protect work Monitor others’ actions in area
Notify others of protection
Transfer Handoff object Physically give/take object
Verbally offer/accept object
Deposit Place object and notify
Table 2.2: The Mechanics of Collaboration, adapted from (Pinelle et al., 2003, p. 288)
In contrast to collaborative work, cooperative work does not necessarily entail a shared goal of the sort
that would be typical of collaboration. This is important because, when attempting to characterise a work
situation, the idea of a shared work goal is not necessarily helpful. Often, organisational conflicts can exist
which are incompatible with the assumption of a shared goal. For example, Symon et al. (1996) found
that, in a hospital context, workers across departments had the same higher order goal (patient care) but
this goal was often subsumed by other individual or group-derived goals that took precedence. In this way,
personnel merely worked alongside one another and traded boundary objects when required during the
process of patient care. Cooperation is thus a more appropriate term for such settings, in the sense that,
while people are not in conflict, they do not regard themselves as ‘collaborators’ and do not necessarily
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pool contributions towards a shared goal.
Having considered a distinction between cooperative and collaborative work, we now look more
closely at core aspects of collaboration that are relevant to this thesis.
2.3 Four Core Dimensions of Collaborative Work
This section delves into various properties of collaborative work. Our aim here to review some of the
processes that are known to be involved in collaborative work and introduce the concept of division of
labour as relevant to the present thesis.
2.3.1 Coordination
We noted above that coordination supports collaboration, but it is worth delving into coordination further
to understand its integral role in work settings. Broadly, coordination refers to the management of activity
within a group. Although various definitions have been proferred in the literature, the most commonly
utilised definition of coordination is that offered by Malone & Crowston (1990), who define coordination as
“the act of managing interdependencies between activities” (p. 90). Coordination therefore has a temporal
focus in that it is about managing sequences of events such that those events occur seamlessly and without
conflict. In work settings, this often relates to the need for certain jobs to be completed before others
can proceed—managing and regulating these transitions is fundamentally what coordination involves.
However, coordination is elaborated further by Rogers (1993) who states that the “interdependencies
refer to common objects that are involved in some way in the activites” (p. 296). Common objects may
refer to boundary objects such as medical records (Symon et al., 1996) or collective cognitive artefacts
like spreadsheets and paper documentation (Nardi & Miller, 1990). Such artefacts are often subject to
simultaneity constraints, meaning that not everyone can make use of them at the same time. Access must
therefore be coordinated, perhaps with individuals taking turns to access the shared resource. Such access
is managed through ‘coordinative behaviours’, as outlined in the mechanics of collaboration (see Table
2.2).
As pointed out by Malone & Crowston (1990), we often notice coordination most when it is lacking;
for example, when two objects collide, when two people bump into each other, or when two meetings are
scheduled in conflict. Coordination, then, helps collaboration to proceed by avoiding conflicts. However,
coordination is a cost per se. Bannon & Schmidt (1991) describe coordinative activities as a type of
articulation work—that is, the ‘work required to organise work’. Articulation work refers to the various
activities in which collaborators must engage to ensure that their efforts add up to more than “discrete or
conflicting bits of accomplished work” (Strauss et al., 1995, p. 151). This requires additional effort, and
can be detrimental to a group’s progress if the overheads outweigh the benefits. Neale et al. (2004) state
that the “overhead or operating costs involved in coordination is referred to as process loss, and distributed
process loss is more costly” (p. 117). These overheads can stack up, requiring even further organisation
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that comes as a distraction from the business of actually getting the work done (Gaver, 1991). For example,
Rogers (1993) studied software engineering teams and found that engineers spent a great deal of time
engaged in meta-coordination—the organisation of various coordination protocols so as to avoid conflicts
between each.
2.3.2 Common Ground
Common ground (cf. Clark & Brennan, 1991) refers to a body of knowledge that is shared among a group
of collaborators. In order to have common ground, individuals must be aware that such knowledge is
held in common by other members of their team (Olson & Olson, 2000). Individuals can make reference
to their common ground during collaboration, and do so in the expectation that knowledge is shared.
Common ground thus refers to the knowledge each person believes that others share in common with them
(Olson & Olson, 2000; Neale et al., 2004). Common ground is continually updated during collaboration
through a process called grounding. At the level of conversation, grounding refers to the “ongoing process
of trying to determine whether what has been said has also been understood, comprising a joint effort
on the part of everyone involved in a conversation” (Neale et al., 2004, p. 117). This process occurs
collaboratively and iteratively (Clark & Brennan, 1991). Common ground is important because it is a
precursor to effective communication and information sharing, which, as identified within the mechanics
of collaboration (Pinelle et al., 2003), are foundational elements of collaborative work.
However, language is not the only means by which common ground is maintained. External rep-
resentations also serve towards this purpose (Roschelle & Teasley, 1995) and common ground can be
established according to a prescribed proforma or rubric, e.g. a task description that immediately gives
collaborators some initial conception of a shared problem. Finally, testing and updating common ground
can be expensive during distributed or computer-mediated work, meaning that common ground is generally
easier to establish when teams are co-located (Olson & Olson, 2000). This is because common ground
requires awareness of one’s colleagues, and this is also true of many other collaborative behaviours.
2.3.3 Awareness
Early ethnographic studies of collaborative work revealed that, in situations where team members are
physically co-located, people very naturally monitor and attend to the actions of their coworkers (Harper
et al., 1991; Harper, 1992; Heath & Luff, 1992; Heath et al., 1995). This general practice of “taking heed
of what is going on in the setting” (Schmidt, 2002, p. 285) is now recognised as a critical component of
collaborative work, and has been described using the general moniker of ‘awareness’.
Much like collaboration in general, awareness is a term that has often been used imprecisely due
to a lack of basic consensus regarding what awareness is and what aspects of behaviour it encapsulates
(Schmidt, 2002). As a term, awareness has its roots in the human factors literature, where the concept
of ‘situation awareness’ has been especially influential (e.g. Endsley, 1995; Perla et al., 2000). Situation
awareness refers to the “state of knowledge that an individual requires to operate or maintain a complex and
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dynamic system, such as an aircraft or nuclear generating station” (Gutwin et al., 1996a, p. 5). Situation
awareness is especially relevant in military settings where personnel must remain aware of their team
members, the nearby surroundings, and the presence of hostile threats. In CSCW, definitions of awareness
tend to be more constrained than that of situation awareness. Perhaps the most widely cited definition is
that offered by Dourish & Bellotti (1992), who describe awareness as “an understanding of the activities
of others, which provides a context for your own activity” (Dourish & Bellotti, 1992, p. 107, emphasis as
original). In essence, this definition tells us that awareness is about knowing what others are doing such
that we can work out what to do ourselves. Context is used “to ensure that individual contributions are
relevant to the group’s activity as a whole, and to evaluate individual actions with respect to group goals
and progress” (Dourish & Bellotti, 1992, p. 107).
Gutwin et al. (1996a) elaborate on this definition and identify four types of awareness relevant to
CSCW: Informal, Social, Group-structural, and Workspace awareness. The first of these, informal
awareness, relates to the general sense of who is nearby and what they are doing—“the kinds of things
people know when they work together in the same office” (Gutwin et al., 1996a, p. 6). This type of
awareness helps lubricate casual interactions and gives people a sense of presence in a social setting. The
second, social awareness, refers to the information necessary to maintain person-person interaction—for
instance, gestures, facial expression, and gaze, through to broader information like whether or not a
person is interested in what we are saying and whether or not they are even paying attention. This type of
awareness is important in any context where conversations or information-exchange is important. The
third, group-structural, pertains to knowledge about one’s team: who is who, what their roles are, what
their responsibilities are, what are their opinions and stances on group issues, etc. This type of awareness
helps collaborators determine appropriate actions that may depend on the intended audience (cf. Goffman,
1959).
Lastly, workspace awareness is a specific type of situation awareness (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002),
defined as:
“the up-to-the-moment understanding of another person’s interaction with a shared
workspace... [involving] knowledge about where others are working, what they are doing,
and what they are going to do next.” (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002, p. 412).
Gutwin et al. (1996a) regard this awareness as critical due to the situated nature of collaboration in a
workspace—“when interaction happens in a workspace, maintaining knowledge about others’ interaction
with the space and its artifacts becomes highly relevant” (Gutwin et al., 1996a, p. 6). In other words,
workspace awareness is not solely about understanding what is in the workspace but instead pertains to
what people are actually doing with the things that are present within it. For our purposes, workspace
awareness is useful because it accounts for general aspects of awareness, like ‘who is who’ and ‘who is
around’, while stressing the importance of what the group is doing, how artefacts are being manipulated,
and how the task is progressing within the context of that workspace (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002).
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It is also important to note that awareness is both a process and a product. As Gutwin et al. (1996a)
describe, “the product is the state of understanding about another person’s interaction with the workspace,
that allows people to interpret events, anticipate needs, and interact appropriately. The process is the
continuous cycle of extracting information from the environment, integrating this information with existing
knowledge, and using that knowledge to direct further perception” (Gutwin et al., 1996a, p. 4).
The subject of awareness is given further treatment in Chapter 7 of this thesis, but for the time being
it is important to recognise that awareness is relevant to a wide variety of behaviours in collaborative
work. These range from basic features of coordination that require knowledge about who is involved in the
collaboration, what their role is, and so on, through to cooperative acts such as giving assistance or offering
clarifications (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). Such behaviours are enabled by information gathering, as
outlined by the mechanics of collaboration related to communication in Table 2.2.
2.3.4 Division of Labour
A final aspect of collaboration we consider here is division of labour, a subject that is a primary focus for
the studies described in this thesis. Here, we use division of labour to refer to “the distribution of work
around members a group” (Foley & Smeaton, 2010). A similar term is ‘task assignment’, which might be
regarded as a more specific type of division of labour focused on ‘finding the right man for the job’ (cf.
Malone & Crowston, 1994; Labella et al., 2006). We prefer the term division of labour as we do not wish
to assume that there is an appropriate individual for a given task, nor that tasks could even be assigned
in this way—some collaborative projects may simply consist of notionally similar work items that can
be completed by any particular individual within a team. Additionally, division of labour does not only
refer to the distribution of explicit task labour but can also be regarded as relevant to the distribution of
cognitive labour. As identified by (Olson et al., 1992a), dividing up the cognitive work means that each
individual “does not have to cycle through all the criteria to ensure a good decision but, rather, can depend
on others to share the burden... and release their cognitive energy to attend to other things” (p. 369).
In terms of its role in collaboration, previous work has recognised the variety of benefits conferred by
division of labour. For example, tasks can be broken down into independent chunks, which may then be
distributed across a team and completed in parallel (Mark et al., 1996). This parallelisation can overcome
problems that sometimes hinder group work, by, for example, alleviating the cost incurred when groups
working collectively must wait for their slowest member (Mark et al., 1996). Planned divisions of labour
also serve as a status overview, bringing structure and coherence to individual activities (Bardram, 1997).
However, division of labour can be difficult to establish, and this is especially true of more complex
projects (Gaver, 1991). A particular problem may be that the components of projects are tightly coupled.
We noted earlier (see subsection 2.2.2) that coupling refers to the interdependencies among subtasks. In
general, the state of divided labour is characterised by loose coupling, but the initial separation of subtasks
can be problematic because some components may require completion before others can be started, or
particular components may be interrelated to the extent that they are difficult to tease apart. Large software
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development projects are one good example; such projects typically involve many hidden dependencies
that can make the work of organising division of labour an arduous task (Herbsleb & Grinter, 1999). In
such cases, collaborators need to invest greater effort to not only separate the project into manageable
chunks, but may also require greater effort to build awareness, maintain coordination and, eventually,
integrate individual contributions into a coherent whole. Division of labour can be made additionally
difficult by distance work (Grinter, 1996; Grinter et al., 1999), with groups needing to establish explicit
coordination protocols (e.g. turn taking) in order to avoid redundancy (Mark et al., 1996; Olson & Olson,
2000; Schmidt, 2011). Protracted management of collaborative activity can also be a cognitive load
(‘collaborative load’) (Fidel et al., 2004).
Detailing these concerns allows us to characterise division of labour as, very broadly, involving three
phases, each of which pertains to the general activity of project completion (cf. Kraut et al., 1990; McGrath,
1990; Galegher & Kraut, 1994; Schmidt, 2011). These are as follows:
Planning, which is related to project initiation in that it requires settling on a shared interpretation of the
problem (Galegher & Kraut, 1994) but also involves the initial distribution of work among members
of a group. Collaborators may need to agree who will do how much of what, and perhaps also how
tasks will be done (Freidson, 1976; Strauss, 1985). This phase may require frequent communication
(Gaver, 1991) and careful decoupling of subcomponents, depending on the extent to which subtasks
are interdependent.
Enactment, referring to execution of the work, where coworkers may transition between periods of
focused collaboration to brief interactions requiring only minimal awareness (Gaver, 1991). The
latter circumstances involve completion of work individually. However, tasks may be reorganised
on an ad-hoc basis in accordance with project progression or situated action (Suchman, 1987).
Integration, where, as tasks are completed and a project nears its end, collaborators may need to weave
their individual components into a coherent whole (Galegher & Kraut, 1994). The extent to which
reintegration is necessary will depend on the initial coupling of subtasks; some collaborative efforts
can simply be aggregated with minimal effort, whereas others may require careful integration.
The temporal organisation of these stages is intended as a general picture of how division of labour
might occur, and thus it is not the only way in which work can be organised. Collaborators might, for
example, be able to contribute bits and pieces of work as the project progresses, rather than delaying
contributions until the very end of the project. The initial division of tasks might also be influenced
in various ways, especially by the issue of control. Assignment of work can, for example, be guided
by organisational protocols, power differentials and status hierarchies (Eason, 1996; Bardram, 1997);
perceptions about gender roles (Mikula, 1998); job roles that prescribe assignment of specific subtasks
(Symon et al., 1996; Poltrock et al., 2003); skills, knowledge, and individual expertise (Grinter et al.,
1999); or standard operating procedures (Grinter, 1996).
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2.3.4.1 Division of Labour and CSCW
Division of labour was very quickly identified as a problematic issue for CSCW systems, in the sense
that technology can provide support for divided work but must also be sensitive to the need for fluid
organisation of tasks (cf. Suchman, 1987). Two early examples highlight these issues. First, Rodden
(1991) found that a lack of task partitioning was a problem in early collaborative hypertext editing tools.
He concluded that there should be “some mechanism that allows authors to work together in independent
hypertext partitions without risk of interference, and then to allow those independent partitions to be
joined at carefully controlled intervals” (Rodden, 1991, p. 21). Second, systems that assign workloads
rigidly can be problematic. Eason (1996) identified problems with a mobile data link used to manage
the assignment of emergency and non-emergency tasks to electrical engineers. Rather than asking a
foreman to delegate roles, as had been standard procedure for many years, the new system used call centre
clerks as intermediaries to send tasks directly to engineers. This was controversial because tasks could
only be ‘delegated’ and engineers could not respond to task assignments by accepting or rejecting work
assignments. This caused them to lose any discretion over the acceptance of jobs and their own work
schedules, in turn leading to conflicts when engineers could not meet the scheduled work assignments.
While distribution of control can determine the assignment of work in some settings, many groups are
initially unstructured in their division of labour. Olson et al. (1992a), for example, studied design teams
and identified that such teams spend about 10% of their time coordinating and organising labour. In such
cases, which may often involve relatively egalitarian power structures, groups must discuss the assignment
of work and achieve consensus about who is responsible for which aspects of the project. In line with the
concerns of the present thesis, it is reasonable to expect that fairness could play a role in the allocation of
tasks (Hertel et al., 2002) and also the way in which work is completed. The exact influence of fairness is,
however, currently unknown. In the following section we consider the meaning of fairness and its potential
relation to division of labour.
2.4 On Fairness: A Short Consideration
This section will consider the basic meaning of the term ‘fairness’. In particular, we shall make an effort to
distinguish fairness from related concepts like equity and equality. This is done so as to bring precision
and consistency to our use of these various terms throughout the thesis. Before proceeding, however, we
must draw attention to several caveats. First, we shall not review everything that can possibly be said about
fairness; such an endeavour is not necessary for our purposes and would likely take a thesis of its own
to achieve. We recognise that large bodies of work exist on fairness within psychology, philosophy, and
economics—Chapter 4 of this thesis provides a closer look at the latter of these literatures.
Second, it should be noted that it is explicitly not the aim of this section, nor this thesis in general, to
discuss what is, and is not, fair. We are agnostic with regard to fairness and adopt the view that fairness
“is in the eye of the beholder” (cf. Wilkinson, 2008, p. 330). In other words, we do not seek to take any
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particular moral or philosophical standpoint on the issue of what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ when determining
fairness. Instead, we shall aim to acquire a sufficient understanding of how people generally think about
fairness, why it can be problematic to define, and how fairness is important in a general sense.
Because fairness is an extremely broad topic, we narrow the present discussion by considering fairness
as it applies to the subject matter of the present thesis, i.e. division of labour during collaborative work.
This topic can be roughly equated to the subject of distributive fairness, which refers to the process by
which resources are distributed among group members (Deutsch, 1975; Hertel et al., 2002). We align this
aspect of fairness with initial divisions of labour, where groups must decide who should do how much of
what. Such decisions may be taken in line with what is perceived as ‘fair’. Our second topic of concern is
fairness during the completion of work. In this case, fairness may arise if certain team members fail to
conform to the standard set within the initial division of labour, as occurs with the well-known free-rider
problem (Brooks & Ammons, 2003). Alternatively, individuals may come to realise that workloads are
unreasonably disproportionate, unsuited to the skills of assigned workers, or require reworking to become
satisfactorily fair. There may also be some general desire for fairness in terms of how the work is enacted;
for example, with reference to time on task, or the amount of effort invested into the shared project (Jackson
& Harkins, 1985).
2.4.1 Defining Fairness
Fairness is one of the most important values in human society (Wierzbicka, 2006; Binmore, 2010a). Most
of us are very well-acquainted with the idea of fairness; it is very common to hear the exclamation “that’s
not fair!”, especially if small children are around at the time. Indeed, one need not look far to find mention
of fairness in everyday life: from the Fair Trade movement to fair use policies, to institutions like the
Office of Fair Trading and the Fair Play leagues in English football, it seems clear that fairness is pervasive.
Yet understanding what is “fair” is a complex problem; fairness itself is an elusive term, with a subjective
nature that can be difficult to translate between languages (Wierzbicka, 2006). And while most people can
intuitively sense when they have, and have not, been treated fairly, many would struggle to articulate their
understanding of fairness in precise terms. Given that we have offered fairness as a topic of concern for
this thesis, it is crucial for us to consider the meaning of the word if we are to offer consistent discussion
and interpretation within later chapters.
At a very basic level, fairness tends to have some degree of association with the idea of equality, and is
often used interchangeably with terms like equity and egalitarianism. Indeed, a simple Google search for a
synonym of fairness provides the word ‘equitable’ as one answer, with a further search for a definition
returning “treating people equally without favouritism or discrimination”.2 A simple definition of fairness,
then, might be that what is fair is simply ‘what is equal’. This represents perhaps the most straightforward
fairness rule, and, for the most part, tends to be satisfactory in everyday situations, so much so that people
are known to rely on a ‘general equality algorithm’ (Hertel et al., 2002) that prescribes equal allocation of
2Source: Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fair?q=fairness#fair
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resources to individuals in exchange situations (Allison & Messick, 1990). Yet while most people would
probably agree that fairness does have at least some basis in equality, it is not necessarily true that equal
outcomes are always satisfactory. This is because equality, in the strictest sense, is inflexible and leaves no
room for adjustment—equal is equal, and that is that. What is regarded as fair, on the other hand, is often
open to interpretation, and may not necessarily be synonymous with equality all of the time.
If fairness is not merely about equality, then what is it about? To answer this question, it useful to
think of fairness in terms of its role as a social norm. A norm can be defined as behavioural standard that
creates “shared expectations about how all group members ought to behave” (Levine & Moreland, 1998, p.
427). In line with Binmore (2010a), we begin by regarding equality as the default position for the fairness
norm. This is because, in line with our statements above, equality is a status quo that is acceptable from a
moral point of view (Rawls, 1999) and is regarded as the ‘fairest’ choice in situations where there is no
clear reason to behave otherwise (Allison & Messick, 1990). This is at least true of Westernised cultures
(Henrich et al., 2001; Wierzbicka, 2006), and means that, with all other things being equal, people expect
to be treated the same, to be rewarded identically, and have equal access to goods and resources (Hobbs,
2010).
From the basic position of equality, fairness involves taking into account issues that affect perceptions
about what each person is perceived to be due from a given situation. Fairness, then, is about proportionality
of treatment, in the sense that it requires one to attend to relevant factors that might provide rationale for
deviations from equality (cf. Hertel et al., 2002). If said deviations are judged as acceptable by the involved
parties, then the outcome is likely to be perceived as fair. Although we cannot provide an exhaustive
list, such factors include entitlements, needs, or perceived rights to a given resource. For example, it is
generally considered acceptable for those in the most dire of medical straits to have preferential access
to emergency healthcare. In this case, certain individuals have an established need over others, in turn
suggesting that it is fairer for them to receive preferential treatment over those with lesser needs. Similarly,
perceived entitlements might influence decisions about what is fair when goods are allocated. For example,
if someone has contributed more work to a collaborative project, he or she might perceive a right to greater
credit as a truer reflection of contribution. Factors more relevant to the context of division of labour might
include differential skills or abilities that guide the assignment of tasks to particular individuals. In an
egalitarian setting, there may be no clear reason to stray from equality in the assignment of duties, but
status hierarchies or positions of authority might legitimise the ability of one individual to ‘dictate’ tasks
to another, as would occur with a manager and his subordinates.
To provide a precise definition, then, we suggest that fairness relates to:
The quality of treating people in such a way that each receives his or her due in accordance
with perceived entitlements, rights, or needs.
This definition allows us to begin with the basic jumping-off point of equality because, in line with
societal norms, people generally perceive themselves as ‘entitled’ to certain considerations, most often
in the form of equal treatment when there is no reason to behave otherwise (Allison & Messick, 1990).
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From there, further factors may shift perceptions of fairness in one direction or another. As outlined above,
specialist efforts, needs, or mitigating circumstances will affect perceptions about what is due to each
person. For the context of division of labour, assignments of work can be influenced by a variety of factors,
and these factors are roughly equivalent to the concepts given in our definition above, in the sense that a
status hierarchy may imply entitlement to dictate work, whereas imbalance in expertise might imply that
an individual needs to handle (or perhaps should handle) more of one task than another.
What is helpful about our definition is that it allows us to specify what is meant by fairness while, at
the same, offering an opportunity to consider what is meant by unfairness. Simply put, any outcome that
disregards the perceived rights or entitlements of an individual is likely to be judged as unfair. Broadly,
fairness can be linked to the concept of justice (cf. Rawls, 1999) in that what is fair is often perceived as
the ‘just’ or ‘right’ course of action with respect to laws or particular moral codes. The factors mentioned
above may serve to legitimise deviations from equality without invoking moral indignation. On the other
hand, deviations from equality where such factors are ignored or do not exist are likely to be perceived
as illegitimate and, hence, highly unfair. Specific illegitimate factors might include pure selfishness or,
in collaborative work, laziness or reluctance to participate in the task. Such concerns are at the heart of
the free-rider problem, which “occurs when one or more members of a group do not do their fair share of
work on a group project” (Brooks & Ammons, 2003), a definition that in itself taps failure to comply with
fairness norms as the primary issue at hand.
However, what makes fairness so slippery is that it is always subjective, and this is very much reflected
within our own definition. There is no true way of specifying exactly what is ‘fair’, and this is one of the
reasons why forming agreements about what is fair can be problematic—individuals may place greater
weight on some issues over others, and the claims of one individual about entitlement may not align with
those of another. Similarly, the subjective nature of fairness is exemplified by cultural variation in fairness
norms (e.g. Henrich et al., 2001; Chuah et al., 2007) and the fact that perceptions about fairness can
change over time in line with wider shifts in societal norms. For example, up until the 19th century it was
considered fair for people to be enslaved or lynched on the basis of skin colour. Such behaviour is now
illegal and abhorred in modern society. The point here is that perceptions about what is ‘due’ are malleable
and can differ from person to person. This is very much evident in modern life as well: for example, it
was, until recently, considered acceptable for chief executives of large companies to be remunerated with
very generous bonuses, even if those bonuses were awarded on the basis of relatively poor performance or
even failure. Public perception of such disproportionate reward systems is changing, especially in light of
recent economic woes attributed to individuals in positions of power within the financial sector.3
In defining fairness, we have touched on the issue of equality as our basic premise. It is worth noting
that both fairness and equality are highly related to the principle of equity, which refers to the allocation
rule of ensuring that outcomes are proportional to the contributions of group members (Levine & Moreland,
1998). We touched on this rule in our discussion above, and although our definition of fairness encapsulates
equity, it is worth noting that equity might be regarded as insufficient compared to fairness because there
3See, e.g., http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16783571
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may be circumstances that prevent individuals from contributing as they would like. For example, a
colleague could have a physical disability that limits the speed at which he or she can complete work—one
might regard it as unfair for this person to be penalised with lower remuneration, especially if he or she
has made a best effort to contribute to the task, because the problem is beyond his or her control. Thus
equity is often insufficient as an allocation rule, perhaps making fairness the better choice.
One final issue worthy of note is that fairness is fundamentally social, in that people would not care
about fairness if they were not interested in the circumstances of others (Binmore, 2010a). This is true
in terms of comparing one’s own outcomes relative to those of specific referent others, as well as to how
individuals are treated in society as a whole. Thus, social comparison (Festinger, 1954; Knez & Camerer,
1995; Cohn et al., 2009) is an important driver for fairness—fairness judgements are always made relative
to some standard, and that standard is often the situation enjoyed by others. If we see that the ratio of our
own inputs and outputs is equal to the ratio of inputs and outputs of others (cf. van den Bos et al., 1997),
we are likely to judge an outcome as fair provided that it also accounts for other relevant factors. But if we
see preferential treatment afforded to others for no clear reason, we might be inclined to denounce such
treatment as very unfair. Within this thesis, the idea of social comparison is important because it is raised
repeatedly in later chapters, and forms the basis for our own arguments about how fairness judgements
might be supported in collaborative systems.
2.4.2 The Value of Fairness: A Basis for Cooperative Interaction
We have noted that, in everyday society, fairness is manifested in the form of broader social norms that
govern how we interact with one another and the institutions that surround us (Binmore, 2010a,b). Many
everyday behaviours can be construed as conforming with fairness norms: for example, the simple act
of waiting in line can be viewed as conformity with fairness because, by joining a queue and standing
patiently behind the person in front, we acknowledge that the person has the right to be served first,
established on the basis of the fact that he or she joined the queue before we did. To ignore that right
would be ‘unfair’, and although there is nothing stopping us from non-compliance with fairness norms,
what usually puts us off is the threat of reciprocity, the general maxim of ‘doing unto others as they do to
us’ (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Here, reciprocity may come in the form of punishment, perhaps in the form
of an angry comment, ejection from the queue, or even violence that could lead to physical harm.
The idea of reciprocity helps us explain why people choose to conform to fairness norms. By treating
others as we would hope to be treated, we in turn increase our own chances of receiving similar treatment.
By recognising the claims, entitlements, and needs of others, we in turn can draw on similar rationale
when it is our own turn to make use of a resource. And by recognising non-conformity to said norms, we
punish others so as to make them comply with our expectations about fairness and what is right in our
societies. Fairness is thus intrinsically related to cooperation. Cooperative behaviours keep our society
ticking over in an amicable fashion—social order would not last long if conflict arose every time one
encountered the sorts of picayune problems that arise on a day-to-day basis. For collaboration, fairness
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might be relevant to the recognised prerequisite of cooperative behaviour. It almost certainly links to the
idea of ‘going along with established procedures’ (cf. our earlier discussion of cooperation) because, by
playing fair, one is conforming to established norms of interaction. In the following section, we consider
prior studies within CSCW where fairness has been mentioned explicitly. This leads to a consideration of
our own research aims.
2.5 Fairness and CSCW
Despite the importance of fairness for our everyday social interactions, there appears to have been little
considered exploration of fairness within CSCW and HCI, meaning that there is no immediately identifiable
body of work from which we can draw. One possible reason for this is that fairness, beyond its potential
role in division of labour, may not initially seem like an important issue for technological design. Yet
a close reading of the literature reveals that fairness has been raised as a concern in a small number of
studies—it is simply that no work has yet attempted to unite these disparate works into a coherent whole.
This is perhaps because fairness, in the limited cases where it has been mentioned, tends to appear well
down the list of concerns for the studies in question. In other cases, papers sometimes address the subject
of fairness implicitly or obliquely. Here we offer a short appraisal of studies that touch on the subject of
fairness, as identified by the author of this thesis. We begin with work that mentions fairness explicitly.
We then consider other issues where fairness might be putatively relevant for CSCW.
2.5.1 Studies Mentioning Fairness
An early study by Galegher & Kraut (1990) (see also Galegher & Kraut, 1994) reports an experiment
on group writing. Students completed a group assignment over a period of two weeks in one of three
conditions: sole reliance on face-to-face communication, sole reliance on computer-mediated communica-
tion (text chat), or computer-mediated communication complemented by telephone conversations. The
researchers aimed to gauge the effects of these communication channels on nine dependent variables, one
of which was the perceived fairness in each group’s division of labour. (The fairness measure was not, in
this case, the primary concern of the research). Galegher & Kraut found that groups working face-to-face
perceived greater fairness in their work process than those in the two computer-mediated groups. This
effect was particularly pronounced while groups were engaged in more execution-oriented stages of work,
as opposed to initial planning. For the present thesis, these findings are interesting as they suggest that
groups may find it more difficult to make judgements about fairness when the completion of contributions
is obscured by technology.
Fairness is mentioned in early CSCW literature on information sharing and privacy. For example,
Kling (1993) discusses the potential implications of increased data capture and its potential implications for
CSCW in terms of how information can be used ethically and safely. Similar concerns were expressed by
Harper (1996) in a study of active badges—small software systems that remotely monitor the whereabouts
32
2.5. FAIRNESS AND CSCW
of colleagues. Such badges were valued highly by those whose job it was to keep tabs on people (e.g.
secretaries) but were regarded with suspicion by academics and research staff due to the perceived
unfairness of increased scrutiny.
To find other studies that mention fairness as a concern, one must look much closer to the present
day. Dong & Fu (2012) mentioned fairness in a study of video-mediated communication; they argue that
video is better for conflict resolution because it promotes turn taking and equity in participation, in turn
allowing for ‘fairness’ in negotiation. They conducted a study that required pairs of participants to achieve
consensus in an appointment-scheduling task using either text-, audio-, or video-based communication.
The study revealed that participants were more likely to reach a consensus when information exchange was
managed in smaller chunks, and that this was best achieved via video. Since a more balanced exchange led
to equality in the negotiation, Dong & Fu suggest that CMC tools might somehow be designed to foster a
feeling of fairness. It should be noted, however, that the authors do not provide any clear design guidelines
on this matter.
Fairness concerns also arose in a recent a study by Merritt & McGee (2012). They sought to explore
how behaviour differs in cooperative computer games when people interact with human or artificial
teammates. Participants played a simple game where they could perform a “yell” to protect their teammate
from enemy gunfire. Each participant played in two different sessions: one with an artificially intelligent
(AI) partner, and another with a human player who was, in reality, also an AI agent, but participants were
not aware of this during the experiment. Participants self-reported a higher instance of yelling when playing
alongside a ‘human’, yet log data showed that protective events were actually lower in this condition. In
other words, participants protected the AI teammate more often but were not consciously aware of this
behaviour. Merritt & McGee interpret this result in terms of fairness, suggesting that interaction with the
human player leads to concerns about equality and a desire to ‘match the behaviour’ of one’s counterpart.
Such concerns were apparently less relevant when players were not concerned about being evaluated by an
artificial teammate.
One might notice that there appears to be little consistency in the specific subject matter of the studies
described above. The one theme that does run common, however, is that each is broadly concerned with
interaction between two or more individuals, as mediated by computer technology. The fact that each
study addresses a different aspect of HCI suggests to us that fairness issues may be more pervasive than
first thought—different aspects of fairness may be important in a wide variety of interactions.
2.5.2 Other Related Work
In addition to studies where fairness has been mentioned explicitly, there are some other topics within
HCI that touch on issues related to fairness. Of course, there are many areas that could be tenuously
linked to the subjects one typically considers when talking about fairness. We do not review such work
here—instead we briefly consider work that has mentioned the term fairness but not ‘CSCW’.
Within some areas of HCI literature, there appears to be an implicit assumption that equitable participa-
33
CHAPTER 2. COLLABORATIVE WORK, FAIRNESS, AND TECHNOLOGY: REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS
tion is somehow preferable when groups work together through technology (e.g. Rogers et al., 2008; Fleck
et al., 2009). Such arguments are predicated on the difficulty of collaboration when technological resources
are limited. Working with a single computer or input device necessarily limits the extent to which each
person can contribute to a computer-mediated task, and it is not difficult to see why this could lead to
inequity in contributions. However, studies in this area seem to lack a clear theoretical distinction between
equitable participation, which seems to be characterised as ‘everyone taking part’, and the sort of equity
in participation that might be characterised by ‘everyone pulling his or her weight’, i.e. in compliance
with fairness norms. Some work in this area is explicitly directed towards this latter conceptualisation (e.g.
Plonka et al., 2012), potentially making this topic relevant to fairness. Yet many researchers do not provide
a clear indication of what equity is intended to mean in their studies (e.g. Harris et al., 2009; Wallace et al.,
2013) making it hard to specify the potential relevance of this literature to the present thesis.
In other areas, fairness arises less in terms of work completion but more with respect to moral or
other social issues raised by technology. For example, O’Neill & Martin (2013) argue that crowdsourcing
platforms, which facilitate mass-scale task distribution (or so-called ‘microwork’), must attend to the
rights and potential benefits offered to workers. O’Neill & Martin conducted an ethnographic investigation
of two companies responsible for processing healthcare data, finding that seemingly menial tasks carry
hidden subtleties and opportunities for, albeit modest, career progression—such aspects could be lost if the
work were transported to a crowdsourcing platform. The implication here is that it may be unfair to erode
the basic opportunities for personal development associated with even the most innocuous of work tasks.
The authors go on to argue that employers of crowdworkers should place greater importance on developing
two-way relationships with their anonymous employees. Such relationships should be founded on trust
and fairness principles, e.g. acceptable payment for the work done and the ability to provide feedback
about an employer’s processes.
A final area in which fairness has been identified as relevant to HCI is in Value-Sensitive Design, which
refers to a “theoretically grounded approach to the design of technology that accounts for human values in
a principled and comprehensive manner throughout the design process (Friedman et al., 2006, p. 349).
The definition of a value is broad: “what a person or group of people considers important in life” (Borning
& Muller, 2012, p. 1125). Several such values, as identified by prior research, include freedom from bias,
trust, and accountability (Friedman & Kahn, 2003). There appears to be no reason why fairness might
not be considered as one value that is also potentially relevant to design (Hochheiser & Lazar, 2007),
although, as noted above, no work has yet addressed the issue explicitly. Prior work does suggest that
fairness is relevant: in an evaluation of a collaborative web search tool, Morris & Horvitz (2007) found
that participants did not use features meant for automatic division of labour because only one member of
the team had control of the functionality. This distribution of control implied an unfair status difference
that was contrary to the collaborative ethos of the group (Morris & Horvitz, 2007). Such a simple design
decision clearly had profound effects on the way the system was used.
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2.5.3 Summary and Implications
As evidenced by this rather sparse review, there is a clear lack of work on fairness in CSCW and, given
the potential relevance of fairness for collaboration, we see an opportunity to assess the extent to which
fairness might be desirable in collaborative work and technology design. The aforementioned study by
Galegher & Kraut (1990) provides a hint in this regard—groups found it difficult to monitor collaborative
contributions in computer-mediated work, and such a problem might remain true in the present day. Indeed,
similar arguments about the lack of feedback about contributions in distributed, technologically-mediated
settings have been made elsewhere (e.g. Hertel et al., 2002, 2003).
For the present thesis, we aim to study fairness in the division and completion of collaborative work.
We suggest fairness is relevant in two ways. First, in guiding the initial allocation of tasks around a group.
This may not be true in all settings, but could certainly apply to those where prescription of tasks is
unguided and the distribution of control is relatively equal. Second, we expect that fairness is relevant to
the completion of work. The very existence of the free-rider problem speaks to this contention, but ensuring
fairness in completion may be especially difficult when a group’s work is mediated by technology—such
situations are often characterised by limited awareness and accountability of contributions. In the following
chapter, we aim to develop these ideas by investigating fairness in the context of collaborating student
workgroups. We explore the extent to which tasks are distributed in accordance with fairness norms, and
whether non-participation arises as a concern. This helps to provide further justification for the work
reported in later chapters.
2.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we selectively reviewed literature relevant to the work presented later in this thesis. We first
explored the notion of computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW), and then focused on understanding
the nature of collaborative work itself. We reviewed several existing attempts at mapping out concepts
relevant to collaboration, and acquired a basic definition of collaboration appropriate for this thesis.
We then discussed the concepts of coordination, common ground, awareness, and division of labour,
highlighting why each is relevant to the design of CSCW systems. This led to our consideration of fairness
and its role in human society. We then reviewed prior studies where fairness has been mentioned in CSCW,
and finally articulated our own interests for the present thesis. The following chapter describes thesis study
1, where we explored fairness and its relation to satisfaction with group outcomes in small groups of 5–6
undergraduate students.
35
CHAPTER 2. COLLABORATIVE WORK, FAIRNESS, AND TECHNOLOGY: REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS
36
CHAPTER 3
A STUDY OF DIVISION OF LABOUR AND
FAIRNESS IN COLLABORATING TEAMS
3.1 Chapter Overview
In Chapter 2 we raised the issue of fairness as a potential topic of concern for collaboration. This
chapter presents an exploratory study of division of labour and fairness in small collaborating workgroups.
Specifically, we use a survey instrument to quantify perceptions about fairness in division and allocation of
work, and explore how these perceptions are related to three dependent variables: the overall satisfaction
with the products of each group’s work; the work process; and the performance of team members. The
workgroups in question were comprised of undergraduate students who had recently completed year-long
collaborative software development projects. Marks from these projects contribute to each student’s final
degree classification, meaning that all team members had a vested interest in ensuring that the work is
competed to a high standard.
The purpose of the study is to obtain some quantitative, non-experimental evidence that implies
the potential importance of fairness during group work. We explore the extent to which fairness and
satisfaction are correlated—one might imagine that, if fairness were important, individuals who perceived
that their work was completed in line with fairness norms would show greater satisfaction than those who
suffered because of free-riding or non-participation from team members. Additionally, we gather initial
qualitative data that describes challenges faced by students and the extent to which problems encountered
are related to fairness and non-participation from team members. Such responses also highlight the sorts
of considerations that are taken into account when managing division of labour in groups. The results
of this study validate the concerns of the present thesis, providing evidence of a) a relationship between
perceived fairness in the division and completion of work, and satisfaction with group outcomes, and b)
the difficulty of monitoring and gauging equality among team member contributions during computer-
mediated collaboration. We also consider the extent to which satisfaction might be influenced by individual
control, team member abilities, and group construction.
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3.2 Thesis Study 1: Survey Study
3.2.1 Study Motivation
As mentioned above, the present study sought to explore the potential links between fairness, division
of labour, and satisfaction in the context of real-world teams. Our chosen teams were small groups of
students, each comprised of 5–6 individuals, who had recently finished collaborating on year-long software
development projects (known as the Integrated Project or ‘IP’) at the University of Bath. Students in
these groups are assigned to teams by the unit lecturer at the outset of the academic year. Groups must
then work to design, implement, and evaluate a complete software system, usually taking the form of a
website or mobile application. Students must also submit four paper-based deliverables documenting their
progression through various stages of the software development lifecycle.
Our selection of these students was partly one of convenience, but can be justified in terms of the
highly collaborative nature of their projects and the importance of the work itself—marks from the finished
software product and its associated documentation contribute towards the final degree classification of
each team member. Students should, therefore, have been interested in creating projects that are of the
best possible quality, and these projects always entail division of labour among the team. Additionally,
the author’s first-hand experience of tutoring groups on the IP unit suggests that students do experience
negative emotional consequences when team members fail to contribute good work or refuse to participate
altogether. In our experience, students are quick to grasp an opportunity to express dissatisfaction with
non-participating team members. These considerations gave us good reason to believe that fairness
would be a foremost concern for students and could be studied in relation to different aspects of project
completion.
In the present study, we used a survey instrument to explore students’ perceptions about division of
labour, fairness, and overall satisfaction with the outputs of their group. Our survey was administered as a
one-off exercise to students after each group had submitted their final software system and paper-based
deliverables, but before each individual had received their final marks for the unit. We opted to use this
critical project interval because the experience of collaboration was still fresh in students’ minds, but was
not yet coloured by their final marks. We believed that this would minimise the potential negative impact
of low or dissatisfactory marks on retrospective evaluation, as could be the case if the survey had been sent
after students had received their final grades.
3.2.2 Survey Design
Our survey was designed to acquire quantitative and qualitative data about a range of issues associated with
group work. First, and in line with the concerns of this thesis, we wanted to acquire insight about fairness
in students’ division of labour. We were interested in any problems students encountered in managing
divided work, especially those related to fairness and non-participation from group members. Second, we
were interested in perceptions about fairness in the division and completion of work. As we have seen, the
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former pertains to initial allocations of work, which we might expect to be taken in line with equality in
the relatively egalitarian settings of student workgroups, but could also be adjusted in line with individual
competencies (making fairness the appropriate term in this case). Conversely, fairness in completion
pertains to the way in which work was actually carried out—it may be the case that perceptions about this
stage will be different if groups incur free-riding behaviour. We aimed to delineate these constructs by
using separate measures for each within our questionnaire.
Third, we wanted to explore the impact of fairness, in both division and completion of work, on overall
satisfaction with group outcomes. We operationalised three measures of satisfaction: satisfaction with the
product of the team’s work, i.e. the system and its documentation; satisfaction with the process used to
assign work, i.e. the chosen method of achieving division of labour; and satisfaction with the performance
of team members, i.e. whether or not team members contributed to an acceptable standard. We reasoned
that all three of these constructs might be influenced by perceptions about fairness in the division of labour.
Our focus on the concept of satisfaction is guided by its use as a dependent variable elsewhere in the
HCI literature (e.g. Galegher & Kraut, 1994; Oulasvirta et al., 2009) and because it is a neutral term that
avoids emphasizing particular emotions while, nonetheless, offering a link to happiness and fulfilment
(Tatarkiewicz, 1976). Moreover, it is used prevalently in psychological and personality measures, e.g. the
much-cited ‘satisfaction with life scale’ (Diener et al., 1985).
3.2.2.1 Scale Development
We developed a series of Likert-type scales intended to gather quantitative data about students’ perceptions
of division of labour, fairness, and satisfaction. Table 3.1 lists the items that comprise each of the scales
used in our survey. After surveying the literature for existing scales on division of labour and fairness, we
found that a prior study by Galegher & Kraut (1994) reports scales used to measure perceived fairness
in contributions. However, their scale was intended to be used on a daily basis, and was phrased using
the present tense (e.g. “We are all contributing fairly to this project”), whereas our survey was a one-off
exercise that called for retrospective phrasing. We were not able to acquire an established measure after
further literature review, and thus we used the work of Galegher & Kraut (1994) to inform our scales
for gauging perceptions about fairness in division of labour. Similarly, our scales of satisfaction were
informed by those of Galegher & Kraut (1994) and by the Group Satisfaction scale, an established measure
reported by Hackman (1988). Finally, we included a single-item scale to gauge perceptions of equality in
contributions to the common project. This was done to allow for comparisons between our two measures
of fairness and a straightforward measure of general equality.
Additionally, we incorporated several other established measures of group attributes into our ques-
tionnaire. Not only did this serve to mask our primary interest in division of labour and fairness within
the questionnaire, it also allowed us to explore whether our concepts of interest were related to other
measures reported within prior literature. We identified five existing scales used to study the effectiveness
and stability of small groups:
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Measures of Fairness and Satisfaction
Fairness in Division of Work, 3 items
My team made an effort to ensure that work was distributed fairly among members
In my opinion, the division of work among my group members was fair.
When dividing up tasks, some members of my group were given an unfair amount of work.***
Fairness in Completion of Work, 4 items
I believe that, by the end of the project, everyone completed a fair amount of work.
One or more people in my group did significantly more work than others.***
Everyone contributed an amount of work that I consider was fair.
Compared to the average amount done by other group members, I did an unfair amount of work.***
Satisfaction with Products from Work
Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the reports our group produced.
Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the system our group produced.
Satisfaction with Process of Assigning Work
I am satisfied with the way in which work was allocated among group members.
Overall, I am satisfied with our chosen method of allocating work to the members of our group.
Satisfaction with Performance of Team Members
The quality of work produced by the other members of my group was satisfactory to me.
Overall, I am satisfied with the collective performance of my team members.
Equality in Completion of Work
All members of my group contributed similar amounts of the various subtasks required by the
assignment.
Table 3.1: Scale items used to gauge fairness and satisfaction in survey, study 1. Reverse scoring is
denoted by ***.
Open Communication, 4 items: measures the extent to which group members feel that they are able to
speak their minds. Stokes (1983) argues that cohesive groups are more likely to take risks that lead
to useful and novel outcomes. To take those risks, group members must be able to speak freely and
make statements that may be counter to current opinion.
Task Motivation, 4 items: gauges perceptions about whether a given team is task-oriented and focused on
work (Zaccaro & McCoy, 1988). High task motivation is seen as a positive for a group.
Group Viability, 3 items: assesses how well a group functions as a team and whether team members
perceive their experience as positive (Hackman, 1988).
Group Cohesion, 5 items: this set of measures assesses the extent to which individuals show affinity and
a liking for their teammates (Stokes, 1983), both of which are taken as a sign of good cohesion.
Social Loafing, 3 items: quantifies perceptions about social loafing behaviour and the non-participation of
particular individuals within a group (Druskat & Wolff, 1999).
The items that make up each of these scales are shown in Table 3.2. We believed that several of
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Measure
Open Communication, 4 items (Stokes, 1983)
My group avoids saying anything that might upset someone.***
My group is very straight-forward with me.
There are certain topics about our work that my group avoids talking about.***
Most people in my group are careful not to reveal too much of themselves to the group.***
Task Motivation, 4 items (Zaccaro & McCoy, 1988)
Performing well is a top priority for my team.
My group members expect high effort and commitment from me.
Only a high level of performance is acceptable to our group.
Our group is highly task-oriented.
Group Viability, 3 items (Hackman, 1988)
As a team, this work group shows signs of falling apart.***
Members of my team care a lot about it, and work together to make it one of the best.
Working with members of my team is an energizing and uplifting experience.
Group Cohesion, 5 items (Stokes, 1983)
If I were to participate in another group like this one, I would want it to include people who are very
similar to the ones in this group.
Most of the people in the group are not the kind of people I would enjoy spending time with outside
the group sessions.***
There are not many people I like as individuals in my group.***
Even if we stopped meeting as a group, I would still want to see the people in this group as often as I
could.
I wish I had more time for socializing with other group members.
Perceived Social Loafing, 3 items (Druskat & Wolff, 1999)
We have some team members that dont put much effort into their work.
Every member of our team does his/her share of the work.***
There are some individuals on our team who dont do much work.
Table 3.2: Established scale items used in survey, study 1. Reverse scoring is denoted by ***.
these constructs could be meaningfully related to fairness and overall satisfaction; for example, one might
imagine that cohesive and well-functioning groups might work in line with fairness norms, and that fairness
and satisfaction might be low if social loafing is high. Use of these scales also allows us to obtain a broader
perspective on the overall working health of our groups of interest.
Following the work of Galegher & Kraut (1994), all measures in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 were implemented
using 7-point Likert scales, with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree.
3.2.2.2 Free-text Responses
Our questionnaire included spaces to gather qualitative data concerning participants’ experiences. Specifi-
cally, we asked: Do you have any other comments or anything else you would like to add regarding your
satisfaction with the Integrated Project?, and Is there anything else you would like to add about your
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Integrated Project group that was not covered by the survey?. We also gave participants the opportunity to
expand upon, and clarify, their ratings on each survey page. All free-text responses were optional so as not
to overburden respondents and to avoid increasing dropout rates.
3.2.3 Survey Pilot
Our preliminary questionnaire was piloted using a small sample of postgraduate computer science Master’s
students who had recently completed a coursework assignment in groups of 3–4 individuals. Respondents
were solicited directly via email, and eight people completed the questionnaire. Initial results suggested
correlations between our variables of interest, and the study also allowed us to make adjustments to the
wording of our own scales after some participants expressed confusion or misunderstanding. Final scales
were identical to those shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Participants
Respondents were second year students enrolled in the 2011–12 undergraduate Computer Science course
at the University of Bath. As mentioned above, all respondents had recently completed a group software
development project, which required the group to design, implement, and evaluate a working software
system. From a possible 68 students in the class, 38 provided a response (56% of class). Ten respondents
were female and 28 were male. Respondents’ ages ranged from 19–32 years (Mean = 20.6, Median = 20).
For the purposes of the Integrated Project, the class was separated into 12 subgroups. While all groups
were represented within our data set, we did not receive an equal number of responses from each group.
(Lower boundary = two responses, upper = five responses).
3.3.2 Survey Implementation and Procedure
The survey was hosted online using Qualtrics survey software.4 To reiterate, all measures in Tables 3.1
and 3.2 were implemented using 7-point Likert scales, with 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree.
The survey had six pages in total, and was designed to be completed quickly because, based on our
personal experience of collecting student feedback, it can be notoriously difficult to get undergraduates
to complete evaluation questionnaires. (A full transcript of the survey can be found in Appendix B).
Participants were first asked to provide informed consent and were told that all of their responses would be
stored securely and confidentially. We stressed that responses would not affect their final mark for the
unit. The second page of the survey requested demographic information including age and gender. The
third page contained the group construct measures, presented in a different randomised order for each




work and assessed the assignment of work among group members, and the fifth page assessed satisfaction
with group products, performance and procedure. Again, all scales were presented in a randomised order.
The final page thanked the student for their participation and offered them the opportunity to leave their
username to be entered into a prize draw. Usernames were stored separately from responses, meaning that
we could not directly identify any individual. Students were made aware of this in the survey.
After the survey was hosted online, two electronic mailouts were made inviting students to complete
the survey. These mailouts were sent 3 days after students had submitted their final assignment. Ten
prizes of £10, drawn and awarded randomly to those who completed the survey, were offered to encourage
responses. The survey was closed after a third mailout failed to elicit any further responses. Prize winners
were selected at random by an independent individual.
3.3.3 Analysis
For the present study we opted to perform analysis at the level of individual responses. While it would
be desirable to also explore our data using groups as the unit of analysis, such an approach would be
statistically unsound as we do not have equal numbers of responses from each group. Our analyses focus
on the interpretation of correlations using non-parametric statistical tests. While a regression analysis
might be useful to estimate the relationship between fairness and our various measures of satisfaction,
such an approach would be weakened by our low number of participants and the fact that our criterion
variables, i.e. measures of satisfaction, are not normally distributed. These issues mean that we cannot
meet the basic criteria for regression (Dancey & Reidy, 2007; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).
In line with similar analyses in prior work (e.g. Druskat & Wolff, 1999; Foo et al., 2006), we obtained
composite scores for each participant in the study; such scores are obtained by computing the mean
of an individual’s responses on a given subset of items (e.g., the average of all four items on the Open
Communication scale). Mean scores are easier to interpret because they are constrained within the original
metric and can be understood within the confines of the original scale (Griffin, 2009). Composite scores
were used for all of our analyses, unless otherwise stated.
The internal reliability of each of our scales was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. For scales with
only two items, the Spearman-Brown stepped-up reliability coefficient, identified as the most appropriate
consistency measure for 2-item scales (Hulin, 2001), was used to gauge internal reliability. All scales were
found to have high consistency, bar Open Communication with an alpha of .58. This value is similar to
that observed by Druskat & Wolff (1999) (.56 in their study, where n = 400) and perhaps suggests that the
potential relevance of this scale should be interpreted with caution. Since it shows only weak to moderate
correlation with the rest of our measures of interest, we will not present any in-depth considerations of
the measure, but will nevertheless retain the correlations in our results set because they do not harm our
analysis.
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Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Openness 4.56 1.02 (.58)
2. Task Motivation 5.14 1.27 .36* (.89)
3. Viability 4.66 1.47 .43** .74** (.84)
4. Cohesion 4.30 1.19 .51** .62** .79** (.82)
5. Social Loafing 4.64 1.80 –.33* –.46** –.64** –.59** (.91)
6. Division Fairness 5.13 1.08 .44** .45** .49** .49** –.47** (.74)
7. Completion Fairness 3.38 1.47 .38* .45** .69** .62** –.82** .64** (.89)
8. Product Satisfaction 5.29 1.66 .38* .80** .66** .58** –.35* .40* .35* (.91†)
9. Process Satisfaction 5.04 1.35 .58** .69** .76** .67** –.51** .65** .61** .67** (.94†)
10. Performance Satis. 4.91 1.66 .40* .82* .78** .64** –.64** .56** .57** .81** .79** (.91†)
11. Contribution Equity 3.47 1.95 .25 .57** .69** .52** –.52** .47** .66** .44** .64** .59** (n.a)
Table 3.3: Correlations among variables for entire sample (n = 38) and observed reliability coefficients
for individual scales.
Note: Cronbach’s alpha shown along the diagonal in parentheses where appropriate. Two-item
scales tested using Pearson-Brown coefficient, denoted †.
* = p < 0.05 — ** = p < 0.01
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Correlational Analyses
Table 3.3 shows the strength and direction of correlations between measures used in our survey. Since
data were non-parametric, and scores were not normally distributed on several scales, all correlations
were computed using Spearman’s rho. In general, correlations are of moderate strength, and all of the
correlations are significant, with p <0.05 throughout. For our primary topics of interest—fairness and
satisfaction—we can see correlations between both aspects of fairness and all three measures of satisfaction.
Additionally, Table 3.3 shows that all three measures of satisfaction are positively correlated with one
another. This is perhaps not surprising; one might intuitively expect that those who were quite satisfied
with the process and products would also be satisfied with performance of team members.
Below we focus on particular correlations of interest and later sketch some potential interpretations in
our discussion section. Our discussion section also reflects more broadly on the possible meaning of our
results, as well as limitations.
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Figure 3.1: Scatterplot illustrating correlation between perceived fairness in division of work and perceived
fairness in completion of work.
Fairness in Division and Completion of Labour
Table 3.3 shows a positive correlation between fairness in division of work and fairness in completion of
work, r(37) = .64, p < 0.01. This may be indicative of a dual fairness trend—if groups operate in line
with fairness at the outset, perhaps the established norm follows through into the completion work as well.
However, comparison of the means in Table 3.3 suggests that, although most individuals perceived their
team as having made an effort to ensure that work had been divided fairly (M = 5.13), the average for
fairness in the completion of work (Row 7) is slightly lower (M = 3.38). This difference is significant,
paired t[37] = 9.47, p < 0.001. Eyeballing the data in Figure 3.1 indicates that some individuals in the
lower right area of the chart perceived high initial fairness but rated completion much lower. This suggests
that some initially fair allocations may not have panned out as intended. Of course, joint projects often
necessitate reshuffling of workloads, but it is also possible that the decrease is due to free-riding behaviour
within our groups of interest.
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Fairness and Process Satisfaction
Table 3.3 shows that satisfaction with the work process has a moderately strong, positive correlation with
perceived fairness in the division of work, r(37) = .65, p < 0.01. The relevant data are graphed in Figure
3.2 and illustrate the expected relationship between fairness and satisfaction—overall, those who believed
work had been divided fairly also express high satisfaction with this approach.
A similar correlation exists between process satisfaction and perceived fairness in the completion of
work, r(37) = .61, p < 0.01. It is worth noting that our measure of process satisfaction pertains to the
initial assignment of work, whereas fairness in completion gauges perceptions about what occurred while
work was actually being completed. This perhaps makes this correlation somewhat less direct.
A more interesting finding is the correlation between fairness in completion and perceived equality
in contributions, r(37) = .66, p < 0.01. The general trend is illustrated in Figure 3.3, although it is worth
noting the presence of some individuals who perceive low fairness but report reasonably high equality and,
conversely, those who perceive reasonably high fairness but low equality. It is possible that these results




Figure 3.2: Scatterplot illustrating correlation between perceived fairness in division of work and process
satisfaction.
Figure 3.3: Scatterplot illustrating correlation between perceived fairness in completion of work and
perceived equality in contributions.
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Figure 3.4: Scatterplot illustrating correlation between perceived fairness in completion of work and
satisfaction with work products.
Fairness and Product Satisfaction
Turning to Product Satisfaction, the correlations with Fairness in Division, r(37) = .40, p < 0.05, and
Fairness in Completion, r(37) = .35, p < 0.05, are noticeably weaker than that of Process Fairness. Of
these two correlations, fairness in completion is likely to be more relevant to product outcomes, and the
relevant data from this correlation are shown in Figure 3.4. It can be seen that some individuals, towards
the upper left of the chart, believe that work was not completed fairly yet still appear to be very satisfied
with the group outputs. Of course, we can only speculate as to why this may occur, but some plausible
explanations can be found within our qualitative data—for now we defer interpretation of these results
until our discussion section.
Fairness and Performance Satisfaction
Satisfaction with performance of team members shows a moderate positive correlation with fairness in
division of work, r(37) = .56, p < 0.01, and completion of work, r(37) = .57, p < 0.01. This aligns with the
other correlations and suggests a relationship between perceptions about fairness and perceptions about
team member performance.
Group Construct Measures
Table 3.3 also displays some notable correlations between our variables of interest and the pre-established
measures of group phenomena. In particular, the construct of Task Motivation is strongly and positively
correlated with all three measures of satisfaction. This is likewise true of Group Viability and Group
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Cohesion, and although the correlations are weaker in these cases, they do remain above moderate strength.
Again, we cannot infer causation but it appears that groups who work well, are cohesive, and remain viable
seem to achieve better outcomes, as characterised by higher satisfaction across all three measures.
The constructs of Task Motivation, Group Viability, and Group Cohesion are moderately correlated
with Fairness in Division of Work. The correlations are slightly stronger for Fairness in Completion of
Work, at least for Viability and Cohesion. It is possible that the scales for these latter constructs have a
more meaningful relationship to the enactment of work, e.g. “Members of my team care a lot about it,
and work together to make it one of the best”, in turn explaining the stronger association.
Lastly, Social Loafing negatively correlates with every other measure, particularly Performance
Satisfaction. It is not difficult to see how these two constructs might be related. While we cannot make
sound claims about causation, the strong negative correlation between fairness in completion of work
and perceptions about social loafing (r(37) = –.82, p < 0.01) suggests a relationship between the two and
clearly speaks to the presence of free-riders within our groups of interest. It is also interesting that the
correlation between Fairness in Division and Social Loafing is noticeably weaker, r(37) = –.47, p < 0.01).
This perhaps speaks to the possibility that allocations were fair at the outset of work, and later became
unfair during actual enactment. (As hinted in our earlier analysis of fairness in allocation and completion.)
3.4.2 Qualitative Responses
Seventeen respondents provided qualitative data. The majority of responses were to the question Is there
anything else you would like to add...? and so we chose to consolidate responses into an aggregated
dataset. Responses were analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) although the analysis
was fairly lightweight due to the limited amount of material within the dataset.5 Our analysis aimed to
inductively elicit topics relevant to division of labour, fairness, and group work in general. Transcripts
were read twice and initial themes were developed. We then passed these themes along with the transcripts
to an independent coder for verification. This resulted in four relevant themes: assignment of work
by competencies; social loafing and non-participation; concerns about quality of work; and awareness
difficulties. A fifth theme, ‘Other’, was used to classify anything that did not fit our other themes, e.g.
opinions about the content of the project unit or facetious remarks. Statements were then classified by the
same coder and a second independent individual, with two disagreements about categorisation resolved
through discussion. Due to the limited quantity of data (responses were relatively short in length, ranging
from one sentence to two paragraphs) we do not make claims about prevalence and prefer to consider
responses as illustrative of the types of problems students encounter during group work. Themes are
described below using quotes appended with participants’ gender and age in the form [M/F, Age].
First, assignment of work by competencies pertained to statements mentioning how subtasks were
divided in accordance with skills and abilities. Four students mentioned that their group had adopted
such an approach. Two mentioned that this served to legitimise inequitable divisions of labour as fair, as
5Approximately 1–2 paragraphs per response—later studies in Chapters 6 and 7 involve analysis of larger interview datasets.
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illustrated by the following response:
“The amount of work done by members was very uneven (eg some did a lot more, some did very little)
but it was not always completely unfair in every case. for example the programming pros did a lot
of programming, and the others helped out and learned some but did not do as much as the pros on
programming.” [F, 20].
Second, social loafing and non-participation pertained to non-participation from team members. Five
respondents mentioned this as a problem within their groups. In some cases particular team members had
dropped out from the course, but in others loafing was related to simple lack of effort:
“The main problems related to getting the work done quickly enough and nobody putting a great deal
(although some amount was) of effort into the work.” [M, 23].
Third, concerns about quality of work pertained to statements where individuals mentioned poor
standards of work from other team members, which in many cases necessitated rewriting of the work. Five
individuals mentioned quality control as an issue. For example:
“I did most of the work in nearly all the deliverables, but I felt too bad to lower anyone else’s
percentage on the contribution forms. Some members did awful work, but it was more convenient for
me to simply redo it than to try and get them to improve.” [M, 20].
Finally, awareness difficulties pertained to the difficulty of gauging individual efforts during highly
subdivided projects. This may have affected perceptions about fairness to the extent that lack of visibility
meant people were more lenient on suspected free riders. Three individuals mentioned this:
“Contributions were fairly specialised by subtask, so the amount of work I saw people doing was
obviously a lot higher amongst the people who were working closely with me. It is difficult to see what
others are doing most of the time, but I still believe everyone contributed a fair amount to the project
as a whole.” [M, 22].
We regard these themes as offering insights into the issues that may have shifted perceptions about
fairness within groups—we use other quotes from our themes to complement our interpretations below.
3.5 Discussion
The present study sought to explore the relationships between division of labour, fairness, and satisfaction
via a survey of small collaborating workgroups. We found that perceived fairness correlated with several
measures of satisfaction. Here we attempt to sketch interpretations and elaborate on other factors that
could influence satisfaction and decisions about fairness in division of labour.
Our foremost finding was a positive correlation between fairness in division of work and satisfaction
with the process of work assignment. Such a finding is a very direct demonstration of the relationship
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between fairness and satisfaction, and is in line with our initial contentions about the potential importance
of fairness in division of labour. More tentatively, the finding perhaps indicates that fairness is the guiding
workload allocation of choice within groups. However, we must be careful about our claims given the
nature of our data, which is based solely on retrospective self-reports—we cannot definitively state that
increased fairness also leads to increased satisfaction. This is because, although fairness in division of
labour could conceivably lead to greater satisfaction, the reverse is also true in that participants’ memories
about how work was divided could be influenced by their general feelings about the project as a whole.
We would stress that more work is required before any definitive conclusions can be drawn about the
relationships we have identified.
A further finding was that perceived equity in contributions was positively correlated with perceived
fairness in completion of work. This speaks directly to the potential desire for roughly equal contributions,
with those reporting low equality also reporting low satisfaction. However, it is worth noting that two
individuals rated perceived fairness as moderate, but equality as low (fairness>5, equality <2.5, see
Fig. 3.3 above). These ratings could be associated with the assignment of work by competencies—
although there may be some basic expectation for equality, it is not uncommon for the sorts of student
workgroups surveyed here to subdivide and assign tasks based on expertise, e.g. according to skill at
computer programming. A qualitative response provided by one of the individuals in question speaks to
this approach:
“We split the written aspects of the coursework up fairly evenly, but we split the programming
component amongst three of the six of us. We decided as a group that this was the best way to do
it. Generally to compensate for this additional workload, the more complex and time-consuming
parts of the non-programming parts of the coursework were given to the three who weren’t doing the
programming; e.g., the design aspect of the presentation.” [M, 23].
Such an approach might be regarded as fairer but could lead to inequality given that programming
comprised a relatively large part of the students’ assignment. Conversely, some individuals perceived
fairness as low but equality in contributions as high. The individuals in question did not leave qualitative
responses to explain their ratings, but one possibility is that their groups may have chosen to divide
equally without taking competencies into account. Such an approach could cause certain individuals to
struggle with the work, potentially leading to the perception of unfairness. These are, of course, speculative
intuitions, but are nonetheless realistic explanations as to why disjoints between equality and fairness
might have occurred.
We also found that fairness in division of work was correlated with fairness in completion, potentially
implying that initial fairness feeds through into the completion of work. However, this was not true
for all respondents—data in Figure 3.1 suggest that several participants believed that work was initially
allocated on the basis of fairness but ended up unfair by the time of completion. Of course, joint projects
often necessitate the reassignment of workloads, but participants’ qualitative statements suggest that some
groups suffered from free-riding behaviour, in turn offering a potential explanation for the perceived drop
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in fairness. For example, one individual (fairness in division = 5, fairness in completion = 2) offered the
following explanation for his ratings:
“One of our group members left our group a few weeks into the project - therefore our initial work
distribution needing changing. Another issue when distributing work was that there was at least one
team member that we were not entirely satisfied with. And as the project progressed, we became less
trusting of this person’s work and tried to assign tasks that were not overly critical to the progress of
the project. This wasn’t the best “group work” approach, but if this person had been given more work,
it would have fallen to myself and another team member to go over the work to get it up to the level
that we expected and that we would be happy to hand in for assessment.” [M, 20].
The presence of a correlation between social loafing and fairness in completion of work further empha-
sizes this issue, with those reporting high social loafing also reporting very low fairness in completion.
While one might be inclined to suspect that low fairness in completion of work has a universally
negative impact on outcomes, this may not have been the case for all of the individuals we surveyed. Our
analysis of product satisfaction (see Fig. 3.4) indicated that five individuals perceived low fairness but
were, overall, highly satisfied with their group’s collective outputs (n = 5, fairness <3, satisfaction >5).
Although we would stress a need to collect further data on this issue, several potential explanations are
available. First, high product satisfaction in the face of unfairness may again be related to the variance
in individual competencies within our groups of choice. The team structures in our student sample were
externally-imposed, meaning that individuals may suffer the effects of being placed with others who have
little interest in the project. In such cases, non-participation from specific team members might mean that
the remainder of the group has greater control over the project’s content. In turn, individuals who have
contributed more might be unhappy about free-riding but would be more satisfied with a project that had a
greater percentage of their own work within it. A statement from respondent 3 (perceived fairness = 1.5,
product satisfaction = 6) speaks to this: “One member gave awful quality work, and I redid all of it” [M,
20]. An alternative explanation is that individuals might be more satisfied with products that arise out of
adversity. For example, the greater effort investment required to overcome the effects of free-riders might
skew satisfaction with group outputs, leaving individuals feeling the ‘warm glow’ of success (cf. Isen,
1970). Our limited dataset prohibits us from exploring these issues in detail, but each could conceivably be
explored in further work.
Our final correlations of interest were those between established measures such as Task Motivation,
Group Viability, and Group Cohesion. In general, these measures were strongly and positively correlated
with measures of satisfaction. These findings might be regarded as further evidence suggesting that high
scores on these measures are generally associated with better group outcomes (Stokes, 1983; Hackman,
1988; Zaccaro & McCoy, 1988).
Although we have observed correlations between fairness and other variables of interest, some of
the correlations could be problematic if our measures were used as predictors in a regression model.
We initially anticipated that we would use regression in our analysis but could not because our data
violated several of the assumptions that underly regression models. One such assumption is the absence
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of multicollinearity, which occurs when there is high intercorrelation among predictor variables. Such
intercorrelations violate several of the assumptions that underly the mathematical estimation of regression
models. The best regression situation thus occurs when predictor variables correlate with criterion variables
but not with each other (Dancey & Reidy, 2007). Almost all of the explanatory variables in our study were
correlated, e.g. fairness in division and fairness in completion (r = .64) and social loafing and completion
fairness (r = -.82), implying multicollinearity.
We do not believe that multicollinearity is a problem for the present study because we did not
perform regression. It would, however, be prohibitive to more advanced analyses in future work. One
common approach to resolve multicollinearity is to set an arbitrary threshold for correlations among
predictor variables and then eliminate unsuitable predictors from the model. For example, a study by
Reed et al. (1985), which examined the relationship between diet and blood pressure in men, used r >
.7 as the criterion for elimination. Predictor variables that were correlated (e.g. milk and calcium) were
evaluated using separate regression analyses. Other authors (e.g. Mansfield & Helms, 1982; Frost, 2013)
suggest examination of variance inflation factors and standardisation of predictors as ways of resolving
multicollinearity. Neither of these is necessary if one is not performing regression but should be kept in
mind if the reader intends to use our study measures in future work. Since almost all of our variables were
correlated, future research should perhaps explore fairness and satisfaction in relation to other variables,
e.g. the number of persons within the group or the type of work that the group chooses to complete.
Likewise, the correlations between our fairness measures and all three measures of satisfaction are
extremely similar; for example, the strength and direction of the correlation between satisfaction with
process fairness in division (r = .56) is almost identical to that of fairness in completion (r = .57). This
could make it difficult to tease the two apart in a regression model. Future work could benefit from
a cleaner distinction between initial fairness and the way in which agreed allocations played out over
time. This could be achieved by collecting several readings of perceived fairness during completion of
the protracted group assignment. The groups we studied began their group project in October 2011 and
completed the assignment in April 2012. In between these dates was a series of deadlines for various
subcomponents of each group’s project. A future replication could see the researcher take one measure of
fairness at the outset and another at each project interval.
3.5.1 Qualitative Findings
We also gathered participants’ qualitative responses, which, although somewhat limited in number, were
indicative of the sorts of difficulties encountered during divided work. For example, respondents spoke of
the need to rework assignments, problems associated with poorly performing or non-participating team
members, and of the difficulties with monitoring and gauging contributions during collaborative work. This
latter aspect is especially interesting as it hints at a potential opportunity to improve groups’ awareness of
each individual’s contributions to the shared project. This in turn could support judgements about fairness
and, presumably, lead to greater satisfaction if individual members can be held accountable for their lack
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of work.
Overall, our results do suggest that fairness can be a salient concern for collaborating teams, especially
when particular team members fail to contribute in line with fairness norms. We also offered tentative
insights regarding some of the ways in which fairness preferences might conflict with different aspects of
group work. Nevertheless, the fairly limited scope of the present study means that it cannot be regarded as
anything more than an exploration of fairness in division of labour—indeed, this is how the present study
was initially conceived. The following chapter probes our issues of concern in more depth by introducing
an empirical model for exploring division of labour. Chapter 4 introduces the conceptual foundations for
our model, and Chapter 5 reports a series of studies where our model is explored in an empirical setting.
3.5.2 Study Limitations and Future Work
Although the collection of quantitative survey data helped to suggest relationships between variables, it
obscured the fine details about what occurred within each of our surveyed groups. Placing greater emphasis
on qualitative responses would have helped to shed light on some of the issues that arose through our
analyses. Also, if we had managed to obtain a complete results set, i.e. a response from everyone in the
class, group level analysis might have allowed proper comparisons between groups where free-riding
was, and was not, present. The fact that we were not able to get responses from the entire class could
additionally mean that our data is reflective of particular personalities, i.e. prosocial types. It is also
possible that the people who did not respond even after our three mailouts were the free-riders mentioned
by some of our participants.
The Integrated Project unit completed by our respondents is a year-long exercise, and our results are
based on students’ perceptions captured at a single moment in time. It would be interesting to survey
students at intervals during the project to examine how their perceptions about fairness change over time
or on a daily basis over a short period of intense work (prior examples of these approaches can be seen
elsewhere, e.g. Galegher & Kraut, 1990; Druskat & Wolff, 1999). Collecting data at set intervals may
prove pragmatically difficult, however, given that not all groups work at the same speed—the end of the
Integrated Project was the only time at which we could be sure that each group’s progress was similar.
This work could be extended by comparing ratings of satisfaction and fairness against the marks
students were awarded based on their projects. Although our survey results can be interpreted as signalling
a preference for fairness in both process and products, we did not ascertain whether those groups with higher
fairness actually outperformed those where unfairness was rife. In other words, it would be interesting to
explore whether groups with more equal completions of work actually achieve better performance than
other groups. An additional extension would be to collect information about the contributions of each team
member. While it would be possible for us to gain access to such data by checking contribution forms
filled out by the students, we chose not to perform such analyses as we did not have informed consent
from our participants.
Lastly, it is important to note that our survey is reliant on students’ conceptualisations of fairness—
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these are likely to be stable at the individual level but perceptions about what is fair in a team could differ
from person to person. For example, those responsible for the programming parts of the project might
perceive the increased coding load as very unfair, even if the rest of the team perceives a competency-based
approach is much fairer. Thus it is important to bear in mind that perceptions can vary within a group
about who is contributing fairly. Further inter- and intra-group analyses would help to explore these issues.
3.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we reported a survey study of small student workgroups. Our survey was designed to gauge
perceptions about fairness in the initial division of work, as well as in the completion of work during the
project. We investigated the extent to which fairness is correlated with satisfaction with a group’s work
products, the process used to assign work, and the performance of team members. We found that:
• Individuals generally perceived that their group’s workload divisions were made in line with fairness,
but it appears that fairness in the completion of work was less prevalent. This was likely due to the
presence of free-riders within some groups.
• Fairness in the division of work was positively correlated with satisfaction with the process used to
divide work, suggesting a relationship.
• Fairness in the completion of work was positively correlated with equality in contributions, further
implying the relationship between the perception of fairness and a general basis of equality. However,
the issue of competence muddies this relationship—some individuals rated equality as very low, yet
perceived this to be very fair. The reverse was also true, with several individuals reporting high
equality but low fairness. It is possible that this relates to individual skills, in the sense that it may be
regarded as fair for those skilled at a particular task to complete more of it, hence causing noticeable
inequality.
• Fairness in the completion of work showed a positive correlation with satisfaction with products,
though this correlation was somewhat weaker than others in our study. Inspection of the data
indicated that some individuals perceived work as highly unfair but were nevertheless highly
satisfied. We suggested that this may be related to higher individual control, or possibly the result of
a retrospective ‘warm glow’ associated with overcoming the adversity of unfairness.
• Qualitative responses indicated that some groups did experience free-riding and non-participation,
and many spoke to the difficulties of managing divided labour in student teams. We also found that
some individuals considered it difficult to monitor the contributions of team members, in terms of
who had contributed what to the project. This potentially suggests an opportunity for computer
support for fairness.
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In the following chapter, we introduce a novel approach for exploring division of labour in an
experimental setting. Our approach is based on the classic ‘ultimatum game’, a model of negotiation that
has been used to study division of money in hundreds of prior studies. We adapt the model to explore
fairness in the division of workloads.
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MODELLING DIVISION OF LABOUR AS
AN ECONOMIC GAME: BACKGROUND
4.1 Chapter Overview
In Chapter 3 we found that fairness in the division and completion of work was a salient concern for
members of collaborating teams. This chapter offers an alternate perspective on fairness by exploring a
model of division of labour based on an economic game. Our game is based on a particular method from
behavioural economics. As a field, behavioural economics uses experimental methods to examine the
effects of social, cognitive, and emotional factors on the economic decisions of individuals and institutions
(Wilkinson, 2008). Among the field’s chief contributions is a deep literature that explores fairness in the
context of economic decision making (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003). Much of this literature makes use of
simple economic games, examples of which include the much-studied prisoner’s dilemma (Poundstone,
1992) and the classic public goods problem (Komorita & Parks, 1995). Such games typically require
players to make private decisions where individual gain is tempered by negative consequences for the
collective good. The fact that games distil intriguing cooperation problems into crisp and simple form is
of broader scientific appeal because it allows for the exploration of fairness preferences in a controlled
empirical setting (Wilkinson, 2008).
Inspired by the economic literature, this chapter introduces a novel approach to studying fairness in
collaboration. Our approach is based on the idea of modelling division of labour in the style of an ultimatum
game (Gu¨th et al., 1982). We begin by characterising division of labour as a process of negotiation where
collaborators bargain over their individual workloads. We then introduce the classic ultimatum game as a
stylized representation of negotiation, and describe how we have adapted its basic structure so as to explore
fairness in distributive allocations of workload. The remainder of the chapter provides the groundwork for
such an effort by offering a review and critical interpretation of the theoretical and experimental research
on ultimatum games. This allows us to consider the various factors that influence behaviour in ultimatum
games, such that these factors can be controlled in our studies. The chapter ends by reviewing prior use of
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economic games in HCI research. We consider how our game can contribute to this ongoing scheme of
research.
The contribution of this chapter is the distillation of our model, representing the first attempt at
modelling division of labour using an economic game. Our review of relevant experiments guides the
methodology employed in Chapter 5, where we report four studies that explore our model using simple
collaborative information seeking tasks. The accumulation of literature using economic games in HCI is a
further and final contribution.
4.2 Towards a Model of Division of Labour
In this section we consider the nature of division of labour and the extent to which it can be considered as
a negotiatory process. This allows us to draw a clear parallel between classical conceptions of division of
labour and our adaptation of the ultimatum game.
4.2.1 Division of Labour as Negotiation
As we saw in Chapter 2 of this thesis, division of labour is an integral part of many collaborative work
situations and has long been a topic of concern for researchers in CSCW. Numerous authors (e.g., Schmidt
& Bannon, 1992; Schmidt, 1994; Eason, 1996; Mark, Haake, & Streitz, 1996) have recognised that
collaborative work arrangements often necessitate the assignment of tasks among coworkers. An initial
challenge in this regard is to achieve consensus about who is doing what, as well as where, when, and how
work will be done (Schmidt & Bannon, 1992).
Multiple scholars (Freidson, 1976; Strauss, 1985; Schmidt, 1994) characterise the assignment of
workloads as a process of negotiation where allocations are proposed and then accepted or rejected. This
occurs as a back-and-forth process where collaborators repeatedly suggest and evaluate allocations until
an agreement is reached (Freidson, 1976). Specific tasks may also be requested, delegated or proffered
(Freidson, 1976; Strauss, 1985) according to prescribed job roles (Bardram, 1997), organisational policies
and standard operating procedures (Grinter, 1996), or pre-established power structures (Eason, 1996). Yet
in an egalitarian setting where no such structures exist, the division of work is likely negotiated (Freidson,
1976; Strauss, 1985; Rogers, 1993; Schmidt, 1994), and it is this basic setting we propose to model and
explore here.
As described in Chapter 2 of this thesis, division of labour can be viewed as involving both planning
and enacting (cf. Schmidt, 2011), and, in an ideal simplification, these may be considered as two distinct
stages (Galegher & Kraut, 1990). In the initial planning stage, collaborators may agree who will do how
much of what, i.e., an explicitly planned quantitative division of labour. To prevent redundancy, they may
also elect to establish a coordination mechanism, which may also occur through negotiation—deciding
not only who will do how much of what, but also how it will be done. In the second stage, where work is
executed, planned allocations may be followed through, adjusted ad-hoc, e.g. as a result of situated action
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(Suchman, 1987; Bardram, 1997) or explicitly renegotiated.
According to these considerations, we focus on two aspects of division of labour. First, the quantitative
division of subtasks among participants. This issue arises at the initial planning stage and raises the
question of how work should be divided in accordance with skills and abilities, social norms, or local rules
established and held by the group. Our second concern is the enactment of agreed workloads, alongside
the management of redundancy in joint work results.
In line with our prior discussion of workload assignment, we propose to model the planning and
negotiation phase by specifying a simplified version of division of labour in the style of an ultimatum game
(UG). The UG is a particular economic game that has been used extensively in studies of negotiation and
pecuniary bargaining (Thompson, 1996). The following subsection introduces the game and its theoretical
foundations.
4.2.2 The Ultimatum Game: An Empirical Model of Negotiation
The ultimatum game (UG), first studied by Gu¨th, Schmittberger, & Schwarze (1982), is a two-player
bargaining game that boils negotiation down to its most basic and final event (Murnighan & Saxon, 1998).
In a standard version of the game, players are tasked with dividing a known amount of some commodity,
typically a sum of money in the region of US$10.6 One player is randomly assigned to the role of the
proposer and is given an opportunity to suggest a division of the resource. The second player, the responder,
then has the option of accepting or rejecting the proposal. If the offer is accepted, the resource is divided
according to the proposer’s offer. If the offer is rejected, however, neither player receives anything and the
money is lost. In a standard, one-shot version of the UG, either of these outcomes ends the game.
Table 4.1 shows the complete range of payoffs for players in a standard UG with a $10 stake.7 We
can see that there are a range of possible options, each of which carries its own degree of risk and reward.
The question is, how should players behave if they want to navigate this tricky decision scenario? In the
majority of published work on ultimatum games, this question is answered using game theory, a branch
of mathematics concerned with modelling the actions of agents in abstracted economic situations, i.e.,
games (Camerer, 2003). Game theory utilizes the standard economic model of behaviour—which assumes
that players in a game are rational, are motivated by utility-maximisation, and are governed by selfish
concerns (Wilkinson, 2008)—to determine a formal rule for how a particular game should be played. This
rule, commonly known as the ‘unique subgame perfect equilibrium’ (Selten, 1975), is a prediction that
identifies the strategy or set of strategies each player should use if he or she is making the best possible
decision while accounting for the decisions of others. The equilibrium is typically derived by backward
induction: by working through all possible permutations of the game, one can determine which action the
6The dollar amount is given because the majority of published studies have been conducted by American authors. Dollars will
be used here to allow for consistent discussion and comparison of the experimental literature.
7According to the structure provided in Table 4.1, it is technically possible for a proposer to offer nothing to a responder.
However, a responder faced with such an offer has no economic incentive to accept, making the model nothing more than a test of
spiteful punishment. For this reason, the minimum offer in a UG is typically set to $1. Table 4.1 simply provides the full range of
offers for illustrative purposes.
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P1 Chooses
ALLOCATION
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10
ACCEPT
$10 $9 $8 $7 $6 $5 $4 $3 $2 $1 $0 P1 profit
P2 Chooses
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 P2 profit
REJECT
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 P1 profit
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 P2 profit
Table 4.1: Payoff chart for a standard ultimatum game with a $10 stake.
first mover should take in each circumstance, and, correspondingly, what the utility-maximising response
of the second mover should be. The equilibrium prediction, then, is the outcome in which each player’s
utility is maximised relative to other possible choices.
As articulated by Bolton & Zwick (1995), the game-theoretic analysis of ultimatum games begins with
three assumptions:
P1. If players are driven by utility-maximisation, and more money means more utility, then both players
always prefer more money to less.8
P2. Proposers know P1.
P3. Proposers can calculate the optimal offer.
The equilibrium is therefore obtained as follows. Since both players prefer more money to less (P1),
the proposer, who knows this (P2), should offer the smallest possible amount to the responder, allocating
the remaining balance to himself (P3). The responder should then accept this allocation, since rejection is
inconsistent with the desire to maximise monetary reward (P1 again) (Bolton & Zwick, 1995). According
to the canonical model, this should be the only outcome, and no rejections should ever occur.
One benefit of game-theoretic analysis is that it offers a very precise benchmark for assessing behaviour
in the ultimatum game. Yet the key finding from Guth et al.’s original study was that players did not
conform to the equilibrium; instead, players often chose to offer 50% of the resource to their anonymous
counterparts, and, in cases where the monetary distribution was not equal, responders sometimes preferred
to reject the allocation. In other words, rather than opting for the monetary-maximising prediction of game
theory, participants’ decisions indicated a preference for notionally fair outcomes. These findings set the
stage for over 30 years’ worth of research on ultimatum games, much of which has shown that human
behaviour repeatedly violates the canonical economic model in a number of important and eye-opening
ways. The results from the literature, which amounts to hundreds of experiments, can be summarised as
follows:
8The idea that players always prefer more money over less, and will continue to do so irrespective of how much money they
already possess, is known as the non-satiation postulate (Smith, 1976).
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• Studies consistently report offers between 30–40% of the prize pool (Camerer, 2003), with one
meta-analysis of 75 experiments revealing an average offer of 40% of the commodity (Oosterbeek
et al., 2004).
• An even split is the modal outcome in many studies (e.g. Gu¨th et al., 1982; Roth et al., 1991;
Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1994; Croson, 1996; Hoffman et al., 1996a; Kagel et al., 1996;
Larrick & Blount, 1997; Slonim & Roth, 1998).
• Responders frequently reject positive amounts, especially those less than 20% of the total money
available (Camerer, 2003).
• Tiny amounts, i.e. equilibrium offers, are almost always rejected (Camerer, 2003).
Taken together, the findings show that the behaviour of human players in controlled experimental
settings repeatedly deviates from the predictions of the canonical economic model—offers are larger
than predicted and not all offers are accepted. The results can, therefore, be interpreted as showing that
individuals care about fairness and reciprocity in addition to their own payoffs; are willing to incur personal
cost to meet these desires; and are willing to punish those who do not behave in a suitably cooperative
manner (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Henrich et al., 2001). These general findings have been replicated across
a wide variety of cultures (Roth et al., 1991; Buchan et al., 2004; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Chuah et al.,
2007; Chen & Tang, 2009) including more than 10 pre-technological and tribal societies (Henrich et al.,
2001, 2004), suggesting that fairness norms are prevalent throughout human societies. Behaviour also fails
to meet the canonical model over a wide variety of experimental treatments (Camerer, 2003). There is,
however, some considerable variation in behaviour according to the influence of certain variables—such
findings are reviewed in section 4.3 of this chapter.
The UG and its results are important for several reasons. First, the results raise questions about the
veracity of the canonical economic model of behaviour. The very fact that human players care about
fairness norms is evidence against the assumptions of rational, profit-seeking, and individualistic interests.
(As in the classic homo economicus model of humanity). Second, since players do not always act in pursuit
of economic gain, the UG helps to demonstrate the importance of nonmonetary components of utility in
driving behaviour away from the predictions of the standard economic model (Andersen et al., 2011). At a
more general level, the results align with broader contentions about fairness preferences and intolerance of
perceived injustice during negotiations.
Perhaps more importantly for the present thesis, the UG has become something of a workhorse for
exploring fairness, both in economics and in the wider social sciences. This is because the effects of a
given variable can be benchmarked against both the canonical model and the modal outcome of an even
split. Variables can thus be gauged by the extent to which they cause behaviour to shift between the
extremes of pure selfishness and straightforward equality. This in turn makes the UG an extremely useful
tool for examining the myriad factors that impact bargaining per se. The basic UG is of further importance
because it provides a foundation for analysing more complicated types of bargaining (Forsythe et al., 1994;
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Croson, 1996). That is, by progressing from one-off to repeated games, one can build an increasingly
realistic picture of real-world negotiation. Such an approach has allowed researchers to examine the impact
of more complicated phenomena, including learning and reputation effects (e.g. Roth et al., 1991; Knez &
Camerer, 1995; Slonim & Roth, 1998; List & Cherry, 2000).
In summary, the UG provides a succinct experimental window on negotiation and has served as an
important tool for exploring fairness in pecuniary bargaining experiments. However, very little work has
investigated division of other resources in ultimatum-style settings. We propose to study division of labour
using an adapted version of the UG. The following subsection presents our novel transfiguration of the UG
and considers some initial suppositions regarding how players might behave in this game.
4.2.3 A Division of Labour Ultimatum Game
Taking the structure of the UG as an initial framework for studying dyadic bargaining, we present a division
of labour ultimatum game (DLUG), where, rather than bargaining over a commodity that both players are
assumed to want to keep (i.e., money), players instead bargain over a resource that we initially assume
players may prefer to forgo or reduce (i.e., work).
In the DLUG, two players each begin with a task that involves completing a number of work items
independently. Both players have identical tasks and must complete them all in order to fulfil the goals
of their assignment and collect a fixed monetary reward. The players are first given the opportunity to
collaborate, such that the tasks they complete contribute jointly towards the overall work assignment. This
collaboration occurs without affecting their payment, i.e. pay is fixed regardless of how much work each
individual contributes. However, before this collaboration can occur, players must agree a division of
labour. As in the UG, one player acts as the proposer, who begins by suggesting a division of the workload.
The second player becomes the responder, who either accepts or rejects the proposal. In the event of
acceptance, players can collaborate and completed items contribute jointly to a shared project. However,
should the responder reject the allocation, findings cannot be shared and each player must complete his
or her task alone. Either of these outcomes ends the DLUG. Players then move on to complete the work
according to the outcome of the game.
Table 4.2 displays the range of payoffs in a DLUG with 10 work items, used here as a straightforward
mapping of the typical $10 stake used in the classic UG. In order to offer an initial analysis of our game,
we begin by making the following three assumptions. First, and in the spirit of the economic literature, we
assume that players are economically rational in that they wish to maximise their rate of pay per unit of
work. Since an individual’s payment is not contingent on the quantity of work he or she agrees to complete,
players should seek to minimise their individual workloads. Our second assumption is that players always
prefer less work to more, irrespective of what the work actually involves. Our final assumption is that
players are selfish and have no regard for the quantity of work completed by their anonymous counterpart,
i.e. the relative size of individual payoffs does not matter. Each person is simply interested in minimising
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P1 Chooses
WORKLOAD ALLOCATION
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
ACCEPT
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 P1 workload
P2 Chooses
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 P2 workload
REJECT
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 P1 workload
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 P2 workload
Table 4.2: Payoff chart for a standard division of labour ultimatum game (DLUG) involving 10 work
items.
his or her workload to gain the monetary reward.9
Following the example of the UG, the equilibrium prediction for our DLUG is derived as follows.
Since both players are assumed to prefer fewer work items, a self-interested proposer faced with a total
surplus of 10 work items should delegate the maximum possible amount (i.e., 9) to the responder.10 As this
offer confers an initial 10% reduction in workload, any responder faced by such an offer should accept, as
rejection would be inconsistent with the aim of minimising work. As with the UG, this should be the only
outcome, and no rejections should ever occur. Players then proceed to complete their allocations, with
each person receiving their reward after completion of their agreed individual workload.
The way in which players might behave in the DLUG is currently an open question. On the basis of
findings from the classic UG, we might expect that the equilibrium outcome identified above would be
relatively rare, with offers instead converging around the point of an even split. This is because, as we saw
earlier, responders in the UG typically reject tiny offers due to their apparent unfairness, and proposers,
who usually anticipate this behaviour, try to avoid rejection by proposing equitable or near-equitable splits.
It is also worth noting that there are several differences between our model and the classic UG, and it
would be interesting to explore the impact of these changes. For instance, the UG is strictly a measure of
distributive fairness, and there is no further interaction once the responder chooses their action. Yet players
in our game must actually proceed to complete the work in accordance with their agreed outcome. Perhaps
this additional stage might provide insights regarding distributive and procedural fairness, beyond what is
capable with the standard UG. Additionally, players would need to engage in some basic collaborative
interactions to manage their division of labour, perhaps to prevent redundancy if the task demands it. The
need to communicate while enacting allocations might also be important, in terms of ensuring agreed
9We regard these as simplifying assumptions, and we do not wish to make an extended argument for work minimisation to be
the de facto approach to the DLUG. Nor do we argue that this is the correct or most socially acceptable way for players to behave
when dividing labour. Rather, we aim to specify how a rational DLUG player might behave if he or she is solely interested in
work minimisation (or, by extension, optimisation of wage), in much the same way that the canonical economic model is used as
a benchmark for traditional economic experiments.
10Recall that the minimum offer in a UG is set to $1 so as to provide the responder with an incentive to accept. We adopt a
similar approach to the DLUG, with a maximum work allocation of 9 items. If the maximum offer were all 10 work items, there
is no clear reason for a responder to accept beyond pure altruism.
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allocations are kept or by allowing said agreements to be renegotiated.
In the following chapter, we put these considerations to the test by implementing and exploring our
DLUG in a series of empirical studies. The remainder of this chapter lays the foundations for the studies
in three ways. Because the UG is known to be sensitive to many aspects of experimental design, the
following section provides a detailed review of factors that are known to impact allocations in UGs—such
a review allows for proper control of these issues in our own experiments. We then consider some of
the primary theoretical explanations for UG behaviour. This allows for an informed discussion when
appraising our results later in the thesis. We then reflect on the merit, and prior use of, experimental games
in HCI research. The chapter closes by considering how our model elaborates on this prior work.
4.3 Factors Affecting Behaviour in Ultimatum Games
This section delves into the literature on ultimatum games to provide a clear synopsis of the available
evidence. We offer this review as it exposes factors relevant to our game and demonstrates that we did not
utilise the game in ignorance of prior work. The review allows us to understand the impact of a wide range
of independent variables—an immediate implication is that such variables will need to be controlled if we
are to adapt the game successfully. Thus, after describing empirical results associated with each variable,
we will sketch a brief methodological implication to illustrate how the findings will inform the experiments
reported in the following chapter. Subsection 4.3.5, found at the end of the review, then considers the
theoretical implications of the surveyed results in terms of their relevance for the present thesis.
In addition, the body of work we will describe further illustrates how the prediction of the canonical
economic model, which views ‘rationality’ as strictly profit-seeking, is almost never supported. Instead,
what will become apparent is that people appear to behave ‘rationally’ in a social, rather than economic,
sense. For example, the economic model predicts that people should accept any offer, yet small offers
tend to be rejected in practice. While rejection of a small offer is costly in economic terms, it is likely
to be socially rewarding because it presents an opportunity to give payback for an insulting offer. It is
therefore not surprising that people are content to punish small offers because the social payoff associated
with rejection is likely to outweigh the financial gain that would stem from accepting. However, if the
right to make small offers was legitimised through an established and mutually recognisable claim to a
greater share of the resource, it might be considered socially irrational to respond with rejection because
such a decision would ignore one individual’s entitlements (cf. our definition of fairness from Chapter 2).
The ability of the UG to tease out such complexities is something that is very much demonstrated within
this review. We will examine the ways in which different variables can cause allocations to shift away
from (and towards) the modal outcome of an even split, and we will see how superficially ‘unfair’ offers,
as characterised by inequity, can be legitimised as fair according to various influential factors. Exploration
of these issues is not only illustrative in terms of theory but also provides a backdrop to the experimental
variables explored in Chapter 5, allowing for considered interpretation of our own findings.
The present review is organised in accordance with three categories of variable: methodological and
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structural, descriptive, and demographic.11 We also introduce the dictator game (DG) (cf. Kahneman
et al., 1986a), the structure of which is described in more detail in subsection 4.3.1 below. In brief, the
DG is a simple variant of the UG in which responders cannot reject the allocation. In this way, it presents
a very clean test of distributive generosity. We feel it is appropriate to consider the DG in this review
because of its close relation to the UG (many studies employ both to compare behaviour across different
treatments) and because the DG serves as inspiration for one of the experiments reported in Chapter 5 of
this thesis. While the review is scoped to consider the ultimatum and dictator games, it is worth noting that
the general findings are applicable to other economic games, e.g. the aforementioned public goods and
prisoner’s dilemma problems.
4.3.1 Probing Fear of Rejection: The Dictator Game
The dictator game (DG) (cf. Kahneman et al., 1986a) is a simple variant of the UG in which the responder’s
opportunity to reject an offer is removed from the bargaining situation. Thus, the proposer in a DG simply
chooses how to divide the surplus and the responder, who has no recourse, receives whatever has been
allocated. The equilibrium in a one-shot situation with a $10 stake is easy to derive: the proposer keeps
everything and the responder receives nothing whatsoever.12 This model has been used to explore the
extent to which the high number of equitable offers in the UG can be explained by proposers’ fear of
rejection (e.g. Guth & Tietz, 1988; Ochs & Roth, 1989; Kravitz & Gunto, 1992). Fear of rejection is
of interest to economists because, if true, it would suggest that fairness in the UG arises from strategic
thinking, rather than as a result of prosocial preferences for equity and sharing (Hoffman et al., 1996b).
The first comprehensive comparison of ultimatum and dictator game giving was effected by Forsythe
et al. (1994). In their experiments, 65% of UG proposals resulted in even splits, compared to just 22% in
the DG. The percentage of heavily inequitable offers was also much higher in the DG: overall, 36% of
dictators gave nothing to their counterparts, with a further 30% offering a tiny fraction of the pie. Such
offers were entirely absent from the UG treatments.
Hundreds of dictator experiments have been reported since the original work of Forsythe et al., and
the results continue to support the original hypothesis about fear of rejection. For example, a recent
meta-analysis of 616 DG treatments found that the average offer was 28.35% of the pie (Engel, 2011).
When this figure is compared to the mean 40% offer in ultimatum games (Camerer, 2003; Oosterbeek
et al., 2004), it seems clear that people are less generous on average in dictator games. However, it is
worth noting that the results are still well above the offer predicted by the canonical economic model. This
implies that, although the fear of rejection can partly explain the frequency of equitable offers in the UG,
11We wish to acknowledge that the structure of this section is loosely based on a prior review of economic literature by Nick
Wilkinson (2008). However, our review differs to his work in that our focus is solely on the ultimatum game and its foremost
variant, the dictator game, and we omit certain variables that cannot be explored using these games. Our review is also more
up-to-date and incorporates literature from 2008 onwards.
12Note that this differs to the UG in that a dictator game typically has no minimum offer. The UG requires a minimum offer
of $1 because, without an incentive to accept, the game simply becomes a test of the responder’s taste for punishment. A $0
allocation in the dictator game, however, is meaningful because it demonstrates total selfishness on the part of the dictator.
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other factors are at work and people do still behave somewhat altruistically even when they cannot be
punished for selfishness.
For our purposes, the DG is important because it is akin to a control condition for the UG: by comparing
results from the two, experimenters can “observe how much more people propose because of fear... as
opposed to, loosely, simply being generous” (Kurzban, 2013, online). Because the differences between
ultimatum and dictator games are interesting from a theoretical standpoint, and because a majority of
experiments use both games, the remainder of this review shall consider the extent to which our surveyed
variables impact behaviour in both of these games.
4.3.2 Methodological and Structural Variables
Variables in this category change how experiments are conducted and are important since they are for the
most part controllable. This means that, through proper manipulation and experimental control, individual
factors and their effects can be isolated and studied systematically.
4.3.2.1 Repetition and Learning
A large majority of ultimatum and dictator experiments are typically run as one-shot affairs, where
participants arrive at the lab, play one round of the game, and then leave with their respective earnings.
Several authors (e.g. Roth et al., 1991; List & Cherry, 2000) have argued that such experiments do not
provide ample opportunities for learning; the supposition is that, if participants were afforded more time to
shed their naivety and learn about the game through repeated trials, behaviour might converge towards the
equilibrium prediction of the canonical model.
The effect of learning can be studied in two ways: either by iterating resolved games to examine
inter-game learning, or by allowing proposers to iterate their offer in a single game, thereby studying
intra-game learning effects. Regarding the former, studies have found a slight tendency for offers and
rejections to fall over time, suggesting convergence towards self-interest after repeated play. For example,
Roth et al. (1991) observed a small decrease in offer size from players from four different cultures playing
ultimatum games over 10 rounds. In a different experiment, Slonim & Roth (1998) found that, over the
course of 10 rounds of ultimatum play, offers declined in tandem with increased experience but only in
high stakes games for a week’s wages. A similar result was obtained in another 10 round experiment by
List & Cherry (2000), who observed that responders became more willing to accept inequitable offers over
time. However, tiny offers were still rejected about 60% of the time, with players only willing to accept
offers in the region of 20–30% in later rounds.
Contrasting evidence from other authors suggests that players may in fact become more generous if
given the opportunity to learn. For example, Oosterbeek et al. (2004) found that when UG results were
aggregated and meta-analysed, repeated play actually increased the proposed share and did not significantly
impact rejection rates—this directly contradicts what the learning argument would predict! More recently,
Brenner & Vriend (2006) conducted an experiment where groups of proposers played 100 rounds of the
66
4.3. FACTORS AFFECTING BEHAVIOUR IN ULTIMATUM GAMES
UG against computer-generated agents. The humans knew they were playing against computers—this,
according to the researchers, should remove all considerations about fairness and reciprocity.13 Results
from four groups of human players showed that players did not learn to make the equilibrium offer, and
were instead boundedly rational, testing the problem space by making a variety of offers and then persisting
with the ones that provided ‘good enough’ payoffs without provoking rejection.
Turning to intra-game repetition, Gneezy et al. (2003) studied a ‘reverse’ ultimatum game in which
proposers had multiple chances to offer an allocation to responders. The game followed the structure of a
standard UG, except that, when a responder chose to reject, the proposer was able to make further offers
until either the responder accepted or the proposer decided to terminate the game (in which case neither
party received anything). However, the proposer was only permitted to increase his or her offer after a
rejection, meaning that responders should reject offers until the maximum possible amount is allocated.
As it transpired, when participants bargained over a surplus of 25 tokens, the modal accepted offer was an
allocation of 13 chips, with 12 the next highest (i.e., the two possible splits closest to equality). When
participants were given a deadline to encourage last-minute, delayed offers, average allocations were
higher than expected: 11.5 and 10.4 chips under three- and one-minute deadlines, respectively. The study
does not support the learning argument since responders did not continually reject offers in the baseline
condition, and, with deadlines, proposers did not wait until the last minute to make the utility-maximising
offer.
In sum, the evidence in this area is mixed, meaning that the impact of learning is unresolved—this
issue is a current research area in experimental economics (e.g. Chen & Gazzale, 2004; Mengel, 2012;
Grimm & Mengel, 2012). What is clear is that, even in studies where learning effects were found, the
extreme predictions of the canonical model were unsupported. While repeated play is important, one-shot
games are a better starting point because they allow for control of punishment strategies (Roth et al., 1991)
and reputation effects (Hoffman et al., 1996a). For our purposes, this means that it will be best to begin
with a one-shot version of our DLUG before attempting iteration.
4.3.2.2 Anonymity
In economic games, the behaviour of participants may be influenced by a lack of anonymity. The
knowledge that decisions are under scrutiny could cause participants to behave in a certain way so as to
appear ‘nice’. Similarly, participants may seek to understand the object of the study in order to appease the
experimenter or maximise their chances of receiving invitations to future studies (cf. Hoffman et al., 1994).
These concerns are especially problematic for economists seeking to draw conclusions about underlying
preferences—fair offers may not reflect participants’ preferences but may instead represent attempts at
playing up to what they believe is the ‘correct’ or most socially desirable behaviour (Levitt & List, 2007).
Some fairly elaborate experimental designs have been created in order to test for the effects of
13It is worth noting that people have a tendency to treat computers as if they were people (Reeves & Nass, 1996), and it is not,
therefore, necessarily certain that all ‘emotional’ concerns regarding fairness were removed.
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anonymity. While economics experiments usually involve a reasonable level of anonymity anyway,
multiple studies have sought to explore the impact of perceived scrutiny by tightening the level of
anonymity between participants and the experimenter. In an early example, Hoffman et al. (1994) used a
dictator game involving double-blind anonymity, where participants were required to place their allocations
into envelopes and then insert the envelopes into a sealed box. This process guaranteed complete isolation
of individual decisions—no individual, including the experimenter or any later observer of the data, could
know who had made which decision, and participants were aware of this fact. The researchers found that
players were much more selfish in the double-blind condition: 62% of the allocations were made at the
equilibrium ($0), compared to a control group with just 8%. Bolton & Zwick (1995) report similar results
for ultimatum games—double-blind anonymity resulted in a 10% increase in zero offers, as compared
to a control condition. However, a more recent meta-analysis of dictator games by Engel (2011) did not
find a significant effect for double-blind anonymity on benevolence unless the experiment was iterated.
Thus, while scrutiny from the experimenter does appear to result in more socially acceptable allocation
behaviour (i.e. fairness), it is possible that anonymity only matters in more complicated designs.
Other work has shown how relaxing the level of anonymity between participants can influence fairness.
Bohnet & Frey (1999) designed a study with three treatments: a standard anonymous DG; a DG where the
recipient was identifiable to the dictator; and a two-way identification where both dictators and recipients
could identify one another visually. The researchers also varied the procedure in the one-way identifiability
condition, whereby some recipients held a number in their hands so that dictators could identify them.
Others also stated their name, city of origin and academic major. In the high-anonymity condition, 28%
of dictators kept all the money for themselves, whereas none of the dictators in the one- and two-way
identifiability cells chose to keep all of the money. Participants in the two-way identifiability condition
were most generous, with over 70% giving away half of their resource. Other studies have found that
generosity increases if participants feel as though they are being watched (Haley & Fessler, 2005), are
knowingly filmed (Wilson et al., 2010), or are primed with material about omniscient dieties (Shariff &
Norenzayan, 2007) while making their decisions.
Based on these results, it appears that anonymity does affect allocations, although behaviour still
does not conform to the canonical model. Participants are more likely to behave in line with fairness
norms when they feel as though their behaviour is scrutinised, but when decisions are perceived as
anonymous and unidentifiable, participants are more likely to become selfish. However, one problem
with the studies in this area is that it is unclear whether these behaviours stem from greater distance
between participants and the experimenter, or from participants and other participants. In other words,
the conceptual differences between whether participants are concerned about being identified by the
experimenter, by other participants in the experiment (who may or may not be peers), or indeed by both,
are quite poorly defined. The only way to navigate this issue would be to manipulate these two aspects
independently—one might expect that decisions would be highly selfish when participants feel as though
they are entirely anonymous and free from scrutiny, though no work has yet attempted this.
In terms of our own work, the present results emphasize the need to ensure that anonymity is controlled
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between, and within, conditions. We identify two courses of action: first, participants in our experiments
should have anonymity from one another—this will allow for the impact of identifiability to be assessed at
a later date. Second, anonymity between the participants and the experimenter needs to be fixed. We opt
for two-way identifiability between subjects and facilitators. While this may increase feelings of scrutiny
among participants to levels beyond what they would experience in everyday life, it alleviates the need for
complicated double-blind procedures. We can also suppress this scrutiny by indicating in the experimental
protocols that participants should keep their decisions private and not read them aloud to the facilitator.
4.3.2.3 Communication
Prior work has identified that communication has a strong impact on benevolence in experimental games
(Sally, 1995), and it is for this reason that participants are not usually allowed to communicate beyond
the written exchange of their offers. In both the UG and the DG, communication typically leads to an
increase in the number of equitable offers. In a study by Bohnet & Frey (1999), dictators listened to
recipients talk about themselves and their academic major—this manipulation led to a fair split becoming
the modal outcome, with 40% of dictators actually giving more than half. However, an earlier study by
Frey & Bohnet (1997) found that when dictators were faced with two recipients, generosity was shown
only to the recipient with whom dictators were allowed to communicate. This clarifies that communication
results in target-specific sympathy rather than a general feeling of generosity (Wilkinson, 2008).
Other work has explored the impact of ‘cheap talk’ (lies, threats, and promises) in UGs. Croson et al.
(2003) used a four-round UG with varying pie sizes and outside options for responders (an outside option
is a sum, typically 10–20% of the surplus on offer, that is guaranteed to the responder should they choose
to reject an allocation). Both sets of players were allowed to pass notes to their respective partners in order
to exchange information about their intentions. There were three findings: first, when responders lied
about the size of their outside option, offers from proposers were larger. Second, threats of rejection from
responders significantly increased offers. Third, proposers who lied about the size of the pie were able to
make significantly lower offers without lowering the probability of their acceptance. These results are
perhaps best regarded as demonstrating the mediating effects of communication on cooperation; while it
can be used to deceive and gain unfair advantages, it can also be used to enforce compliance with social
norms, as with those responders who threatened to reject unsatisfactory offers.
In sum, the impact of communication is such that experimenters try to minimise it by, as mentioned
above, disallowing all communication beyond the written exchange of offers and acceptances among
participants. The implication for our work might be that participants should not be allowed to communicate.
However, this would be very restrictive in terms of exploring collaborative work, which, as articulated in
Chapter 2, is underpinned by communication. We will strive for a faithful replication of the procedure used
in economic methods by restricting communication during the DLUG allocation procedure. Participants
will then be allowed to communicate freely during enactment of the agreed workloads. This will offer a
sufficiently rich picture of collaboration while avoiding the potential impact of friendly communication on
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the DLUG outcome.
4.3.2.4 Stake Size
Recall that the typical financial stake in a UG experiment lies in the region of $10. Sceptics of economic
experiments argue that such a relatively inconsequential sum is incapable of inducing realistic behavioural
responses because the amount to be rejected is a pittance (see Camerer & Thaler, 1995, page 210). The
supposition, then, is that bargaining over high stakes will create a shift towards self-interest, and hence the
predictions of the canonical model. Similarly, responders should also be less likely to reject if the cost
amounts to more than a couple of dollars.
The evidence from studies exploring this question shows only a weak effect for stake size, consistent
over a variety of pecuniary amounts and research populations. An early test by Forsythe et al. (1994) found
that the size of the pie ($5 versus $10) did not affect distribution of offers. Similarly, Hoffman et al. (1996a)
found that allocations were comparable between low and high stake sizes ($10 versus $100) and not all
offers were accepted in the high stakes condition. In some cases substantial offers were rejected, including
two out of five $30 offers in the high stakes condition. Overall, however, when the data were combined
with that from two other studies (Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1994), the only significant result
was that responders were less likely to reject when stakes were higher. More recent meta-analyses confirm
these findings for both ultimatum (Oosterbeek et al., 2004) and dictator games (Engel, 2011).
However, the aforementioned studies are problematic because rejection of $30 is not that high compared
to, say, rejecting hundreds or even thousands of dollars. Other studies have explored this issue by decamping
to countries where the typical stake used in an American experiment has a much higher purchasing power.
Some studies suggest that increasing stake size does not impact behaviour: a study conducted in the Slovak
Republic (now Slovakia) by Slonim & Roth (1998) compared ultimatum play over 60 Slovak crowns
(SK, equivalent to 10$ at the time of the experiments) and 1500SK (equivalent to the average weekly
wage for Slovaks at the time). They found no significant difference between offers in low and high stakes
games during one-round games, though responders were about 10% less likely to reject in high stakes
conditions. A similar experiment in Indonesia by Cameron (1999) raised the stakes to three times the
monthly expenditure of an average participant. Overall, Cameron’s results were similar to the Slonim
& Roth study, in that a fair offer was the modal outcome and no significant impact was found for stake
size on proposer behaviour. Responders were also more willing to accept unfair offers in the high stakes
condition.
Alternative evidence comes from List & Cherry (2000), who examined the dual impacts of stakes and
learning. They found that, over the course of 10 rounds of ultimatum play, proposers did become more
selfish with their offers. However, this effect only occurred when the stake was $400—self-interested
behaviour was much less common with a $20 stake. They also found that, although stakes had no impact
on rejections of tiny offers (such offers were almost always rejected), the mean rejection rate decreased
in the high stakes condition, indicating that responders were more willing to accept lower offers when
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the stakes were higher. List & Cherry explain their results using cognitive cost theory, intimating that the
cost of deriving the equilibrium strategy is too high when stakes are low. It is possible that the increase in
stakes makes the decision seem more important—prior work does argue that heuristics are less likely to be
applied in important decisions than in trivial or unimportant ones (Sherman & Corty, 1984). However, it
is still interesting that the behaviour of participants in List & Cherry’s study was tempered by fairness
concerns—people did not become totally self-interested. A more recent experiment by Andersen et al.
(2011) also found that high stakes leads to inequity. They conducted an experiment in several villages in
Meghalaya, Northeast India, with a maximum stake size of 20,000 rupees, equivalent to just over a year’s
income in the villages in question. They found that offers were significantly lower with high stakes when
compared to other low stakes environments, and there were significantly fewer rejections in the year’s
wage condition.
Based on these studies, the canonical model is not supported unless the stake is very high and stands
to have a major impact on an individual’s life. For responders, the pecuniary reward may dominate
the punishment value at higher stakes, but may be outweighed by the punishment value at lower stakes.
However, stakes may not have this effect “if, as stakes increase, a responder’s utility from punishing a
proportionally small offer rises at least as much as his utility increases” (pp. 578 Slonim & Roth, 1998).
Fairness perceptions, then, still matter at high stakes, but people are certainly more willing to tolerate
inequity if the amount they each receive is sufficiently large.
Although the evidence in this area is mixed, the studies detailed above at least imply that stakes are
worth controlling. It is not difficult to imagine that participants could become significantly more likely to
delegate tasks if their workload is unreasonably high or if the work itself is especially arduous. As we do
not yet know the exact impact substituting money with work, we will use a straightforward mapping of 10
work items in place of 10 units of currency. We can only speculate as to the relative utility of contributing
each work item to a joint project, but using a 10 item task will at least allow for superficial comparisons
between our results and the $10 stake used in most UG experiments.
4.3.2.5 Entitlement
As outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, fairness is based on equality but also accounts for the entitlements
and needs of each involved party. Researchers have explored the impact of perceived entitlements, both
to roles and resources, on ultimatum bargaining. Based on our own understanding of fairness, we might
expect that those who perceive themselves as bearing a legitimate claim would attempt to retain more of a
surplus when asked to divide it. Empirical evidence suggests this to be true, and a variety of techniques
have been employed to induce the feeling of entitlement.
Gu¨th & Tietz (1986) (cited in Hoffman et al., 1994) used a design where the roles of proposer and
responder were independently auctioned to the highest bidder. They found that participants generally paid
more for the right to be the proposer, and the recognition that proposers had paid a higher price led to
smaller offers and increased rates of acceptance. An alternate approach was employed by Hoffman et al.
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(1994), who asked participants to complete a general knowledge quiz prior to playing the UG. Participants
with the highest quiz scores were awarded the role of proposer, and the researchers expected that this sense
of deservedness would lead to smaller offers. On average, offers fell by about 10% when the proposer role
was earned, as compared to a control condition where the modal outcome was a fair split. Moreover, this
decrease in offer size was achieved without significantly raising the frequency of rejections, implying that
the entitlement gained perceived legitimacy in the eyes of both participants.
Evidence from studies of the dictator game provides similar insight regarding entitlements. An
experiment by Cherry (2001) used two conditions, one a standard DG, and the other a DG where dictators
completed an earnings task which involved making bets on the outcomes of a lottery. Total earnings were
then based on the results of the betting. In the baseline condition, 74% of dictators allocated a positive
amount, with 14% offering half of the money. In the earnings treatment, however, only 24% of dictators
made a positive offer and there were no equal splits. Similar results were obtained by Cherry, Frykblom, &
Shogren (2002) who found that the number of zero offers rose from 17% to 80% when dictators earned
their endowments, increasing to 96% when the earnings task was combined with a double-blind anonymity
procedure. Evidence from a recent experiment (Carlsson et al., 2013) suggests that behavioural differences
concerning earned wealth remain true in the field; dictators were significantly less likely to give their
payment away when it was earned.
Other work has explored perceived entitlements claims for both dictators and recipients. Oxoby &
Spraggon (2006) found that when dictators earned the right to claim the wealth by completing a quiz (but
recipients did not) dictators kept all of their money 100% of the time. But, when the recipient’s claim to
the money was established via an earnings task (which was not completed by the dictator in this condition),
just 5% of dictators kept all the money, and, in some cases, dictators gave away all of the endowment to
the recipient. List & Cherry (2008) report a similar experiment except both participants completed an
earnings task. They found that approximately 90% of dictators subsequently gave nothing, as compared to
70% in a condition where only dictators earned their wealth and 50% in a baseline condition. One other
study by Eckel & Grossman (1996) revealed that offers increased if a responder is perceived as especially
deserving. When dictators were offered the opportunity to allocate some of their $10 endowment to an
anonymous student, participants donated an average of 10% of their payoff, but when the recipient was
identified as the American Red Cross, participants donated an average of just over 30%. While the fact
that allocations increase if a benefactor seems more deserving of aid feels intuitively obvious, the donation
of more to a charity is theoretically interesting as it suggests that the moral cost associated with not giving
money to a charity may be higher, meaning that aversion to feelings of guilt may guide offer sizes.
The findings concerning entitlements are one of the more reliable manipulations to be found in the
literature, and because entitlements can shift allocations both towards and away from equity, the results are
again problematic for the canonical model. We argue that entitlement manipulations actually demonstrate
compliance with fairness norms; equity is not always the fairest outcome, especially when entitlements are
present. In our own experiments, we will not manipulate perceived entitlements in our baseline conditions.
This will provide a clean test of participants’ preferences, as revealed in the absence of rationale that would
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suggest one allocation over another.
4.3.2.6 Number of Players
Several studies have incorporated multiple responders to explore how players evaluate their own payoffs
relative to those of others. For example, Knez & Camerer (1995) used a design involving a single
proposer who made simultaneous offers to two responders. The researchers found that responders disliked
relative inequity and would typically compare their own payoffs; if the difference was too high, rejection
was significantly more likely. Even a 50 cent increase in the first responder’s payoff relative to the
second’s doubled the likelihood of rejection. However, another finding was that responders were even
more concerned about their own payoff relative the proposer’s, and another study in three-person games
involving an active and non-active responder showed that allocations of between 10–15% to non-active
recipients were only rejected by active responders about 5% of the time (Gu¨th & Van Damme, 1998). This
indicates that players tend to be mainly concerned about fairness in relation to active others, rather than to
all involved parties per se. In the present thesis, our experiments will focus on two player bargaining to
restrict the impact of having multiple counterparts in the work scenario.
4.3.2.7 Available Information
The information held by each player can also impact allocations. In ultimatum games, information is
usually explored by introducing an asymmetry where one player knows more than the other about some
aspect of the game. Regarding the amount of money to be divided, responders may be in one of three
states of knowledge: perfect information, where the amount on offer is known for certain; imperfect
information, where the possible pie sizes and their probability distribution are known; or no information,
where no knowledge about the pie size is held whatsoever. In the latter circumstance, one might expect that
proposers could lower their offers without risking the threat of rejection. Responders might also become
more willing to accept low offers as they have no way of comparing their payoff to that of the proposer.
The general finding concerning this manipulation is that responders are more likely to accept smaller
offers under circumstances of incomplete or no information (e.g. Mitzkewitz & Nagel, 1993; Straub &
Murnighan, 1995; Croson, 1996; Rapoport et al., 1996; Croson et al., 2003). Since small offers could
indicate a small pie size, and no opportunity for social comparison exists when the pie size is not known,
responders seem willing to give proposers the benefit of the doubt and would rather receive some money
than none. Of greater interest is the behaviour of proposers: Croson (1996), for example, observed that
offers were significantly lower when proposers knew that responders could not determine the total size of
the pie. A subsequent study showed that this behaviour was also sensitive to knowledge about a responder’s
outside option, with proposers offering about 10% more when the exact size of the option was known
(Croson et al., 2003).
Information can also be manipulated by concealing or varying participants’ knowledge about the
relative value of payoff items. Kagel et al. (1996) investigated fairness by using a design where UG players
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were tasked with dividing 100 tokens. The experimenters manipulated both the value of the tokens (a
single token was worth either 10 or 30 cents to each player) and the information given to each player about
relative values (i.e. whether or not both players are aware of the true value of tokens in their respective trial,
and whether or not this awareness is common knowledge). When both players are paid equally for their
tokens, and both are aware of this fact, the situation becomes a standard UG, with 100 tokens equivalent to
$10. But things are quite different when each player’s chips are of a different value. If a proposer knows
that chips are worth 30 cents to him but only 10 cents to a responder, a truly fair offer would require an
allocation of 75% of the chips. Such an allocation would mean that the monetary payoff each receives
from the tokens finishes up equal. But since only the proposer knows the true value of his tokens, he can
offer exactly half and appear fair while actually receiving more money than the responder. This outcome
is exactly what was observed during the study—the mean offer in the asymmetric condition was 46%,
meaning that the proposer’s take home pay is actually much greater than the responder’s. Since responders
had no reason to believe this was an unfair offer, rejections were almost non-existent. This study supports
the argument that proposers merely want to seem, rather than be, fair, and is important as it demonstrates
how information asymmetry can sometimes lead to self-interested behaviour.
Finally, information can also be provided about the past histories of players, in terms of their previous
offers or behaviour. Such information can provide a reference point for fairness judgements, and brings
bargains closer to real-world situations where reputation effects are likely to play a role. Perhaps not
surpisingly, several studies have found that players tend to offer more to other players who have a visible
history of fair play (Knez & Camerer, 1995; Cason & Mui, 1998) and in the study by Croson et al. (2003)
reported above, responders demanded more and were more likely to reject offers from proposers who had
lied and behaved unfairly in previous ultimatum bargains.
For our own work, information will be easy to control—we will simply ensure that players have
complete knowledge of the payoffs and that the information given to players is equal. This will allow
for future manipulations of information availability. (Such a manipulation is explored in Thesis Study 4,
reported in the following chapter).
4.3.3 Descriptive Variables
Descriptive variables are those that alter superficial aspects of the experiment, particularly in the way
the situation is presented to participants. Here we focus on framing effects induced via changes to the
experimental protocols.
4.3.3.1 Framing Effects
Framing effects, which refer to simple changes in the descriptive language used to present an action or a
series of options, have been studied extensively in the literature on contingent weighting in judgement
and choice (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The main finding is that frames can affect the outcomes of
choice problems, to the extent that actions can be systematically altered according to the way in which a
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particular decision outcome is framed (see Tversky et al., 1988).
Regarding ultimatum and dictator games, studies have shown that procedural frames, which are
defined as “ways of describing actions in structurally equivalent allocation procedures” (Larrick & Blount,
1997, p. 810), can suppress equitable allocations. Hoffman et al. (1994) examined how varying the
instructions in an ultimatum game can negatively impact equitable offers. Their first condition used
standard instructions that asked participants to ‘divide’ the resource; the second used instructions framing
the experiment as an ‘exchange’ between buyers and sellers, thought to induce more self-interested
behaviour by invoking behavioural norms associated with competition. The study showed that the average
offer size was significantly lower (by almost 10%) when the game was framed as a buyer/seller exchange,
with the percentage of equitable offers falling by about 30% overall. A similar effect was observed in
dictator games: about 40% of dictators made equitable splits with standard instructions, yet with the
exchange instructions there were no fair offers and zero allocations increased by 20% (Hoffman et al.,
2008).
Procedural frames can also enhance cooperation in games. Larrick & Blount (1997) used two
conditions: one with the standard ‘division’ language, and a second where players ‘claimed’ an amount of
the resource. The researchers found that 56% of splits were equitable in the claim condition compared to
35% in the divide frame. Participants were also more likely to accept zero offers under the claim language.
The authors argue that the ‘claim’ language implies equality of ownership, whereas the divide language
is more confrontational—perhaps proposing a ‘division’ implies that player one has control over player
two’s outcome.
Finally, a study by Croson (1996) examined the effect of making proposals in percentages versus
dollar amounts. Evidence from the contigent weighting literature suggests that when offers are made in
percentage terms, making relative payoffs more salient, greater weight is assigned to fairness considerations
(Tversky et al., 1988; Croson, 1996). Croson observed that the framing of an offer as a percentage caused
rejection rates and average demands to increase, as compared to offers framed as pecuniary amounts.
These results were consistent with the predictions based on contigent weighting—when fairness is made
salient via expressing allocations as a percentage amount, equitable allocations increase.
We will make use of these findings in three ways. First, we will use instructions from prior UG
experiments as a basis for own studies. This will ensure that our protocols are couched in the lingua
franca of the related literature. Second, we will keep language consistent from study to study, i.e. by not
arbitrarily changing from ‘allocating’ work to ‘delegating’ or ‘claiming’ workload. Finally, we will use
absolute figures rather than percentages when describing participants’ workload assignments.
4.3.4 Demographic Variables
Numerous studies have explored the impact of demographic variables on ultimatum and dictator behaviour.
Here we explore three variables that may be relevant to the design of our own experiments.
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4.3.4.1 Gender
The majority of studies have found no differences in the relative size of offers made by men and women
when playing with anonymous partners, in both ultimatum (Eckel & Grossman, 2001) and dictator games
(Frey & Bohnet, 1995; Bolton et al., 1998; Dufwenberg & Muren, 2006). That said, women tend to
reject less often and are more likely to accept low offers (Eckel & Grossman, 2001). When the gender
of the responder is known to the proposer, both genders tend to give more to men than women (Eckel
& Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Ben-Ner et al., 2004). Schweitzer & Solnick (1999) further found
that females offer about 5% more to attractive males, as compared with unattractive males.14 For dictator
games, a recent meta-analysis that did not control for anonymity showed that women both give and receive
more on average (Engel, 2011). In our own work, it is likely that the impact of gender will be mitigated by
our decision to keep participants anonymous.
4.3.4.2 Education
Some studies suggest that academic major can influence allocation behaviour, and it is certainly possible
that, because of their studies, students of economics and business might be more aware of the game-
theoretic solution in a bargaining experiment. However, the evidence on this issue is mixed: Carter &
Irons (1991) observed that students of economics offered about 7% less and demanded 7% more than
noneconomists, whereas Kahneman et al. (1986b) found the reverse, with students of economics and
business actually more generous than those studying psychology. Other studies have found no differences
between economics students and those from other disciplines (e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Kagel et al.,
1996; Oosterbeek et al., 2004). We will control for education by ensuring that our participants are not
drawn from a single academic discipline or background of study.
4.3.4.3 Culture
Several landmark studies suggest that cultural norms of fairness do impact bargaining outcomes in the
ultimatum game. The main finding is that there appears to be cross-cultural variation in what constitutes
a ‘fair’ offer. Roth et al. (1991) examined UG behaviour in four countries: America, Israel, Japan, and
Yugoslavia (now Slovenia). Although the mean and modal offers were between 40–50% of the prize pool in
all four cultures, a small amount of cultural variation was present in the data; proposers in Israel were more
miserly, offering an average of 10% less than participants in the USA and Yugoslavia, and rejections were
also less common in Israel. However, one problem with studies of this sort is that they only survey a single
city and may not reflect broader intra-cultural differences: Buchan et al. (2004) found results contradicting
those of Roth et al. (1991), e.g. that Japanese were more generous than American participants. More
recently, a meta-analysis of 37 UG studies drawn from populations across 26 countries actually found no
significant differences in proposer behaviour between cultures, though there were significant differences
14This study is unique in that it is the only recorded case in which the modal offer was more than 50% of the pie.
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among rejection rates (Oosterbeek et al., 2004).
More interesting evidence comes from a comprehensive comparison of 15 small-scale, pre-
technological and tribal societies by Henrich et al. (2004), who found a number of intriguing results
concerning average offers in ultimatum games. Two tribes, the Lamelara of Indonesia and the Ache of
Paraguay, were extremely generous and frequently offered more than 50% of the prize pool to responders.
Conversely, the Peruvian Machiguenga tribe offered an average of just 26% of the prize. The researchers
link these findings to the societal characteristics of the tribes in question, focusing on two explanatory
variables. First, the amount of general cooperative activity among citizens: when members of a society hunt
in groups, ultimatum offers tend to be higher. The most tight-fisted tribe, the Machiguenga, rarely trade
outside the immediate family. Second, the degree of market integration is important: when a large-scale
market exists for the trade of goods and labour, ultimatum offers tend to be higher.
Overall, the evidence for culture suggests that perceptions about fairness differ between societies,
and that these perceptions directly affect behaviour. While there is mixed evidence for cultural variation
in technologically developed societies, it is clear that no culture ever conforms to the predictions of the
canonical model. Although it would be easy to control for culture in our experiments, we prefer to invite
participants from across our campus as we do not have access to a guaranteed subject pool. Thus we must
rely on the persons that we are able to recruit through our own endeavours.
4.3.5 Interpretation & Implications for this Thesis
The previous subsections reviewed a total of thirteen relevant factors that are known to impact behaviour
in the UG. Some of these factors are the result of extensions to the basic blueprint, e.g. iterating resolved
games or changing the value of the stakes on offer. Others are simply a matter of who is playing the
game, e.g. participants’ gender or country of origin. While the review has been offered partly as evidence
of our having thoroughly surveyed the UG literature, it also allows us to understand what the impact
of each variable is and whether or not it is particularly important for our own ends. This feeds into our
experimental design, as described more thoroughly in the following chapter.
It is worth considering the implication of results from the UG in terms of what they reveal about human
behaviour. Clearly players ascribe to some basic notion of fairness in social exchange, a fact that is made
salient by the UG. Control conditions show that offers are frequently made on the basis of equity, and
responders happily reject positive amounts to reach an equitable outcome. However, as revealed by the
present review, proposers can become more or less likely to make equitable allocations in accordance
with particular variables, and responders can become correspondingly more or less likely to reject an
allocation. For instance, people will try to increase their own profits when they know that they are not
being monitored, or when they can leverage a competitive advantage, e.g. an information asymmetry. But
people become more generous if they can see their partner, are allowed to communicate with them, or feel
that recipients are especially needy. These findings demonstrate how people selectively invoke different
fairness rules according to the situation at hand (cf. Leventhal, 1976). The UG literature helps to pinpoint
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the circumstances in which particular rules are applied and, in turn, allows one to make inferences about
how particular effects would extrapolate to more complicated settings (Camerer, 2003).
The results also expose some of the tensions that exist between individual preferences and the pressures
imposed on decision making by societal norms. Such norms are macrosocial structures that exist outside
of individual preferences (Binmore, 2010b; Gintis, 2011). Tension occurs between the two because selfish
choices often appear preferable but their selection is tempered by norms that suggest otherwise. The UG
literature helps us to reason about how fairness might operate with respect to the salience of particular
norms. For instance, a feeling of high anonymity likely makes fairness norms for sharing less salient.
Knowledge of how a given variable impacts allocations therefore provides ammunition to attack the
question of why people behave as they do in situations where different norms may be in operation.
We have already noted that some variables can increase generosity, whereas others can steer allocations
towards selfishness and the predictions of the canonical model. In the economic literature, any deviation
from equity is sometimes taken as evidence of self-interest, irrespective of the circumstances under which
it occurs (e.g. Cherry et al., 2002). While it is true that certain manipulations demonstrate a willingness to
deceive for selfish gain, the present review has stressed the need to consider why apparent self-interest
occurs. It is not always the case that superficially ‘selfish’ players are being unfair. Rather, the perception
of behaviour as fair or unfair depends on the extent to which a competitive advantage is being leveraged as
well as the underlying intention behind actions (Rabin, 1993; Nelson, 2002). As noted by Camerer (2003),
“Fairness is a judgment people make about an action players take or its consequences, and that judgment
affects their preferences for actions and allocations. Whether an action is judged as fair, and what players
do as a result, respond to observable variables in intuitive ways. It is fair to keep more if you became the
Proposer by winning a contest, or if keeping money is the only way a Proposer can play a second time
and earn more money” (p. 114). The latter part of Camerer’s argument runs parallel to proposed rules of
justified self-interest, which dictate that inequitable allocations can be fair in the correct circumstances
(Lerner, 1971; Leventhal, 1980). The point here is that self-interest is not always ‘selfish’ but may actually
be a key component of ensuring fairness norms are upheld—one needs to look beyond the numbers to
understand what is motivating different allocation decisions and how those motivations relate to a decision
maker’s attempts to operate in line with their understanding of fairness.
Given the wide array of empirical findings, one might wish to turn to an accepted theory that provides
a complete explanation of the results. Sadly, such a theory does not exist. This is because the diverse
and sometimes conflicting outcomes from the UG have proven difficult to consolidate within a single
framework. What attempts there have been in this regard (e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) still fail to account
for all of the empirical data (Binmore, 2010b) and thus accounting for the results remains an ongoing
endeavour within the economic literature. One issue that is beyond debate is that human behaviour does not
match the outcome predicted by the canonical economic model—at least not in the overwhelming majority
of cases. In truth, this is a finding that surprises only economists, and even then it is only surprising in
light of the theoretical backdrop against which the empirical results are cast (i.e. the neoclassical model
of behaviour). We would stress that the game-theoretic prediction must be considered for what it is: a
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mathematical benchmark that specifies how players ought to behave if they make utility-maximising
choices in light of the expected utility-maximising decisions of others. It is by no means an accurate model
of human behaviour, not least because rationality in the economic sense is always defined in terms of
pecuniary losses and gains. In light of the available evidence, one might argue that people are not strictly
profit-seeking and instead rely on a more socially-oriented form of rationality. That is, economically
‘irrational’ decisions are actually very sensible if considered in relation to the scenario in which such
decisions would ordinarily occur. For example, conforming with fairness is costly in a pecuniary sense
but is highly rational in the real world, where cooperation is vital for survival in the longer term. But
since people have been shown to become both more or less prosocial depending on the variable under
study, evidence from the UG literature suggests that most real world decisions are guided by a mixture of
self-interest and concern for the welfare of others (Camerer, 2003).
4.3.5.1 Explaining Ultimatum Game Behaviour
While it is explicitly not the aim of this thesis to explain why people behave as they do in ultimatum games,
it now seems appropriate to consider some of the primary theoretical explanations that have been proferred
within the literature. Reviewing this material helps to inform our understanding of the UG and direct our
own interpretations of behavour in the novel DLUG paradigm. Here we shall consider explanations of
proposer and responder behaviour in turn.
The most straightforward explanation of UG behaviour is that offers result from fairness norms held
by human players. Face value appraisal of the available evidence lends weight to this explanation, and
indeed, to the average person, the idea of behaving entirely selfishly in the game may conflict with the
basic standards upon which our societies operate. Nevertheless, considerable research effort has been
invested in determining why people prefer fairness over the selfish option. Several explanations relate
to the nature of the UG and the way in which it is interpreted by players. For instance, players may rely
on equitable offers because they have a poor understanding of the game; in a one-shot setting, players
are simply making naive guesses about how best to divide the source, rather than working through the
problem carefully as they should (e.g. Binmore et al., 1985). This explanation fits well with the ‘general
equality algorithm’ used in social decision making (Hertel et al., 2002), but is somewhat facile given that
players are known to be able to derive the optimal solution (Gu¨th et al., 1982) and exhibit preferences for
fairness even after multiple rounds and learning opportunities (Roth et al., 1991; Knez & Camerer, 1995;
Slonim & Roth, 1998; List & Cherry, 2000). In fact, one meta-analysis of UG experiments found that
players actually become more, not less, generous over time (Oosterbeek et al., 2004). Bounded rationality
(cf. Brenner & Vriend, 2006) presents an alternative explanation—players survey the range of available
payoffs and choose an option that balances the various possible outcomes. It appears that this option is not
the canonical offer, at least in the majority of cases.
An alternative explanation concerns the aforementioned threat of rejection—that proposers are afraid
of rejection and, in essence, play fair to balance threat of rejection with pecuniary gain (cf. Guth & Tietz,
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1988; Ochs & Roth, 1989; Kravitz & Gunto, 1992). Results from dictator games support this intuition;
most show a drop in equitable allocations when compared to UG treatments. However, we saw earlier
that proposers continue to make allocations above the minimum amount even when the responder has no
recourse. This in itself indicates that players still see a need to behave in line with fairness norms and often
find it difficult to suppress their conformity to said norms.
Various models have been proposed to account for fairness norms in economic decision making. In
essence, these models aim to account for empirical findings by assuming different underlying motivations
for offers and rejections. One such explanation is that of inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999).
The idea here is that people generally dislike inequity and are willing to give up material payoffs in
order to achieve more equitable outcomes—such an argument can account for the behaviour of both
players in the UG. Fehr & Schmidt (1999) suggest that inequity aversion helps maintain cooperation; by
rejecting inequity and perceived injustice, people demonstrate that they are not willing to be taken for
fools, and hence lower the opportunity for others to free-ride. Alternatively, guilt aversion (Brenner &
Vriend, 2006) represents a conceptually different argument in that proposers are assumed to experience
disutility (i.e., guilt) when making an allocation that they know is selfish. In this case, fairness arises as a
way of preventing this feeling; the perception of oneself as a ‘bad person’ is enough to sway proposers
towards the equitable offer. Similarly, responders might accept a tiny offer because they feel guilty about
rejection and causing ‘pain’ to the other. In practice, however, this latter conjecture tends not to be the
case, suggesting that responders may derive some payoff from satiating anger (Andreoni & Miller, 2002),
or perhaps experience a negative emotional response from perceived unfairness (Sanfey et al., 2003). The
broader idea of moral costs in decision making also informs a model proposed by Levitt & List (2007),
who emphasize that fairness may stem from a desire to balance moral costs with pecuniary gain. Other
approaches emphasize the role of intentions in determining acceptance or rejection (Rabin, 1993), whereas
others stress the role of altruistic concerns for allocation behaviour (Andreoni & Miller, 2002). This wide
variety of explanations speaks to the inherent difficulty of accounting for the array of results obtained
using the classic UG, but also emphasizes the considerable academic interest that has been invested into
the model.
A final explanation that has seen a great deal of interest concerns the nature of the experiment itself;
that is, as a supposed test of underlying preferences or conformity to norms, the experimental situation
guides the behaviour of participants towards cooperative outcomes. Zizzo (2010) suggested that laboratory
experiments are influenced by ‘cognitive experimenter demand effects’, including the options available
to participants (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008), unintended emphasis of variables of interest, anonymity
between subjects and the experimenter (Hoffman et al., 1994), or the particular instruments used in the
study (Larrick & Blount, 1997). For example, the mere presence of the option to give money in a dictator
game might imply that donating is the correct behaviour (Winking & Mizer, 2013). Indeed, participants in
dictator games actually move away from the prosocial choice when the option to steal money is introduced
into the experiment (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). Because of these concerns, research in economics has
recently steered towards capture of real-world decision making through use of natural-field experiments
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(Harrison & List, 2004). Use of the ‘natural’ prefix here is deliberate because subjects are typically
unaware that they are participating in an experiment, meaning that concerns regarding experimenter effects
and anonymity are alleviated. Such experiments capture natural behaviour in tasks where ‘participants’ act
under their own volition in the belief that they are not being scrutinised (Harrison & List, 2004).
Several such studies exist, and the methods employed are quite ingenious. Happily for our work,
results suggest that behavior in the field is not that different to the laboratory. Gu¨th et al. (2007) conducted
an ultimatum game via the German newspaper Die Ziet; more than 4,500 readers ‘participated’ in the
game by responding to a competition form which asked them to split 1,200 euros between themselves
and two anonymous others. Each participant had a small chance to be rewarded with the products of their
proposals. The researchers found that behaviour was not different from that of laboratory studies: 60%
of respondents chose an equitable split, and this allocation was significantly more likely to be accepted
by responders. As with laboratory studies, the game theoretic benchmark was the offer least likely to be
accepted. Similar results were found for a newspaper dictator game study, with dictators giving about 40%
of the resource to anonymous others (Ockenfels & Werner, 2012). An alternative approach was adopted
by Stoop (2012) and Franzen & Pointner (2013) who conducted anonymous dictator experiments using a
misdirected mail technique. Participants received an ostensibly misdirected envelope containing a cash
prize for participating in an experiment. The dependent variable was whether not each individual would
keep some or all of the money, or whether they would go to the effort of mailing the reward to its intended
recipient. In the study by Stoop (2012), results were identical between the lab and the field: envelopes
were returned about 50% of the time. In a within-subjects design, Franzen & Pointner (2013) found that
dictators who had previously donated money in the lab were also more likely to return the envelope in the
field.
In summary, explaining why people behave as they do in ultimatum games has proven difficult.
Competing theories exist, each of which has varying levels of support and associated caveats. Whatever the
underlying explanation, the key point is perhaps that the UG provides very consistent evidence regarding
fair outcomes and the extent to which fair outcomes can be influenced by specific variables. Moreover,
field studies indicate that findings obtained in the laboratory remain true in the real world; in some
cases, laboratory studies actually underestimate the generosity shown in everyday settings. That said,
counterevidence is beginning to emerge (Winking & Mizer, 2013) and thus research on explaining UG and
DG behaviour is very much an ongoing endeavour.
4.4 Economic Games and Human-Computer Interaction
We began this chapter by proposing to adopt the ultimatum game to study division of labour. We now
now review prior use of economic games in HCI with the aims of situating our intended contributions and
considering how our DLUG paradigm could prove useful to the field.
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4.4.1 Prior Use of Economic Games in HCI Research
As identified by our review earlier in this chapter, economists use experimental games in two ways. First,
evidence from games has theoretical value because it presents an anomaly for the canonical economic
framework, and is therefore relevant to the development of behavioural models that attempt to incorporate
social preferences into utility functions (e.g. Bolton, 1991; Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Second,
and as articulated earlier in this chapter, economic games can be used to investigate the impact of particular
variables (e.g. anonymity, payoff size, gender) on the outcomes of bargaining per se.
Research using economic games in HCI corresponds with the latter of these two categories. This
is perhaps not surprising given that refinement of economic theory is not typically a goal for HCI
research. Rather, games are used to measure the impact of various situational or interface manipulations on
cooperative behaviour during use of computers. Cooperation in such studies is measured by the distributive
generosity of participants’ allocations, with higher allocations taken as a sign of an increased willingness
to cooperate. It is not always the case that these allocations are pecuniary; many studies employ tokens or
virtual currencies as placeholders for the payments participants receive at the end of the experiment. The
following subsections review such studies according to the subject matter they address.
4.4.1.1 Trust
The most prevalent use of economic games in HCI has been in studies of trust; in particular, how trust
can be enhanced or engendered by computer interfaces. Many social cues are lost when groups have to
work in distributed and computer-mediated settings (Olson & Olson, 2000), and loss of such cues can
make it difficult for team members to establish mutual trust, especially if they lack information about their
collaborators’ actions, intentions, and emotions (Riegelsberger et al., 2003).
Work in this space argues that the tendency for individuals to cooperate or defect is a proxy for the
level of trust among group members; groups with higher collective gains are understood to have established
greater trust, with high defection rates viewed as a sign of distrust (cf. Bos et al., 2002; Scissors et al.,
2009). An early study by Rocco (1998) used a public goods game to explore trust formation in face-to-face
and electronic settings, finding that people were more trusting in the former setting. Other studies have
employed the prisoners’ dilemma to assess the impact of communication medium (Jensen et al., 2000;
Zheng et al., 2001) and personal online profiles (Davis et al., 2002) on trust development. More recently,
the ‘Daytrader’ social dilemma task, a variant of the prisoners’ dilemma where participants choose how to
invest earnings over a series of rounds, has been employed to study the impacts of communication medium
(Bos et al., 2002; Zheng et al., 2002; Nguyen & Canny, 2007) and linguistic similarity (Scissors et al.,
2008, 2009) on computer-mediated trust at the intra-group level.
4.4.1.2 Social Distance
Studies of distributed work have shown that ‘distance matters’ (Olson & Olson, 2000) and that the social
distance between coworkers can be a barrier to collaboration. Bradner & Mark (2002) studied social
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distance using an iterated prisoner’s dilemma with six rounds. They found that participants located
in Irvine, California, initially preferred to cooperate with a partner situated nearby over a partner on
the eastern seaboard (in this case, Boston, Massachusetts). More design-oriented work has sought to
address the problem of social distance through awareness mechanisms. Kim et al. (2012) report a study
where groups participating in a public goods problem were provided with sociometric feedback about the
behaviour of their collaborators. The sociometric feedback successfully increased the level of cooperation
in groups who began the task in distributed settings.
4.4.1.3 Agents and Avatars
Finally, economic games have been used in studies exploring cooperation between humans and comput-
erised agents. Early studies by Kiesler et al. (1996) and Parise et al. (1996) employed the prisoner’s
dilemma to study willingness to cooperate with agents represented by human faces. Both studies found that
people were more willing to cooperate with increasingly human-like computers, implying that interface
agents might be more successful if they possess human-like qualities. More recent work has developed
this theory by designing algorithms that can account for human fairness preferences during interaction
with agent-based systems (de Jong et al., 2008).
Research has also used economic games to explore how people behave in virtual environments. Yee
& Bailenson (2007) used the ultimatum game to study the impact of varying the appearance of a user’s
avatar.15 Participants played four rounds of the UG with a confederate who, in this study, acted as the
responder. In the first condition, participants used an avatar that was noticeably taller than the confederate’s.
In the second cell, the participant’s avatar was noticeably shorter. The researchers found that those in the
taller avatars were more likely to make and reject unfair offers, the implication being that people act in line
with their stereotypical perceptions of tall people while under the guise of a taller avatar. Finally, Lazem
& Gracˇanin (2010) and Lazem et al. (2012) used a commons dilemma to examine communication in the
virtual world of Second Life. They found that groups who were allowed to communicate via voice were
better able to sustain the common resource pool, as compared with groups who relied solely on the visual
actions offered by their avatars.
4.4.2 Merits of our Approach for HCI
Having considered prior use of economic games in HCI and CSCW, we propose that our adaptation of the
UG has merit for the following reasons.
A majority of prior studies in HCI have simply applied economic games in extant form—no work has
used economic games to study division of labour in the manner we have proposed. Some studies conducted
outside of HCI have explored negotiation over other incentives, e.g., waiting time in a UG (Berger et al.,
2011), yet no research has attempted to explore a variable quantity of work as the payoff in a bargaining
situation. The use of pecuniary incentives is assumed to induce known preferences in subjects, i.e. that
15An avatar is a human-like digital representation of a user in a virtual environment.
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more money is preferred over less (Smith, 1982). However, many social transactions in everyday life are
one step removed from financial payoffs, and this may cause behaviour to change (Ariely, 2008; Berger
et al., 2011). Within economics, the use of field goods is seen as a progressive exercise over induced
valuations (Harrison & List, 2004; Winking & Mizer, 2013). Such studies speak to the potential impact
of commodities on fairness; for example, Takahashi (2007) found that persistent smokers were tolerant
of inequality when bargaining over money but not over cigarettes. In line with such work, our DLUG
allows us to study the division of a currency held as common interest by those in the field of CSCW—that
is, work, and the coordination of work undertaken by people in pursuit of collaboration and cooperative
activity. This has utility for CSCW because it allows us to address an important question for collaboration:
to what extent do people reason about workloads in the same way that they reason about other resources?
Such a contribution is made possible by both the design of economic games (their simplicity and the
fact that they can be so readily transfigured) and the substantial literature reporting reliable phenomena
concerning the way they are played.
We recognised earlier that one strength of economic models is their simplicity. However, this cleanli-
ness comes at the expense of scope; the UG and other economic tools are unavoidably narrow in terms of
how they model cooperation. In the UG, players come to the lab, participate in one round of negotiation
with an anonymous individual, and then leave with their payoffs. There is thus no anticipation of future
interaction, a situation that may be constructed for good scientific reasons (e.g. to minimise the impact
of reputation) but is arguably not representative of the real world. Our DLUG compensates for this by
isolating the planning phase of work, with players then required to complete the procedural outcome of
actually doing their allocated tasks. We feel this offers several opportunities. First, it pushes the decision
scenario closer to the real world endeavour of doing collaborative work—any such decision about division
of labour around a group is made in the knowledge that one has to work with the individuals in question,
even if this work is neither co-located nor concurrent. Second, as an exploratory scientific endeavour, the
DLUG provides an opportunity to study fairness preferences in both allocation and enactment. This latter
conjecture is warranted by an emergent ‘matching’ effect, as reported in the following chapter.
Finally, as we design and build systems that support collaboration on a large scale, understanding
aggregate effects associated with fairness and justice in work will be increasingly important (Benkler,
2012). In particular, the volume of anonymous, computer-mediated collaborative work is likely to increase
with future developments in crowdsourcing, microwork, and other mass-contribution systems (Kittur,
2010). Models such as ours, that allow for the exploration of cooperation and preferences in the allocation
and enactment of work, could be used to inform division of labour policies in such systems. There is also
no reason why the aforereviewed studies using economic games in HCI could not be replicated using the
DLUG—such studies might unveil new insights about how variables influence allocation of work over
tokens or pecuniary payoffs.
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4.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we first proposed to adapt the classic ultimatum game to study division of labour. We
presented our novel division of labour ultimatum game and proposed to explore it in an empirical setting.
To provide a proper theoretical and methodological foundation for our own model, we reviewed relevant
empirical literature on the the ultimatum game and identified a range of factors that must be controlled in
our own experiments. Our review showed that what is regarded as a fair outcome in the UG can be shifted
according to myriad factors. This further emphasized the subjective and variable nature of fairness but
provided a clear demonstration of how fairness can be explored using economic games. We then explored
how the ultimatum and other games have been used in prior HCI research in order to articulate the potential
impact of our own contributions. The following chapter reports the findings from a series of empirical
studies where our DLUG was iteratively explored in an experimental context.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL STUDIES USING THE
DIVISION OF LABOUR ULTIMATUM
GAME
5.1 Chapter Overview
Chapter 4 introduced our novel division of labour ultimatum game (DLUG) and presented a select review
of the theoretical and empirical literature associated with its predecessor, the classic ultimatum game
(UG). In this chapter, we present a series of studies where the DLUG is employed to investigate fairness
in the division and completion of collaborative work. To this end, we instantiate our game with the task
of collaborative information seeking, a nascent area of research in which division of labour is a relevant
research question (Foley & Smeaton, 2010; Kelly & Payne, 2013). Our approach is incremental; an
immediate aim is to explore behaviour in the DLUG, and our results provide further evidence of fairness
preferences in participants’ distributive allocations of workload. We also study participants’ work process,
and through analysis of behavioural protocols we identify strategies used to coordinate work while avoiding
redundancy. We suggest that these strategies could be employed to enable divisions of labour in specialised
collaborative search tools. Additionally, we report an emergent finding concerning overall equality in
participants’ search times. This finding is highly unexpected, and we attempt to interpret and explain the
result by drawing on relevant work from social psychology.
This chapter is organised as follows. We briefly reiterate our DLUG as a model of articulation work
and provide justifications for our decision to focus on web-based collaborative information seeking. This
allows us to pinpoint the way our studies could usefully contribute to the literature on collaborative search.
We then describe how the present studies have been designed to account for the factors known to affect
ultimatum games, as outlined in Chapter 4. We then present our experiments, which focus on three types
of protocols: allocations and participants’ stated rationale for said allocations; coordination strategies;
and an analysis of participants’ task completion times. The chapter ends with a general discussion that
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attempts to consolidate each finding alongside relevant literature.
5.2 Foundations for the Present Studies
To reiterate, we propose to explore division of labour using our novel twist on the ultimatum game. In our
game, two players are tasked with agreeing a division of a known quantity of work items. Completing
the work provides each individual with a fixed pecuniary reward. If the players can agree an allocation,
the two are allowed to collaborate and contribute work items to a common pool. However, if they cannot
agree, they must each work individually. The game begins with one player, the proposer, suggesting a
division; the responder then accepts or rejects the proposal. In the event of acceptance, players collaborate
and complete the task according to their agreed allocations. If the second player rejects, however, then the
game ends and players must work alone.
The subsections below outline some important decisions regarding our task choice for exploring the
DLUG. We also explain how the various factors identified in Chapter 4 have been accounted for and
controlled in our experiments.
5.2.1 Task Choice: Web-Based Collaborative Search
Our DLUG necessarily requires a collaborative task in order to become operational. One of the aims of
the present work is to demonstrate the theoretical and practical merit of the DLUG for HCI. Therefore,
we chose a task that allows us to investigate the allocation of work while providing sufficient opportunity
to acquire implications relevant to interface design. Our task of choice is web-based collaborative
information seeking, also known as collaborative search. We use these terms synonymously because
they refer to the same behaviour: that of two or more “participants work[ing] together to satisfy an
information need” (Morris, 2013, p. 1182). Collaborative search is a nascent research topic that has seen
growing interest within the HCI, CSCW, and information retrieval communities. To narrow our efforts, we
characterise collaborative search as involving at least two searchers conducting explicit, intentional work
(cf. Golovchinsky et al., 2011). This definition precludes consideration of recommendation and filtering
systems that algorithmically enhance search using prior results from anonymous ‘collaborators’ (e.g. Park
& Pennock, 2007).
As a test case for our model, collaborative search is a good fit because it is a realistic situation where
collaborators must decide how to partition the task while defining a management strategy to prevent
redundancy in their information seeking activities (Foley & Smeaton, 2010). In other words, collaborative
search involves both quantitative allocation and coordination of work, thereby capturing both aspects of
the phenomenon we wish to investigate. In addition, division of labour is a relevant research problem
in the literature on collaborative search (Foley & Smeaton, 2010; Golovchinsky et al., 2008a; Morris,
2008; Kelly & Payne, 2013). Several authors have designed and developed specialised systems to support
collaborative search. Examples of such tools include SearchTogether (Morris & Horvitz, 2007), WeSearch
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(Morris et al., 2010), and CoSense (Paul & Morris, 2009). (Further systems are described in Chapter
6 of this thesis.) Division of labour is one concept underlying the design of these systems (Morris &
Horvitz, 2007; Foley & Smeaton, 2010) but little is known about how people organise their efforts during
collaborative search without specialised system support. This gives us the opportunity to contribute to
current literature by investigating how searchers coordinate when carrying out their experimental task.
Identification of any coordination strategies would provide immediate implications for design—future
collaborative search systems could be designed to partition work in accordance with said strategies.
5.2.1.1 Division of Labour in Collaborative Search: Systems and Approaches
Within the literature on collaborative search, four general approaches to managing division of labour have
been identified (Golovchinsky & Pickens, 2009; Kelly & Payne, 2013), each of which involves a different
degree of specialised support from the system. These are:
Communicative approaches, where people exchange information about their search activity in order to
avoid redundancy and coordinate work. This approach entails no specific system support for division
of labour beyond methods of exchanging information, e.g. chat functionalities (Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez &
Shah, 2011)
User Interface approaches, where tailored support for division of labour is provided at the user interface.
SearchTogether (Morris & Horvitz, 2007), for example, includes buttons that allow collaborators to
distribute results from individual queries or specific search engines around the group.
Algorithmic approaches, where data about search activity is collected at the system layer and is re-used
to enhance information seeking. For example, algorithms can be designed to surreptitiously remove
results from a user’s queue according to prior judgements of relevance from collaborators (Foley &
Smeaton, 2009).
Role-based approaches, which prescribe the assignment of tasks in accordance with roles that have
predefined duties. For instance, the Cerchiamo search system requires one user to spend time finding
sources while another evaluates findings and provides feedback on their relevance (Golovchinsky
et al., 2008a).
Research suggests that each of these approaches can be beneficial for collaborative search, though
each does have its associated caveats (see Kelly & Payne, 2013, for a review). However, relatively little is
known about how collaborative searchers coordinate in the absence of technological support. If emergent
practices were identified, future systems could be designed to support such behaviours. Prior work by
Morris (2008) identified two strategies used by collaborative searchers to divide work in the absence of
specialised support: divide-and-conquer, where searchers explicitly coordinated their activities by using
different search engines or keywords, and brute force, where searchers did not coordinate their activity and
instead coped with redundancy when merging their results later on. However, the existence of these two
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strategies arises from searchers’ self reports rather than direct empirical observation. The present studies
extend this literature by identifying other strategies used by searchers when coordinating collaborative
search. We argue that these strategies could be supported within the design of collaborative search tools.
To further scope our concerns, the present experiments are constructed to consider only distributed,
synchronous collaborative search. We realise that focusing on one instance of collaborative work constrains
the applicability of our findings from the present studies, at least to a certain extent. However, focusing on
one instance of collaboration allows us to hold parameters including interdependency, i.e., tight versus
loosely coupled work, and temporality, i.e. synchronous versus asynchronous work, as constant. We fully
expect that the frequency and complexity of interactions will influence the division of labour and resultant
needs for coordination (cf. Olson & Olson, 2000) yet we hold these constant to facilitate inter-experiment
comparisons. Our results are then available for comparison with future studies using different tasks and
experimental setups.
Finally, it seems important to consider whether our task is sufficiently rich to be characterised as
‘collaboration’. As will be seen in our experimental procedure, participants’ task is to collect sources
from the Internet to form a shared bibliography. Such a design is intended to mirror the early phases of
shared literature review, a common collaborative information seeking task (Morris, 2008, 2013). In our
experiments, participants complete this task through a chat client, searching for and contributing sources
on-the-fly until the required total is reached. This act of ‘shortlisting’ also matches the process adopted
during real-world collaborative information seeking (Kelly & Payne, 2014, see Chapter 6 of this thesis).
While our experimental conceptualisation of collaborative search is necessarily somewhat reductionist,
we believe that it involves behaviours necessary to satisfy a basic definition of collaboration (such as
that outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis). Our task involves division of labour, information sharing, and
contributions towards a common goal, all of which are integral aspects of collaborative work. We see our
approach as an almost ‘minimal collaboration paradigm’, in that we capture the basic processes involved in
collaboration while abstracting away from potentially influential factors, e.g. physical appearance, spatial
setup, and group dynamics more generally (Levine & Moreland, 1998).
5.2.2 Remarks on Experimental Methodology
5.2.2.1 Controlling Factors that Impact Behaviour in Games
As evidenced by our review in Chapter 4 of this thesis, ultimatum games are sensitive to many aspects
of experimental design. This subsection remarks in detail upon how we have considered such issues in
the design of our experiments. These considerations are important because, as this is the first study of
its kind, it is important that we establish a consistent protocol for our experiments while mitigating the
impact of influential variables. This will allow for legitimate comparisons. The decisions reported below
are true of all experiments reported in this chapter, unless otherwise stated. The most pertinent issues and
our methodological choices were as follows:
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Anonymity: we designed the present studies as simple collaborative situations where participants had total
anonymity from one another. Not only does enforcing anonymity follow the procedure typically used
in behavioural decision making experiments (Camerer, 2003; Croson, 2005), keeping anonymity
constant controls for the impact of identifiability itself; participants are known to become more or
less generous when anonymity is relaxed or tightened (Hoffman et al., 1994; Bolton & Zwick, 1995;
Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Haley & Fessler, 2005; Wilson et al., 2010). This also has the dual benefit
of controlling for gender effects and physical attractiveness (Schweitzer & Solnick, 1999; Eckel &
Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Engel, 2011). Although we recognise that, in the real world, most
collaborators are likely to know each other and search tasks will not always be completed under
conditions of anonymity, we would argue that to understand the effects of interpersonal knowledge
requires some understanding of how collaboration is managed in its absence.
Repetition: we opted to use a single round of the DLUG, with participants then going on to complete
the task as agreed. While it is true that repeated play is more realistic, in the sense that real-world
negotiations are more likely to be iterative rather than one-shot, proper understanding of such play
requires some knowledge about behaviour in one-shot games (Forsythe et al., 1994). Our paradigm
is novel and thus it seems appropriate to begin at the most basic level before proceeding forwards.
One-shot games also control for punishment strategies and reputation effects (Roth et al., 1991; List
& Cherry, 2000), both of which could conceivably impact division of labour.
Communication: participants in our experiments were not allowed to communicate prior to completing
the DLUG. This minimises the impact of ‘cheap talk’ (Croson et al., 2003) and the positive effects
of communication more generally (Sally, 1995; Frey & Bohnet, 1997; Bohnet & Frey, 1999) on
allocations. The only communication that occurs during the allocation is the offer and the response,
both of which are made via computer terminals (more detail is presented in the description of
experiment one). We then relax the constraint on communication during the process of completing
work, such that participants are allowed to communicate, coordinate, and share findings during their
collaborative search task. Such a design holds greater external validity in the sense that arbitrary
constraints on communication during the enactment of work would be unrealistic.
Stake size: we saw earlier that stake size does not have much of an impact on ultimatum play, in that
people continue to make equitable offers even when large amounts of money are on the table
(Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1996a; Slonim & Roth, 1998; Cameron, 1999; Oosterbeek
et al., 2004). While we can intuitively expect that our participants will experience some disutility
if asked to complete more work for less pay, we cannot give an exact a priori estimation of how
varying the quantity of work will impact allocations. As such, we opted to use a payoff of 10 work
items as a straightforward mapping of the typical $10 stake used in ultimatum games. This was not
an arbitrary decision: we considered that the task of finding 10 sources was a reasonable request of
our participants given expected experimental constraints (trials < 1 hour) and anticipated financial
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payment (£5).16 This work inevitably raises questions about the subject of reduced workload as an
incentive, and we return to this matter when discussing the results of these experiments.
Entitlement: we randomly assigned participants to the roles of proposer and responder to avoid creating
perceived role or resource entitlements (Gu¨th & Tietz, 1986; Hoffman et al., 1994; Cherry, 2001;
Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2006). Our participants must earn their monetary payoff
by completing some work, but there is no initial reason for either player to do less work towards
this goal, i.e. we do not ‘suggest’ particular allocations. This ensures cleanliness in terms of testing
decisions about division of labour.
Framing: we controlled for framing effects by keeping instructions consistent for all of the present
experiments. These were adapted from instructions used in prior UG experiments (Forsythe et al.,
1994; Hoffman et al., 1994). We were careful not to imply any need to share or be fair, and did
not make any major changes between experiments that could explain shifts in behaviour, e.g. by
changing the language from ‘dividing’ to ‘allocating’ work (cf. Larrick & Blount, 1997). All
workload units were described in absolute numeric terms, rather than percentages (Croson, 1996).
Demographics: we saw earlier that gender, academic background, and culture can all impact ultimatum
bargaining. The impact of gender is mitigated by our decision to keep participants anonymous.
While the impacts of education and culture could be controlled in theory, this would be restrictive
as we do not have easy access to large numbers of participants from a particular creed or culture.
Instead, we had to rely on self-selecting volunteers. We therefore relaxed this constraint and allowed
people from across our campus to participate. Since our participants had a diverse array of academic
backgrounds, any effects associated with a particular discipline should be minimised.
To an extent, some of these decisions were tempered by our desire to balance the established methods
of experimental economics with a reasonable construction of collaborative work. Consider the role of com-
munication; in economics, it is highly atypical for participants to communicate, whereas communication is
an integral aspect of collaboration. Disallowing communication would, therefore, be welcomed by the
former but unjustifiable for the latter. This is exemplary of the complexities raised by the present work.
In any case, our efforts to hold these key parameters constant, and avoiding arbitrary changes from one
study to the next, should allow the results of the present studies to be compared to any future work that
takes place in this area. Our established method can be used in future replications and studies that examine
particular variables, e.g. by increasing the total workload or by relaxing anonymity between participants.17
16As it transpired, sessions took between 15–50 minutes to complete, but participants were not told how long sessions would
last prior to recruitment and thus had no expectations about the amount of work involved. It is possible that such explicit
knowledge about how long a particular task will take may affect allocation behaviour. We will return to the issue of incentives
during the general discussion of these studies.
17Future work could also draw on these variables to bring the study closer to the real world, e.g. by allowing communication
before and during the allocation process. (“What would you do if I made this offer?”, or “I don’t like that offer, make it lower
and I’ll accept”).
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Having explicated these issues, we now move on to exploring behaviour in the DLUG. Our first
experiment was intended as a pure instantiation of the game, where collaborators have limited knowledge
about their task and are bargaining over notional work items.
5.3 Thesis Study 2: Division of Labour as an Economic Game
5.3.1 Design
We designed our first DLUG experiment as a simple situation in which participants were required to
complete an information seeking task to earn a fixed payment of £5. The exact task was to use a Web
browser to locate 10 sources so as to form a bibliography that addressed the following question: “To what
extent can design be considered a psychological process?”. This question was selected on the basis of
pilot trials which indicated that the question was understandable to those with little knowledge of the topic
but still sufficiently broad that the task was not trivial. We opted for a bibliography task because collection
of papers and webpages is a common and realistic collaborative search task (Morris, 2008). We did not
provide participants with any specialised support for this task beyond a web browser for search and a chat
program for communication. As hinted earlier, this allows exploration of the work management strategies
used by participants in the absence of any particular technological encouragement or facilitation.
Rather than simply asking for a list of sources, we presented the task description as ‘forming a reading
list of 10 reliable sources for students of a night class’. This was done so as to introduce a soft yet
meaningful criterion to the search task, which we hoped would encourage participants to evaluate sources
more carefully before pasting them into the chat window. Participants in the aforementioned pilot trials
(which did not initially include the description emphasising reliability) often chose to paste the first 10
references that appeared in Google. This behaviour is undesirable in the sense that it requires little effort
to coordinate the work, in turn making our observations of the work process somewhat meagre. We found
that introducing the reliability criterion encouraged participants to invest more effort in evaluating the
quality of sources prior to inclusion.
While our task description suggested that sources should be ‘reliable’, we opted not to specify exact
criteria for what constituted a suitable source for the reading list. We also withdrew from specifying exact
requirements for effort and time on task. These are all factors which could affect the allocation behaviour,
and thus rather than constrain them we allowed participants to self-regulate their effort investments and
judgements of relevance. We hoped that this would allow for interesting and naturalistic behaviours
to emerge, and indeed this decision was warranted by our process results where we unveiled novel
coordination strategies and an emergent effect in task completion times.
For this study, participants were not told about the search topic before dividing up the work. Although
this has less external validity in terms of real-world work allocation, this design represents a purer instantion
of the DLUG, in terms of bartering over work as a currency, and allows investigation of allocation behaviour
in advance of specific task knowledge. (The issue of task-related knowledge is addressed head-on by our
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next experiment). Pairs of remote participants thus agreed a division of ‘work items’ through the DLUG,
and then completed the task according to their agreed division. Participants coordinated their activity
through an instant messaging (IM) program and all activity in each client was logged and timestamped for
later analysis.
We also considered the opportunity cost associated with participating in the present experiment.
Essentially, the work requested of participants was a barrier to the collection of their £5, which was
presumably their sole motivation for volunteering into the experiment. It is possible that seasonal changes
could affect participants’ desire to do the work required and, in turn, lead them to want to leave more
or less quickly (cf. Berger et al., 2011). In summer, for example, participants may be especially keen to
enjoy the hot weather, meaning they could make unfair offers in order to escape the experiment sooner.
On a rainy day, participants might be perfectly content to remain in the lab. While this is an inherently
difficult issue to control for, the study reported here was conducted over a three-week period in August
2010, meaning that seasonal effects should not be a major impact. Trials were conducted at one of three
intervals (10am, 12pm, and 2pm) and no more than two trials were conducted on any particular day.
A final consideration was whether or not the task of pasting references into a shared bibliography
was sufficiently collaborative to produce meaningful results, i.e. whether or not it really constitutes
‘collaboration’. Given that, when completed collaboratively, our tasks have participants who are explicitly
aware of their collaboration, have shared intentionality, offer contributions to the common good, and have
some vested interest in the outcome of the work, we believe that our tasks can satisfy our earlier definition
of collaboration presented in Chapter 2.
5.3.1.1 Hypotheses
Since we did not design the present experiment with specific hypotheses in mind, and were not aiming
to test any particular variable, we eschew exact predictions concerning how participants may or may not
behave. Moreover, this is the first experiment using the DLUG, and thus behaviour is currently an open
question.
Recall, however, that there are at least two naive predictions about how players might behave. First,
there is the baseline prediction of self-interested behaviour, which would see proposers allocate the
maximum possible amount (9 items) of work to their anonymous partner. The responder should then
accept this offer as it confers a 10% reduction in workload. However, there is a second intuition; based on
the fact that players desire equity and anticipate rejection, offers in ultimatum games typically converge at
the point of an equitable split. It is possible that the same actions might emerge in the DLUG. These issues
are worth keeping in mind when appraising the results reported here.
5.3.2 Materials
Participants used a Microsoft Instant Messenger (IM) client to play out the DLUG and subsequently
communicate during the Web search task. All searches were conducted using the Mozilla Firefox web
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browser. A non-intrusive Firefox extension, HCI Browser (Capra, 2010), was used to record search
behaviour surreptitiously, including queries and page visits, into a text file.
To obtain informed consent, we used a paper-based script designed in accordance with our institution’s
ethical guidelines. Copies of all instructional materials used in this experiment can be found in Appendix C.
We used two sets of instructions to present our experimental task. The first page was given to participants
prior to the DLUG, and presented the task as follows: In this study you will be required to search the
Web for information in order form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading must have 10
reliable sources. The instructions then explained how to play out the DLUG via the messenger client.
The second page of instructions described the web search task, presented as follows: You have been
asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10 reliable sources
containing information that addresses the following question: “To what extent can design be considered
a psychological process?.
We used a post-experiment questionnaire to gauge computer expertise and search experience using
measures from Morris (2008). To probe decision making about allocation behaviour, we included the
following questions: 1. Why did you choose to allocate the work in the way that you did? 2. What
factors, if any, influenced your decision? 3. Did you consider making a different offer? If so, what did
you consider?. We also included a 5-point Likert scale to gauge participants’ familiarity with the search
topic (1 = no familiarity, 5 = high).
5.3.3 Participants
Nine female and 11 male students and research staff from six different University departments took part
in the study. Participants’ ages ranged from 20–44 years (M = 28.3 years). Assignment of participants
to pairs was a matter of timetabling convenience. Three pairs were male-male, two were female-female
and all others were mixed pairings.18 As mentioned earlier, we offered participants £5 as an incentive to
participate in the study.
All participants reported conducting Web searches daily. Thirteen participants reported ‘expert’
computing skill, with the remaining seven reporting ‘intermediate’. These findings indicated that our
subjects were comfortable with Web search and none were novice computer users, who we might expect
to find exploratory search quite difficult. The topic of design psychology was not familiar to most of our
participants (M = 1.8, SD = 0.9).
5.3.4 Procedure
Participants completed the study in pairs, and were located in separate offices in different areas of our
campus. These offices were separated by about 200 feet, thereby minimising the chances that participants
would meet. At no point were the participants introduced face-to-face before, during, or after the study.
Care was taken to maintain anonymity in each trial by using gender-neutral language when referring to the
18We provide this information to show that gender was distributed across conditions and roles, i.e., not all proposers were male.
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other participant, e.g. “we are waiting for the other person to arrive”. Sessions took from 15 to 50 minutes
to complete and no time limits were imposed on participants.
On arrival at the study, participants were assigned to the role of either proposer or responder. Each
participant was introduced to the study by a facilitator. Facilitators were connected via the Facebook chat
client, allowing correspondence about participant arrival, study completion, etc. Participants were told that
the study was exploring the organisation of workload during a Web search task. After providing informed
consent, participants were told that the study had two parts and that each part would be explained in turn.
Participants were first handed the division of workload instructions. Instructions were worded carefully,
and modelled on those used in previous ultimatum game studies (Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et al.,
1994; Larrick & Blount, 1997) so as to avoid any experimental demand implying the need to share or
be fair.19 Each participant was told that they had to form a bibliography containing 10 sources in order
to complete the study and receive their payment. However, they had the opportunity to collaborate and
divide their workload, such that any sources obtained would contribute jointly to a shared bibliography
of 10 items. In line with our experimental design, participants were not told the exact search topic but
only that they would be forming a bibliography. Proposers were asked to specify an allocation by typing
‘I want you to find χ sources’ into the chat, where χ was to be replaced with their numerical allocation.
Responders then had the option of accepting or rejecting the offer in the same chat window by typing
either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’. In the event of acceptance, participants would form a joint bibliography and
amalgamate sources as they were found by pasting them into the chat window. However, in the case of
rejection, both participants would have to find 10 distinct sources separately.
After allocating work via one round of the DLUG, participants were introduced to the Web search
task. We asked participants to record their found sources by copy-pasting a snippet of relevant text into the
chat, alongside a hyperlink to the source. Participants were told that they could use any search engine to
find sources, which could be anything they deemed relevant to the topic (webpage, blog, scholarly journal,
etc). Beyond the requirement of 10 sources, the only other criterion given to participants was that they
could not post sources their partner had already found, i.e., all sources had to be distinct. Participants
could communicate via the chat during the study, but were asked not to reveal any personal or identifying
information. Participants were asked to notify the facilitator once they had completed the task, at which
point they were presented with the post-study questionnaire. They were then free to leave the experiment,
irrespective of whether or not their partner had finished.
5.3.5 Results
Our results focus on four metrics. We present the outcomes of the DLUG first, alongside participants’
reported motivations for making allocations. We then examine participants’ strategies for coordinating
work and preventing redundancy. Finally, we examine participants’ paired task completion times so as to
gauge their level of investment in our experimental task.
19Copies of the instructions used in this experiment can be found in Appendix C.
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Session ID Proposer’s Allocation Responder’s Workload Outcome
1.1 5 5 A
1.2 4 6 A
1.3 5 5 A
1.4 5 5 A
1.5 5 5 A
1.6 5 5 A
1.7 6 4 A
1.8 5 5 A
1.9 5 5 A
1.10 5 5 A
Table 5.1: Workload allocations and acceptances, study 1, A = Accepted, R = Rejected.
5.3.5.1 Workload Allocations
Table 5.1 shows the allocations made in each trial of this experiment. All of the workload proposals
made were accepted, i.e. there were no rejections. Eight proposers offered an even (5-5) workload split.
Two proposers made uneven splits; the first delegated six sources to her partner and four to herself (4-6),
whereas the second did the opposite, allocating just four sources to her partner and six to herself (6-4).
Interestingly, both 6-4 allocations were implicitly renegotiated to the point of fairness during the process
of work. In other words, despite the agreement, each participant posted exactly five sources. In both cases,
the partner in charge of four sources completed their share of the work first and spontaneously went on to
obtain and post a fifth source. This occurred in spite of the fact that participants knew that they could leave
after finishing their own portion of the task.
5.3.5.2 Motivation for Dividing Work
The post-experiment questionnaires revealed that six proposers who made a 5-5 split invoked fairness
as a complete explanation of their offer. Two of these proposers revealed that they had wanted to make
an unfair split but were reluctant to do so because of the threat of rejection. One cited efficiency in the
negotiation process: “simplest possible split, no need for negotiation, no risk of rejection”. Another saw a
fair division as the most efficient way of completing the task as quickly as possible due to the synchronous
work situation. The explanations for the uneven offers were not, in the author’s opinion, totally convincing.
The generous 6-4 proposer cited the same fear of rejection as two of the fair offer proposers, whereas the
ungenerous proposer claimed: “I enjoy delegation”.
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5.3.5.3 Coordination Strategies
The major coordination problem faced by our participants was avoiding redundancy, i.e. duplicated sources.
Since we did not instruct participants to overcome this problem, we examined the IM chat logs in an
attempt to explore the naturalistic strategies employed to ensure coordination and prevent redundancy. We
identified two clear strategies: Wait & Repair, and Partitioning by Web/Document Space.
Wait & Repair. A priori, one strategy for dealing with duplications would be to simply wait for them
to arise and then repair them, either immediately (in the way a repair works in conversation (Clark &
Schaefer, 1989)) or at a later combination stage (as in the brute force strategy identified by Morris (2008)).
Such a strategy, which we deem Wait & Repair, will only be identifiable in situations where duplications
actually do occur. This happened in only one pair, and the repair was managed immediately, as shown in
the following transcript from the chat logs:
[Pair 1.2]
Participant Two: I think we found the same [pertaining to Participant One’s last source]
Participant One: oki
Participant One: I will look for another
[Participant One pastes a reference and snippet of text.]
Participant Two: Good job!
A further seven pairs made no explicit mention of strategy and never suffered a duplication. Since it
is likely that these pairs would have spontaneously repaired breakdowns if they had occurred, we have
provisionally classified these as examples of the Wait & Repair strategy.
Partition Web/Document Space. A second available strategy for avoiding duplications is to explicitly
coordinate work by searching for different types of source, perhaps by using different Web services.
We observed two pairs discussing and following this strategy. In one case, the discussion emphasised
document types (scientific articles versus blogs and websites), and in the other, it emphasised web services
(Google scholar versus EBSCO). However, there is a natural confound between services and document
types, and indeed both discussions reflected this, so for now we prefer to consider these as versions of the
same strategy. We title this strategy Partition Document/Web Space. The vignettes below illustrate pairs
dividing the task in this way:
[Pair 1.8]
Participant Two: I’ll use Google scholar to find scientific papers. Is that ok?
Participant One: sounds great, and I will try to find information from news & blogs
Participant Two: perfect
[Pair 1.10]
Participant One: How about you look at non-journal sources and perhaps news and I take google
scholar, ISI and EBCSO?
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Figure 5.1: Correlation between task completion times of proposers and responders, study 2, rs = .77).
Participant Two: why don’t we both try to find what we find first and maybe share later? not sure
there’s much around outside non-journals.
Participant One: Ok I am going to work in ISI then..searching for ‘psychological processes design’
5.3.5.4 Task Completion Times
We obtained an overall search time for each participant, i.e. the elapsed time between the point at which
the first query was issued by one member of the pair and the time each searcher pasted their final source
into the chat. Our motivation for obtaining this data was twofold. First, we wanted to gauge participants’
general level of investment in our experimental task. Second, informal reports from facilitators suggested
that pairs were finishing at similar times, but that there might also be some between-pair variance. Analysis
of the search time data allowed us to explore whether this observation carried any weight.
Eyeballing the data, we observed that within-pair completion times were strikingly similar, but that
there was also a clear difference between pairs. This dual effect is illustrated in Figure 5.1, which graphs
the raw search time data for the experiment. In order to examine the strength of the trend and assess its
statistical significance, we first transformed the data using natural logarithm in order to remove positive
skew (Skewness statistic = 0.942). Natural logarithm was used because logarithmic transformations are
preferable when data is positively skewed (Sheskin, 2011), are appropriate for ratio level data like time
(McDonald, 2008), and are necessary in order to normalise the data to better meet the assumptions of
statistical tests (McDonald, 2008; Sheskin, 2011). A correlation was then computed between the paired
search times using Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient. We observed a strong positive
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correlation, r(8) = 0.88, p < 0.001.
5.3.6 Discussion
This experiment sought to explore our empirical model based on the ultimatum game. We asked participants
to bargain over the allocation of work items in a collaborative information seeking task. The results are
indicative of fairness preferences in the division and completion of labour.
At a broad level, behaviour in the DLUG mirrored findings from the standard UG in that participants did
not appear to follow a behavioural model based on pure self-interest. Studies of the UG have consistently
found that the modal offer tends to be a fair split of money (see, e.g. Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Camerer,
2003), and the same is true of the experiment reported here. We found that eight of our 10 offers were 5-5,
with the remaining two close at 4-6 and 6-4. That participants did not attempt to free ride by minimizing
their own workload is indicative of a tendency towards fairness in the division of labour. Indeed, although
our sample size was very small, the prevalence of completely fair allocations is even stronger than typically
observed in the economic literature, where the modal outcome of fairness tends to account for about
50-60% of a given sample.
It is also interesting that workloads were managed so as to be even more explicitly equal during the
process of completing work. This equality was realised in two ways. First, the rare cases of unequal
allocation were implicitly reworked during the course of completing the task. This suggests a preference
for correcting initial inequity during the process of work, perhaps due to an implicit form of positive
reciprocity, whereby the party with the smaller workload takes on some of their partner’s work in order to
thank them for generosity shown during the workload division.
Second, and perhaps more interesting, was the finding of a strong, positive correlation between paired
search times. One part of this result relates to the high degree of similarity within a pair. This is interesting
in light of the fact that there appears to be little reason for participants to finish at almost the same
time. If anything, the circumstances of the experiment, where participants have minimal awareness, work
anonymously, and can leave after completing their individual allocations, might be expected to count
against this behaviour. What makes the finding doubly interesting is that this similarity is consonant with a
clear difference between pairs, even though all pairs work on the same task. This seems to indicate that
pairs somehow synchronised, albeit implicitly, their overall work rate so as to finish at similar times. At
this juncture we shall not elaborate on this effect since we have a low number of participants—we feel that
more data is required to explore whether this effect is pervasive or whether it arose through some quirk of
the experimental procedure.
With regard to the fairness observed in the DLUG, one possible explanation is that it is due to
uncertainty concerning the actual work required. Recall that participants were asked to complete the
DLUG before being told anything about the search topic – our motivation for this was to explore DLUG
behaviour in terms of notional work units stripped of any particular attractiveness or unattractiveness.
Since the chances of this occurring in the real world are probably quite low, a more realistic design would
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provide absolute task knowledge to participants. An additional problem with the present study is that,
while the preference towards fair offers does at least appear stable, the number of participants is clearly
too low to establish the veracity of the findings. To address these issues, we designed an experiment that
builds on our first study. In the second experiment, we attempt to directly manipulate qualitative aspects of
the search task by informing participants of their search topic in advance of the DLUG, manipulating topic
as an independent variable. This allows us to explore how information search topic might influence both
allocation agreements and strategies that emerge during the process of completing work. We also obtain
further evidence concerning the apparent matching of task completion times. This study is reported in the
following section.
5.3.7 Study 2 Summary
This study was created in order to gain an initial grasp on behaviour in our division of labour ultimatum
game. Through a study involving 20 participants, we found that:
• The modal allocation of was an even split, occuring in eight of 10 cases.
• Two methods were used to coordinate work. In the first, participants simply waited until duplications
arose and then repaired them on-the-fly. In the second, participants explicitly agreed on a partitioning
strategy that saw them each take responsibility for segregated aspects of the available Web or
document space.
• Participants’ completion times were synchronised in an interesting yet unexpected fashion.
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5.4 Thesis Study 3: The Impact of Search Topic in the DLUG
5.4.1 Study Overview
Following on from the experiment reported in Section 5.3, the study reported here was designed to explore
the veracity of our prior findings. Our goal was to examine three salient issues:
• In experiment 1, we saw that the modal allocation of work in our DLUG was a fair split, mirroring
findings from the standard UG. Our model was intended as a pure instantiation of the DLUG, but
was somewhat unrealistic in that participants lacked knowledge about the task at hand. Thus, we
sought to rectify this concern by providing complete task knowledge up-front to participants.
• As well as exploring how information search topic might influence allocation agreements, we wanted
to explore the impact of topic on the coordination strategies used by our participants, and to further
explore the prevalence of different coordination strategies as a function of the task at hand.
• Finally, we wanted to examine whether the search time effect would be replicated in an experiment
with more participants.
We elected to address these three issues simultaneously by manipulating search topic as an independent
variable. In our first study, we found that the information topic of ‘design psychology’ was not familiar
to most of our participants. Previous work has shown that knowledge of a topic can aid Web search,
whereby searchers can use existing knowledge to form more effective queries, in turn leading to speedier
information retrieval (Duggan & Payne, 2008; Kang et al., 2010). Beyond this, we hypothesised that
knowledge of a topic might also allow new strategies for partitioning the joint task among team members.
The study therefore attacks the issue of topic knowledge and its dual impact on division of labour and
resultant coordination during collaborative information seeking.
5.4.2 Design
The design of this study was similar to study 2 in that we retained the scenario of dividing a task requiring
10 bibliographic references, presented as forming a reading list for a night class. Again, participants
worked anonymously and were located in separate rooms. We used two different search topics in the study,
manipulated between groups and initially forming two experimental conditions. Our choice of topics
aimed to provoke differing responses from our participants while balancing feasibility, i.e., sources on the
topic had to actually exist so that participants were able to do the work requested.20 The topics we elected
to use were as follows:
20We recognise that it is likely impossible to find a research topic that is universally boring or interesting, if only because
of interpersonal differences in interests. Since one could potentially spend forever trying to find a topic that is universally
unattractive, we eventually settled on ‘good enough’ topics that provoked a sufficiently quantifiable difference in terms of interest
and enjoyment from our participants.
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1. Popular music in the 20th century. This topic was selected because most people have at least some
passing knowledge of musical acts, and might even have personal preferences that they could
draw on during the task, meaning that popular music would be a relatively attractive, or at least
non-aversive, topic for creating a bibliography. A straightforward search for this topic on Google
returned more than 37,700,000 hits, suggesting a sufficient number of sources would be available
for our task.
2. The life cycle of mycetozoa slime mold, which we assumed most participants would be ignorant of
and uninterested in. This topic was selected based on the relative obscurity of slime molds and
because participants in pilot trials indicated that the topic appeared daunting at first glance. The
topic was also manageable in terms of available sources, returning more than 61,600 hits on Google.
Pilot studies confirmed our intuitions about the attractiveness of these topics (using the scales described
in the Materials subsection below) and indicated that both tasks were manageable within our defined
experimental constraints (<1 hour per trial) without the task being trivial.
5.4.3 Materials
All locations, equipment, and software were identical to those used in study one. The procedure and
experimental protocols were the same as before, with a small modification to the instructions such that the
search topics were presented up-front alongside the DLUG. (Materials can be found in Appendix D.) As
in study one, we explored participants’ judgements of topic familiarity via a 5-point Likert scale included
in the post-experiment questionnaire. To probe differences between our two conditions, we added three
5-point scales to explore participants’ judgements of topic difficulty (i.e., how hard it was to obtain results),
interest in the topic, and overall enjoyment of the task.21
The experimental task was presented to participants as follows: You have been asked to form a reading
list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10 reliable sources containing information
about [artists or bands that shaped the history of popular music in the 20th century] / [the life cycle of
mycetozoa slime molds].
In this study, a non-intrusive Firefox extension, HCI Browser (Capra, 2010), was used to record search
behaviour surreptitiously, including queries and page visits, into a text file.
5.4.4 Participants
Thirteen male and 27 female students, research and administrative staff from 12 different University
departments took part in this study. Participants’ ages ranged from 18–48 (M = 25.7). Again, we did
not control for demographic variables and participants were randomly assigned to condition and role.
21We note that it would be preferable to examine ratings of topic interest both before and after the study, so as to allow for
pre and post-hoc comparisons. However, we decided that administering a pre-task questionnaire, in the gap after the DLUG but
before commencing the task, would be impractical from a pragmatic perspective and would also draw participants’ attention to
topic as a matter of interest.
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There were 10 pairs in each condition; in the popular music condition, one pair was male-male, four were
female-female and the rest were mixed pairings. In the slime mold condition, one pair was male-male,
five were female-female and the rest were mixed pairings. All participants were naive to our experimental
design and were not involved with our previous study. We again evaluated computing skill and search
experience using measures from Morris (2008). All participants reported conducting Web searches daily.
Again, our participants were comfortable with Web search and were not novice computer users, with 11
participants reporting expert computing skill and 29 reporting intermediate. Participants were recruited via
the University noticeboard on the promise of £5 for completion of the experimental task.
5.4.5 Procedure
The procedure employed in this experiment was identical to that used in study 2, see subsection 5.3.4.
5.4.6 Results
5.4.6.1 Manipulation Checks
Participants in the slime mold condition rated themselves as significantly less familiar with the search
topic (M = 1.25, SD = .786) than those in the pop music condition (M = 3.35, SD = 1.348), t[38] = -6.016,
p < 0.001. Those researching slime mold also considered it significantly more difficult to find sources (M
= 3.15, SD = 1.266) than those researching pop music (M = 2.30, SD = .865), t[38] = 2.534, p = 0.016.
Participants in the slime mold condition considered the topic significantly less interesting (M = 2.25,
SD = .1.251) than those in the pop music condition (M = 4.05, SD = 1.050), t[38] = 4.928, p < 0.001.
Their rated enjoyment of the task was not significantly different between conditions.
5.4.6.2 Workload Allocations
Table 5.2 shows the allocation data for the pop music condition, and Table 5.3 displays the slime mold
condition. It can be seen that no proposals were rejected. Regarding allocations, eighteen of the twenty
proposals were 5-5. The two unfair splits were made at 6-4, and both of these occurred in the slime mold
condition. Notably, both involved proposers offering to take on more work. Unlike in experiment one,
neither of these two allocations were corrected during the work process. Instead, the pairs completed their
allocations (6-4) as agreed.
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Session ID Proposer Allocation Responder Allocation Acceptance
2.1 5 5 A
2.2 5 5 A
2.3 5 5 A
2.4 5 5 A
2.5 5 5 A
2.6 5 5 A
2.7 5 5 A
2.8 5 5 A
2.9 5 5 A
2.10 5 5 A
Table 5.2: Workload allocations and acceptances, study 3, pop music condition. A = Accepted, R =
Rejected.
Session ID Proposer Allocation Responder Allocation Acceptance
2.11 5 5 A
2.12 6 4 A
2.13 5 5 A
2.14 5 5 A
2.15 5 5 A
2.16 6 4 A
2.17 5 5 A
2.18 5 5 A
2.19 5 5 A
2.20 5 5 A
Table 5.3: Workload allocations and acceptances, study 3, slime mold condition. A = Accepted, R =
Rejected.
5.4.6.3 Motivation for Dividing Work
In the pop music condition, nine proposers cited fairness as their primary consideration when deciding
how to allocate the work. Two proposers stated that the fear of rejection also played a role in their decision.
One proposer used his own level of expertise as a basis for making a fair split, anticipating that his partner
could cover the areas of music where he had little knowledge.
In the slime mold condition, seven proposers invoked fairness when choosing an allocation. One of
these considered a fair split as the most efficient way to divide the work. Three proposers stated that their
proposal came about as a method of avoiding rejection. The two proposers who took on six sources for
themselves both rationalised this in terms of an assumption that they were likely to be better at the task
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than their unknown partner.
5.4.6.4 Coordination Strategies
Table 5.8 shows the strategies identified in this experiment together with the number of pairs who used
each, delineated by search topic. As before, Wait & Repair was the most frequent strategy, but in only
one case was repair actually necessary. As observed in experiment one, three pairs employed the Partition
Web/ Document Space strategy. The vignette below illustrates one pair explicitly coordinating work by
partitioning only the Web space:
[Pair 2.19, Slime Mold]
Participant One: shall we using 2 different search engine to find the sources? or else we may have
same results
Participant Two: no problem... which one are you using?
Participant One: i am using google how about you?
Participant Two: i am using google scholar... will also look into library resources
Participant One: maybe you can mainly focus on the scholar and i will search for the relevant websites
Participant Two: ok
We also identified a new strategy, which we call Partition Semantic Space. Use of this strategy was
confined to the pop music condition, and involved choosing different aspects of the topic independently of
web services or document types and dividing these aspects between collaborators. Five pairs explicitly
discussed and employed this strategy. The vignettes below illustrate two different pairs using this strategy
to coordinate after agreeing 5-5 allocations:
[Pair 1.1, Pop Music]
Participant One: would you like to spend one minute discussing how to carry out the task?
Participant Two: ok
Participant One: would you like to take a particular historical period?
Participant Two: does the 20th separate nicely?
Participant One: well I was thinking, before rock and roll and after rock and roll... for example: before
1950s... and after 1950s when all the rock and pop music starts
Participant Two: sounds good... although there was more after 1950
Participant One: so if you are comfortable with it I am happy to do the first ‘half’ of the X century, say
the beginning of popular music, early blues and ragtime... and you can do the 1960s onward... so we
are sure we don’t replicate
Participant Two: sounds like a plan
[Pair 1.8, Pop Music]
Participant Two: so do you want to take Hendrix and one of the others and I’ll do the other two
Participant One: yes... I will take hendrix and Micheal [Jackson] pls
Participant One: ok, ill do the beatles and Elvis
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Figure 5.2: Correlation between task completion times of proposers and responders, study 3, rs = .58.
5.4.6.5 Task Completion Times
Figure 5.2 graphs the raw search time data and again shows a striking concordance between partners’
search times. Again, a Pearson correlation was computed on log transformed data, and revealed a strong
positive correlation, r(18) = 0.76, p < 0.001.
5.4.7 Discussion
Our manipulation of the attractiveness of the work task, in terms of topic of search, was successful.
Participants considered the slime mold topic significantly less interesting and significantly more difficult
to obtain sources for. They also considered themselves significantly less knowledgeable about the topic.
However, this manipulation had no observable effect on the outcome of the DLUG. Again, the majority of
offers (90%) were 5-5 and all offers were accepted. Although there were two 6-4 offers in the slime mold
condition, the numbers involved are not large enough for this to be any more than a hint of a manipulation
effect. That said, this hint is elaborated slightly by these two proposers explaining their offers in terms of
their own ability to perform the task, which is conceivably influenced by the perceived difficulty of the
search topic. This rationale also gives us some insight into the issues that proposers take into account
when deciding upon their allocation, directly implying that division of work is less straightforward than
division of money. (This subject is discussed in more detail later in this thesis).
Unlike experiment one, neither of the two uneven allocations was altered in the process of work.
Looking into the process data, the likely reason for this is that the participant with more work managed
to finish their part of the task first. It is interesting that these inequitable offers do not appear to have
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been motivated by disparity in knowledge; the individuals in question both considered themselves very
unfamiliar with the slime mold topic. Instead, it appears that allocations were made on the basis of
perceived skill, i.e. that the proposer was sufficiently confident in their own abilities that they kept more
work to ensure that it was completed quickly. As mentioned above, it appears that these perceptions were
well-justified.
The strategies of Wait & Repair and Partition Web/Document Space were observed again in the slime
mold and the pop music conditions, where additionally a new strategy, Partition Semantic Space, was
observed in five out of ten pairs. In this case, participants leveraged existing knowledge to establish
coordination. We suggest that this strategy depends on both participants having some pre-existing
knowledge of the topic in question, and expecting their partners to share this knowledge. But, when a topic
is obscure or unfamiliar, such behaviour is not possible, necessitating the use of alternate strategies (such
as partitioning of the Web space) to create coordination.
Our third concern in this experiment was the replication of the search time effect obtained in study 2
(see Section 5.3 above). Although the correlation was slightly weaker in this experiment, we did observe
the same overall trend, indicating that it was not a fluke result. Observation of Figure 5.2 shows the effect
to be quite striking. We can see that there are several trials which ended quickly, lasting a little under 500
seconds (8 minutes). At the other extreme, we see trials that lasted almost 3000 (50 minutes). Despite a
small amount of variance within some pairs, completion times appear to be highly similar within each
trial. This again seems to indicate a desire for overall equity in both the allocation and completion of work.
However, at this point we have no evidence beyond this speculation as to what could drive this effect, what
could regulate it, and how it could be bootstrapped. Informal remarks by participants suggested that some
felt ‘pressured’ to increase their own work rate in order to keep up with their partner. This suggests that
asking participants for more information about issues concerning their regulation of effort and the attention
they afford to their partner could be instructive in terms of explaining the effect.
In general, the evidence we have gathered thus far from our DLUG is indicative of fairness preferences
in the division of labour. However, it is important to note that proposers in the UG often behave strategically,
making fair offers in order to guarantee acceptance from the responder (Guth & Tietz, 1988; Ochs &
Roth, 1989; Kravitz & Gunto, 1992). This was an important consideration for at least two proposers in
experiment one, and a further five in experiment two, all of whom stated that they had wanted to make
an unfair offer but chose not to do so. Given that proposers seem interested in lowering their workload
while avoiding rejection, a sensible offer in the DLUG is a proposal that provides the best possible chance
of avoiding rejection whilst still lowering the workload by as much as possible. This line of reasoning,
combining gain in utility with probability of rejection, may explain the frequency of fair offers in our study.
It is therefore possible that, just as in the classic UG, fair offers arise as a result of strategic behaviour
intended to mitigate risk, rather than a desire for fairness per se.
In Chapter 4 we saw that a classic way of investigating strategic fairness is via the dictator game,
where the responder’s option to reject the allocation is removed. The proposer simply allocates money,
and the responder takes whatever he is given. The supposition here is that if proposers are truly concerned
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about equity and fairness then they should continue to divide the surplus in half even when there is no
threat of rejection. The canonical model predicts that proposers in dictator games should never give any
money away. While studies typically show that participants do continue to make positive allocations in
dictator games, one recent meta-analysis of dictator games found that the average offer was 28.35% of the
pie (Engel, 2011). When this figure is compared to the average 40% offer in ultimatum games (Camerer,
2003), the evidence gives credence to the idea that proposers play fair (or stay relatively close to fairness)
due to fear of rejection in ultimatum games.
To follow up on these issues, we designed a third study that explores whether threat of rejection could
explain the prevalence of fair offers. The benefit of our DLUG is that it lends itself directly to a dictator
style design—we can simply remove the responder’s opportunity to reject and explore whether proposers
continue to allocate half of the work to their anonymous counterpart. Such a design is also interesting
for the procedural components of our results, in that we may be able to examine the persistence of the
matching effect under circumstances of unequal workloads.
5.4.8 Study 3 Summary
This study was created in order to explore the impact of information search topic on behaviour in our
division of labour ultimatum game. Through a study involving 40 participants, we found that:
• The modal allocation was once again an even split, occuring in 18 of 20 cases. No offers were
rejected.
• A new strategy for coordinating work emerged in the condition with popular music as the topic of
interest. This strategy, Partition Semantic Space, complements our earlier findings from study 2, and
demonstrates another emergent method of preventing redundancy during collaborative search.
• We replicated our earlier finding concerning an apparent matching of participant’s task completion
times.
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5.5 Thesis Study 4: Testing the Persistence of Equity in a Dictator Variant
5.5.1 Study Overview
In study 3 we found that the attractiveness of the work task was not enough to steer allocations away from
the point of fairness. Although the results provide further evidence of a fairness norm in the division of
labour, one issue the study did not address was that of fear of rejection may play a role in creating fair
offers. This rationale was uncovered in our reading of post-experiment questionnaires, and has been used
by economic theorists to explain behaviour in ultimatum experiments (cf. Guth & Tietz, 1988; Ochs &
Roth, 1989; Kravitz & Gunto, 1992).
The present study draws upon the literature on dictator games, reviewed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, to
explore threat of rejection as an explanation of our results. We achieve this by removing the responder’s
opportunity for recourse from the bargaining procedure. Proposers are then given 10 work items and told
to allocate any number to the responder.22 This means that if proposers are truly concerned about equity
and fairness, egalitarian offers should persist in a setting where there is absolutely no threat of punishment.
If, however, fair offers arise through strategy, we should see a drop in eql allocations and a shift towards
selfish behaviour. Proposers are thus confronted with a very stark choice between sharing at least some of
the workload or free-riding entirely.
The canonical prediction in a dictator game is for the proposer to keep everything and for the responder
to receive nothing. As with our DLUG, the reverse is now true: if the proposer is solely interested in
receiving the £5 for attending the experiment, and is given a costless choice between completing more or
less work to receive that reward, he should prefer less work. In a situation where he can delegate as much
work as he chooses with no risk of punishment, the extreme prediction would be a 0-10 allocation, with all
of the work going to the responder.23 The proposer would then leave the experiment with his or her money,
and the responder would complete the work as assigned. However, the dictator game literature tells us that
it is usually rare for such allocations to occur unless they are somehow legitimised, e.g. via an earnings
task (Hoffman et al., 1994; Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2006; List & Cherry,
2008). That said, offers in dictator games do tend to be smaller than those in ultimatum games, meaning
that results typically fall somewhere between the markers of fairness and pure self-interest. Our intuition,
then, is that while the 0-10 allocation may be too extreme an outcome, we may at least see a shift away
from fair offers when responders cannot reject allocations.
In addition to exploring the delegation scenario outlined above, we wanted to explore whether an
exemplary manipulation of the UG would apply when replicated in the context of division of labour. We
saw in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4 that the literature on economic games is quite vast, and a true exploration
of the many possible variables is beyond the scope of a single thesis. For the present experiment, we opted
22The second player has no opportunity to respond so is not really a ‘responder’ as such. We continue to use the word responder
for continuity and to distinguish between player roles.
23As noted in Chapter 5, dictator games do not typically include a minimum offer because the zero allocation is meaningful.
We follow similar reasoning and allow proposers to delegate all of the surplus.
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to impose an information asymmetry an manipulate available information as a variable of interest. This
allows us to further address the question of whether or not proposers actually want to be fair, albeit in a
different way to that of the dictator game.
In Subsection 4.3.2.7 we saw that the information held by each player in an ultimatum game can
affect outcomes, particularly when this information is asymmetric. For example, when proposers know
the amount to be divided but responders do not, proposers typically lower their offer to increase their
payoff slightly (Croson, 1996). Responders are also more likely to accept such offers, since they cannot
determine the relative fairness of the allocation (Croson, 1996). Extending this logic to circumstances
of division of labour, let us imagine that an information asymmetry exists between players, where the
proposer knows the amount to be divided but the responder does not. In such a situation, the proposer
could allocate more work to the responder if the responder does not know the exact amount to be divided.
For the purposes of dictation, information asymmetry may make it sufficiently more easy for a proposer
to be unfair if the responder is not initially aware of the total amount to be divided. Even though the
responder has no opportunity to reject, he or she has no way of knowing that the allocation is secretly
unfair, and thus collaboration could proceed in an otherwise typical fashion—he or she has simply been
‘dictated to’ and there is no way of knowing whether this dictation is fair or unfair.
The following experiment sought to explore the established intuitions about information asymmetry,
but under circumstances of division of labour. If proposers care about fairness, the asymmetric information
manipulation should have no effect on offers. On the other hand, the proposer might be tempted to take
advantage of the responder and delegate more work in order to leave the experiment early.
We also considered that it would be interesting to explore the impact of inequity in the planning stage
of work, in terms of how it could affect coordination strategies and the search time effect reported earlier.
With regard to the latter, two possibilities exist. First, if highly unfair allocations were made, we might
expect this to disrupt the matching effect. Alternatively, it would be interesting to explore whether the
participant with a greater workload upped their effort in order to leave the experiment around a similar
time as the anonymous partner. It would also be interesting to see how the matching effect plays out when
one person does not have full knowledge of the collective goal, as would be the case under circumstances
of incomplete information about the task at hand.
Lastly, we used this experiment as an opportunity to probe the causes of the search time effect. In
study 3, some participants had stated that they felt pressured by their partner’s work speed. We therefore
augmented our post-experiment questionnaire with questions that tried to gauge whether participants felt
influenced by their partner’s activities; whether they monitored the activities of their partner during the
study; and whether they were satisfied with the speed at which their partner worked. These questions are
described more precisely in our Materials subsection below.
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5.5.2 Design
The design of this study was highly similar to that of studies 2 and 3 in that we retained the bibliography
task for consistency purposes. This experiment used two conditions. First, a standard dictator game,
identical in execution to our DLUG but with the sole caveat that responders could not reject the allocation.
In this condition, both participants knew the total amount of work to be divided, i.e., responders were told
that there were 10 items. Our second condition created an information asymmetry, whereby, at the time of
task delegation, responders were not told the amount to be divided, and proposers were aware of this fact.
We refer to these conditions as complete information (CI) and asymmetric information (AI) respectively.
We elected to retain the slime mold topic from study 3, using it in both conditions. Holding this constant
was necessary to ensure that any changes in offer distribution (as compared with studies 2 and 3) could be
correctly attributed to the removal of rejection from the bargaining scenario, rather than a change in search
topic.
5.5.3 Materials
All equipment and software were identical to those used in studies 2 and 3. Participants again worked
anonymously using an MSN client for communication (shown in their left monitor) and a Firefox Web
browser to find information (right monitor). Experimental protocols were similar to those used in studies
2 and 3, but were modified to account for changes to the allocation procedure. (Materials can be found
in Appendix E.) In the CI condition, proposers were told they could allocate any number of sources to
the responder. In the AI condition, proposers received the same instructions with an additional paragraph
explaining that the responder did not know the amount to be divided. Instructions given to responders were
the same in both conditions, except that in the AI condition responders were not told the exact number of
items required in the reading list. Instead they were told that the proposer would allocate ‘a number of
sources’ to them. After pilot trials it emerged that proposers were unsure whether a completely selfish
allocation would affect their payment. Proposers were also unsure whether 0-10 was a legitimate allocation
for the purposes of the study. We therefore modified the instructions to clarify these issues.
In this study we used different laboratories to studies 2 and 3; this came about as a result of our
department’s relocation to another area of the university campus. Despite the change in physical location,
we attempted to replicate the pragmatics as closely as possible. The laboratories used after the move
were at opposite ends of a communal research lab with about 100 yards’ separation. These labs were
accessed via separate doors, meaning that participants were not visible to one another. The experimenter
did his utmost to preserve anonymity during the study and participants did not meet in accordance with
our established experimental protocol. Proposers and responders were told to meet the experimenter in
different areas of the building, meaning that they did not see or meet each other (as would occur if asking
them to come directly to the lab).
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5.5.4 Participants
Sixteen male and 24 female students, research, administrative and support staff from 18 different University
departments participated in this study. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 – 38 years (M = 24.7) making the
sample comparable to earlier experiments. Participants were recruited via the university noticeboard on
the promise of £5 for participating in a research study. We did not control for demographic variables and
participants were randomly assigned to condition and role.
There were 10 pairs in each condition; in the CI condition, one pair was male-male, two pairs were
female-female, and the rest were mixed pairings. In the AI condition, one pair was male-male, four pairs
were female-female, with the rest mixed pairs. All participants were naive to our experimental design
and had not participated in our previous experiments. We again evaluated perceived computing skill and
search frequency using measures from Morris (2008). No participants were novice computer users and all
reported conducting web searches at least several times per week.
As in study 3, we gauged participants’ perceptions about topic familiarity, difficulty and interest. The
topic of slime mold was not familiar to most of our participants (M = 1.4, SD = 0.9), was considered
moderately difficult (M = 2.95, SD = 1.1), and was not particularly interesting (M = 2.3, SD = 1.039).
These results are highly similar to those recorded in the slime mold condition of study 3.
5.5.5 Procedure
The procedure employed in this experiment was identical to that used in study 2, see subsection 5.3.4.
5.5.6 Results
For clarity we again present our results in sequence, focusing first on workload allocations, reported
motivations for dividing work, coordination strategies employed to prevent redundancy, and the search
time effect.
5.5.6.1 Workload Allocations
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the breakdown of allocations in each condition. It can be seen that, as in the
DLUG, the modal outcome was a fair split of the work. Eight of 10 allocations were 5-5 in both the CI
and AI conditions. In the CI condition there were two 4-6 allocations; in the AI condition, there was one
4-6 allocation and one 3-7 allocation.
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Table 5.4: Workload allocations, study 4, complete information (CI) condition.











Table 5.5: Workload allocations, study 4, asymmetric information (AI) condition.
5.5.6.2 Motivation for Dividing Work
In the CI condition, 5 proposers mentioned fairness when explaining their allocation in the post experiment
questionnaire, e.g., “I think allocating half work to each is the fairest option.” [ID 3.5, see Tables 5.4 and
5.5]. Not surprisingly, all of these proposers made 5-5 allocations. Two other proposers mentioned time
and efficiency when explaining their offers, e.g., “Chose to distribute the work evenly as it seemed like
the fastest way to get the task done.” [ID 3.10]. The remaining 5-5 allocator’s rationale hints at fairness
without mentioning it explicitly: “50-50 dividing of the work seemed like the reasonable thing to do,
regardless of the task context.” [ID 3.6].
The questionnaire responses provide some insight into the decisions of the 4-6 allocators in the CI
condition. The first stated that he was tempted by a highly unfair allocation: “Given a free choice between
0 and 10 sources I was tempted by 10, however I chose to search for 4; easier task for me” [ID 3.1]. The
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other participant’s rationale was slightly unclear but appears to hint at the perception of ability: “Just want
to know/try to find sources by myself” [ID 3.9].
In the AI condition, six of 10 proposers cited fairness as an explanation of their allocation. All of
these proposers made 5-5 allocations. Two other proposers mentioned equality, but not fairness: “2
participants: equal distribution of workload. This is the fastest way to complete.”. [ID 3.12]. “I chose to
tell my partner to find 5 of the sources so as to make the work equally difficult.” [ID 3.19]. The former
quotation again mentions speed as a factor of concern when allocating work.
The rationales given by the two unfair allocators were as follows: “I gave more work to the other
participant because I didnt want to do much by myself.” [ID 3.13] “I gave my partner 6 and me 4. Mainly
because I don’t feel very confident using the internet search engine for educational topics.” [3.18].
5.5.6.3 Coordination Strategies
Fourteen of our 20 pairs employed the Wait & Repair strategy. Two pairs incurred a breakdown resulting
from duplication, and again in both cases, the person responsible for the duplication went on to correct the
mistake and obtain another source:
[Pair 3.16, AI condition]
[Participant one pastes a reference]
Participant Two: I’ve already used the creationwiki source
Participant One: I will refind one
The remaining six pairs employed the Partition Web / Document space strategy by explicitly discussing
their strategy, as illustrated by the following vignette:
[Pair 3.5, CI condition]
Participant Two: Hi there... I am going to have a look on JSTOR first of all for journals
Participant One: Hi, sure – I’ll look on Google Scholar and GoodReads
In one case, partitioning of the web space was conflated with the Wait & Repair strategy:
[Pair 3.6, CI condition]
Participant One: I’m guessing the best way to go about it would be to either look into books which are
related to the subject, or papers
Participant Two: yes, we might might be able to find good sources from wikipedia
Participant One: Should we use the same sources... or different ones? Using the same might imply
identical readings hence giving us more work... what do you think?
Participant Two: no, we have to find unique sources but we could find them from the same webpages
Participant One: True. We’ll just check the links once we post them here and see whether they’re the
same
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Figure 5.3: Correlation between task completion times of proposers and responders, study 4.
5.5.6.4 Task Completion Times
Figure 5.3 graphs the raw search time data and appears to show the same trend between paired search
times seen in studies 2 and 3. Again, the data was positively skewed (skewness statistic = 0.96) so the
data was transformed using natural logarithm. A Pearson’s product-moment correlation was computed and
revealed a moderate correlation, r(18) = .513, p = 0.021. Although this correlation is somewhat weaker
than the trend observed in experiments one and two (where both r coefficients > 0.75), we can see that
Figure 5.3 does appear to display the same overall trend as seen in our prior experiments.
Appraisal of Figure 5.3 suggests one potentially outlying data point (upper left region of the chart)
which may be responsible for lowering the strength of the correlation. Such an outlier could be tolerated in
a large sample but it is likely that this pair, who appear to have quite a large difference in their completion
times, significantly weakens the correlation in our relatively small dataset. We explored the impact of
removing this data point in line with literature on outlier removal (Judd & McLelland, 1989; Barnett
& Lewis, 1994; Osborne & Overbay, 2004), which suggests that outliers with a z score over 3 should
be removed. Exploratory analysis revealed that pair 3.11 from the AI condition (see Table 5.5) were
eligible for removal based on this criterion, where z scores were computed based on the mean difference in
completion times between each pair (M = 282 seconds difference, SD = 339). With a difference of 1382
seconds, pair 3.11 were more than 3 standard deviations from the mean; temporary exclusion of their data
from the analysis results in a positive correlation closer to the expected strength, r(17) = .704, p < 0.001,
Pearson’s product-moment coefficient.
Although exclusion of this pair does return the correlation to the anticipated level, we do not argue
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Category Description Frequency Example Statement(s)
Workrate Adjustment Makes statement about adjusting
their workrate based on that of their
partner, i.e. indicating that they ei-
ther sped up or slowed down.
15 “Because that person finished his
part so fast, I think I have to hurry
up and finish it soon.” [R, ID 3.3]
“Felt I had to find sources as quickly!”
[R, ID 2.13]
Coordination of Work Makes statement about adjusting
their search behaviour, i.e. alter-
ing their choice of pages visited or
search engines used.
8 “I became more abstract or alterna-
tive in my wording and what I looked
for” [R, ID 3.5] “I would find alter-
native source on the same website”
[P, ID 3.14]
Ensuring Quality Makes statement about adjusting the
way in which they judge the quality
of found sources.
2 “He/she makes me feel like I should
check his/her sources (how reliable)”
[P, ID 3.9]
Miscellaneous/Other Makes statement with content that
does not match other categories or
statements.
4 “We both find the relevant sources
one by one, like inspiration”[R, ID
3.6]
Table 5.6: Participants’ responses to the question “Did you feel influenced by the activities of your partner
during the study?”, study 4. In Example Statement(s) column, P = proposer, R = responder.
that they should be discarded outright. Post-hoc examination of the pair’s chat log, questionnaires and
search history implies that the disparity may have arisen due to a lack of advance planning about where to
search, with the second participant stating that “his choices [referring to the proposer] made me change
mine”. In other words, failure to coordinate perhaps resulted in both persons searching similar material,
with the responder repeatedly pipped to the post in her choices. This would in turn necessitate further
search, perhaps explaining the disparity in completion times.
5.5.6.5 Search Time Effect: Questionnaire Responses
In order to probe the causes of the search time effect, participants were asked whether they felt influenced
by the activities of their partner during the experiment. Of our 40 participants, 38 responded to this
question. The majority (29) stated that they did feel influenced in some way, with only 9 stating ‘no’. The
remaining two responses were unclear or nonsensical.
Since we were interested in whether participants felt compelled to alter their rate of work in order
to match their partner, rather than how participants selected sources for the bibliography, we classified
affirmative answers using an open coding approach. This led to the formation of four categories of
response, as shown in Table 5.6. Responses were grouped into these categories by two independent coders;
initial agreement was .93 with two disagreements later resolved through discussion. Table 5.6 shows that
statements pertaining to the adjustment of work rate, based on the feeling of being influenced the partner’s
work, were the most frequent. Such statements typically described feeling the need to either speed up or
slow down the pasting of references in order to ‘keep pace’ with the partner.
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5.5.7 Discussion
The present study was motivated by the finding that some participants in studies 2 and 3 explained their
fair offers as a strategic method of avoiding rejection in the DLUG. Here, we used an applied version of the
dictator game to investigate whether proposers would continue to allocate work ‘fairly’ when the responder
could not reject the allocation. Our intuition was that, if fair allocations in prior experiments were the
result of strategic behaviour rather than fairness preferences, allocations might shift towards unfairness
when proposers are able to allocate work with impunity. To further probe this intuition, we implented a
condition involving asymmetric information, where only the proposer had complete information about the
total workload to be divided. This manipulation removes the responder’s ability to compare his payoff to
the proposer’s; such a design has been shown to suppress fair allocations in both ultimatum and dictator
experiments (Croson, 1996).
In spite of our design, 16 of 20 proposers made a 5-5 allocation. Moreover, our implementation
of information asymmetry appears to have had almost no effect on allocation behaviour. Both of these
findings stand in stark contrast to prior results from the economic literature. Regarding unfair splits, three
were made at 4-6 and one was 3-7, and all were in the proposer’s favour, i.e. proposers delegated more
work to responders. This is slightly different to our previous experiments in that earlier allocations typically
saw proposers keep more work for themselves, perhaps suggesting that the dictator manipulation had a
small impact. However, the majority of participants still opted for an even split. Our decision to explore
the dictator variant was partly motivated by the intuition that fair offers may arise through a mixture of
strategy and other-regarding preferences. We hinted in our discussion of study 3 that people may seek
to minimise risk by making an equitable offer—such an allocation lowers the threat of rejection while
also providing a reasonable reduction in workload. The fact that people persist with equitable offers when
there can be no rejection implies that risk minimisation cannot account for our findings. Instead, other
motivations must underly the tendency towards fairness.
We have now observed that a fair split was the modal outcome in three studies. Of 50 recorded splits,
80% have been equitable and the remainder stray from equity by only a small amount. Face value appraisal
of our results suggests that fairness norms in division of labour may be stronger than those for monetary
payoffs. However, we must be careful about this conclusion given the presence of several other competing
explanations. For example, examination of the post-experiment questionnaires revealed that some dictators
had wanted to be unfair but chose not to, with one dictator stating: “Given a free choice between 0 and 10
sources I was tempted by 10, however I chose to search for 4”. Such responses are interesting in the sense
that they demonstrate participants reversing on their initial preferences. However, they provide no clear
insight as to why this reversal occurs. One very distinct possibility is that the moral cost associated with
the highly unfair action, in this case a 0-10 allocation, outweighs the gain in utility associated lowering
the workload. Recent models of individual decision making (e.g. Levitt & List, 2007) suggest that utility
functions may incorporate a nonpecuniary moral payoff, denoted by the negative externality that a selfish
decision imposes on others. Here, the decision to engage in the 0-10 allocation may be at odds with an
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individual’s identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000) or may be viewed as immoral, antisocial, or simply wrong
(cf. Levitt & List, 2007). This would explain why participants chose to renege on their initial tendencies,
opting instead for fair splits. One other possibility is that participants chose not to follow through on the
unfair allocation due to the potential for scrutiny from the experimenter. That is, participants may have
been aware that a reduced workload would result in early departure from the experiment, in turn signalling
a highly selfish allocation to the facilitator. Such scrutiny may have deterred participants due to fear of
looking like ‘the bad guy’. However, it would be difficult to deal with this problem without implementing
a convoluted double-blind procedure. These concerns hint at deeper underlying issues with the enactment
of economic experiments more generally. For now, we shall defer in-depth discussion of these possibilities
until a later, more general discussion of the present experiments (section 5.7 of this chapter).
Turning to our process results, we again observed the use of strategies to coordinate work during
collaborative search. Although no new strategies emerged, we were able to replicate the strategies of Wait
& Repair and Partition Web/Document space, as observed in studies 2 and 3. Additionally, we did not
observe the use of the Partition Semantic Space strategy. Since participants reported low knowledge about
the subject, these findings support our arguments that semantic partitioning is only available when at least
one collaborator has at least some knowledge of the topic.
This experiment also replicated the search time effect for a second time. While the strength of the
correlation was initially moderate, we saw that removal of one outlier from our dataset returned the
correlation to the expected strength. This again suggests a desire for fairness in the completion, as well
as allocation, of the collaborative task. Recall, however, that the effect has two components: first, the
matching of completion times within a pair, and second, an often-considerable variance between pairs.
For example, in the present experiment we see pairs with completion times of around 10 minutes, yet
others whose time approaches 30 minutes. This begs the question as to what exactly determines the overall
task completion time for the pair—it is not immediately clear as to why one pair would complete the task
quickly when another takes three times as long.
One speculation that arose from study 3 was that participants somehow felt compelled to raise or lower
their workrate based on the observed efforts of their partner. Through our analysis of post-experiment
questionnaires in the present study, we found some that participants reported a perceived need to either
speed up or slow down the pasting of references in order to ‘keep pace’ with the partner. This would
explain how participants finish up with similar times. However, none of the statements tell us exactly why
participants felt the need to do this. It may be that the effect relates to some overall desire for equity in
both the allocation and the process. Alternatively, it could be the result of more complicated psychological
phenomena, e.g. the social comparison of relative workrate (cf. Festinger, 1954). Again, we shall return to
this issue in a more general discussion of our studies later in this chapter.
All of the findings thus far point towards fairness preferences in division and completion of work. One
possibility is that the fairness we observe results from our very explicit framing of the allocation procedure
using our game. It is possible that the prevalence of fairness is somehow resultant of our explicit framing
of the planning phase of work; thus it would be interesting to explore whether similar results would emerge
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if an explicit framing was not used. We therefore designed a fourth and final study that replicated our
previous experiments with a single change—our explicit framing of the allocation phase was removed
altogether, and collaborators were simply instructed to organise the task as they saw fit. We examine how
division of labour occurs without an explicit frame; whether searchers do indeed allocate work, and if
they do, what allocations are made. We also use this next experiment in two additional ways. First, by
introducing a new search topic, we examine whether the strategies we have observed also apply to other
topics. Second, we examine whether the matching effect in search times occurs when our explicit framing
is not used.
5.5.8 Study 4 Summary
This study was created in order to explore threat of rejection as an explanation of fairness observed in our
division of labour ultimatum game. This was achieved by using a design in the spirit of the dictator game,
where responders cannot reject the amount that has been allocated. We also introduced an information
asymmetry manipulation where only proposers knew the amount to be divided. Through a study involving
40 participants, we found that:
• The modal allocation was once again an even split, occuring in 16 of 20 cases. Of the four notionally
unfair offers, three were 4-6 and one was 3-7. Questionnaire responses indicate that a majority of
participants invoked fairness when choosing how to divide the work.
• The information asymmetry had no noticeable effect on offers; dictators did not take the opportunity
to increase their allocations in the knowledge that dictatees would not be able to evaluate them.
• When working on the Slime Mold search topic, participants once again used the Wait & Repair and
Partition Web/Document Space strategies, but did not employ the Partition Semantic Space strategy.
• The search time matching correlation was replicated for a second time.
• A majority of participants felt that they needed to ‘keep pace’ with their partner’s work rate,
particularly if the anonymous other worked quickly.
120
5.6. THESIS STUDY 5: ALLOCATING IN THE ABSENCE OF THE DLUG
5.6 Thesis Study 5: Allocating in the Absence of the DLUG
5.6.1 Study Overview
In studies 2 to 4, we saw that fairness appears to be a guiding principle in the majority of our participants’
interactions. One possibility is that the equality observed thus far might be an artifact that stems from
explicit partitioning of the planning and acting phases of work. It would, therefore, be interesting to test
whether similar behaviour would emerge when collaborators are not provoked into any type of formal
articulation work—perhaps participants would not plan their activities so explicitly if the DLUG were
removed. It would also be interesting to the allocation of work both quantitatively (who does how much of
what?) and qualitatively (who searches where for what?), as well as whether we would observe the same
evidence of fairness and equity as in prior experiments. The present study examines the veracity of our
findings in the absence of our empirical frame. We retain our experimental task and invite participants to
complete the work in whatever manner they deem fit. We also introduce a new information search topic to
explore the use of coordination strategies as a function of the task at hand.
5.6.2 Design
This experiment was equivalent to studies 2, 3, and 4 in that we retained the scenario of dividing a task
requiring 10 bibliographic references. This study again presented the task as forming a reading list for a
night class. We retained the topics of pop music and slime mold, as used in study 3, and added a third topic
on the subject of ‘international art crime’ to probe for new types of coordination strategy. This topic was
selected on the basis of work by Bailey et al. (2009) who found that, out of 20 topics taken from the TREC
robust collection (Voorhees, 2006), international art crime was perceived to be a difficult search topic. We
expected that including this new topic might allow us to observe new strategies for coordinating work.
Including the slime mold and pop music topics also allows for some superficial comparisons between the
results of this experiment and studies 3 and 4.
5.6.3 Materials
All equipment and software were identical to those used in studies 2 to 4. The procedure and experimental
protocols were similar to previous studies, save the necessary modifications required to remove all mention
of the DLUG. (Materials can be found in Appendix F.) The instructions presented the experimental task
in the same manner as before (You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class...).
All questions pertaining to the DLUG were removed from the post experiment questionnaire.
We also added several questions to explore some of the issues that arose during earlier studies.
Participants were again asked to indicate whether they felt influenced by their partners, and whether their
decision to include sources was influenced by their partner. As in our earlier experiments, Likert scales
were used to gauge topic familiarity, topic interest, task difficulty, and task interest. We also included the
question used in study 4 regarding participants’ perceptions about the need to speed up or slow down.
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5.6.4 Participants
Thirty-six (13 male and 23 female) students, research, and administrative staff from 14 different University
departments took part in this study. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 – 46 (M = 26.7, SD = 7.1986).
Demographic variables were not controlled for. This study did not involve any kind of role assignment
(unlike previous studies, participants were not explicitly characterised as proposers and responders).
Assignment of participants to pair was a matter of timetabling convenience.
There were six pairs in each condition; in the pop music condition, five pairs were mixed and one was
female-female. In the slime mold condition, four pairs were mixed, with the others female-female. In the
art crime condition, two pairs were female-female, one was male-male, and the rest were mixed gender
pairings. None of the participants were involved in our previous studies. We again evaluated computing
skill and search experience using measures from Morris (2008). All participants reported conducting Web
searchers daily. Fifteen participants reported expert computing skill, with 21 reporting intermediate. These
findings again indicated that our participants were comfortable with Web search and the use of computers.
As in our earlier experiments, we gauged participants’ perceptions about topic interest, difficulty and
familiarity using 1–5 Likert scales. For pop music, participants considered themselves moderately familiar
with the topic (M = 3, SD = 0.9), did not find it especially difficult (M = 2.5, SD = 1) and found it quite
interesting (M = 3.9, SD = 0.9).
The topic of slime mold was not familiar to most of our participants (M = 1.5, SD = 1), was moderately
difficult (M = 3.08, SD = 0.6), and was not particularly interesting (M = 2.5, SD = 1.1). These results are
highly similar to those recorded in studies 3 and 4.
Finally, although the subject of international art crime was not familiar to most of our participants (M
= 2.2, SD = 1.5) participants did not find it especially difficult (M = 2.5, SD = 1) and, on average, actually
considered it the most interesting of the three topics (M = 4, SD = 0.95). This result stands in contrast to
the findings of Bailey et al. (2009), where art crime was perceived to be the least compelling of 20 search
topics.24
Participants’ rated enjoyment of the task was similar between topics (pop music: M = 3.75, slime
mold: M = 3.66, art crime: M = 3.9), matching the findings of study 3.
5.6.5 Procedure
The procedure used in this study was identical to that of studies 2 to 4, except that participants received
only a single set of instructions and no DLUG or explicit allocation procedure was used.
24This falls into line with our earlier discussions concerning the difficulty of obtaining a universally interesting or dull search
topic.
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POP MUSIC
Session ID Agreement Sources Found P1 Sources Found P2 Total
4.1 5-5 proposed 5 6 11
4.2 None 8 3 11
4.3 5-5 agreed 6 7 13
4.4 None 5 5 10
4.5 None 13 9 22
4.6 5-5 agreed 6 6 12
SLIME MOLD
Session ID Agreement Sources Found P1 Sources Found P2 Total
4.7 5-5 agreed 5 5 10
4.8 None 5 5 10
4.9 None 6 6 12
4.10 None 5 5 10
4.11 None 4 10 14
4.12 None 10 6 16
ART CRIME
Session ID Agreement Sources Found P1 Sources Found P2 Total
4.13 None 6 7 13
4.14 5-5 agreed 5 5 10
4.15 None 6 4 10
4.16 None 5 5 10
4.17 None 5 5 10
4.18 5-5 agreed 5 5 10




Since we did not prompt any allocation behaviour in this experiment, it is useful to explore two issues: first,
whether an explicit quantitative allocation was agreed in each pair, and second, whether such allocations
remained as agreed during the process of work.
We first explored whether participants agreed an explicit allocation, and, if they did, what these
allocations were. Table 5.7 shows cases of agreement alongside the actual number of sources obtained by
each participant. It can be seen that while only a third of pairs agreed an allocation, all were made at 5-5.
It is worth noting that not all of these allocations ended up at 5-5; in half of all cases, participants posted
more sources than absolutely necessary.
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5.6.6.2 Motivation for Dividing Work
Participants were asked what factors, if any, they considered when organising the work. Only two
participants mentioned fairness, e.g., “I decided 50/50 would be a good fair start.” (P1, session 6, pop
music). Other participants’ rationales were more task-focused, either mentioning the need to have diversity
in the reading list; the need to organise the work while preventing redundancy (i.e. what coordination
strategy to use); or the need to ensure reliability in the reading list.
5.6.6.3 Coordination Strategies
Table 5.8 shows the strategies employed by participants in this study, alongside those identified in studies
2, 3, and 4. The use of coordination strategies in this study was relatively infrequent in comparison with
previous experiments. Twelve pairs (66%) did not use a coordination strategy and have been classified as
using the Wait & Repair method in Table 5.8. Only one of these pairs incurred a duplication, which was
later corrected during the process of work.
Regarding explicit strategies, one pair used the Partition Semantic Space strategy in the pop music
condition. No other explicit strategies were used in this condition. In the slime mold condition, two pairs
utilised the Partition Web Space strategy. No other explicit strategies were used. In the art crime condition,
one pair used Partition Semantic Space and two pairs used Partition Web Space. The vignettes below
illustrate pairs using the strategies; the first shows a pair agreeing to partition the semantic space, and the
second shows a pair agreeing a 5-5 allocation while simultaneously negotiating a Web space division.
[Pair 4.4, Pop Music]
Participant Two: ok should we pick 2/3 artists and then find sources of info on them?
Participant Two: so let’s say the beatles, rolling stones and jimmy hendrix?
Participant One: We could do see, what we find
[Pair 4.7, Slime Mold]
Participant One: Hi, how shall we go about getting the reading list?
Participant Two: hi there... do you wanna do 10 and i do 10 then share, or do you prefer do 5 each?
Participant One: Shall we each do 5, but so that they don’t overlap, would you like me to do journals
and you do webpages?
Participant Two: can do, I don’t mind
Additionally, in the art crime condition, we observed the following interaction after the pair had initially
agreed Web space partitioning:
[Pair 4.18, Art Crime]
Participant Two: I am struggling here. What keywords are you using to search?
Participant One: “art theft” and “art crime” so far
Participant Two: Thanks I will try something similar
Although this is in truth a case of one participant helping another, it hints that Partitioning by Keyword
Space is a new strategy which might be used for coordination.
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Coordination Strategy
Thesis Study Topic Wait & Repair Partition Web/Document Space Partition Semantic Space
2 Design 8 (1) 2 0
3 Pop Music 4 1 5
Slime Mold 8 (1) 2 0
4 Slime Mold 14 (2) 6 0
5 Pop Music 5 0 1
Slime Mold 4 2 0
Art Crime 3 2 1
Total 46 15 7
Table 5.8: Frequency count of agreed coordination strategies seen in studies 2 to 5, by search topic.
Numbers in brackets signify an instance of breakdown caused by duplication of work.
5.6.6.4 Task Completion Times
We again derived participants’ search times from process logs. Unlike earlier experiments, participants in
this study often obtained more items than were specific by the task description. As we are interested in
examining whether participants stop around a similar time, we opted to analyse search logs on the basis of
the time at which each participant each pasted their final reference of choice. (As opposed to their fifth
reference, as was appropriate in the majority of cases in earlier experiments). Such a decision offers a
more accurate representation of participants’ end points, as determined by their decisions to terminate the
pasting of references.
Figure 5.4 graphs the search time data and again shows a striking concordance between partners’ task
completion times. Again, a Pearson correlation was computed on log transformed data, and revealed a
strong positive correlation, r(16) = 0.878, p < 0.001.
5.6.6.5 Search Time Effect: Questionnaire Responses
We again asked participants about the extent to which they felt influenced by the actions of their partner.
Twenty-seven participants provided some information about the issues affecting their workrate and
decisions to paste sources. Appraisal of responses suggested that they would fit the categories identified in
study 4. Table 5.9 again shows the categorisation of statements by the same two independent coders, who
this time incurred one disagreement which was resolved through discussion. Results are similar to study 4
in that many participants again felt compelled to adjust their work to ‘match’ the apparent efforts of their
partner.
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Figure 5.4: Correlation between task completion times of proposers and responders, study 5.
5.6.7 Discussion
This study sought to explore behaviour in our experimental task without using the DLUG to initially
frame the allocation of work. We observed that relatively few pairs agreed, and subsequently followed
through with, explicit allocations. Of those who did allocate, all were made at 5-5 splits. Participants’
reported motivations for dividing the work in this way once again fall into line with fairness preferences.
One interesting aspect of behaviour in this experiment was that 50% of pairs posted more sources than
were absolutely necessary, i.e. they overshot the task requirements. This was not observed in our prior
experiments. While this might initially seem like participants failed to properly internalise the task, we
suggest that this behaviour has more to do with the way in which participants went about completing
the task. That is, rather than define a stopping point for each person, participants collected references
until they realised that the task requirements had been met. In some cases, the lack of clear division of
labour resulted in unnecessary work. One perk of explicit allocations, as defined within the DLUG, is
that it offers a clear objective for terminating individual activity. Indeed, other authors have argued that
planned divisions of labour can serve as stopping rules (e.g. Bardram, 1997). The behaviour we saw in
this experiment could actually be more representative of real-world collaborative search, where people
often gather sources into shared repositories (or ‘shortlists’) and then discuss findings after an unspecified
period of time (Kelly & Payne, 2014, see Chapter 6 of this thesis).
Turning to the enactment of work, the use of coordination strategies in this study was of similar
frequency to that observed in prior experiments. Although it arose only once, we again find that Partition
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Category Description Frequency Example Statement(s)
Workrate Adjustment Makes statement about adjusting
their workrate based on that of their
partner, i.e. indicating that they ei-
ther sped up or slowed down.
11 “They were working faster than me
so I felt under pressure to go quicker.
I would have liked to work slower
to provide quality sources.” [P2, ID
4.8] “Felt like a competition to find
10 links first!” [P2, ID 4.11]
Coordination of Work Makes statement about adjusting
their search behaviour, i.e. alter-
ing their choice of pages visited or
search engines used.
8 “First three links by him/her were
about americans, that made me look
for artists in Europe/Asia.” [P1, ID
4.1]
Ensuring Quality Makes statement about adjusting the
way in which they judge the quality
of found sources.
4 “They seemed quite thorough so I
tried to do the same.” [P1, ID 4.6]
Miscellaneous/Other Makes statement with content that
does not match other categories or
statements.
4 “Not really, he was going off track
the majority of the time.” [P1, ID
4.5]
Table 5.9: Participants’ responses to the question “Did you feel influenced by the activities of your partner
during the study?”, study 5.
Semantic Space is confined to the pop music condition, with those working on slime mold using Partition
Web Space relatively more frequently. Of course, we must be modest about these results given the
low number of observations, but the reoccurence of the strategies does at least strengthen our overall
understanding of coordination during collaborative information seeking. We also saw that these strategies
were used during research on ‘International Art Crime’, where a hint of another strategy, Partitioning by
Keyword Space, was witnessed. It is likely that, with further work, other such methods of coordination
would be identified.
We again observed a strong positive correlation in paired task completion times. This falls into line
with the results of studies 2, 3, and 4. Both aspects of the effect were replicated: paired participants
tended to finish at similar times, and there was considerable variance between some pairs (see Figure
5.4). We should note that the matching of times within a pair may initially appear less interesting because
participants did not play the DLUG and were not incentivised with the opportunity to leave the study
early. However, the replication of the effect here is important for two reasons. First, the fact that the effect
persists without the DLUG suggests that it is not somehow tied to our explicit framing of the planning
phase. Second, this study also shows that the matching effect need not be tied to a 5-5 allocation. If it were,
overall times in the present study (where 50% of pairs involved participants each obtaining a different
number of resources, e.g. 6 and 7) would not match up at all. The fact that participants complete different
quantities of work, but still finish up at similar times, speaks to the overall consistency of the effect in the
face of variable amounts of completed work.
Since the experiments reported within this chapter were essentially variations on a theme, and touch
on the same issues multiple times, the following section of this thesis reflects more broadly on the present
studies. We shall discuss salient issues that have come to the fore when examining bargaining over division
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of work. We shall also offer potential explanations and alternative interpretations of our various results,
alongside some reflection upon the issues raised by our method.
5.6.8 Study 5 Summary
This study removed the DLUG and had no explicit delineation of planning and acting in division of work.
The study was intended to explore the persistence of our results when our empirical frame, the DLUG,
was removed from the division of labour task. We also introduced a new search topic, International Art
Crime, to examine whether our observed coordination strategies map to other search topics. Through a
study involving 36 participants, we found that:
• Most participants did not agree a quantitative split of the work. This resulted in many pairs doing
more work than was absolutely necessary, pointing to the utility of explicit allocations as stopping
rules.
• When participants did allocate (33% made an allocation), such allocations were made at 5-5.
• Participants once again used the Wait & Repair and Partition Web/Document Space strategies, and
also employed the Partition Semantic Space strategy when working on the pop music and art crime
topics. We observed a hint of a new strategy, Partitioning by Keyword Space.
• The correlation in search times was replicated for a third time. This indicates that the effect is not
somehow tied to our explicit delineation of planning and acting via the DLUG.
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5.7 General Discussion of Studies 2 to 5
The following subsections offer broader discussion of, and reflection upon, the present findings. In
discussing our results we will consider in turn the DLUG allocations, the observed coordination strategies,
and the matching effect in completion times. We will sketch possible explanations, provide further insights,
and consider alternative interpretations as appropriate.
5.7.1 DLUG Allocations
A major aim of the experiments reported in this chapter was to explore bargaining over workload in our
novel DLUG paradigm. In our first two experiments, we found that the modal outcome was a fair split
(86% of cases), occurring when the search task was unknown, known to be interesting, or uninteresting to
participants. We also found that a majority of proposers (73%) used fairness as a complete explanation of
their offer. In our third experiment, we drew on the dictator game to explore whether proposers would
become more selfish when responders had no recourse and limited information about the task. Even in this
case, 80% of splits remained fair. Our last experiment explored allocations in the absence of an explicit
frame. While quantitative allocations were somewhat infrequent, those who did explicitly partition their
task typically did so at the point of fairness. Taken together, our four experiments provide further evidence
for a fairness norm in the division of labour. Although it has not been our aim to compare the DLUG
with the UG, one might actually argue that the frequence of equity is even stronger than that observed
during negotiation over pecuniary payoffs. While our findings should be interpreted with caution given the
number of participants involved, the results are at least stable and consistent.
The work we carried out during these studies was highly exploratory and, as such, was always a risk
in terms of the results we might obtain. When conducting our studies, we were initially surprised (and
sometimes disappointed) by the fact that participants did not attempt to minimise their workloads and
instead repeatedly made fair allocations. However, considering our results in conjuction with relevant
literature would suggest that the findings are, perhaps, not so surprising. In Chapter 2 we recognised that
fairness is fundamentally about conforming to agreed norms, which may or may not be implicit, while
ensuring that rewards are reflective of contributions. This was reiterated in Chapter 4, where, during
our review of ultimatum games, we noted how monetary allocations decrease when proposers perceive
themselves as entitled to more of the resource (as when claim is legitimised by an earnings task). Such
findings are usually interpreted as ‘increased self-interest’ by economists, but are perhaps better regarded
as demonstrating compliance with an expectation for fairness, at least in the sense that when only the
proposer has exerted effort to obtain the reward, it is arguably fairer for them to be entitled to a greater
share of the surplus.
In the present experiments, we tried to provoke a range of allocations by manipulating the attractiveness
of the search task and by allowing proposers the opportunity to allocate without recourse. Regarding
the former, participants with the unattractive task did acknowledge that they knew less about the task,
perceived it as harder, and found it more difficult to obtain sources. Yet these factors did not impact
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allocation behaviour. One potential explanation here is that the task unattractiveness was not a strong
enough incentive to encourage inequity. Yet perhaps a better explanation is that the incentive of a ‘reduced
workload’, and hence opportunity to leave the experiment early, is not enough to warrant breaking fairness
norms. Such an explanation might also be applied to the results of our dictator experiment as well—perhaps
the disutility associated with being ‘the bad guy’ outweighs the benefit associated with delegating all
of the work. These intuitions rest on the fact that participants do actually see the opportunity to leave
the study early as an incentive. We must remember that participants took time out of their day to come
to the experiment, and thus might actually be curious about the task and willing to try their hand at it.
Delegating all of the work would deny such an opportunity, and might feel odd given that the participants
were likely expecting to have to do ‘something’ to receive their reward. Issues such as these, as well as the
highly exploratory nature of this work, make it important to consider why participants might be so inclined
to make fair splits in the DLUG. We now consider some possible explanations, as well as alternative
interpretations.
5.7.1.1 Equality as a Decision Making Heuristic
In discussing fairness in Chapter 2 of this thesis, we saw that people often make equitable allocations of
goods as an efficient means of negotiating decisions in social contexts (Harris & Joyce, 1980; Allison &
Messick, 1990). This ‘general equality algorithm’ (Hertel et al., 2003) serves as a fast and frugal heuristic
for distribution of resources, especially when the decision involves an element of risk or requires extensive
deliberation (cf. Collett, 1977). While minimisation of risk could play a role in invoking fairness (the
equitable allocation is hypothesised to be an offer that mitigates the primary risk of the decision scenario,
i.e. the threat of rejection), study 4 of this thesis demonstrated that risk minimisation alone cannot account
for fairness in the DLUG. This is because participants continued to make equitable allocations in a dictator
version of the DLUG where allocations could not be rejected. If risk minimisation had been the motivating
factor in driving allocations, we would have expected to see many more unfair allocations of workload
than were recorded.
This finding does not, however, completely rule out the use of the equality heuristic as an explanation.
Participants might simply have been relying on equality for other reasons. In the context of our DLUG, an
equitable allocation is straightforward in terms of cognitive processing, provides a reasonable reduction
of workload, and conforms to egalitarian norms—equality is the default expectation in social exchange
if no other mitigating factors are present. It may be that, rather than looking for the optimum reduction
of workload, participants were instead looking for a ‘good enough’ outcome and considered fairness to
be the ‘just’ option in light of its socially satisfying character and relative ease to obtain. Alternatively,
it may be the case that participants actually want to try their hand at the work and thus have no strong
desire to behave selfishly—this taps the broader issue of whether reduction in work is a sufficiently strong
incentive to drive selfish behavior. What is interesting is that our participants might have been relying on
fairness as a convenient heuristic even if it did not reflect their initial preference. Some individuals in study
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4 stated that they had wanted to make an unfair allocation, but chose not to, instead opting for an even
split. Exactly why participants chose this approach is an open question. We can offer an initial exploration
by considering issues raised in the economic literature regarding incentives and moral costs in decision
making. Before engaging such considerations, however, we first discuss two other plausible explanations.
5.7.1.2 The Role of Communication: Anticipating Collaboration
A better explanation of the results might be that participants were aware of the fact that they would
need to work with their anonymous counterpart after making the allocation. In a typical UG experiment,
participants come into the laboratory and are paired with an anonymous person in a separate room. No
verbal communication occurs between the two, with the only information exchanged (at least in a baseline
treatment) being the proposer’s allocation and the responder’s decision. This information is usually
transmitted on paper or via computer terminal (Croson, 2005).
The procedure described above is one of the ways in which our DLUG experiments differ sharply
to the classic UG, at least in procedural terms. Recall that participants in our experiments make their
allocations via text chat, and were later free to communicate with their partners during the experimental
task. While we made a reasonable effort to incorporate the methods of experimental models into our own
studies, it was necessary for our participants to communicate in order for their collaboration to be at least
something more than entirely artificial. One issue here is that communication is known to have a strong,
positive impact on cooperation in ultimatum and dictator games (Frey & Bohnet, 1997; Bohnet & Frey,
1999; Croson et al., 2003) and this is also true of other economic games (Sally, 1995). Since participants
in our studies knew that they would be working with their anonymous partner, they would, presumably,
have recognised that they might need to communicate with them during the experimental task. One might
therefore speculate that the anticipation of collaboration explains the high number of fair offers in our
DLUG.
Why might the very anticipation of collaboration result in a fair distribution of work? One explanation
is that, by making a fair allocation of work, one is conforming to expected norms and is offering a very
clear signal of willingness to cooperate. This aligns with the concept of collaboration readiness, which
refers to the preparedness of an individual or organisation for collaboration, and includes both hard and
soft factors (Rosas & Camarinha-Matos, 2009). Examples of hard factors include technological fit or
matching competencies, whereas soft factors incorporate behavioural norms, values, traits, and trust (Rosas
& Camarinha-Matos, 2009). Fairness, then, might be regarded as a soft aspect of collaboration readiness;
by demonstrating that one is willing to behave fairly, one is demonstrating good character and providing a
productive foundation for collaboration. Existing accounts of collaboration and the collaborative process
(e.g. Roschelle & Teasley, 1995; Pinelle et al., 2003) do not really consider fairness as a critical aspect
of work. The present research, however, implies that fairness preferences may play a mediating role for
collaboration from beginning to end.
The idea of ‘anticipating collaboration’ as an explanation of fairness could be readily explored using
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our DLUG. Such an experiment might contain two cells: one that involves subsequent collaboration after
completing a DLUG, and one that does not. (The latter example would provide a perspective on the
allocation of workload in terms of notional work units, even purer than that of our first experiment.) Such
a study might also include a cell where participants engage in a standard UG over money, thus making
the study a stepwise-esque comparison between a DLUG involving collaboration, a very rarefied DLUG,
and the UG itself. Capturing a significantly different offer distribution with the non-collaborative DLUG
would then give credence to the explanation offered above.
5.7.1.3 Collaborative versus Competitive Framing
An issue that is somewhat related to the preceding discussion concerns the way in which our DLUG
is framed to participants. Ultimatum games are typically presented to participants as ‘decision making
experiments’. Instructions and procedures are designed to abstract away from everyday scenarios and
not activate “unconscious, preprogrammed rules of social exchange behavior” (Hoffman et al., 1996a,
p. 659). In our studies, the framing is somewhat less neutral in that participants are aware that they are
about to engage in a collaborative activity and will achieve some benefit for doing so (i.e., they can reduce
their workload, leverage the benefits of having a partner for an unfamiliar task, and so on). Perhaps our
task is perceived as an explicit opportunity to collaborate, rather than compete, with another player, and
this framing gives rise to goals that do not correspond with the minimisation of work. Prior work in
economics has shown that the way in which a game is framed can impact allocation behaviour: Larrick
& Blount (1997) demonstrated the effects of framing the UG using the language of ‘claiming’ versus
‘dividing’, with the former producing more prosocial responses. Liberman et al. (2004) found that labelling
a structurally equivalent prisoners’ dilemma as either a Wall Street Game or a Kibbutz Game25 led to a
decrease in cooperation when the competitive norm-inducing Wall Street frame was used. Since cues of
social norms can enforce social norm compliance, the fact that ultimatums are not usually framed in terms
of collaboration may, therefore, explain the prevalence of fair offers in our studies.
Our experiments were effectively labelled as a collaboration problem, and this means that participants
may have been more cooperative than they would if the work was divided but no collaboration happened.
While our decision to frame the experiment in the language of collaboration may explain the frequency
of fair offers, we regard this as a positive aspect of our design that would only be of concern to the most
hardheaded of economists. Our aim with this work has been to study collaborative division of labour;
therefore, one might argue that evocation of relevant norms would actually be a desirable characteristic for
our studies. Moreover, when introducing our model in Chapter 4, we introduced the workload minimisation
approach as a baseline for DLUG play, intended primarily as a way of positing what players could, rather
than should, do in the DLUG. We would argue that our results using a ‘collaborative’ frame are actually
more valid in terms of investigating division of labour than an experiment that artificially imposed a
25Liberman et al.’s experiment was run in Israel: a Kibbutz is an Israeli collective community where the principle of equality is
held in extremely high regard: goods are shared between all members of the Kibbutz, gifts are held in a common treasury, and all
purchases are made collectively. See Talmon (1972) for further reading.
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competitive norm as a baseline. However, we do not disagree that the possibility of evoking different
behavioural norms is intriguing: normative framing has been shown to impact fairness preferences in both
economics and psychology. For example, fairness judgements are more prosocial when people believe they
are interacting with ingroup versus outgroup members (Hertel et al., 2002, Study 1), and when ingroup
norms are cooperative rather than competitive (Hertel et al., 2002, Study 2). In line with our earlier
discussion concerning the impact of communication on allocation, we would offer the issue of normative
framing as an area for future work.
5.7.1.4 Moral Costs
A third consideration is the extent to which participants’ decisions might have been impacted by factors
that are known to impact decision making more generally. The issue of morality is especially relevant
here: Levitt & List (2007) argue that, in any allocation, the utility derived from making the selfish choice
has to outweigh the moral cost associated with the action in question. We hinted earlier that the moral
cost of the selfish allocation in our experiments might have outweighed the corresponding gain in utility
associated with doing less work. Our participants were given a very stark choice between completing
an amount of work (of their own choosing) or, in a nutshell, freeriding in order to receive their reward.
No participants preferred the latter option. Several stated that they ‘felt bad’ about making the selfish
allocation, and instead opted for an even split, presumably to comply with social norms. Thus the potential
disutility associated with selfishness appears to have been more salient than the payoff associated with a
reduced workload, in turn explaining participants’ gravitation towards fairness. This again raises the issue
of work as a commodity in bargaining—we now address this issue in more detail.
5.7.1.5 On the Utility of Allocating Work
Our application of the ultimatum game to study division of labour has raised a number of issues about
the act of deciding how to allocate a given task, and necessarily provokes broader questions about non-
pecuniary bargaining. In particular, we can begin to think not only about what it is that participants are
trying to maximise or minimise in our studies, but also our incentive structure and the relative utility of
contributing work items to a joint project. These issues are interrelated to an extent, and discussion of each
may assist in terms of explaining the frequency of equitable offers observed in our game.
Let us first consider the issue of what it is that participants are trying to achieve when allocating work
in our DLUG paradigm. This question is intimately connected to the way in which participants value, and
hence derive utility from, the commodity over which they bargain. As we saw in Chapter 4, a majority of
subjects in economic experiments, like those that employ the UG, are incentivised usual actual financial
rewards. The game-theoretic analysis of such experiments relies on the non-satiation postulate (Smith,
1976). This postulate assumes that, if given a costless choice between two alternatives, where the first
yields more utility than the second, the utility-maximising option should always be preferred (Smith, 1976).
In other words, if more money means more utility, then more money should always be preferable to less.
133
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL STUDIES USING THE DIVISION OF LABOUR ULTIMATUM GAME
The incentive structure in a standard UG is, therefore, quite clear: proposers are assumed to be motivated
to retain the surplus, and, for responders, the negative financial consequences associated with refusing the
proposer’s offer provide a clear disincentive for rejection.
If our experiments have shown one thing, it is that applying the utility-maximisation framework to
division of labour is not straightforward. Unlike traditional economic experiments, our currency of interest
is work, and one implicit assumption in our model is that less work is preferable to more. While we
introduced this primarily as a simplifying assumption in Section 4.2, the analysis was intuitively sensible
because if one is given a costless choice between receiving a reward for completing either more or less
work, one might opt for the latter option as it maximises reward in relation to time. (Essentially, one is
optimising ‘wage’). However, participants in our studies did not behave in line with this reasoning. On
the one hand, this makes our results qualitatively similar to the outcomes observed in typical UG studies,
where empirical results fail to conform to the canonical economic model of behaviour. Yet on the other,
our results beg the question of what exactly our participants were trying to achieve with their allocations.
For example, when we attempted to vary the level of the tasks’ desirability, as per our second experiment,
several proposers actually kept more work for themselves. And later, in our third experiment, participants
had the opportunity to delegate all of the work with no recourse, but most often chose to make a fair split.
These results are counterintuitive given a work-minimisation model, and would seem to imply that subjects
do not actually strive to minimise their workloads. The implication here is that participants clearly derive
utility from other things than just minimizing work—defining exactly what those things might be presents
a very clear and immediate opportunity for future work.
A second issue raised by this discussion concerns the nature of work itself. Our experiments essentially
treat money and work as fungible, but the latter commodity is in many ways qualitatively different to
money. Any currency lacks meaning if one does not appreciate, or cannot properly gauge, its value;
the currency must, therefore, hold some intrinsic value to its bearer in order to be perceived as worth
‘something’.26 In a standard UG, the consequence of allocating more or less money is quite clear. In
the DLUG, however, the exact value of the items in the pool to be distributed is uncertain: sources in
a collaborative information seeking task are necessarily somewhat coarse with respect to actual effort,
because, for example, one might expect some sources to be harder to find than others. Items in the pool
are thus somewhat ambiguous in the sense that it may be difficult to predict how much time—and, by
extension, effort—will be required to obtain each item. This in turn means that it may be difficult to assess
the difference between alternative outcomes, making the allocation decisions we obtained potentially
somewhat abstract—participants’ allocations perhaps reflect an estimation of their and their partner’s
abilities to complete the task rather than their ‘valuation’ of the work. However, one might argue that
the ambiguous nature of DLUG items is actually closer to the real world, where people are known to be
bad at predicting task completion times (Buehler et al., 1994). Allocation of any task, then, must involve
26See, for example, the money illusion effect, where consumers tend to rely on the nominal rather than absolute value (in terms
of purchasing power) of money when evaluating transactions (Shafir et al., 1997). When evaluating unfamiliar currencies, people
spend less if the currency is a multiple of their home country, but more if it is a fraction, suggesting they find it hard to gauge the
value of unfamiliar currency (e.g. Raghubir & Srivastava, 2002; Wertenbroch et al., 2007).
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some level of ambiguity, and attempting to fix or constrain this property of work could be problematic. If
anything, our studies reveal the nature of work as a much more nebulous commodity than money. Since
previous work has shown that ambiguity and risk can impact economic decision making (e.g. Heath &
Tversky, 1991; Kahneman, 2003) future work might specify the time required by each subtask so as
to investigate perceptions of notional versus absolute work units. Our decision not to specify an exact
completion time for the experiment can be justified by the discovery of our search time effect, but expected
time investment is another factor that could be controlled in future.
Our final consideration on this matter is that work is characterised by myriad parameters which may
impact allocation choices. If one focuses on time spent working on a task, one might imagine preferring
fewer work items. If one instead focuses on the quality of the final product, then delegating work to another
requires trust in their competence. If one seeks to maximise efficiency, then one must pay attention to skill
and efficacy, as was done by participants in study 3. And the fact that the work may not be aversive at all
(some tasks are intrinsically motivating) means that the relative utility of contributing a work item to a
joint project is unclear. These are all considerations which will affect division of labour, and might also be
related to fairness in that there may be circumstances under which unfairness is legitimised by efficiency.
Such considerations provide an exciting array of possibilities for putting our novel DLUG to use in other
studies.
These considerations reveal that our exploration of the DLUG as yet only scratches the surface of
its potential, and the numerous issues raised by this discussion should not necessarily be regarded as
problematic. Rather, we view these avenues as potentially fruitful areas for further research. Our long-term
hope in designing the DLUG is that it might allow insights into division of labour, planning, and negotiation
in collaborative work more generally. And although we have manipulated how interesting a task is and
found little effect on allocations, we remain optimistic that studying the impact of work characteristics on
the DLUG, and comparing these with the well established phenomena in the classic UG, might allow the
DLUG to throw light on the judged utility of work. We regard an understanding of the utility of work, and
of components of projects, including the utility associated with work done by others rather than oneself, as
a vital boundary of progress in the understanding of collaborative work, especially in the various trade-offs
between delegation or distribution of labour and control. (Just as it is now recognised that considering
utility is vital for understanding individual trade-offs in cognitive performance, e.g., in speed-accuracy
tradeoffs (Howes et al., 2009)). Similarly, the possibilities outlined in this discussion raise the possibility
of exploring punishment strategies and framing effects in our DLUG. Chapter 8 of this thesis distils these
various possibilities into a scheme for future work.
5.7.2 Coordination Strategies
We found that searchers used a variety of coordination strategies to organise their work. Uncovering these
coordination strategies helps to justify our DLUG in terms of producing pragmatic outputs that can be of
immediate use to HCI. Our foremost finding, beyond the strategies themselves, was that searchers may use
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different strategies to coordinate their work so as to avoid the problem of duplication. While studies 3
and 5 showed that search topic did not affect quantitative workload allocations to any great extent, we
did observe that properties of the shared task influence the availability of coordination strategies. That
is, participants working on pop music often chose to partition by semantic space, whereas this strategy
was never observed in the conditions involving the slime mold and design psychology topics. However,
the strategy was replicated in study 5 with the pop music and art crime topics. Perhaps the most valuable
aspect of these results is that, as hinted in our introduction to this chapter, collaborative search systems
might be designed to provide support for the division of labour policies we have identified. Our strategies
are likely not the only available methods for coordinating work during collaborative search, and thus
future research might continue to explore emergent coordination behaviour in the hope of identifying new
opportunities for creating division of labour. More broadly, our strategies imply that designers might wish
to consider different ways of partitioning work, as relevant for the task at hand. For example, in a system
for collaborative travel planning, collaborators could partition work by separating potential destinations,
transport versus accommodation, and so on.
Interestingly, we did not observe any participants postponing the management of duplication to a sepa-
rate final stage, as suggested by the brute force strategy identified by Morris (2008), where collaborative
searchers divided work and then amalgamated sources later, leading to redundancy. It is possible that this
strategy is used more often in asynchronous collaborative work. We have obtained no evidence in our
studies that the various coordination strategies are differentially effective, but it seems plausible that some
strategies will be better for some tasks than others. Future work might explore these issues by instructing
teams to use various strategies, and by using more refined metrics to judge the quality of team performance,
e.g. number of queries issued, or time on task in relation to strategy employed.
5.7.3 Search Time Effect
Perhaps the most striking result from the present experiments was the close correspondence of completion
times of partners within a pair. This occurred regardless of any particular pair’s completion time: some
pairs finished the task quite quickly, whereas others took longer, but within-pair differences were highly
similar across the board. Thus it seems that participants, for whatever reason, appeared to ‘yoke’ their
efforts so as to end up with equity in the overall completion of the task itself.
Not only was this finding serendipitous, its occurrence was surprising given that participants were
neither incentivised nor instructed to ensure similarity in their workrates. If anything, one might expect
that such behaviour would be discouraged by many features of our experimental design: participants were
anonymous and under circumstances of limited identifiability; were spatially separated and communicated
only through text chat (meaning that awareness was fairly limited); and were free to leave the experiment
after finishing their own allocation (implying that their work is in no way dependent on the partner’s).
Lastly, and perhaps most pertinently, there seems to be no real reason to match completion times given
that this pattern of behaviour confers no obvious economic or procedural advantage. Here we attempt
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to interpret the effect and consider its underlying cause, as well as how it came to pass in the present
experiments.
In terms of understanding why our participants might have strived for equity in completion, several
clues can be found in the literature on social loafing, which refers to the tendency to invest less effort
when working in groups than when working alone (Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Kravitz & Martin,
1986; Kraut, 2003). Slacking behaviour of this nature has been demonstrated in a variety of tasks requiring
either physical or cognitive effort (including shouting, rope-pulling, and brainstorming; see Jackson &
Harkins, 1985, page 1199). Social loafing is typically regarded as a negative phenomenon since it most
likely leads to a decrease in overall productivity for groups. At least two variables are known to mediate
social loafing. First, the ability of participants to identify each individual’s contribution appears to be key:
participants are seen to loaf if they believe others will not bear witness to their efforts (Latane et al., 1979)
but the loafing effect disappears if mutual identifiability is held constant (Williams et al., 1981). Second,
researchers have shown that social loafing occurs when individuals expect their coworkers to loaf—such
expectations cause people to subsequently lower their own efforts so as to “establish an equitable division
of labour” (Jackson & Harkins, 1985, see Abstract). While both of these explanations aim to account for
observed shortfalls in collective effort, research has also shown that efforts can be increased according
to expectations. For example, Jackson & Harkins (1985) found that when participants worked with a
confederate and expected her to invest high effort, participants followed suit, but when the confederate
was expected to exhibit low effort, participants also invested low effort themselves. Since these results
suggest that effort can be increased and decreased according to knowledge about shared exertions, social
loafing can actually be regarded as the lower end of a more generalised effort matching phenomenon.
In their attempts to account for these effort matching effects, Latane et al. (1979) suggest that
participants adjust their effort levels so as to ensure that work is completed in line with fairness norms.
Elaborating on this explanation, Kerr (1983) suggested that if one’s partner exhibits (or is expected to
exhibit) loafing behaviour, one might lower his or her own effort so as to avoid looking like the ‘sucker’ (as
opposed to raising effort so as to compensate for the shortfall in productivity). Such arguments are clearly
of relevance to the present thesis—the effect we tapped here might simply be this ‘effort matching effect’
at work, in turn providing further evidence of a general desire for fairness in the process of completing
work.
An alternative explanation for social loafing, and the effort matching effect more generally, is that
participants engage in social comparison so as to determine how much time to spend on a given task. Social
comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) posits that people frequently compare themselves to others in order to
evaluate their own opinions, abilities, and actions. As articulated by Jackson & Harkins (1985), this means
that people may “match their level of effort not to the partner’s level, but to some normative standard that
is communicated through the partner; that is, the partner’s expressed intention to work hard or hardly
work gives the participants information about how people, in general, would respond. Thus participants
match effort not because of a sense of fairness or equity, but simply because they are conforming to some
standard” (Jackson & Harkins, 1985, p. 1206). While we recognise that this explanation is not immediately
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applicable to our work (if only because neither one of our participants is an experimental confederate
masquerading as a coworker), social comparison effects might still be responsible for our own results in a
similar, but subtly different, fashion. This is described as follows.
Research has shown that people are especially prone to engage in social comparison during circum-
stances where behavioural requirements are ambiguous or unclear (Karau & Williams, 1993; Gibbons
& Buunk, 1999; Mussweiler, 2003). Our experiments did not specify exact requirements for time or
quality of work, meaning that participants were left to determine how to satisfy these vague criteria for
themselves. Perhaps in attempting to resolve this ambiguity, participants used cues about one another’s
workrate to arrive at some emergent normative standard, in turn leading to eventual similarity in completion
time.27 Feldman (1984) argued that norms are often determined by initial patterns of behaviour when a
group comes together; tentative, early actions mark the boundaries of acceptable behaviour and lead to
expectations about performance. Since norms can spontaneously arise when behaviours that satisfy one
group member are imitated by others (Opp, 1982), our participants might have finished up at similar times
simply by pacing themselves at some mutually satisfying rate. That is, rather than striving to meet fairness
norms, the norm was simply to ‘do as my partner is doing’. Since none of our participants engaged in
any explicit discussion about how long to spend on the task, any such matching effect must have emerged
implicitly rather than via explicit negotiation—a feature that makes our observed correlations all the more
fascinating. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that every pair would arrive at the same normative
standard for effort investment, meaning that we would naturally expect some variation between pairs if
this explanation were true. And, as it turns out, our work offers strong support for this intuition by the fact
that completion times in our studies were often dissimilar between many of our pairs.
In terms of how this process might have been bootstrapped in our experiments, insight can be obtained
by considering the way in which participants were able to interpret one another’s efforts during our
experiments. Recall that the only indication of workrate available to each participant was the pasting
of references by their partner into the shared chat. This shared resource was in fact the sole awareness
mechanism provided to our participants. The qualitative responses collected in studies 4 and 5 indicate
that participants sometimes felt a need to increase their workrate due to the perception that they were
‘lagging behind’, particularly when the anonymous collaborator seemed to be working quickly. Others
testified that the work process sometimes felt like a ‘competition’ to see who could finish first. It would,
therefore, seem that if one participant arbitrarily decides to work quickly, the second feels the need to
speed up, hence leading to a matching effect. This would certainly help to explain why some pairs finished
the task in a much shorter timeframe than others. In some cases, it is possible that the matching effect
might be the result of social pressure—the perception that one is ‘lagging behind’ very likely leads to
an upturn in completion time (perhaps facilitated by social comparison as well, at least to some extent).
27Levine & Moreland (1998) define norms as “shared expectations about how all group members ought to behave” (Levine
& Moreland, 1998, p. 427). Norms are a characteristic of group structure that can guide how a group goes about its business,
and can be determined formally or informally. Norms are sometimes inferred from the behaviour of other group members,
with regularities interpreted as conformity to group norms and irregularities interpreted as deviance (conflict) from those norms
(Levine & Moreland, 1998).
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However, this interpretation does not provide insight as to why matching occurs when no such pressure is
felt, as is presumably the case in longer trials. Perhaps in this latter case behaviour is based on judgements
of partner competence, as evidenced by statements like “they seemed quite thorough so I tried to do the
same” [Participant 12 in study 5]. Whatever the cause, it appears that the general phenomenon is one of
matching to some perceived standard—the question for future work is how such standards are derived.
One issue that might play a role is intrinsic motivation regarding the task. That is, if an estimation of the
other person’s effort is the sole driver on one’s own investment, then the effect is likely to be normative
and a correlation would emerge. However, if the effect is driven by issues such as independent interest
in the search topic, then perhaps we would not see a yoking effect. Providing proper answers to these
questions clearly requires further experimentation.
Although we have expressed surprise at the yoking of task completion times, it is possible that the
effect we observed is merely a reduced form of how groups naturally arrive at pacing of their work. The
literature on small groups uses the term entrainment to describe the way in which groups repeatedly adopt
the same workrate across temporally distinct tasks (Kelly & McGrath, 1985). If a group is given 10
minutes to complete a task, and then later is asked to complete a similar task with a 20-minute deadline,
group members tend to work at the same rate as occurred beneath the shorter deadline (Kelly et al., 1990).
In settings with time abundance, groups have to set a workrate for themselves. Workrate likely emerges as
a normative standard, based either on prior example or on some initial tendency that is reached arbitrarily
(perhaps by one member deciding to invest high effort and others following suit, as suggested above).
What would be interesting is to see whether pairs who invested a high or low amount of effort in our
paradigm also did the same when invited back for a second task, or whether the behaviour of persons who
invested little effort could be shifted by pairing them with a thorough searcher. Any new emergent effects,
alongside participants’ testimonials concerning decisions about workrate, could then throw greater light on
some of the questions we have posed during this discussion.
Lastly, it is worth returning to the issue of how participants determined an appropriate level of effort in
order to understand how the phenomenon might play out pragmatically. In the present experiments, we
required each participant to set his or her own threshold for what constituted a suitable contribution for
the shared bibliography. As far as our experimental protocol is concerned, any source is acceptable—pay
is not based on performance, and participants are not disqualified from payment for producing poor or
irrelevant sources. Perhaps the matching effect can be explained in terms of participants adjusting the
threshold of acceptability in accordance with the workrate exhibited by their partner. In other words, a
participant faced by a partner who appears to be working quickly might respond by adjusting their own
acceptability threshold downwards, allowing them to speed up the pasting of their contributions and keep
pace with their partner. Likewise, if work begins at a leisurely pace, perhaps the threshold for analysis
remains constant or is raised as contributions are added. We should note that although we have measured
and described the matching effect in terms of completion times, it is entirely possible that it emerges from
participants attempting to match some other aspect of their efforts, such as the resulting quality of found
sources, and we note that several trials did involve negotiations about what might constitute an acceptable
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level of quality for the reading list. However, this cannot explain why the matching effect occurs in trials
where no communication occurs whatsoever, as was the case in several of our experiments. Perhaps some
participants were content to match time, whereas in others quality was also a criterion. As we did not
collect data that would allow us to resolve these considerations, further research is required to delineate
these issues.
While the present discussion has attempted to account for the effort matching phenomenon observed
in our experiments, it is quite clear that further work is required to disentangle the exact mechanisms
underlying the effect. Irrespective of its cause, it appears safe to say that people seem to strive for some
degree of equity when completing shared tasks. The following subsections consider the theoretical and
practical implications of the search time results recorded in the present experiments.
5.7.3.1 Implications for Theory
Prior work on effort matching effects typically employs experimental confederates in order to bring about
changes in participants’ efforts. For instance, the study by Jackson & Harkins (1985) used an assistant who,
in a high effort condition, said she had “tried very hard on the practice trial and, because she thought the
research was interesting, was going to try hard throughout the experiment” (ibid, p. 1202). In the low effort
condition, she stated that she “had not tried hard in the practice [trial] and, because she thought the research
was boring, wasn’t going to try hard for the rest of the experiment” (ibid, p. 1202). Participants were
later seen to shift their efforts so as to match the expressed intention of the confederate; the implication is
that expectations about one’s partner bring about changes in one’s own behaviour, as mentioned above in
subsection 5.7.3.
Our findings are made distinct from prior studies by the fact that we do not use experimental confeder-
ates but still witness matching behaviour from our participants. As discussed earlier, we did not specify
exact requirements for effort, meaning that participants in our experiments are responsible for setting their
own effort threshold. The present studies might be regarded as evidence that effort matching can arise
naturally and in a non-contrived fashion. Furthermore, the present studies suggest that effort matching
can arise without explicit knowledge of a partner’s intentions—we remarked earlier that none of our
participants discussed how long to spend on the task, and, in many cases, times are highly similar without
any conversation occurring at all. Perhaps effort matching is a pervasive phenomenon in collaborative
work groups—further work should explore whether a similar effect can be obtained in non-laboratory
contexts.
5.7.3.2 Implications for Collaborative Systems
An exciting implication of the search times finding concerns the role that technology may have in mediating
the effect. In particular, one might imagine that the effect is moderated by the level of awareness provided
by the collaborative software. In the present experiments, awareness was maintained via the pasting of
references into the chat; participants were not actually able to see what was happening on their counterpart’s
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screen. Yet even this relatively meagre level of awareness was enough to facilitate effort matching. A more
design-oriented implication, then, is that the level of awareness participants have in a collaborative system
may affect not only their ability to collaborate, but might also influence their ability to make fairness
judgements and to pace their overall workrate. Perhaps varying the awareness information provided to
participants might disrupt, or even enhance, the matching effect. One would expect that without the ability
to have at least some awareness of joint action, the synchronisation effect would disappear completely—it
would be impossible to match effort without the ability to make ongoing judgements about a partner’s
workrate. Similarly, if the ‘paste as you go’ approach favoured in our experiments were removed in
favour of delayed pasting, i.e. sources are only entered after a searcher has found enough to satisfy his
or her contribution, then the matching effect is likely to disappear. Both of these points are more logical
observations rather than empirical questions, but it would be intriguing to explore how the synchronisation
effect might be perturbed by more or less granular levels of awareness in whatever technology participants
happen to be using at the time.
5.7.4 Task Completion Time and Quality of Work
Although our experiments saw variable levels of investment from our pairs into the shared task, one
question not explored in our analyses was whether time on task equates to a better quality of work product.
That is, we do not know whether pairs who chose to work for longer periods of time acquired sources that
were more relevant to their assigned search topic than those who worked quickly. Analysis of participants’
work quality might further our understanding of why some spent longer on the task than others—although
we did not specify a precise expectation for effort, perhaps some participants were evaluating sources more
thoroughly in an attempt to provide high-quality contributions to their bibliography. If this were the case
then we might expect those with longer completion times to have finished up with better, more relevant
sources than those who worked quickly.
One might intuitively expect that spending longer on a task leads to a better quality of output, and
evidence from the literature on small groups supports this notion. A classic finding is that time constraints
lead to a performance tradeoff, where time-pressured groups tend to work at a higher rate of output than
those who are not time pressured. However, this increased productivity comes at the expense of both
quality and quantity of work products. For example, Kelly & McGrath (1985) found that groups working
on writing tasks were more productive (in terms of words-per-person-per-minute) with a 10 minute time
constraint, but the work completed by these groups was shorter in length and of lower quality than that
produced by groups working beneath a 20 minute deadline. Other authors have obtained similar results
when studying different group tasks (e.g. Karau & Kelly, 1992; Kelly & Karau, 1999; Harrison et al.,
2003; Kelly & Loving, 2004).
To examine the relationship between task completion time and work quality in our studies, we
performed exploratory analyses using the results of Thesis Study 2 (our first DLUG experiment) . Recall
that the search topic from the experiment was: “To what extent can design be considered a psychological
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process?” and pairs had to deliver a total of 10 sources that could be used to answer this question. To
determine the quality of each participant’s found sources, we adopted the established procedure of using
judges to evaluate the quality of work products (Kelly & McGrath, 1985; Harrison et al., 2003). For
the purposes of the analysis, we defined ‘better quality’ work as sources that were ‘more relevant to the
search topic’. Two independent coders with academic backgrounds in HCI were given complete lists of
the references (69 total) collected by our participants. Coders were blind to the purposes of our study.
We asked the coders to examine the content of each reference and provide quality ratings using a 1–5
Likert-type scale, where 1 = “Not at all relevant” and 5 = “Highly relevant”. Inter-rater reliability was
found to be .74, with disagreement denoted by a disparity of two or more data points between ratings, e.g.
coder 1 rating = 2, coder 2 rating = 5. Because the two coders were unable to convene for discussion, a
third independent rater was given all items of disagreement alongside a random subset of other references
to ensure masking. We then used the evaluations of the third coder to resolve disagreements.
The quality score for each reference was used to acquire an overall quality rating for each participant’s
work. This was done by averaging the ratings of the five items collected by each person in the study (Mean
quality rating = 3, SD = 0.7). We then correlated each individual’s rating with their task completion time
to explore whether those who worked for longer acquired sources that were of better quality. The analysis
revealed a weak positive correlation which was not statistically significant, Pearson’s product-moment r =
.17, p = .473. This would suggest that spending longer on the information search task did not lead to better
quality of found sources.
Although this result appears to go against prior evidence from the small group literature, there are
two issues which need to be considered. The first is that previous studies use measures of quality that are
quite different to ours. Several studies (Kelly & McGrath, 1985; Karau & Kelly, 1992; Harrison et al.,
2003) use scales developed by Hackman et al. (1967) in which quality is assessed according to various
dimensions, including the visual presentation of a group’s efforts. This scale was used as a measure of
quality in the study by Kelly & McGrath (1985), in which the quality of presentation was higher when
groups had an extra 10 minutes to complete their task. Visual presentation is a quality criterion that does
not map well to our study: participants were simply pasting references into a shared chat window, and
since our task description did not suggest a need for the bibliography to be aesthetically appealing, it would
be difficult to distinguish our participants’ efforts by visual presentation. A more appropriate criterion
might be that of adequacy, which was used as a measure of quality in studies by Kelly & McGrath (1985)
and Karau & Kelly (1992). The concept of adequacy seems to be closer to our concept of relevance, and
what is especially interesting about this metric is that both of the studies mentioned previously found that
groups who spent longer on a task did not produce more adequate solutions than groups who were time
pressured.28 It may thus be the case that extra investment beyond a certain threshold improves only certain
aspects of a group’s work and not others. For example, groups might use abundant time to improve quality
28In spite of our best efforts, we were not able to examine the original measure of adequacy used by Kelly & McGrath (1985)
and Karau & Kelly (1992). This is because both studies point to the work of Hackman et al. (1967) as the source for the adequacy
measure, but the cited paper makes no mention of the scale. It is difficult to know what to make of this beyond the suggestion that
it may be an endemic mistake in the literature.
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of presentation in favour of content. For the present thesis, the result perhaps emphasizes the fact that there
was no real advantage to spending more time on the task, especially since effort was not a criterion for
success in the experiment.
A second issue is that the mean quality of participants’ findings tended to fall at the midpoint of the
scale used by our coders to evaluate sources (M = 3, scale = 1–5). It is not the case that our participants
were polarised in the sense of producing either extremely poor or high-quality work. Rather, the majority
of bibliographies were something of a mixed bag, with each participant’s contributions comprised of
several sources that were good and several that were poor. This led the majority of ratings to be clustered
around the midpoint of the scale. This could perhaps be caused by a learning effect where participants
gradually developed a better understanding of the search topic and thus contributed better sources towards
the end of their work. However, eyeballing the raw data does not suggest this to be the case: some
participants pasted their least-relevant source last, whereas for others quality was variable throughout their
work. Further insight on this matter could be gained by questioning participants about their decisions
during the experiment, but this is unfortunately beyond our reach at this juncture.
One final point worth considering is that participants’ work quality might have been impacted by
their perceptions of what constituted an appropriate source for the bibliography. We asked participants to
collect ‘reliable sources’. Some of the gathered references were highly relevant to the topic (mostly those
from scholarly journals) whereas others were only tenously relevant but could nevertheless be regarded as
reliable due to the reputation of their source. For example, one participant contributed a BBC news story
on colour psychology. This item was given a very low relevance rating by our coders but could arguably
be considered as reliable because it originates from a trusted source. Our definition of quality might not
be in line with that invoked by our participants—future studies that attempt to explore the relationship
between quality and time should ensure that this confound is avoid and that expectations about effort are
made clear to participants.
Overall, our analysis of Study 2 suggests that time on task did not lead to better quality contributions.
This result is potentially interesting because it runs counter to the intuitive supposition and appears to
fall into line with some prior evidence from the small group literature, but should perhaps be interpreted
with caution due to the various issues outlined above. Since the studies in this thesis were not specifically
designed with analyses of quality in mind, combined with the fact that appraisal of participants’ sources
by independent coders was both time and labour intensive, we elect not to pursue this line of inquiry any
further.
5.7.5 Limitations And Further Work
The present experiments are limited in scope and thus myriad opportunities exist for further work. First,
the experiments reported in this chapter are merely a drop in the ocean in terms of what could be explored
using the DLUG. Chapter 4 explored thirteen factors that are known to impact behaviour in the classic UG—
future work could continue to attempt replications of known effects, as attempted with the information
143
CHAPTER 5. EMPIRICAL STUDIES USING THE DIVISION OF LABOUR ULTIMATUM GAME
asymmetry enacted in study 4 reported here. Alternatively, the DLUG could be used to explore factors
relevant to the assignment of work; for example, status hierarchies, knowledge disparities, skills—the
possibilities are quite extensive. In developing the present experiments, we were affected by factors
including time constraints, limited staff support and constrained experimental budgets. It would be
interesting to see what could be achieved if these issues were not present.
One immediate area for future work would be to explore how different variables can legitimise unfair,
or at least inequitable, allocations. Our attempts in this regard were unsuccessful, but one manipulation
that may have a noticeable impact is that of entitlement. Positions in the DLUG could be awarded based
on prior knowledge, performance on an earnings task, or by allowing participants to place bids on roles
(cf. Gu¨th & Tietz, 1986). Such entitlements could be more or less distorted, e.g. with only one player
completing the earnings stage. Participants might be more inclined to shift away from equity beneath such
manipulations, and further work could then explore the impact of inequity on process results.
Although we attempted to mirror the procedure of economics experiments quite closely, there are
a number of concerns related to our protocol that could have impacted our results. One is the issue
of scrutiny, which can affect decision-making experiments in two ways: first, by the extent to which
participants perceive their decisions as subject to inspection by referent others, i.e. the experimenter, and
second, by lessening intersubject anonymity—participants may view their own role in the experiment
with greater saliency if they do not see themselves as ‘lost in the crowd’. Perhaps in our experiments,
which involved a number of procedural differences to standard UG procedures, participants were acutely
aware that their decisions might be scrutinised at a later time—the very presence of a facilitator might have
caused participants to behave in the socially acceptable manner, especially if they thought the facilitator
might bear witness to the allocation made using the chat window. Participants’ decisions may therefore
reflect what they thought was morally correct rather than their innermost preferences. One other procedural
difference is that participants completed our experiment one at a time (in anonymous pairs), rather than in
groups as is typical of economic experiments (Croson, 2005). While individual participation has been used
in prior UG studies (e.g. Henrich et al., 2004), it is possible that our participants felt highly individuated.
Both of these issues warrant further study.
A second procedural issue concerns the impact of social norms in tandem with the type of people
recruited for our experiments. Our participants voluntarily self-select into our experiments, meaning that
they might naturally be ‘cooperative types’ who are, on average, more prone to agreeable behaviours and
are more likely to act in line with fairness norms (Levitt & List, 2007). This may correspond with a lack of
lazy, free-rider types, who are unlikely to go out of their way to assist an experimenter for a relatively small
reward. This in turn could have affected our results in that our samples are not properly representative.
We would note that issues concerning self-selection are a broader concern for laboratory experiments and
there is not much one can do about this beyond further research.
Lastly, one limitation of the present experiments is the use of synchronous collaboration in which
participants performed their parts of the task at the same time, and this may have played a vital role in
allowing them to match effort. It remains to be seen if asynchronous workers are similarly influenced by
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whatever cues they might receive about their partner’s efforts. Further work might explore whether effort
matching occurs in tasks beyond collaborative search. Clearly there is a need to explore whether fairness
persists in more or less aversive tasks, and such studies can push on our contentions about the utility of
work; for example, in a highly aversive task, participants might be much more tempted by the opportunity
to delegate and avoid work. Alternatively, they might feel more risk averse or more guilty about palming
off their perceived responsibilities. Further work can push on our ideas to develop utility functions relevant
to CSCW that account for the various factors that impact division of labour during collaborative work
activities.
5.8 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we explored our DLUG model in a series of empirical studies. Our model was designed
to isolate the planning phase of work, and we used four experiments to explore how participants divided
their labour and whether such divisions were taken in line with fairness norms. Our task of choice was
collaborative information seeking, implemented as requiring collection of 10 bibliographic references. In
summary, we found that:
• the modal workload allocation in all of our experiments was an equitable split of the work, and
notionally unfair allocations did not stray very far from the point of equity. (6-4, and one case of
7-3). All of the allocations were accepted.
• participants used a variety of coordination strategies to enable division of labour and navigate the
problem of redundancy. Examples include organising their work by dividing different search engines,
or by semantic properties of the task at hand.
• there was an emergent matching effect in participants’ task completion times, which may be evidence
of a broader effort matching effect (cf. Jackson & Harkins, 1985) enabled through social comparison
and the ambiguous effort requirements of our task. Such an effect can be interpreted as evidence for
overall equity (and hence, fairness) in the work process (Latane et al., 1979).
Taken together, the findings of the present experiments provide further evidence of preferences for
fairness in division of collaborative work. Putting aside issues associated with our experimental model and
the utility of work, we suggest that fairness may play an important signalling role in collaborative work—
by proposing to divide work evenly, and then following through on that proposal, one is giving a clear
indication of willingness to cooperate, in turn demonstrating collaboration readiness (Rosas & Camarinha-
Matos, 2009). Fairness is also a very straightforward, cognitively inexpensive allocation (Allison &
Messick, 1990) that creates a harmonious basis for collaboration—which is how our experimental task,
with its suggestion of interdependency and a shared goal, was likely perceived by participants. Not only
do these findings suggest theoretical merit for the DLUG, the coordination strategies offer direct input for
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collaborative search systems, in turn suggesting that the DLUG can be used to provide productive design
implications as well.
The following chapter expands the scope of our concerns to the extra-lab world. We continue to study
the task of collaborative information seeking, as well as the extent to which searchers divide their labour
and desire fairness, but in the context of everyday search tasks. We report a field study where pairs of
searchers used an existing collaborative search tool to complete everyday tasks of their own choosing (e.g.
travel planning). The study is both theoretically and practically oriented in that we aim to understand




COLLABORATIVE SEARCH IN CONTEXT:
A REAL-WORLD STUDY
6.1 Chapter Overview
Chapters 4 and 5 reported empirical work based primarily on results obtained from the laboratory, where
fairness and division of labour were explored using collaborative search tasks. We also described how
participants coordinated their work to prevent redundancy during search. Since those studies were, at least
initially, geared towards exploring behaviour in the novel DLUG, this chapter takes a different approach
by exploring division of labour and fairness outside of laboratory settings. Here we report a qualitative
study that explores how pairs of searchers organise their work during everyday collaborative search tasks.
The first motivation for this study is the need to consider how division of labour is played out in other
situations, both in terms of how work is organised and the extent to which participants care about fairness.
A second motivation for this study is to enhance the pragmatic and design-oriented contributions of
this thesis. We noted in chapter 5 that collaborative search is a situation in which division of labour is
often desirable, and that the question of how best to implement division of labour is currently an active
one within the research community (Foley & Smeaton, 2009; Morris, 2008; Kelly & Payne, 2013). In
the present study, we deployed two existing collaborative search tools to pairs of searchers conducting
everyday information seeking tasks. Our immediate aim was to understand whether the tools were useful in
supporting actual collaborative search, and thus we recruited pre-established collaborators with information
needs that were intrinsically collaborative—tasks were self-selected, and participants used their assigned
system for as long as they wished, creating high external validity. Second, interviewing our participants
about their experiences allows us to understand how the tools were used in accordance with existing
routines, in turn contributing to a broader theoretical understanding of collaborative search behaviour ‘in
the wild’. And, by detailing how our participants used and appropriated particular system features, this
research provides implications for the design of future tools to support everyday collaborative search tasks.
147
CHAPTER 6. COLLABORATIVE SEARCH IN CONTEXT: A REAL-WORLD STUDY
6.2 Study Background
6.2.1 Understanding and Supporting Collaborative Search
Within the broader area of social search, collaborative web search describes situations “in which partic-
ipants work together to satisfy an information need” (Morris, 2013, p. 1182). Such activity can occur
either synchronously or asynchronously, and participants may be co-located or geographically distributed
(Golovchinsky et al., 2008b). Collaborative search is usually scoped to consider explicit, intentional
collaboration (cf. Golovchinsky et al., 2011), precluding consideration of filtering or recommendation
tools that utilise prior searches from anonymous ‘collaborators’.
Several studies have revealed that collaborative search occurs during a variety of professional and
personal tasks, including medical research, travel planning, and online shopping (Morris, 2008, 2013).
However, searchers report that managing such collaboration can be arduous, requiring workarounds such
as link sharing via email (Morris, 2008, 2013) or the use of ‘tools-at-hand’ (e.g., blogs, text documents)
to keep track of search results (Capra et al., 2010). Researchers have suggested that these behaviours
can be supported at the user interface, and, to this end, a number of systems have been designed by
the research community. Examples include CoSearch (Amershi & Morris, 2008) Results Space (Capra
et al., 2012), Cerchiamo (Golovchinsky et al., 2008a), Querium (Golovchinsky et al., 2012), Coagmento
(Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011), ViGOR (Halvey et al., 2010), SearchTogether (Morris & Horvitz, 2007),
WeSearch (Morris et al., 2010), and CoSense (Paul & Morris, 2009). While the specific functionality
offered by each tool is different, and can vary according to the anticipated scenario of use, the common
goal has been to alleviate the need for workarounds by providing browser-based support for collaborative
search. Rather than provide an in-depth review of these systems, which is not necessary for the purposes of
this thesis, it is instructive to focus on the general aspects of collaboration that researchers have aimed to
support with these tools. These are awareness, division of labour, persistence, and sensemaking (Foley &
Smeaton, 2010; Halvey et al., 2010; Morris & Horvitz, 2007; Paul & Morris, 2009). Here we will briefly
review the relevance of these concepts for collaborative search and consider how each has been supported
in the aforelisted systems.
6.2.1.1 Awareness
Awareness in collaborative search refers to the ability to acquire knowledge about the current and past
activities of one’s interaction partners (Shah & Marchionini, 2010) which provides a context for one’s
own activity (Dourish & Bellotti, 1992). Such knowledge promotes coordination and lessens the need
for explicit communication about task progress (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002).29 Features for supporting
awareness during collaborative search include shared query, browsing, and page visitation histories (Capra
et al., 2012; Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011; Morris & Horvitz, 2007); commenting of pages (Gonza´lez-
Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011; Morris & Horvitz, 2007); and increased salience of particular results based on
29An in-depth treatment of awareness in collaborative systems more generally is given in the following chapter.
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collaborator ratings (Capra et al., 2012).
6.2.1.2 Division of Labour
Division of Labour in collaborative search refers to the process of distributing a task across members
of a group (Foley & Smeaton, 2010). The aim here is to facilitate concurrent work while preventing
redundancy and duplication of effort. In collaborative search tools, division of labour has been supported
through text chat systems, which allow collaborators to establish division of labour through communication
(Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011); automated splitting of search results (Morris & Horvitz, 2007); allocation
of tasks by role (Golovchinsky et al., 2008a); and algorithms for selective filtering (Foley & Smeaton,
2010).
6.2.1.3 Persistence
Persistence, referring to the storage and display of activity from prior search sessions, enables asynchronous
collaborative search through information re-finding and resumption of prior search sessions (Capra et al.,
2012; Morris & Horvitz, 2007). Persistence has been supported through retention of chat logs, pageview
statistics, and session histories (Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011; Halvey et al., 2010; Morris & Horvitz,
2007); automatic generation of session summaries (Morris & Horvitz, 2007); and relevance rating tools
(Capra et al., 2012).
6.2.1.4 Sensemaking
Finally, sensemaking support allows collaborative searchers to understand the search process, in terms of
what has been found, how it was found, and where tasks have been handed off between collaborators (Paul
& Morris, 2009). Example features include: context awareness through visualisation of search strategies
and trajectories (Paul & Morris, 2009); functions to exchange sections of webpages (Morris et al., 2010);
and browsable timelines of pages viewed by collaborators (Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011; Paul & Morris,
2009).
It should be noted that these design aspects are interrelated to an extent. For instance, chat functionality
can support both awareness and division of labour by allowing searchers to exchange information and
then coordinate their efforts based on a negotiated protocol. The level of provision for each concept
may also differ according to anticipated scenarios of use; some systems are directed towards supporting
asynchronous search activity (e.g. Capra et al., 2012), whereas others are more generalisable across
circumstances (e.g. Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011).
While studies have suggested that the features described above are beneficial for supporting collabora-
tive search, no work has yet examined the success of any tool when used in natural field settings. Instead,
most have been studied using artificial tasks completed under the constraints of short-term laboratory
evaluations. This is problematic because real-world search may involve protracted behavioural patterns
that are not well supported by current systems. Additionally, a growing body of empirical work suggests
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that various factors, including awareness (Shah & Marchionini, 2010), communication channel (Gonza´lez-
Iba´n˜ez et al., 2013), time (Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez et al., 2012), and spatial proximity (Shah & Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez,
2010), can impact the collaborative search process. While such studies serve to advance theoretical
accounts of collaborative search, they do not offer findings regarding the use of tools outside the laboratory,
and offer little in terms exploring how work is organised with respect to division of labour and fairness.
An additional motivation for the present study is that the actual success of collaborative search systems,
in terms of mainstream takeup, has been fairly limited. To the best of our knowledge, none of the tools
presented within the research literature has achieved widespread adoption. Morris (2013) further notes that
the majority of commercial systems intended for collaborative search are either defunct (e.g. Aardvark,
Flock) or remain in the early stages of development (e.g. Pinterest, So.cl). One potential reason for this
is that existing collaborative search tools may require too much effort or do not offer meaningful benefit
over ad hoc practices (e.g. link sharing via email) used during everyday tasks Morris (2008). However,
neither of these possibilities has been investigated. A related issue is that collaborative search tools have
only been studied in relatively short-term laboratory evaluations. While such studies are fine for testing
specific hypotheses and evaluating initial designs, they do not provide information about how systems
are used over the longer term. No work has, as yet, studied the efficacy of collaborative search tools in
quotidian settings. It is, therefore, unclear as to how well existing tools fit with everyday collaborative
search practices.
Given the considerable research effort invested in supporting collaborative search, we believe that
studying how current tools fare in everyday settings would be beneficial for directing future design
activities. To this end, we designed a field study of collaborative search tool use, with the aims of gaining
a better understanding of collaborative search in the wild and of identifying potential enhancements for
future systems. We used two existing systems to study collaborative search behaviour. The fact that we did
not develop either system means that we cannot access system logs containing quantitative data about tool
use. The study instead focuses on qualitative analysis of interviews conducted after our participants had
used an assigned system to complete a real-world collaborative search task.
6.3 Thesis Study 6: A Field Study of Collaborative Search Behaviour and
Tool Use
6.3.1 System Choices
We used two systems to study collaborative search behaviour. Our first system was Coagmento30, a freely
available tool that incorporates a range of features designed to support collaborative search (e.g. shared
bookmarks, chat functionality) (Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011). This tool can be regarded as a ‘general
purpose’ collaborative search tool in that it is not intended to support any particular task over another.
30http://www.coagmento.org
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Figure 6.1: The Coagmento system. (A) The Coagmento toolbar. (B) The CSpace with drop down
selections for filtering saved results. (C) Shared history displaying thumbnails of recorded
pages. (D) A larger preview of a page, accessed by clicking on the relevant thumbnail. (E)
Information about a page’s time of capture, project, and username of the original viewer. (F)
Sidebar providing chat functionality, history, notifications, and a notepad.
Since we did not specify in advance that our participants should engage in any particular type of search,
this made Coagmento an appropriate choice for our study.
Our initial intention was to have all of our participants use Coagmento. However, a software update
introduced a number of bugs (e.g. SQL database errors, malfunctioning UI elements) halfway through the
study. These problems were beyond our control as we are not responsible for the creation of Coagmento.
To avoid the problems affecting our remaining participants, we decided to switch to Diigo.31 While this
choice was partly pragmatic (very few of the systems presented in the research literature are available for
outside use) Diigo’s overall functionality is actually very similar to Coagmento, meaning that a change of
system did not require a large departure from our established methodology. And, as will be seen in our
results, using a second system was beneficial in that differences between the two tools allowed us to obtain
some valuable comparative insights.
6.3.1.1 System Functionalities
Both Coagmento (see Figure 6.1) and Diigo (Figure 6.2) are web-based systems. Each is comprised of two
parts: a web browser plugin that provides rapid access to features intended for collecting, sharing, and
saving information; and an online space to which users can save pages and view the results of prior search
sessions. Both tools are also available as mobile applications, but these will not be discussed here as none
31http://www.diigo.com
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Figure 6.2: The Diigo system. (A) The Diigo toolbar. (B) Shared history with links to recorded pages.
(C) Link to the user’s personal library (‘My Library’). (D) Sidebar providing a list of pages
from their personal (not group) library and a list of annotations on the current webpage.
of our participants opted to use them during our study.
Figure 6.1 shows the Coagmento system installed on a user’s browser. The browser is open at the
online ‘CSpace’ repository (B) to which pages are saved during search sessions. When the user is logged
in to the system, all webpages visited are recorded to this history, appearing as thumbnails in chronological
order (C). Each thumbnail can be clicked to reveal a larger preview of the relevant hyperlink (D), alongside
the date and time of viewing and the username of the visitor (E). This history is then shared with all
collaborators in a dedicated project folder, accessible via the CSpace.
The Coagmento plugin provides two components: a toolbar (Fig. 6.1, A) and a sidebar (F). The
former includes buttons that allow users to bookmark whole pages, collect annotations and snippets,
and recommend pages to collaborators. Pages captured using these tools are saved to the shared history
and appear as an image bearing the relevant icon (the second thumbnail in area C shows the icon for
a bookmarked page). Users can then selectively filter their history according to these differing types
of content using the ‘All Objects’ dropdown (B). Of the remaining buttons, ‘Resources’ opens and
closes the Coagmento sidebar, which contains a shared chat, a notepad, a history of recent bookmarks,
and a notification submenu. ‘Editor’ provides access to a shared document for collaborative editing.
Finally, the toolbar displays a summary of the current page in terms of views, snippets, and annotations
(Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011).
Diigo (Fig. 6.2) provides a toolbar plugin (A) with functionality similar to Coagmento. Users are able
to bookmark pages, leave highlights on relevant sections, or capture (screenshot) particular sections of a
page. Each of these can then be saved to the Diigo webspace, either to a private library (accessed via the
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‘My Library’ tab in area C of Fig. 6.2) or, in the case of bookmarks and highlights, to a shared ‘group’
space listing captured links in chronological order (Fig. 6.2, B). Of the remaining buttons, ‘Send’ allows
users to email a page directly to a collaborator, and ‘Read Later’ allows for the webpage to be saved to a
private library for later reading. The Diigo sidebar (D) provides quick access to the user’s private library, a
list of annotations for the user’s current page, and a view of all prior readers of a particular webpage.
Comparison of Figures 6.1 and 6.2 reveals some differences which are worth considering due to their
reference later in the paper. The first concerns the way in which each system saves and presents pages
to users. In Coagmento, pages are represented using small thumbnails, each of which must be clicked to
reveal further information about the represented page. In Diigo, no thumbnail is visible; instead, the title
of the page is shown alongside a hyperlink and the username of the person who made the bookmark. Thus,
the provision of initial descriptive information is different in each system—Coagmento relies solely on
visual information, whereas Diigo uses text.
A second difference concerns the way in which each system tracks user behaviour. While active,
Coagmento records all of the pages a user visits while logged in to the system, with individual pages
represented by individual screenshots in the CSpace area (Fig. 6.1, C). This means that every page a user
visits is captured by the system, regardless of whether or not the content is relevant to the user’s primary
information need. In contrast, the only pages captured by Diigo are those that the user explicitly tells the
system to save, either by bookmark, highlight, or capture (area B of Fig. 6.2 displays some examples).
As will be seen in our results, this ‘all or nothing’ dichotomy leads to a number of concerns related to
sensemaking and privacy during the display of shared search histories.
At this point, we should stress that it is not the aim of this chapter to ‘evaluate’ Coagmento and
Diigo in terms of their usability or relative successes and failures. Rather, our use of these systems is
guided by the fact that they can be regarded as exemplary tools that might be used to support collaborative
search—indeed, Coagmento has been designed in accordance with the research literature on collaborative
search (Gonza´lez-Iba´n˜ez & Shah, 2011). We have no investment in either system and no desire to to
demonstrate that one is better than the other. Our aim is to use these tools as probes to learn more about
real-world collaborative search while identifying broader lessons for future systems.
6.4 Method
6.4.1 Study Design
Beyond our use of two tools, we designed the present study to be as naturalistic as possible. Three concerns
here were the selection of search tasks, expected duration of participation, and location of study.
Choice of search task is a difficult yet critical issue when studying information seeking (Kelly, 2009).
As we were aiming for high external validity, we elected to use natural tasks (Kelly, 2009) and allowed
participants to choose their own tasks. This encourages intrinsic motivation while providing insights into
real everyday search behaviour.
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The present study was open-ended and no time constraints were imposed on our participants’ search
process. Not only did this provide ample time for our participants to explore and become familiar with
system features, it allowed us to understand tool use during the broader collaborative search process,
spanning tentative exploration through to results collection, refinement, and eventual selection.
Lastly, we allowed participants to use the systems according to their own preferences: at home, at
work, or even on the move. We felt that learning about where, when, and how collaborative search occurs
would help to understand how tools are used in the wild, and might also prove useful in terms of designing
future technologies.
6.4.2 Participants
A total of 16 participants (eight pairs) took part in our study. Participants’ ages ranged from 19–34 (M =
24.4, SD = 4.7). Pair 3 were both male; pairs 6 and 7 both female; and all other pairs were male-female.
Pairs were comprised of friends or romantic partners, i.e. there were no anonymous pairings of unfamiliar
participants. Participants were recruited via Facebook and our University noticeboard. Our adverts stated
that we were looking for groups of people who would soon be completing a collaborative search task,
offering the “opportunity to use a system designed to support collaborative information seeking behaviour”.
We used purposive sampling, vetting those who responded to our advert to ensure that their information
needs were genuine. We did not have cause to turn away any of those who responded to our adverts. We
offered each participant £20 as a goodwill gesture for completing the study. All participants were made
aware from the outset that their payment was fixed and that it was not related to performance or time spent
using their assigned system.
Table 6.1 provides information about the system assigned to each pair alongside task choices. Each
pair used only one system and none changed tool during the study. The tasks chosen by our participants
fit well with what the literature identifies about collaborative search (Morris, 2008, 2013), and several
pairs actually chose to complete more than one task during the study. While the nature of the information
required by each of the tasks is different, we consider them to be qualitatively similar in that each is
open-ended and allows for considerable latitude in terms of exploratory search behaviour. Furthermore,
each involves an evolving information need that calls for the search and comparison of multiple sources
with the aim of arriving at an agreed outcome, i.e. a specific location, hotel, or other item of choice. We
felt this stylistic similarity would permit generalisation of insights over different tasks.
Table 6.1 also displays statistics regarding distinct search sessions, the number of items captured during
each task, and total duration of use. We requested these figures from participants after task completion
(this helped prevent advance notice of scrutiny impacting behaviour during searches) and all participants
consented. It is worth noting that the total duration of use refers to the elapsed time between participants’
first and last search sessions during the entire study. This means that aggregations of completion time
for different tasks do not always equate to total duration of participation; some tasks were completed
concurrently, whereas others were distinctly separate. Although the lack of precise log data makes these
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Pair System Chosen task(s) Distinct search sessions over time, by task Pages saved, by task Total time
1 Coagmento Travel planning 10 sessions over 14 days 27 14 days
2 Coagmento Travel planning; House hunting 6 sessions over 16 days; 3 sessions over 8 days 10; 8 35 days
3 Coagmento Concert venues 3 sessions over 12 days 4 12 days
4 Coagmento Travel planning 3 sessions over 7 days 9 7 days
5 Diigo Houses; Shopping 3 sessions over 5 days; 8 sessions over 3 days 3; 10 10 days
6 Diigo Houses; Travel planning; Shopping 15 sessions over 14 days; 4 over 7; 3 over 3 18; 8; 14 21 days
7 Diigo Houses; Travel planning 3 sessions over 7 days; 2 sessions over 8 days 22; 8 21 days
8 Diigo Travel planning; Shopping 8 sessions over 6 days; 5 sessions over 8 days 10; 8 14 days
Table 6.1: Participants’ assigned system, task choices, distinct search sessions, number of items saved,
and total duration of use. The ‘Pages saved, by task’ column refers to the total number of items
captured using bookmarks, snippets, or annotations. Note that some tasks were completed
concurrently and others were distinctly separate, meaning that aggregations of task completion
do not equate to total duration of participation.
somewhat coarse indicators of usage, it is clear that all participants used their assigned system for at least
one week and engaged in multiple information seeking episodes during that time. This in turn increases
our confidence in the meaningfulness of participants’ experiences with their assigned system.
6.4.3 Materials & Procedure
Each pair of participants was provided with all necessary software alongside installation instructions and a
briefing script introducing the study, tailored according to the system assigned to each pair. The script
clarified that participants should use the software we had provided each time they were searching for
information towards their chosen task. The script also stated that there were no expectations about the way
in which the tool should be used. Rather, participants were encouraged to use their tool in whatever way
they deemed appropriate. We also provided a detailed instruction document explaining the functionality
of the relevant system. The document described each system feature in full by providing a screenshot
alongside explanatory text. All features were given equal descriptive treatment (roughly one page per item)
so as not to suggest the importance of any feature over another. We were also careful to ensure that we
only described the workings of each feature, rather than how it should be used to support search behaviour.
After installing the relevant system, participants created their own user accounts and were allowed
to search at their leisure. As mentioned above, no constraints were placed on participants in terms of
process. Participants were free to decide when to engage in search sessions, how long to spend on each
session, and when to terminate their information seeking activities. Participants were asked to email the
author once they felt they had satisfied their information need and no longer had use for the system. A
semi-structured interview was then performed with each participant. Thirteen of these interviews were
conducted face-to-face in a quiet office; two were over the telephone; and one was via Skype. Interviews
were one-to-one between participant and the author; searchers did not, therefore, discuss their information
seeking behaviours while their partners were present. This allowed us to cross-check statements and ensure
consistency of behavioural accounts. During interviews, participants were invited to access their assigned
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system if they could not remember exact details or wanted to elaborate on particular functionalities.
All interviews lasted less than one hour. To avoid response bias and to dissuade participants from
trying to please us with their answers (Dell et al., 2012), we began by reminding participants that we
did not design the system and there were no right or wrong answers insofar as this study was concerned.
We used a basic framework of 32 questions, as listed in Appendix G of this thesis, which were directed
by the concerns of our study and questions used in prior work on collaborative search (Capra et al.,
2010). These questions allowed us to explore participants’ search process; interactions with their tool and
collaborator; and how search products were used in accordance with their chosen tasks. As our protocol
was semi-structured, we were able to probe issues as and when they arose, and we invited participants to
elaborate on their remarks, allowing novel topics to emerge.
6.4.4 Analysis
All interviews were conducted, recorded, and transcribed by the author of this thesis. This procedure
was adopted in favour of automated or paid transcription services because transcription is integral to the
process of analysis; by coding the interview transcripts himself, the author was familiarised with the data
at an early stage (Riessman, 1993) and was able to interpret meaning conveyed by participants’ intonation
and delivery (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This fed through into the transcription of interviews, which were
transcribed so as to give a verbatim account of participants’ statements for later interpretation (in line
with recommendations in relevant literature, e.g. Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999; Braun & Clarke, 2006). This
resulted in over 200 pages of transcript.
We used open, axial, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to identify initial codes, structure
codes into themes, and then group themes with reference to participants’ search process and behaviour.
The coding process was iterative, with transcripts subjected to three readings. Initial codes were developed
and refined during each reading, with internal consistency achieved by scrutinising the data for counter-
examples. We should acknowledge that some codes were influenced by our interview questions. For
example, by asking about division of labour, it was inevitable that a related code would arise during
analysis. However, many new codes also emerged, indicating to us that the results had novelty beyond
current knowledge.
6.5 Results
To bring clarity to our results while making sense of our participants’ experiences, we cluster our themes
using four categories: search process & management, appropriations & afforded behaviours, fairness
preferences, and interface design issues. The first encapsulates general information about our participants’
collaborative search process; such insights are detailed independently of specifics concerning how system
features were used. The second pertains to the emergent forms of interaction centred around the use and
appropriation of particular system features in support of collaborative search. These categories address our
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aim of exploring real-world collaborative search. The third considers the extent to which participants were
concerned about fairness during task assignment and execution. The final category allows us to drill down
into specific issues linked to interface design, many of which are best understood through consideration of
participants’ search behaviours.
As our data are primarily qualitative, we present themes alongside direct quotations from our partici-
pants. To identify speakers, we use the form [Px,y] where x indicates the ID number of the pair, as listed in
Table 6.1, and y refers to the first or second member of that pair.
It is worth noting that participants were generally positive about the design concepts behind the two
tools, and all participants believed that their assigned system had merit over ad hoc solutions. Regarding use
of system features, all participants stated that they used their system’s toolbar, and that they had accessed
the shared online space to view search results. In Coagmento, searchers reported using bookmarks,
annotations, and snippets. All participants stated that they did not use recommendations, the shared editor,
or any of the resources in the sidebar. In Diigo, participants reported using highlights, bookmarks, and
screenshots. All participants stated that they did not use Send, Read Later, or any of the functionality
within the sidebar. While the absence of log data means that we cannot definitively state that particular
features were or were not used during our study, participants’ statements are revealing about preferences
for some features over others. Before providing more specific details about how features were used to
support collaboration, the following subsection paints a general picture of participants’ search process and
management strategies.
6.5.1 Search Process & Management
6.5.1.1 Circumstances of Search
Table 6.2 outlines the search scenarios reported by each pair of participants. Although we cannot specify
exactly how many times each type of search occurred, we did ask participants which of their identified
scenarios occurred most often. Responses indicated that distributed, asynchronous search was the most
frequent scenario for pairs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Pairs 4, 7, and 8 identified co-located, synchronous search as
their most common scenario. While one might expect that such choices would be determined by living
arrangements, this was not always the case. Pair 2, for example, were a cohabiting couple who reported
conducting all of their searches asynchronously.
Perhaps a more valuable aspect of these results is the fact that tool use was not isolated to a single
setting. Rather, all pairs reported engaging in at least two different scenarios of search, and participants
described how search activities shifted according to everyday life. Pair 1, for example, reported working
only asynchronously when apart, but engaged in both synchronous and asynchronous search sessions when
co-located at the weekends. Our participants did not report any immediate difficulties in managing these
transitions; this may be due to the fact that, as identified earlier, both tools used in our study are general
purpose systems intended to support search across a range of scenarios.
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Co-located Distributed
Pair ID Synchronous Asynchronous Synchronous Asynchronous







8 X X X
Table 6.2: Participants’ reported circumstances of search activity. AXin a cell indicates that participants
engaged in the relevant type of search.
6.5.1.2 Task Management Strategies
Four pairs reported using division of labour as a way of organising their task. Pairs 1 and 2 divided their
travel planning by determining a set of locations and splitting them to create targeted individual searches.
Pair 3 established a very distinct role assignment, where different aspects of the search process were
divided using semi-formal roles: one searcher was responsible for finding a venue for their band’s concert,
while another sought places to promote the event. Finally, pair 7 reported dividing the web space during
house hunting, with one searcher checking private rental sites and another scouring university-hosted
pages. These strategies reflect variations of the divide-and-conquer approach described by Morris (2008)
and align well with the strategies identified in Chapter 5.
The remaining four pairs did not plan a division of labour. These pairs described a ‘dive in and do it’
approach, akin to the brute force management strategy identified by Morris (2008). However, participants
did not report any negative experiences related to organising the task in this way.
6.5.1.3 Search Process
While we were not able to log behavioural data about search activity, participants did provide verbal
accounts of their search process, and these are instructive in terms of understanding what searchers were
actually doing during our study. All participants reported following a broadly similar process, beginning
with the use of familiar search engines to learn about the information space at a high level. Participants
then reported narrowing their search focus to be more specific:
“We started by simply Googling what we’re looking for, and when you get leads you search for those
specific things, like that specific realtor or a specific area.” [P6, 2]
Participants reported that this process was directed by their existing knowledge, and by external factors
such as an available shopping budget, dates of travel, or availability of particular venues in the local area:
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“I already knew which websites to target, I started off with a few commercial websites and others,
looking at StudentPad and the [University] noticeboard.” [P6, 1]
After identifying relevant websites, behaviour shifted to the selective capture and bookmarking of
results. For all our participants, search and bookmarking were fragmented over multiple sessions. Searchers
stated that sessions were interspersed with communication, both during and between searches. As well
as ordinary conversation, email, and message exchanges, participants reported using system features
like comments and annotations to further their task-related discussions. Participants reported that their
overall tasks would end with discussion of the results to reach consensus over an outcome, i.e. the ‘chosen
products’ from their search. In broad outline, this process corresponds well with existing theoretical
accounts of web search, where exploratory information seeking has been characterised as an extended,
fragmented process, involving multiple search sessions, queries, and information sources (Golovchinsky
et al., 2012).
We now delve into the way in which system features were adopted in support of this general pattern of
collaborative search behaviour. Our later Discussion section then considers the broader implications of the
results, in terms of lessons for collaborative search systems.
6.5.2 Appropriations & Afforded Behaviours
6.5.2.1 Page Capture for Re-Access and Suggesting Relevance
During their information seeking process, all eight pairs made use of system features intended for
information capture: bookmarks, snippets, and annotations in Coagmento; and bookmarks and highlights
in Diigo. At the most basic level, these features were used to overcome the ad hoc practice of sharing
hyperlinks via email. Participants valued the ability to save pages to a joint repository and, correspondingly,
to see pages saved by their collaborator:
“I thought it was really helpful to know exactly what he had looked at and what he wanted to go see.
Instead of him having to send me a variety of different emails and links, it’s all been saved visually
right there for you.” [P4, 1]
In providing different features for capturing information, the designers of both systems have anticipated
that searchers may wish to retain different types of content. For instance, bookmarks are intended as a
way of saving whole pages, whereas annotations and snippets allow capture of particular subsections or
page elements. Our participants, however, tended to adopt just one of these features to achieve the same
outcome: that of capturing pages to ‘pull out’ particular results from the web space. Pair, 1, for example,
used Coagmento’s ‘Snippet’ feature to achieve this, whereas pairs 2, 3 and 4 used ‘Bookmark’ for the
same purpose. Furthermore, responses indicated that capture behaviour was more nuanced than simply
‘saving pages for later’. First, capture was intended as a way of favouring particular results for more rapid
re-access:
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“It was particularly useful because I could go back quite easily and know what I’d already put up
there, so I wasn’t reposting it or covering the same ground.” [P5, 2]
Second, capture was sometimes used as way of increasing the salience of particular results, with the
aim of suggesting potential relevance to a partner. The intent was not necessarily to return to a particular
page but was instead an attempt at bringing something to the partner’s attention:
“Looking through Expedia, when I found some good hotels I would snippet them and then I would say
to him, oh I’ve found these ones that look good, and I’ve snippeted them.” [P1,1]
6.5.2.2 Forming and Discussing Shortlists
We identified that page capture was actually related to a more general strategy—that of shortlisting, where
features like bookmarks and snippets were used to form lists of potential choices and, eventually, reach an
agreed outcome. All participants engaged in this behaviour:
“We would aim towards a list of five nice hotels” [P2, 2]
“In the final decision, we had a top five possibles to choose. Which is where the bookmarking came in.”
[P4,2]
Participants testified that shortlisting was an existing behaviour, but espoused the benefits of the tools
in terms of bringing structure to this process:
“Normally we would put links on Facebook, drop all the links into a conversation. But that is chaotic.
So it was nice to have them all there without going through our conversation trying to find the link
we’re talking about.” [P7,1]
Participants reported engaging in conversation about their shortlists, either verbally or, in the case
of Diigo, by annotating shortlisted links using comments. This occurred as a back and forth process of
contributing and evaluating suggestions to the list. Participants stated that using comments on Diigo was
useful in supporting this behaviour, indicating the value of features that allow discussion of shortlisted
items:
“We would keep commenting on each other’s things, so one link had three comments, I would comment
and she would comment, then I would comment back. And they weren’t all mixed up.” [P6,1]
While the actual content of the lists was qualitatively different between tasks (i.e. some pairs were
choosing houses, others shopping items) the overall goal was the same: form a list of candidates, discuss
and refine the list, and then settle on a ‘good enough’ outcome in line with the goal of the information
seeking process. However, this process was not always linear or in sequence. Some participants reported
that they would be more careful about relevance by evaluating sources on-the-go, keeping only ‘definite’
possibilities in the shortlist. Others would take a more carefree approach, forming a longer list of potentially
relevant sources and then narrowing them down at a later stage. Participants reported that shortlists were
eventually used and reviewed to reach final consensus:
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“A lot of it was down to seeing what the other person thought, and then between the two of us, we
decide, oh let’s go for that one. If there’s no availability there, you go to the next choice on your list.
So you almost rank them between the two of you, for personal preference.” [P1,2]
6.5.2.3 Sharing versus Saving: Sensitivity to Time Constraints
In forming shortlists, participants reported that if their task was time pressured and needed to be completed
in a short time frame, they would change their behaviour to ensure that their partner checked recorded links
more quickly. In other words, rather than wait for their partner to check the system at some unspecified
time, participants would use external communication methods to alert their partner about the information:
“We want a house quickly because it’s a little late, so we had to speed up the process. I had to call her
up and tell her ok, please go and check this house, I’ve posted it on the group. It’s possible she would
go and check, but we were in a hurry, so I have to convey the message to her ASAP.” [P6, 1]
Participants also explained that information was itself often time-critical, in that pages could be subject
to expiry. For instance, holiday deals and special offers can be available for limited periods of time, and
houses can disappear quickly from the rental market. The knock-on impact for collaboration was one of
requiring fast action:
“If it comes up with a great hotel price you click on more details and it would say, there’s only two
more rooms with this price left... if there’s only two rooms left, we need to be quick otherwise we might
not be able to get this room at this price.” [P1, 2]
However, participants spoke of using out-of-band channels to notify their partner more quickly in this
instance:
“Because it gets updated quite often, London seems like quite a quick turnaround on properties. So we
chatted over Facebook a bit and then I could send links to websites over Facebook and say does this
look ok?” [P2, 1]
This behaviour is interesting given that both systems have features allowing webpages to be sent
directly to the email inbox of a collaborator, both of which might be used in a time-pressured search
scenario. Yet none of our participants used these features; instead, ad hoc methods of communication were
preferred.
6.5.3 Fairness Preferences
In addition to studying participants’ search process and tool use, we asked questions about fairness and
whether or not searchers were concerned about equity in the work process. The first thing to note here
is that a majority of pairs (six out of eight) believed that their work had been completed roughly equally.
While it is important to remember that these results are based on retrospective self reports, most were
satisfied about this way of completing work:
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“I think we both did the same, which was nice. I was satisfied with that.” [P6, 1]
However, when probed further, the majority of participants were actually not all that concerned
about fairness during their completion of the collaborative search task. This may initially seem contrary
to our contentions regarding the importance of fairness in collaborative work, yet close reading of the
responses reveals new and nuanced perceptions that have implications for our understanding of fairness in
a collaborative setting. First, participants were working with friends and family and so were happy to let
things slide that might not be forgiven in professional settings. Such responses suggest that the context of
work influences the salience of fairness norms:
“We’re friends, so one it doesn’t count... it doesn’t matter if I put in two and a half hours and five links
and she puts in an hour and a half and fifteen links, as long as we find it.” [P6, 2]
“Fairness wouldn’t be important to me, no. If it had been someone I didn’t know, something like you’ve
actually got work to do, if it had been uneven that would have been annoying.” [P5, 1]
Second, the nature of the work itself seems important as many participants did not see the task as ‘work’
per se. This was true of the task itself and the consequences that would stem from failing to contribute:
[Fairness didn’t matter] “because it wasn’t like ‘work’, it was fine... But if you’re both meant to be
contributing equal parts to a job, and somebody else is not pulling their weight, it’s annoying... but
here, there’s no real implication of someone not doing it. There’s no kind of repercussions or anything.”
[P8, 1]
Two individuals, one from pair 3 and one from pair 4, believed that their work was not completed fairly.
However, contrary to our earlier study of student workgroups, respondents were not all that concerned
about the apparent lack of fairness. These participants felt it was more important to ensure task completion
over equity:
“I think that getting the task done was more important.” [P4, 1]
“We needed to get it done, so just having her quick opinions was worth the workload being uneven.”
[P5, 1]
In some cases it seemed like ensuring that both had opportunities to participate, regardless of how
much work was done, was more important than ensuring equality. This was related to a need to ensure that
both members were involved simply so that they each had the opportunity to give input on the products of
the collaboration:
“To a certain extant, I wanted to make sure that it was being equally done, and that it wasn’t just me
doing it while someone else played Sim City, because when we’re travelling further down the line all
of a sudden someone’s like, why are we staying at this hostel?” [P4, 1]
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However, a key issue arose in that, while most participants were not that concerned about fairness,
some said that it was actually quite hard to make judgements about what their partners had been doing.
This issue ties in with some of our earlier contentions regarding the difficulty of judging contributions (and
hence, equity) in computer-mediated settings:
“It was hard to tell what he had been doing and how much he’d done without seeing his screen.” [P4,
1]
The fact that searchers found it hard to gauge contributions during use of these two tools is somewhat
surprising given that both systems have a shared search history. Each of these could presumably be used to
make judgements about fairness—one could simply visit the history and compare the number of sources
accessed to work out whether or not contributions were even. However, as will be seen in the next section,
participants encountered various issues with this history, many of which caused them to forego using it
altogether. Thus, in truth, it is likely that participants were left unable to make considered judgements
about fairness—this is a concern that has been raised in this thesis and elsewhere in the literature (e.g.
Galegher & Kraut, 1990). For now we shall defer this matter to our discussion section. The following
subsection delves into interface issues encountered by our participants.
6.5.4 Interface Design Issues
In addition to the behavioural patterns identified above, participants described a number of experiences
and issues related to interface design and collaborative search.
6.5.4.1 Shared Search Histories: Information Overload
Participants described how, during search sessions, they would visit the online repository of their assigned
system to review their own results and explore what had been found by their partner. Recall that our first
system, Coagmento, provides a complete history of search behaviour by capturing all pages visited by the
user during information seeking episodes. Previous work suggests that such ‘search trajectories’ can be
beneficial for sensemaking and facilitating awareness (Paul & Morris, 2009, 2011). However, seven out of
eight Coagmento users actually reported that they found the history overwhelming:
“I’d open up the hostel search and there’d be a list of a hundred hostels... and when I’d try and go
back to look at which ones were the cheapest, I’d have to look through all of them again to try and find
the one in the history. I ended up just searching it again because it was too hard to find.” [P4, 2]
This problem was partly related to the collection of landing pages, portals, and otherwise irrelevant
material that held little utility for sensemaking. Participants suggested that they wanted to get rid of such
pages and see only the most relevant information without having to trawl through the entire history:
“I never looked at the history because the snippets were the core information. I just want something
that jumps out and says... this is the information that she has found.” [P1, 2]
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Participants suggested that it would be helpful if Coagmento’s history was searchable, or that, rather
than allowing the system to indiscriminately record all pages, the process of information capture could be
more selective:
“It’s almost like when you’re searching you want to be able to dictate what’s saved. So even if it’s just
a little ‘plus’ button, where maybe you don’t want your Google search to come up, but, whatever site,
even if you don’t think it has anything to do with it, but you might want to look at it again, you can just
hit a button and it’s going to come up there.” [P4, 2]
Some users did mention benefits of the timeline view. One member of pair 1 reported retracing their
partner’s search results to see what had been done earlier. Members of pair 2 reported using the timeline to
direct their own work based on the results of their partner, while one member of pair 4 thought the ability
to rediscover past results could be useful.
Responses from Diigo users provide an interesting contrast on this issue. Such participants did not
express any dissatisfaction about not being able to view a complete search history, and none expressed any
desire to have more information about their partner’s search process. Some were actually skeptical about
the need to understand their partner’s process:
“As long as you both know what you’re looking for, it doesn’t matter how you go about finding it. I
didn’t feel like I needed to know what he typed into Google.” [P8, 1]
6.5.4.2 Shared Search Histories: Privacy Concerns
The fact that Coagmento captures images of all pages visited made three users hesitant about the potential
consequences of having personal information recorded:
“While I’m searching for hostels I’m using Facebook and Gmail at the same time... I think if you’re
working in a group that history could get a little weird, because you’re going back to your bank account
to figure out how much you still have left.” [P4, 2]
This highlights how, for our participants, real-world collaborative search was not an isolated endeavour;
instead, it occurred as part of a broader planning activity that required access to personal and private
information. Clearly a screenshot image of such content would risk a privacy violation. Participants were
not specific about whether any such violations occurred during the study, but the mere threat of information
leakage was enough to affect behaviour. In line with earlier statements concerning information overload,
participants suggested the solution of selective tracking:
“I was always making sure that I wasn’t logging in to other things while logged in to that. Maybe if it
had a way of knowing it was on a page for logging in to your emails... it would know not to record
those kinds of pages.” [P3, 2]
In contrast, privacy did not arise as an issue during discussion with Diigo users, likely due to the fact
that no pages are captured unless specifically requested by the user.
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6.5.4.3 Shared Search Histories: Sensemaking and Rationale
Several issues arose related to sensemaking of the shared history, in terms of understanding what and why
information had been found. Regarding the former, responses suggest that searchers need to be able to
appraise page representations both quickly and easily, and do not want to spend a long time making sense
of shared results. This was exemplified by participants’ experiences with Coagmento, where each item
in the shared history appears as a small thumbnail showing an image of the webpage (see Figure 6.1).
However, rather than simple thumbnail images, participants wanted an up-front summary of contextual
information about each page: a descriptive headline, a preview of its contents, and the time it was saved.
We note that this contextual information is available within Coagmento but requires the user to click on
each thumbnail to view it. Our responses imply that such information should be presented up-front, with
low interaction costs, to facilitate rapid assessment of relevance and sensemaking of pages:
I would want to see the header you’d get if you bookmarked it in a browser. So, under ‘hotel search’,
then the name of the hotel, that sort of thing. The thing is that it’s either two or three links you have to
click through before you even get to the page itself...And so I would’ve used that more if I’d had the
ability to go, I know what that is... that’s what I want... without having to click, click, click.” [P2, 2]
Although Diigo records pages using a title and contextual information, sites are not listed with
thumbnail images (see Figure 6.2). Somewhat ironically, all Diigo users indicated a desire for thumbnail
previews of each page, as with the style used by Coagmento. This suggests providing both types of
information could be beneficial for sensemaking:
“You know like on Facebook when you put a link they give you a small image and a description of
what’s in the website... it would be nice to have that feature because it triggers your mind about the
thing you saw... a picture of the house could appear there automatically.” [P7, 1]
A second issue related to sensemaking was that searchers wanted to understand why particular pages
had been visited by their partners. This was true of both the search history and pages shortlisted using
bookmarks:
Without the other person telling you what they’d gleaned from each of the links, it was difficult. You
need some explanation, he could have looked at all this stuff and thought, this is a load of rubbish.
Then what’s the point of you looking at it? [P1, 1]
Participants wanted to annotate and append specific pages to provide rationale about why results had
been selected, and to draw attention to specific aspects of webpages. Both practices are in line with the act
of suggesting relevance:
“When I would bookmark a whole page, it wasn’t necessarily the whole page that I wanted her to
look at... I wanted her to pick out the Regent’s Canal, but if I’d bookmarked the page, she wouldn’t
necessarily know that.” [P4, 2]
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Users of Diigo reported using a short description at the point of page capture to inform their partners
about why particular links were relevant. This information would then appear alongside each result in
the shared space. Searchers also described appending links with information gleaned from the page so
that their partner did not necessarily have to re-run the search. However, users also mentioned that they
wanted more ways of tagging or marking captured results. One goal was to indicate that certain pages
were temporarily irrelevant. Users did not want to delete such pages in case they became useful later on:
“I added ‘TAKEN’ to the house because I didn’t want to delete it, it’s better to have it there for future
reference because you never know, so I just put that tag.” [P7, 2]
6.5.4.4 Segregation and Manipulation of Shared Information
Our chosen systems allowed shared results to be viewed in two forms: either as a list of one’s own results,
or as a combined list of with those of one’s partner. However, four participants desired to see only the
results of their partner. This action was not possible in either system, but this type of separation would
clearly be advantageous when attempting to make sense of a partner’s work:
“It came up with all of your stuff to start with, what you’d done when you go on it... which I really
didn’t care about as much, because you know what you’ve done. That’s not the immediate reason you
go on there, you go on to see what the other person has done.” [P1, 1]
Participants also wanted the ability to distinguish different aspects of their work from others. For
example, pages related to flights, hotels, and sightseeing were treated equally by the systems, i.e. as
superficially equivalent ‘pages’. But to searchers, these pages were related to different subtasks. Users
wanted more ways to differentiate and classify these results by creating subcategories and folders that
would allow results to be directed towards particular sections. Only one of our tools, Diigo, provided
support for this. Participants were able to create specific groups to manage the overlap in concurrent
completion of different search tasks:
“We made different groups, one was for house hunting, one was for holiday hunting, and the third one
was on these dresses that we were shopping for online.” [P5, 1]
Additionally, users reported that they wanted the ability to manipulate the results in greater depth; for
example, by moving sources from project to project in accordance with changes in information need and
the overall progress of task completion. Users of both systems also wanted to rank and reorder results
in their shortlists, so as to allow for visual comparisons. This related to the practice of shortlisting and
reaching consensus:
“if I have a preferred order for all these houses, like if I want to call this one first and that one second,
I would like to have the possibility of rearranging them.” [P7, 2]
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6.5.4.5 Awareness and Notifications
In discussing their partner’s activities, participants’ responses imply that notifications of recent work (e.g.
searches, bookmarks) would help to maintain a general level of awareness:
I think it would be nice to get actual notifications of things. If she’d bookmarked a page, I could get a
notification of a bookmark, or a tag, something like that. [P4, 2]
Interestingly, both systems do provide notifications but in different ways. Coagmento’s notifications
appear in the sidebar but, as all of our participants stated they did not use this feature, likely went unnoticed.
By contrast, Diigo provides daily email notifications alerting collaborators to the presence of new links in
shared groups. Although one participant found the emails useful in terms of being able to check recent
links with her mobile device, the remaining participants said they did not actually read the emails; instead,
they were mainly used to gain awareness of the mere fact that something had been done. Again, this
speaks to a desire for some general level of awareness about the fact that contributions are being made.
When checking their assigned system, participants wanted to be able to find these contributions quickly
and easily:
“It could highlight that this is the new comment, or this is the new thing, instead of me having to search
constantly.” [P6, 2]
Two users stated that it would be helpful to have awareness of when their saved results had been viewed
by their partner, i.e. a confirmation that results had actually been seen. Responses also indicated a desire
for such notifications to be more immediate and situated in the web browser, rather than the system itself.
Several drew on their experiences with Facebook to suggest how these notifications might be implemented:
“It could work like Facebook, where you get the notification, you click on it and it takes you to the
page.” [P4, 2]
6.5.4.6 Effort Requirements
Finally, throughout our dataset, there was a general undercurrent of wanting a minimal threshold for effort.
The perception was that, when search was the primary task, any additional effort above and beyond an ad
hoc solution was undesirable:
“All you wanted was something easy, you didn’t want something that was going to add a load of time,
because the search was quite time intensive. You didn’t wanna feel like you were going to have to do
loads of extra work on it.” [P1, 1]
Users of Coagmento made more specific remarks about effort, in that that they would prefer aspects of
the tool to have lower interaction costs. In addition to the earlier statements concerning the number of
operations required to access contextual information in the search history, participants remarked upon the
excessive number of stages involved in other tasks. For example, when the system asks users to rate and
leave comments about bookmarks at the point of page capture:
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“I guess the reason the bookmark thing asks for a one to five rating is so it could do some filtering. But
at the time it’s too much effort. I don’t want to do that, I want to automatically know what’s important.”
[P2, 1]
6.6 Discussion
The present study sought to investigate collaborative search behaviour in everyday settings. At a broad
level, the fact that searchers found merit in their assigned system suggests that the design concepts
embodied by each are on the right track—it was not the case that participants considered the tools unusable
or inappropriate, and many stated informally that they planned to use the tools again outside of our study.
Some of the primary benefits noted by our participants included the ability to save links to a shared
space, thereby negating the need for ad hoc workarounds, and the fact that the tools brought structure and
persistence to the otherwise ephemeral process of collaboration over time.
6.6.1 Implications for Collaborative Search Tools
General aspects of participants’ search behaviour are revealing about how the tools were used in everyday
circumstances. Beginning with the search process, collaboration among our participants was not isolated to
a single configuration of time and space. Instead, all participants reported engaging in multiple scenarios.
Although no work has argued otherwise, these findings suggest that tools should aim to support search
across a range of settings rather than a single time/space configuration. The systems we used were not
restrictive in this regard, but some other tools (e.g. Capra et al., 2012; Halvey et al., 2010) have been
designed with specific circumstances in mind.
One of our most consistent behavioural findings was the generalised use of page capture features
(snippets, bookmarks, and annotations). While this stresses the importance of allowing searchers to save
pages to a shared space, our results suggest that capturing pages is actually more nuanced than simply
‘saving pages for later’. Rather, searchers used these features to save pages for re-access; to share results
with their partner with the aim of suggesting relevance; and to form shortlists, i.e. subsets of results that are
collected as potential candidate outcomes for the group’s collaboration. However, we saw that pairs tended
to settle on, and persist with, a single means of page capture to achieve all three (e.g. Pair 1 used only
snippets for shortlisting and suggesting relevance). Given that these are essentially distinct behaviours,
which might appeal to different users in the light of different nuanced needs, we suggest that each is
potentially worthy of independent support. Future tools could provide separate methods for page saving,
page sharing, and suggesting relevance. Regarding the latter, some existing tools allow collaborators to
suggest relevance by ‘liking’ pages (Golovchinsky et al., 2012) or through up- and down-voting of results
(Capra et al., 2012), but future systems could do more to separate shortlisted pages from those that are
awaiting judgements of relevance. This would avoid conflation of the two, as occurred for some of the
participants in our study.
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In forming shortlists, participants wanted to annotate saved results to share rationale about why pages
had been selected; to make pertinent information salient (e.g. the rent of a saved property or the price of a
hotel); and to engage in task-related discussion about the quality or relevance of results. Several systems
(Morris & Horvitz, 2007; Paul & Morris, 2009) allow commenting of saved items in the manner offered by
Diigo; our study reiterates the value of allowing annotation of links to facilitate sensemaking and sharing
of knowledge in the context of everyday tasks.
However, we found that searchers wanted to rearrange listed items to express an order of preference, or
‘check off’ items by deleting some while retaining others. This process of bringing structure to data is part
of sensemaking (Tao & Tombros, 2013) but our chosen systems did not allow users to repurpose results in
any meaningful fashion at the end of their tasks. The implication here is that, as well as supporting aspects
of the search process, future tools might also do more to support the manipulation and reuse of search
products. Since searchers want more ways of interacting with their results, different workspaces could
be provided to allow segregation of items; searchers could then be allowed to move items between these
spaces in accordance with relevance judgements and task progress. Such an approach can be seen in the
ViGOR system (Halvey et al., 2010), which includes a workspace that allows searchers to drag and drop
results into groups that can then be reorganised and restructured at will.
Some broader issues related to sensemaking and awareness concerned searchers’ difficulty in un-
derstanding what had been found during their partner’s searches. This is a foremost challenge during
collaborative search (Paul & Morris, 2009) and indeed this was true for our participants. An initial issue
concerned identifying the location of recent work when checking their assigned system—searchers often
found it hard to identify recent collaborative contributions (e.g. new annotations) in the presence of a
large search history. Future tools can benefit by ensuring that notifications are available and that they
lead straight to recent contributions. A second lesson is that sufficient information must be given to allow
searchers to appraise shared representations with relative ease. Prior laboratory studies suggest that rapid
sensemaking can be promoted by displaying contextual information about search results (Paul & Morris,
2009, 2011). Our participants’ statements align with this, and indicate that representations should combine
content previews (e.g. a visual thumbnail) with contextual information (e.g. a page description) that allow
comprehension while lessening the need for collaborators to click through and revisit every individual
result.
An important design challenge raised by the present study concerns the vexed question of history
logging and the extent to which page capture should be deliberate or automatic. Earlier work suggests
that the approach of capturing all pages, which provides a persistent account of a collaborator’s ‘search
trajectory’, is beneficial for sensemaking (Paul & Morris, 2009, 2011). However, we found that, with
this approach, the quantity of information captured was regarded as overwhelming. Rather than wade
through a large history, our searchers simply wanted to identify only the most relevant information. This
finding is similar to that obtained in a laboratory evaluation of CoSense (Paul & Morris, 2011), where
searchers reported feeling overwhelmed by search histories and struggled to identify ‘good’ from ‘bad’
information. In suggesting solutions to this problem, Paul & Morris (2011) recommended that designers
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allow filtering of search histories by content. This solution would not, however, necessarily overcome the
problem of information overload as pages accumulate over time—even filtered lists could become difficult
to comprehend. One interesting aspect of our results is that none of our Diigo users felt the need for a
complete search history. This tentatively suggests that a complete history may not always be necessary for
quotidian tasks, especially if collaborators communicate about their progress as part of their daily routines.
(As in our study.) That Diigo users did not complain about the effort of saving pages also hints that page
capture could be left entirely under the control of the user. This would, in turn, prevent the collection of
interstitial pages that appear to offer little utility for sensemaking.
This work has also identified issues that arise only in real-world search. One example pertained
to time-criticality, both of search processes and information itself, with some items available only for
short windows. We are not aware of any prior work that has raised time constraint as an issue for
collaborative search—perhaps future systems could elaborate on this issue and provide more pointed ways
of delivering results to one’s partner (e.g. through mobile devices). A second issue was the subject of
privacy, which highlights the need to ensure that tools are capable of interleaving with the broader tasks
in which collaborative searches are embedded. Searchers in our study were nervous about the potential
capture of personal or private material. While an obvious answer to this issue would be to allow deletion
of pages from the system’s history, a more elegant solution would be to record only pages relevant to the
user’s information need. This could be achieved by allowing the user to enable or suppress tracking in
specific browser tabs—this would compartmentalise search to a specific location, leaving other areas safe
for private multitasking.
As many of these implications concern specific issues, it is worth considering how the present study
can direct future collaborative search tools more generally. First, our results lend support to Morris’ recent
assertion that collaborative search solutions must be low-effort and “sufficiently lightweight compared
with status quo ad hoc solutions” (Morris, 2013, p. 1190). Our participants expressed dissatisfaction
if interactional demands imposed by their tool exceeded those of their previous solution (e.g. email,
Facebook). Since the implication here is that any tool with unnecessary effort requirements stands to fail,
features in collaborative search systems should be benchmarked against the equivalent ad hoc solution.
Additionally, the tools used in our study included many features which, according to our participants,
were not necessary for their task. This suggests that future solutions could be scaled back in favour of
lightweight support for core collaborative search behaviours. An example system might support the rapid
sharing of pages between two linked browsers, with simple awareness mechanisms, like those desired by
our participants, that notify collaborators of recent activity after their web browser is opened.
Alternatively, more specialised systems could be developed to provide targeted support for specific
tasks. Some of our participants mentioned informally that they would value support beyond that for search.
In travel planning, for example, searchers could be able to apply their shortlists to a map, helping them
with their journey or sightseeing plans. The wider implication here is that collaborative search tools could
be embedded in larger applications that support a broader range of high-level planning tasks.
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6.6.2 Division of Labour and Fairness
Regarding division of labour, our first result was that the types of coordination strategies used by partici-
pants in our earlier laboratory studies were replicated in the field. One pair divided the work by partitioning
the Web space. Two others assigned labour by splitting travel searches according to potential destinations,
very much akin to a division by semantic space. Additionally, one pair used a role assignment. This
latter strategy extends our earlier work and emphasises the utility of distinct roles for division of labour
(e.g. Golovchinsky et al., 2008a). Other pairs did not adopt formal divisions of labour and instead used a
brute-force strategy (Morris, 2008). Since pairs did not report any difficulties with managing their task, we
can only assume that these approaches were sufficient for managing work—perhaps searchers would have
encountered problems if aspects of their tasks were more tightly coupled. Moreover, it appears that work
was completed asynchronously in a majority of cases, meaning that the risk of redundancy was easier to
overcome. Participants reported discussing their findings daily, and it is not difficult to imagine that these
discussions would direct search in directions that differ from those already explored by the partner.
Turning to fairness, most participants believed that individual contributions to the tasks were roughly
equal, which does indicate some initial tendency towards fairness in the work process. Yet most participants
were not all that concerned about fairness—most were more worried about finding the required information
and ensuring that their partner had some say in the outcome, as opposed to ensuring strict fairness through
each person finding the same number of sources. These results emphasize two aspects of fairness in
collaboration. First, the importance of context: our pairs had existing relationships which were very
personal. Friends, for example, will have known each other for a reasonable period of time and may be
more forgiving of one another’s free-riding than they would be in professional work groups. Thus striving
for fairness likely depends on the people with whom one is working and the circumstances in which
work is completed. This latter issue was elaborated by a second aspect of our results, in that perceptions
about the work itself were important. Several participants reported that the collaborative information
seeking task didn’t really feel like ‘work’, suggesting that these tasks were not perceived in the same
light as professional, work-related duties. We suggest these issues had an impact on the extent to which
participants needed to ‘police’ conformity to fairness norms.
A final aspect related to fairness was that, again, participants hinted at the difficulty of making accurate
judgements about contributions. We have already discussed the fact that most did not make use of the
shared search history due to interface issues. Participants resorted to making rough judgements about one
another’s work, due in part to the costs of information access at the interface. (We must remember that
participants’ perceptions of equality are based on retrospective self-report; it is possible that, if more had
delved into the shared search histories, these perceptions would be less immediate.) Nevertheless, these
results indicate the difficulty individuals encounter when trying to make judgements about the contributions
of their collaborators. We regard the issue of judging contributions as an opportunity for design that
raises myriad questions: How can we assist people in making fairness judgements when working through
collaborative systems? What information needs to be presented? And what issues might occur when
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information is available to allow for fairness judgements? These questions are explored in the following
chapter, where we examine granular awareness metrics in an existing collaborative work context.
6.6.3 Study Limitations & Future Work
This study is not without its limitations, though most of these can easily be regarded as opportunities for
future work. An immediate limitation is that we were only able to report on a small number of pairs from
a single culture. Despite an open call for participants, we did not receive any interest from groups of three
or more. It is possible that larger groups would differ in terms of their search and sharing practices, calling
for different features than those suggested here. Fairness might also be much more difficult to manage and
gauge when more individuals are involved in the collaboration.
Our participants were mostly of university age and were relatively computer-savvy. Studies have
shown that demographic and socio-economic factors can impact search behaviour and system usage (Aula
& Haki, 2008; Hargittai, 2006) and these issues may be worth exploring in the context of collaborative
search.
Regarding search tasks, the results of this study were based on tasks with high external validity, yet
the patterns of behaviour reported here may not generalise to all other forms of collaborative search. For
example, we were not able to examine the task of literature search and review, an endeavour that will no
doubt be familiar to readers of this thesis. Several systems have been designed to support collaborative
review, ranking, and re-finding of electronic documents (e.g. Capra et al., 2012; Golovchinsky et al., 2012).
Future work should examine how our findings map to this commonplace and cognitively demanding task.
Studies have shown that the use of portable devices such as phones and tablets is an increasingly
common method of conducting CIS (Morris, 2013). We did not account for this emerging aspect of
collaborative search. Future work might examine the way in which searchers transition between use of
different devices—one might imagine that searches on a mobile device would impose design challenges
beyond those of desktop systems.
Finally, we were unable to access quantitative data collected at the system level—future work might
employ such an approach to reach more precise measures of tool use. Reliable data about which features are,
and are not, used in field settings would help to confirm our findings and guide the design of collaborative
search tools.
6.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter reported a qualitative study of collaborative information seeking and tool use. We deployed
two existing collaborative search tools (Coagmento and Diigo) to pairs of searchers with genuine, pre-
existing collaborative information needs. Searchers then gave us their feedback on these tools and
provided insights concerning the search process. This study provides insight into the process of real-world
collaborative search, in terms of how search products are employed towards the process of shortlisting and
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arriving at an end product. Additionally, this study provides a number of pragmatic implications that can
be used by designers to improve the interfaces of collaborative information seeking tools.
Additionally, this study has extended the earlier findings of this thesis as follows. First, our earlier work
in Chapter 5 identified several strategies employed by searchers to manage redundancy. The present study
confirmed the use of these strategies in real-world contexts, further emphasising their utility to designers
of collaborative search systems. Second, we explored participants’ approaches to division of labour and
their concerns for fairness. In short, participants responses speak to the variable importance of fairness
with respect to the task—searchers seemed less interested in ensuring equity, and this seemed to be related
to the fact that they did not view the task as ‘work’ that would be completed in professional contexts. Thus
their concerns for fairness were certainly more relaxed than those of the students in Chapter 3. Participants
expressed some opinions that align with our prior findings in other ways, one of which was that it is very
difficult to make judgements about a partner’s work without sufficient information about their activities (cf.
Galegher & Kraut, 1990; Kim et al., 2012). Thus, while searchers were not that concerned about fairness
and did not feel a need to see the fine details about what their partner had done, the issue of judging each
person’s contributions to the shared task remains problematic. The following chapter draws on the findings
of the studies reported thus far to consider how collaborative systems might support the monitoring of
joint contributions, in turn allowing collaborators to judge whether each individual’s contribution is fair.
173







Prior chapters of this thesis have investigated the relationship between division of labour and fairness in
the context of collaborative work. Literature reviewed and results obtained from Chapters 3–6 suggest
that collaborative groups often desire, and consequently strive for, fairness in the division and completion
of their work. However, achieving fair outcomes can be problematic for groups, especially in computer-
mediated settings where monitoring joint progress may be inherently difficult due to limited awareness
(Galegher & Kraut, 1990; Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). Such concerns have also been raised in earlier
chapters of this thesis; participants in Chapters 3 and 6 found it difficult to make judgements about fairness
due to a lack of awareness about the ongoing contributions of team members. This chapter aims to draw
these strands of work together in order to consider how collaborative systems could allow people to work
in line with fairness preferences. We suggest that this could be achieved through awareness mechanisms
designed to provide granular information about individual contributions.
We begin by reviewing the subject of awareness in collaborative work and problems associated
with maintaining awareness in computer-mediated settings. We find that prior approaches, e.g. social
translucence (Erickson & Kellogg, 2000; Erickson et al., 2002), often aim to balance awareness with
privacy during collaboration. However, we argue that such approaches would be insufficient for gauging
fairness due to a lack of detail that does not allow for comparison between each individual’s contributions.
We suggest that, in order to assess fairness, collaborators might be provided with an awareness mechanism
that provides detailed information about each team member’s contributions. We investigate the potential for
such awareness by studying an existing collaborative context where teams make use of information about
contributions; in this case, the online game World of Warcraft (WoW). WoW is a large virtual environment
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in which players must collaborate in groups of 10–25 to overcome difficult challenges known as ‘raids’.
Raids are intrinsically collaborative, computer-mediated tasks that require a high degree of coordination,
planning, and skill in execution. Fairness is also a concern for these groups; players must decide how
much effort to invest during a given encounter, and also need to make decisions about the assignment
of rewards from group activities. These aspects of raiding, combined with an interdependent division of
labour among players, place WoW within the scope of CSCW (cf. Nardi & Harris, 2006; Bardzell et al.,
2008) and suggest a potentially productive context in which to study contribution awareness.
The study in this chapter considers how damage and healing meters contribute to the management of
WoW raids. Such meters provide detailed visualisations of two key outputs for these groups. By studying
how players make judgements about team member contributions, we aim to consider whether awareness
mechanisms like those used in WoW would be applicable to other CSCW situations where fairness might
be important. The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, we introduce the idea of contribution
awareness and identify WoW as a context in which similar information is already used. Second, by
studying raiding in WoW, our study sheds light on the way in which awareness information contributes
towards various aspects of raiding activity. We describe how damage and healing meters contribute to
individual and group awareness, and also highlight sociotechnical issues stemming from the use of meters.
Finally, we consider the extent to which these issues might apply if meters were adapted to other contexts.
Thus, in aiming to distil our earlier findings into a simple design paradigm for collaborative systems, we
contribute an understanding of how awareness information supports the practice of raiding in WoW.
7.2 Background
The following sections offer a short review of literature related to awareness in CSCW. This leads us to our
consideration of how fairness judgements might be supported through contribution awareness. The concept
of awareness was reviewed earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.3) and is generally related to
knowledge about one’s collaborators and their interactions with artefacts relevant to the collaborative task.
Such knowledge provides a context for individual activities (Dourish & Bellotti, 1992), but the importance
of the workspace itself is emphasised by Gutwin & Greenberg (2002), who state that awareness pertains to:
“the up-to-the-moment understanding of another person’s interaction with a shared
workspace... [involving] knowledge about where others are working, what they are doing, and
what they are going to do next.” (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002, p. 412).
Below we offer further insight into the utility of awareness for collaboration and identify why it can be
difficult to support within CSCW systems.
7.2.1 The Importance of Awareness in Collaborative Work
Knowledge about what others are doing in a workspace supports many basic activities during collaboration.
These include, and are certainly not limited to: assignment and coordination of work, management of
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coupling, communication about the task, anticipation of actions, and indentifying opportunities to provide
mutual support (Dourish & Bellotti, 1992; Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). More generally, awareness helps
to “reduce effort, increase efficiency, and reduce errors for the activities of collaboration” (Gutwin &
Greenberg, 2001, p. 9). These issues mean that awareness is essential for effective collaboration—without
sufficient awareness, collaboration can be laboured and difficult to sustain (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2000).
Humans are very adept at gathering information necessary to build awareness, so much so that
awareness is typically taken for granted in face-to-face settings. In ordinary circumstances, most people
find it very easy to collect information required for answering basic questions about what is happening
in a workspace: who is nearby, what they are doing, where they are working, and so forth (Gutwin &
Greenberg, 2002). It is easy to collect information relevant to these issues when we work with others in the
same space, and a variety of perceptual cues help us in this regard. Gutwin & Greenberg (2002) identify
three primary means through which awareness information is gathered:
1. Bodies and consequential communication. The positioning of bodies in the workspace can provide
relevant information; simply watching people work is enough to know where everyone is and
what they are doing. Additionally, as people interact with artifacts and each other, consequential
communication occurs (Segal, 1994). Such communication is not explicitly intended to provide
information but does so as a consequence of action. An example offered by Segal (1994) is visual
monitoring. When a pilot watches his partner manipulating a display, the very observation of action
may be enough to know that certain procedures have been followed. In other words, information is
obtained by watching the interaction, rather than by viewing the content of the display itself.
2. Artefacts and feedthrough. The use and movement of artefacts can provide awareness information. For
example, objects may make sounds, change colour, or react to manipulation (Gaver, 1991). When
an object is used, outside others can see or hear changes as a result of the interaction; thus, what
would normally be feedback to the user also offers feedthrough to inform observers about actions
(Dix et al., 1993). The movement of objects among collaborators can also indicate task progress,
ownership, or suggest an intended course of action (Pinelle et al., 2003).
3. Conversation, gesture, and intentional communication. Verbal conversation is used to numerous ends
during collaboration, from informing about progress through to clarifying problems and coordinating
division of labour (Mark et al., 1996). Conversation also allows for overhearing; people can ‘listen
in’ on exchanges made by others (Heath & Luff, 1992) which may then be helpful in the completion
of other tasks or in promoting peripheral participation (Monk & Watts, 2000). Qualities of speech
like intonation, emphasis, hesitancy, and pitch can offer information about collaborators’ feelings
or state of mind (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). Information is also communicated through verbal
overshadowing, which occurs when people speak their actions aloud (“I am just placing this object
here...”) without an intended audience (Heath et al., 1995; Roschelle & Teasley, 1995). Such
utterances are useful because they unintentionally convey information to others nearby. Finally,
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visual actions and non-verbal communication (gestures, gaze, facial expression) help to promote
awareness: simple head nods can act as emblems to replace communicative acts, and gestures can
emphasise or give clarity to spoken statements (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). Physical movements
facilitate mechanisms of deixis (pointing and reference, e.g. “that one over there”) (Wong &
Gutwin, 2010). The movement of hands in a shared task also supports coordination and is revealing
about individual actions and intentions (Tang, 1991).
The immediate availability of the information described above, together with the inherent observability
of actions, makes face-to-face collaboration a very natural and fluid experience (Gutwin & Greenberg,
2002; Moore et al., 2007a). When working in the same room as one’s colleagues, it is usually quite
easy to tell who is around and get a sense of what they are up to. Similarly, conversations will be
straightforward, gestures will be readily visible, and the status of shared objects will be easy to ascertain.
However, the information necessary for creating and maintaining awareness is not always available when
collaborators are distributed, and this can make collaboration difficult to sustain. This is also true of
many computer-mediated work settings, making the subject of awareness a critical problem of interest for
CSCW.
7.2.2 CSCW and the Problem of Awareness
As noted above, awareness can be difficult to sustain outside of face-to-face interactions. This is especially
true for computer-mediated work among remote collaborators who lack access to information that is often
implicit for face-to-face teams (Herbsleb & Grinter, 1999; Gutwin et al., 2004). A problem specific to
digital workspaces is that interaction within the shared space provides less information than equivalent
actions in physical settings (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). For example, moving a PDF around one’s digital
desktop does not create the same shuffling noises (or feedthrough, Dix et al., 1993) that others would hear
when shifting papers around a physical desk. Furthermore, the lack of presence information means that
collaborators may find it difficult to establish basic understandings of who else is in the workspace, where
they are working, what they are doing, and so on (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). In short, collaborative
systems often limit “what people can perceive of others in the workspace” (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002, p.
420) and reduce a person’s “visual field to the limited area of a computer screen” (Gutwin et al., 1996a, p.
1).
The lack of awareness information means that distributed and computer-mediated teams have to
invest additional, and often costly, effort to ensure smooth collaboration. Such efforts are overheads that
go above and beyond what is required when working in co-located settings, and are problematic given
that awareness is not typically a primary goal; rather, it is a secondary goal necessary for completing
some task in the environment (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2001, 2002). Such concerns have made the the job
of supporting awareness one of the most, if not the most, important research problems in CSCW. Yet
designing effective solutions has proven to be an obdurate problem that remains a topic of interest (e.g.
Kim et al., 2012; Kolfschoten et al., 2013). Because the related literature is large and varied, and a full
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review is not necessary for our purposes, we shall consider why supporting awareness can be difficult and
why approaches have been hindered by problems related to privacy and excessive information sharing.
7.2.2.1 Supporting Awareness: Identifiability and the Privacy Tradeoff
Having discussed what awareness is, why it is important for collaboration, and why it can be difficult to
acquire in computer-mediated settings, it is now worth considering some design solutions that have been
proposed within the literature. Our aim here is not to discuss every single awareness mechanism ever
created; rather, we seek to consider the issues that may arise when attempting to support fairness in the
division and completion of collaborative contributions. Such issues could affect the acceptance of any
system designed in this regard.32
As we have seen, awareness is critical for collaboration but can be hard to maintain in digital
workspaces. This was especially true of early CSCW and groupware platforms, which had little to
no support for awareness. Developing awareness mechanisms was technically difficult and for many
years “people were aware of what collaborators sent them, and little else” (Grudin & Poltrock, 2012).
The increase in computing power that arrived in the early nineties allowed researchers to begin exploring
support for the sort of awareness that had, up until then, been almost non-existent (Grudin & Poltrock,
2012). Media space systems were an early example in this regard (e.g. Mantei et al., 1991; Gaver, 1992;
Bly et al., 1993). Such systems included high-fidelity (by 1990s standards) audio and video links that
attempted to recreate the co-located and informal nature of a shared office space. However, the perception
of video as a solution to remote awareness retreated as it became clear that surreptitious observation of
colleagues was not always desirable (Hudson & Smith, 1996; Grudin & Poltrock, 2012). A particular
problem is that ‘always-on’ awareness feeds, as characterised by video links, blur the distinction between
private and public channels (Hudson & Smith, 1996). People were seen to absent-mindedly engage in
behaviours that are inappropriate for public space (Greenberg & Rounding, 2001), making hi-fidelity feeds
especially problematic for use in spaces that are ordinarily private, e.g. the home (Greenberg & Rounding,
2001). In short, then, too much awareness information risks an invasion of privacy, especially when that
information is being made public.
The issue of privacy makes designing awareness mechanisms a difficult task. One approach to
managing privacy is reciprocity—making sure that whenever someone can see you, you can see them too.
However, Hudson & Smith (1996) note that this approach has caveats in that it forces all spaces to become
public and can cause excessive disruptions. They present some design approaches that obfuscate certain
details in awareness feeds to allow observers to see that someone is there without necessarily being able to
see what the person is doing. Other authors suggest high-level guidelines, in the vein of design paradigms,
that attempt to balance awareness and privacy. One such approach, which we will use as a jumping-off
point for our own considerations about contribution awareness, is social translucence (Erickson & Kellogg,
32For a review of how various systems have addressed specific elements of workspace awareness, see Gutwin & Greenberg
(2002).
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2000; Erickson et al., 2002). The goal of a socially translucent system is to make shared actions visible
while supporting awareness and accountability. Regard for privacy is shown by the fact that the approach
champions ‘translucent’ over ‘transparent’ design; a translucent system is one that displays who is around,
and perhaps hints at what they are doing, without surrendering the fine-grained details that cause privacy
problems. Such an approach necessarily entails making certain aspects of collaborators’ behaviour visible
while obfuscating others.
Figure 7.1 shows the Babble chat room system, a canonical example of socially translucent design
(from Erickson et al., 2002, p. 41). Babble contains a buddy list (left side, Fig. 7.1) where the colleagues
of the current user are listed using coloured dots. The centre box then contains the ‘Commons Area’, a
social proxy which provides clues about the presence and activity of potential collaborators. This proxy
acts as an indication of whether collaborators are available for conversation. When a person is active, his
or her dot moves towards the centre of the circle. If a person is inactive, their dot resides at the edge of the
area. And if a person is logged on but in another room (shown in the list on the right), their dot resides
outside of the circle. Thus the system makes it possible for collaborators to be aware of who is around,
where they are, and whether or not they are active, but does not reveal detailed information about each
individual’s current work activities.
Of course, social translucence represents just one point on the awareness–privacy continuum, and we
do not suggest that is the only way of supporting awareness. Rather, we consider this approach because it
helps to highlight the way in which judging equity and fairness might be difficult in a collaborative system.
For example, a system like Babble might allow us to answer some basic questions about our collaborators,
but the knowledge that others are ‘active’ is likely insufficient for judging fairness. Instead, we argue that
collaborators require more detailed information about the contributions from each team member in order
to make judgements about fairness. Such information might relate to what others are doing, how they are
doing it, and perhaps also how much they are doing. The following section presents some considerations
in this regard.
7.2.3 Towards Contribution Awareness: A Social Proxy for Effort?
Based on findings presented earlier in this thesis, we wish to consider how computer systems could
enable collaborators to strive for fairness when completing divided work. We suggest that designers could
achieve this by providing information about the contributions that are being made by each member of a
collaborative team. In line with our earlier work and definition of fairness, we shall focus on the issue of
allowing collaborators to make judgements about equality in contributions. Such a goal will intrinsically
support fairness by allowing collaborators to observe deviations from equality; subjective judgements can
then be made in line with individual expectations or whatever norms and procedures the group is following.
While this may seem a relatively straightforward task, we believe that such a mechanism would need to
account for certain subtleties concerning fairness and collaborative work in general. Here we aim to bring
some specificity to the idea of contribution awareness and consider how it might be implemented.
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Figure 7.1: User interface of the Babble chat system, an example of socially translucent design, (from
Erickson et al., 2002, p. 41). The Commons Area (upper centre) is a social proxy that
provides clues about the presence and activity of collaborators. When a participant is active,
their individual dot moves to the innermost point of the circle. Collaborators unavailable for
conversation are placed outside of the circle.
First, it seems intuitively obvious that collaborators would some need awareness of the very fact that
contributions are being made. However, we contend that such general understandings must be accompanied
by a reasonable level of detail about such contributions. This in turn would promote some understanding
of actions, as opposed an understanding of mere ‘activity’. For instance, the message that ‘Ryan is typing’
offers a hint about the author’s current work task. But the message that ‘Ryan is typing at 70 words per
minute in Chapter 7’ makes it easier to specify current performance. One way to think about this is in
terms of a continuum between ambiguity and precision; more or less information can be provided about a
person’s work that, in turn, can help facilitate judgements about equality. If sufficient detail about work
is available, one might be able to answer questons about whether particular levels of performance are
appropriate to the given situation. We cannot prescribe an exact level of precision in this regard; this would
very much depend on the task at hand, and the challenge for the designer would be to determine the correct
level of detail at which information is sufficient to allow for equity to be realised.
Our second contention is that an awareness mechanism for judging equity (and hence, fairness) will
need to allow for social comparisons. As we have seen, fairness is intrinsically social and people make
judgements about equity by assessing their own outcomes relative to those of others (cf. Festinger, 1954;
Knez & Camerer, 1995; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Cohn et al., 2009). Thus, judging equity in a collaborative
work setting would require that people are able to see their contributions vis-a`-vis those of others. The most
straightforward way of achieving this would be to provide some shared representation of contributions,
with each individual’s contribution shown relative to those of everyone else. Such a representation would
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need to be reciprocal in that collaborators would have to share details about their own efforts in order
to receive information about those of others. Again, we cannot specify the correct content for any such
representation, and nor can we prescribe the exact means by which relative fairness should be assessed.
Such issues are very much dependent on the types of contribution that are relevant to the task at hand, and
it might be necessary to alter the focus of such a display based on critical aspects of the group task (cf.
Straus, 1999). In brainstorming, for example, the number of ideas contributed by each person might be
a suitable metric, whereas in tasks with well-defined stopping rules, measures of individual progress or
intensity of work (e.g. words per minute) could be more appropriate.
It is important to note that we see these contentions as tentative and by no means definitive. We do
not suggest that mechanisms for judging fairness in contributions should be the only source of awareness
information available to a team. Rather, we suggest that mechanisms for assessing contributions should
extend whatever information is available for answering the basic questions about awareness: who is around,
where they are, what they are doing, and so on. We envisage a mechanism in the style of an awareness
widget—an interface element that augments a digital workspace with information about the actions of
collaborators (Gutwin et al., 1996a,b; Gutwin & Greenberg, 1997). Very much in line with the general
scheme of this thesis, we do not suppose to tell people what is fair or what they should do. We are
simply concerned with exploring the challenge of providing the necessary information that could allow
fairness judgements to be made. Nor do we seek to argue that all collaborative systems should support
fairness—this is a matter that should be decided in accordance with the situation at hand.
The ideas presented here inevitably raise some questions about the way in which awareness of contri-
butions might impact a group’s work. The fact that computers can keep a persistent record of contributions
might actually make fairness easier to manage than in offline settings, especially if each individual can be
held accountable for his or her actions. However, requiring people to surrender information about their
contributions, and possibly their work process, necessarily infringes on their privacy. Whether or not this
erosion would be problematic in a group setting is another question. Several prior studies do suggest
that people are sensitive to increases in information disclosure and are especially wary of unwarranted
personal monitoring from others (Ramage, 1994; Harper, 1996; Cheverst et al., 2007). Yet increased
information disclosure might be felt less acutely if the information is clearly task-related, is provided with
the consent of all team members, and leads to collective benefits that are recognisable to all team members.
It would also be interesting to examine the impacts contribution awareness might have on group dynamics
and overall participation. For example, a study by Harper et al. (2007) found that contributions to an
online movie ratings site increased by 530% when information about the median contribution was emailed
to community members. However, those above the median actually lowered their overall contribution,
implying that providing a target for performance had both positive and negative consequences for collective
participation.
While our present considerations have aimed to abstract away from specifics about how contribution
awareness might be implemented, we note that there are some existing circumstances in which mechanisms
like those we have proposed are already in use. One such setting, described in brief at the outset of this
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chapter, is in the online game World of Warcraft. In the remainder of this chapter, we report a study of
groups in Warcraft. Our study explores how groups use simple meters that quantify and visualise damage
and healing, two primary outputs integral to task progress. We were interested in how meters contribute to
different aspects of group awareness, in terms of making individuals accountable for contributions and in
ensuring groups meet their targets. In this way, the study is akin to an evaluation of our design idea—we
aim to understand how meters can be beneficial, but also explore the various sociotechnical issues that
arise through their use. The following sections offer some background on grouping in Warcraft and lead
into our consideration of damage and healing meters as mechanisms for contribution awareness.
7.3 Thesis Study 7: Awareness Meters in World of Warcraft Raid Groups
7.3.1 Warcraft Raiding: Background
World of Warcraft (hereafter, WoW) is a massively-multiplayer online game (MMOG) with approximately
9 million active users around the globe (Birnbaum, 2013). In WoW, players choose a character and enter
into a virtual environment populated by various fantasy races (elves, orcs, gnomes and the like). The goal
of the game is to complete quests and battle enemies to obtain experience points. After a while, experience
points result in a ‘level up’ that increases the character’s strength, in turn furthering the player’s ability to
progress through the various areas of the game world.
Like other MMOGs, WoW emphasizes the collaborative and social aspects of gaming. This is
especially true at higher levels, where players must band together in teams of 10 or 25 to defeat challenging
dungeons known as “raid” encounters (Bardzell et al., 2008, 2012). The basic challenge of a raid involves
progression through a series of battles with increasingly tough ‘boss’ monsters (Bardzell et al., 2012).
Defeating a given boss allows players to acquire powerful rewards (known colloquially as ‘epic loots’)
which enable further progression by, for example, bestowing players with the strength required to face
more difficult bosses and dungeons. Raids also offer players the opportunity to accumulate social capital
such as status, reputation, and friendships (Jang, 2007). This capital then supports further progression
while fostering an experience of fun and achievement within the context of the game (Jang, 2007; Bardzell
et al., 2012)
However, navigating a raid dungeon is by no means straightforward. Not only are raids time and labour
intensive, the majority are punishingly difficult and represent the uppermost challenges within WoW.33
Most raids require a high degree of planning, coordination, and communication among players, and
groups may need to adhere to a specific strategy (or set of strategies) to defeat a given boss. Additionally,
players often need to manage transitions between different phases of an encounter, with each phase
requiring a new tactic that players must adopt in order to progress. Failure to perform these actions can
place the group in jeopardy, sometimes resulting in a “raid wipe” that leads to death for the entire group
33As the reader may not be familiar with the finer points of WoW raiding, Appendix I provides an example of a raid’s
progression through an encounter with the dragon Onyxia.
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and requires the encounter to be restarted. Group members must therefore ensure that their individual
contributions are consistently well-timed and appropriate to the required strategy. Moreover, because the
line between success and failure is very thin, raids cannot afford to tolerate non-participation or free-riding
behaviour. Both of these issues entail a certain degree of awareness between raid members—team members
must monitor individual and collective contributions, making raiding highly relevant to our interest in
contribution awareness. Although there has been some prior work on awareness in WoW and other virtual
environments (e.g. Brown & Bell, 2004; Ducheneaut et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2007a,b) the question of
how groups monitor collective contributions during high-intensity raids has not been explored. Thus, in our
exploration of damage and healing meters, we are presented with the opportunity to make a contribution to
the literature on WoW and collaborative gaming in general.
A second aspect of raiding relevant to the current work concerns the assignment of rewards. As
mentioned above, raids are undertaken in pursuit of loot drops, but the distribution of loot from raids
is almost always uneven—only a limited number of items drop from each boss, and not all items that
drop can be used by all players. This means that no single player is guaranteed to be rewarded after each
encounter. Groups are therefore faced with the problem of deciding how to best allocate rewards while
accounting for the contributions of all raid members. Such decisions may be taken in accordance with
fairness norms. Studying the use of awareness metrics in WoW offers an opportunity to shed light on how
work is divided in an additional, non-rarefied setting.
7.3.1.1 Division of Labour in Raiding
As a collaborative endeavour, raids necessarily entail division of labour among their members. This
division of labour is managed through ludic (meaning ‘game defined’ Bardzell et al., 2012) and social
roles. Regarding the latter, most raids have a leader who acts as a kind of project manager: he or she is
responsible for assigning sub-roles before the start of the raid, outlining attack strategies, and keeping
track of overall progress. Other social roles include the communications officer, responsible for issuing
instructions during battles, and the loot master, a player who takes temporary possession of the items a
group receives from each boss. Ludic roles, on the other hand, are defined by each player’s character class.
Different classes have different abilities, and these in turn define a player’s responsibilities within a raid
group. Some classes, like Warriors and Death Knights, are adept at mitigating damage and protecting
other players from enemies.34 Priests and Shamans are primarily responsible for healing other players and
providing benefactions. Classes like Warlocks, Mages, Hunters, and Rogues focus on offense, applying
‘damage-per-second’ (DPS) required to defeat the raid boss. Finally, some other classes blur the lines
between these three roles: Paladins and Druids, for example, can tank, heal, and apply damage, though not
all at the same time—players typically need to focus their efforts such that they specialise in a single one
of these roles, rather than all three.
While many encounters call for a different division of labour among players, the interdependencies
34Holding the attention of an enemy in this way is known as ‘tanking’.
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among ludic roles define the division at a very high level. Characters responsible for tanking monsters
will not live long without the aid of a healer, and neither healers nor tanks can defeat a boss without the
support of DPS classes. This means that, during group activities, particular classes are accountable for
certain tasks but not others. For instance, it is accepted that the job of the healers is to keep everyone else
alive; thus, if other characters suffer death during an encounter, suspicion of fault is immediately directed
towards the healers (Bardzell et al., 2008).
7.3.1.2 Awareness in Raiding
Although there is an emerging body of work on WoW and virtual environments more generally, no
academic work has yet addressed the subject of awareness in raiding. This is surprising given that, as an
intrinsically collaborative task, raiding must entail a certain degree of awareness among players. Many
features of raid battles are indicative of this need. For example, some encounters require players to ensure
that a particular spacing is maintained, else the raid may take additional damage from certain triggered
effects or threats in the local environment. Performance of such coordination must require awareness
of others. Additionally, players may have an understanding about what each raid member’s role is, but
will nevertheless require an up-to-the-moment understanding of whether or not specific tasks are being
performed. We identify three methods of obtaining awareness information in WoW:
• First, explicit communication is used to create and maintain awareness. All players have access to a
series of text-based chat channels within WoW, at least one of which is private to the raid group.
Because text-chat is difficult to use when raiding—players need to use their hands to control their
characters— the majority of raid groups use out-of-band voice chat systems, e.g. Skype, TeamSpeak,
or Ventrilo, to allow for voice communications (Chen, 2008).
• Second, as a mimetic representation of its user, an avatar naturally gives off information useful for
awareness as it moves around the virtual environment (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). For example,
a player’s position in virtual space may be revealing about current or intended courses of action.
Avatars often animate while executing certain actions, e.g. spellcasts involve different movement of
the avatar’s limbs, and these animations can be recognised by other players. Avatars are sometimes
expressive enough to communicate emotions; for example, typing ‘LOL’ in Warcraft causes the
player’s avatar to tilt its head and laugh out loud. At a higher level, the fact that collaborators are
represented by avatars means that an individual need only survey their immediate field of view to
answer basic questions like who is nearby and whether or not they are enemies.
• Third, WoW has a number of interface elements that support basic aspects of awareness, e.g.
a minimap that shows the player’s current location relative to other players in the environment.
Mousing over this map reveals the identities of said players and indicates whether each is friendly or
hostile.
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Prior work on awareness in virtual worlds has identified some deficiencies with the above methods
(Brown & Bell, 2004; Moore et al., 2007a,b) but one issue that has not been covered is the fact that these
channels are usually insufficient for raids. This is partly due to their limited bandwidth—for instance,
in a group of 25, not all players can speak aloud at the same time, and text chat is easily flooded with
so many participants—but also because they do not provide all of the information required by raids. To
acquire such information, players use a variety of third-party interface ‘add-ons’ to augment the basic
interface of WoW. Many such add-ons exist to support raiding, and here we shall consider meters that
display information about the damage and healing performed by members of a raid group. Use of such
meters appears to be prevalent within the wider WoW raiding community, and we will consider how these
meters support awareness of contributions.
7.3.2 Damage and Healing Meters: Simple Metrics for Contribution Awareness
Figure 7.2 displays two examples of damage meters from WoW. We can see that these meters have several
properties that align with our earlier contentions about contribution awareness. The first is that meters
present an aggregation of the damage or healing performed by each player in the group. This provides
a rough idea of each player’s overall contribution to the collective effort. The second is the hierarchical
ordering of players using individual bars that allow for social comparison, i.e. assessment of one person’s
contribution relative to the next. Players are further distinguished by the colour of their individual bars.
Colour in this case pertains to each person’s class—green is typically associated with Hunters in WoW,
Rogues appear as yellow, etc. These colours are consistent with other elements in WoW and are thus
familiar to the majority of players.
Additionally, we see that meters can be progressively more or less detailed in terms of the information
they present. Meter A in Fig. 7.2 shows a simple bar chart with each raid member’s name; this information
is slightly inexact but nevertheless offers a rough idea about each player’s contribution. Meter B makes
this information more explicit by providing exact figures that show (Fig. 7.2 B, left to right) the total
damage inflicted by each individual; their damage per second; and their contribution as a percentage of the
overall group effort. In this way, the second meter allows players to not only compare their contributions
but also quantify the difference between rankings.
While Fig. 7.2 displays only damage meters, healing meters are functionally and aesthetically identical
to those used for damage. The only difference is the type of information that is presented by the meter.
However, most healing meters provide an alternative view that allows players to view overhealing, which
captures the amount of healing that was performed unnecessarily on players already at full health. While a
small amount of overhealing is unavoidable, excessive overhealing can be regarded as a sign of poor play.
Rather than making calculated decisions about where to direct effort, a player may be healing the wrong
targets or ‘spamming’ the same spell over and over. Either of these behaviours would exaggerate his or her
contribution on the basic healing meter. Overhealing is also distinct from damage dealing because it is not
possible to ‘overdamage’ an enemy, making overhealing an important source of information about the
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Figure 7.2: Two damage meter addons for World of Warcraft. (A) shows a basic damage meter. (B)
shows the Recount interface addon, which provides more granular information about the total
damage inflicted, damage per second, and percentage contribution to the group’s overall total.
quality of work that is being done.
In discussing these meters, it is important to recognise that the information they present is not normally
available to raid groups. In ordinary circumstances, players know only their own efforts and have no way
of finding out how much damage or healing their comrades are contributing. Meters work by extracting
this information from each player’s WoW client and presenting it in a shared visualisation that is made
available to all members of the raid group (provided that they too have the relevant add-on installed).
Thus, without meters, players ordinarily have no way of evaluating the contributions provided by each raid
member.
We contend that meters embody the primary design properties that might be included in a mechanism
for contribution awareness. What we wish to understand in the present study is how meters are used to
support awareness in the context of raid encounters. It seems immediately obvious that the presence of
damage and healing meters will alleviate the need to communicate explicitly about these issues, but the
precise utility of these meters, especially for making fine-grained inferences about fairness, is currently
unclear. The present study addresses these questions by interviewing players of WoW about meters and
the issues that arise through their use. This allows us to unveil a range of sociotechnical concerns, which
we then aim to extrapolate to the broader issue of awareness in computer-mediated workspaces.
7.3.3 Are Games ‘Work’?
Given that most people play games like WoW in the pursuit of leisure, the reader may harbour reservations
as to whether any insights obtained would be applicable to the broader context of other CSCW situations.
Here we sketch some brief justifications as to why WoW is an appropriate setting for our study.
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The first thing to note here is that games, particularly Warcraft, have been a topic of concern for the
CSCW community within recent years—several published works provide a precedent to suggest that
productive implications can be derived from the study of gaming contexts (e.g. Nardi & Harris, 2006;
Bardzell et al., 2008, 2012). Second, virtual platforms like WoW are not always perceived as games
per se. The arduous and often repetitive nature of in-game tasks frequently blurs the line between work
and play (Yee, 2006c; Chen, 2008). Games like WoW usually include professions (e.g. blacksmithing)
which, if mastered, allow players to produce commodities that can be sold or traded; thus many players
are unwittingly ‘working for fun’ (Yee, 2006c). Additionally, one survey of more than 5000 players (Yee,
2006b) revealed that 60% of respondents regularly spent 10 consecutive hours in an online world, with
some spending 16 hours or more per day. This made the virtual world akin to a full-time job for these
players, many of whom regarded the virtual world as both their job and their ‘home’ (Yee, 2006a).
At a broader level, the problem of distinguishing between work and play remains a topic of debate
within the CSCW community (for examples, see Crabtree et al., 2005; Schmidt, 2010). In line with our
above statements concerning virtual worlds, one can think about play as a form of work, and of work
as involving some degree of play (or at least, leisure, Brown & Baarkhuus, 2007). Reflecting this line
of thought, the concept of ‘productive play’ has recently entered the CSCW lexicon. The argument that
games are somehow irrelevant to CSCW is, therefore, problematic and rests on the notion that work and
play are mutually exclusive—if one considers the concept of work as ‘any purposeful activity, whatever
the goal’ (Brown & Baarkhuus, 2007), this would easily encapsulate gaming activities. Furthermore, it
can be argued that although WoW does not result in a ‘work product’ beyond the intangible goods and
experiences of players within the game, there is a collective output of having fun (cf. Nardi & Harris,
2006) and the fact that this is both collaborative and computer-mediated is enough to place WoW within
the scope of CSCW.
Given these considerations, we are confident that findings derived from WoW can be extrapolated
to other settings. The following sections describe the methods employed during this study and the main
findings.
7.4 Method
To reiterate, this study aims to investigate how awareness meters in WoW support team participation and
judgements about fairness in contributions. Additionally, we aim to understand the various sociotechnical
issues that arise through use of these meters, with a view to considering how such issues might impact the
application of meters in other collaborative systems.
Following the precedent set by earlier work on WoW (e.g. Bardzell et al., 2012; Chen, 2008; Duche-
neaut et al., 2006), this study was informed on several levels. First, the author of this thesis is a former
WoW player with first-hand experience of raiding. This participation frames our analysis and interpretation
while providing an understanding of the social situation in which participants’ collaboration occurs. Such
an understanding is critical for game-related research, where “researchers should have played the games
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they are studying... if they do not, they cannot know what questions to ask, decipher the local language,
understand the game mechanics, or have any sense of the social context of play” (Williams et al., 2006, p.
342).
Second, we engaged in observation of players completing current high-level raid content in WoW. This
was done to update the author’s understanding of WoW and to improve our ability to question current
players—several years have elapsed since the author’s last period of protracted play. Observations were
conducted by watching live, player-created web streams. These are essentially public video and audio
feeds where players ‘invite’ others to watch them raid by broadcasting the contents of their screen over the
Internet. Four such feeds were observed over four separate one- to three-hour sessions. (The exact feeds
viewed are listed in Appendix H). We did not obtain consent to observe these players because they invite
observation by making their feeds public. Additionally, we did not collect data about these players; rather,
the author took notes about aspects of the raid encounter, e.g. what the coordination requirements were,
what the name of the boss was, and so on. The researcher also noted the actions performed by players
and the types of interface elements used. These notes, combined with the author’s own experiences of
WoW, helped shape the questions used in our third and final stage, where we performed semi-structured
interviews with current WoW players. These interviews aimed to unveil players’ experiences, and issues
encountered, during use of damage and healing meters during WoW raids. The findings we report here are
derived from this latter data source.
7.4.1 Participants
We interviewed two male and three female WoW players.35 Interviewees’ ages ranged from 18–46 (M
= 26.8). Interviewees had been playing WoW for an average of 6 years (range = 4–8.75 years). All had
experience of raid encounters ranging from early content in WoW’s initial release through to its most
recent expansion (at the time of writing, Mists of Pandaria). Perspectives from all currently available
classes were represented in our responses, and our interviewees encapsulated tanks, healers, and damage
dealers. Four of the five interviewees had experience with multiple classes and raid roles. Two players had
also held formal, organisational roles within their raid groups, e.g. raid leader or communications officer
(responsible for giving commands during raids).
All interviewees had been in a raiding guild. A guild is a persistent collective of anywhere between two
to several hundred players (Williams et al., 2006). Guilds are often synonymous with raid groups because
raids are often comprised of players from the same guild (Chen, 2008)—effectively, the formal structure
facilitates persistent grouping (Bardzell et al., 2012) and also allows certain policies to be implemented
that help to manage raids in the longer term, e.g. a guild bank to which all members can contribute. Two
35We recognise that five interviewees is a vey low number considering that WoW has more than 10 million active players, and
thus our responses can not be considered as truly representative. However, one benefit of the low number of responses is that we
were able to consider each person’s response in depth, and we were beginning to see saturation in terms of topics covered even
with just five responses. Since our aim is to illustrate salient issues associated with contribution meters, we feel that the present
study has proven successful in this regard, even with the low number of interviewees.
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of our interviewees described their guild as casual (one or two raids per week), two stated medium-core
(two to three raids every week, without fail), and one as hardcore (three or more raids per week, without
fail). Two had held positions of authority within their guilds. Additionally, all respondents had engaged
in raids with their guild and in ad-hoc pick-up groups (PUGs). PUGs are one-off collectives that form
to defeat an enemy and then disband afterwards. Even though our number of interviewees is low, these
demographic aspects do suggest that the raid experiences surveyed were broad and not isolated to just
casual or hardcore players.
7.4.2 Procedure
Interviewees were recruited through Facebook. Interviews were conducted one-to-one between indi-
vidual participants and the author of this thesis. Two interviews were face-to-face and three were via
telephone/Skype. All interviews lasted between 50 minutes and 1.5 hours. Interview questions used
in this study can be found in Appendix H. We began each interview by requesting the demographic
information described above. We then asked questions that covered a range of raid-related behaviours.
These included how the interviewees determined appropriate actions in the context of a raid; the interface
elements used to remain aware of teammates’ behaviour; and how the interviewees determined whether
others were contributing properly on raids. We also asked whether they used damage/healing meters
(which all respondents did) and probed their opinions and experiences with these particular mechanisms.
Interviews ended with a short debrief about the purpose of the study. Participants were not paid for their
participation.
7.4.3 Analysis
All interviews were recorded and transcribed by the author of this thesis, allowing for early familiarisation
with the dataset and development of initial understanding. This resulted in 52 pages of transcript. We used
open, axial, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The coding process was iterative; transcripts
were given two complete readings and initial codes were evaluated and refined during each reading, with
internal consistency strengthened by scrutinising the data for counter-examples. Codified concepts were
then structured into the themes that comprise our results set.
7.5 Results
Our analysis produced eight clear themes, and these are described in the subsections below. For ease of
interpretation, we separate themes into two distinct groups. Our first group considers themes relevant
to how contribution meters support raid groups, ranging from a general sense of awareness through to
managing fairness during distribution of loot after an encounter. Our second subsection then considers
sociotechnical issues that arise through the use and interpretation of contribution meters. These themes
cover both positive and negative issues.
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Before presenting the themes, we first consider the extent to which awareness is necessary during raids,
as evidenced by player responses that imply the general importance of awareness in WoW. Like our earlier
qualitative analyses, we use quotations that are illustrative of particular points. We identify speakers by
their participant number, gender, and age (M/F).
7.5.1 The Importance of Awareness in Raids
Participants’ responses offer some insight as to why awareness is both necessary and important in raid
settings. All participants considered it necessary to maintain a high-level sense of awareness of what is
happening at any given time during a raid. One participant referred to this as ‘raid awareness’, which is
perhaps best likened to workspace awareness (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2000, 2002) in that it relates to a
very general understanding of the group’s status and their interaction with various entities in the virtual
environment. As the interviewee surmised:
“It’s important to be aware of everyone around you—this includes healers, tanks, and damage dealers—
so you can spot someone who may be standing in the wrong place, or may just be in a bad place in
general...you need to focus your eyes on the centre of the screen so you’re able to watch the boss and
the ground for incoming attacks and keep an eye out for bad positioning. This gives you the ability to
tell them to move, which will avoid wipes.” [P3, F, 19]
Raid awareness appears to underpin many different aspects of raiding. For instance, there is the need
to be vigilant of, and subsequently control, unpredictable threats. Many encounters involve additional
monsters, known as ‘adds’, that are weaker than the main enemy but are sufficiently dangerous that the
raid must deal with them or risk a wipe. A second issue concerns the placement of team members within
the virtual space. Many encounters inflict additional damage if raid members clump together or stand in
particular areas; thus, the team needs to be aware of these issues and re-coordinate physical placement
when necessary. Finally, there is a need to monitor progress on the primary task; certain encounters must
be completed within a specific time frame, or else the enemy will ‘enrage’, resulting in increased damage
that the group may not be able to withstand. Team members must therefore maintain a degree of overall
awareness if they want to maximise their chances of success on the raid and minimise the threat of wipes
caused by poor coordination or sloppy play.
Additionally, and in line with the earlier definition of awareness offered by Dourish & Bellotti (1992),
raid awareness provides a context for individual actions, in the sense that observing the behaviour of others
appears to enable raiders to make decisions about appropriate actions. This was elaborated by the same
participant as above:
“Being aware of what everyone else is doing allows me to see when I need to use my own abilities,
whether defensive or offensive, or to swap to a different position. If I see the rest of my raid move to
the other side of the room, I need to move too. But if I wasn’t raid aware I wouldn’t be paying attention
to them, and thus I’d end up probably dying from not moving.” [P3, F, 19]
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Thus raid awareness is not only related to the interdependent division of labour among players but also
allows players to adapt and react strategically in the high-pressure raid environment.
We now delve into the ways in which meters contribute to various aspects of this overall raid awareness.
We also consider the extent to which meters are involved in decisions about fairness.
7.5.2 How Meters Support Raid Groups
7.5.2.1 Monitoring Contributions and Identifying Underperformers
As discussed earlier, the information presented in damage (or ‘DPS’)36 and healing meters is not usually
available to players when using only the standard WoW interface. Meters work by collecting information
hidden at the system layer and forming an on-screen visualisation of this information. Metered content is
then available to all members of the raid, provided that they have the relevant interface add-on installed.
The first, and perhaps most obvious, way in which meters support raiding is by allowing each member
of the raid to actively monitor the contributions of all other individuals in real time. The presence of an
individual on the DPS meter is often enough to know that they are active and contributing, in turn lessening
the need for explicit communication about individual actions. Conversely, the absence of an individual can
prove informative, especially if that player suddenly disappears off the meter—players can infer that the
individual has some problem, e.g. loss of internet connection, or is distracted by another task, which may
or may not be raid-relevant. Meters thus provide a very quick resource towards which players can glance
to get an overall sense of the raid’s status. Yet meters also allow for monitoring of individual participation.
As one player described:
“Everyone must pull their weight to progress through raiding... In WoW all it takes is for one person to
mess up and it’s a wipe, so everyone must do the tactics and conform to their role to the best they can...
DPS meters give raid leaders the information to see who is slacking or failing.” [P1, 28, M]
The latter sentence within P1’s statement leads us to a second way in which meters are used; that is, to
identify individuals who are underperforming. Recall that meters are ranked hierarchically according to
individual outputs. Thus, those at the bottom are always contributing less damage or healing than those at
the top of the meter. However, meters also allow players to compare contributions by gauging the relative
size of each individual’s contribution bar (see Fig. 7.2). Thus players can make judgements based not
only on ranking but also on the basis of a quantified contribution measure. These dual aspects of meters
help the raid deal with underperformers in various ways. First, the consistent placement of an individual
towards the bottom of the meters can be used to identify opportunities for improvement:
“If you have four people all doing roughly around the same damage... and then two straggling really
badly at the bottom you know it’s to do with them, it’s not to do with the raid or the boss.” [P2, 23, F]
36DPS is an acronym for damage-per-second, a jargon phrase that refers to ‘dealing damage’.
192
7.5. RESULTS
In this way, meters allow raids to check for non-contributors, who may then be removed from the
group based on evidence available in the meters. However, meters are not always enough to know why
an individual is underperforming. This is important because a player’s consistent placement near the
bottom of the meter does not mean they are lazy per se but could instead mean that the player is in need
of guidance. Interviewees described how the information presented in meters helped to identify such
opportunities for improvement. Such improvement can be assumed to support the long-term health of the
group, with those towards the lower end of the rankings encouraged to make improvements so that their
contributions come into line with other raid members:
“In the raid it is particularly so you can identify weaknesses... it might be that someone’s having a
real problem with what loot they’ve got, what armour... so the aim isn’t to say, ‘oh get out of here
we’ll get someone new’, it’s to identify weaknesses and learn from them... so you can eliminate all the
weaknesses.” [P3, 19, F]
“In rare cases it’s down to using the wrong rotation37 so we’d try to correct that and get them to look
further into their class and learn the right rotation.” [P4, 46, F]
In general, the very presence of an individual on the DPS meters implies that he or she is actively
participating in the raid. Interestingly, presence on the DPS meters cuts both ways. Sometimes, the
fact that someone is on the DPS meter can be a sign that they are actually not performing the correct
tasks. Many fights require certain players to control additional enemies using traps or immobilising
spells, entailing a large drop in DPS contribution because the individual in question must divert his or her
offensive capabilities away from the primary target. These ‘crowd control’ tasks tend to be pre-assigned,
and thus if the person in charge of such a task remains present on the meters while additional enemies are
around, raid members will be aware that the person in question is not performing the correct task:
“In this case if you weren’t doing your job then you were high on the meter. It’s how we knew the
hunter wasn’t doing his job, when he started to shoot up the DPS meters because he was just standing
still and firing on the boss, instead of killing the add.” [P4, 46, F]
In this way meters allows players to be held accountable for both appropriate and inappropriate
behaviours.
7.5.2.2 Providing Targets for Performance
A second way meters support raid activity lies in providing a target for performance. Because the
information meters display is detailed, players are able to ascertain whether certain performance standards
are being met. This can be of critical importance during certain scenarios where players must achieve, and
subsequently maintain, a certain numerical threshold of performance throughout the encounter, else the
37A player’s ‘rotation’ refers to the order in which his or her offensive abilities are executed. Certain rotations produce better
damage output than others, making rotation selection an important aspect of raid behaviour.
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raid may stand to fail. The damage meter provides a common resource for gauging whether this threshold
is being met and who, if anyone, needs to increase their effort during the encounter:
“I often look at my damage meter to make sure I’m achieving the right amount of DPS, this applies to
every raider so that we can kill the boss quickly. If the right amount of DPS is not met, then the boss
can enrage after a certain amount of time, causing a wipe.” [P3, 19, F]
In some raid encounters, it is often unclear what the required level of performance for a damage or
healing class should be. Studies suggest that people have a tendency to look for normative standards when
behavioural requirements are uncertain (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). In line with arguments earlier in this
thesis, one way of acquiring such a standard is through social comparison—people look to the behaviour
of others in order to guide their own actions, in essence ‘doing as others do’ (cf. Festinger, 1954). In
WoW, meters are a resource for this information. While contributions on some raids are reactionary, in the
sense that they are defined by what is going on in the raid and the abilities of the boss, the visualisation of
performance gives a target standard to which team members can direct their efforts.
7.5.2.3 Facilitating Public and Private Comparisons
Responses suggest that a certain degree of equality in contributions is desired in raid groups. In line with
our contentions earlier in this chapter, meters help players achieve equality through the visualisation of
contributions relative to one another. As in Fig. 7.2, the position of each player’s coloured contribution bar
makes assessment of equality relatively straightforward:
“You could see that by a bar on the DPS meter, as long as bars are all aligned then everyone’s doing
roughly the same, of course there’s variations but I don’t really mind... it shows everyone’s putting in a
fair amount of effort.” [P1, 28, M]
Equality in contributions appears to be important for two reasons. The first is very much related to
fairness and the expectation that all members contribute: if contributions appear similar on the meters,
players can be assumed to be fulfilling their role and group leaders need not be concerned about monitoring
individual performances. However, a second reason pertains to the overall risks of raiding, in that it is
better to have even performance between members rather than a ‘spikier’ or more polarised output, where a
few individuals pull away at the top and all others remain at the bottom. This is because the latter scenario
is much riskier in a raid setting; if the top contributors disconnect or suffer death, the raid is at a higher risk
of failure due to a larger overall percentage loss of damage output. Concerns such as these may explain
why raid groups invest much effort in training new or underperforming players: it is in the collective
interest for contributions to be fairly equal and of a certain (usually high) standard. Meters provide raid
groups with the information required to assess both of these concerns.
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7.5.2.4 Supporting the Assignment of Rewards
Recall that assignment of looted rewards is a problem faced by raid groups: items are limited in quantity
and not all items can be used by every member of the raid. Moreover, two or more players may feel that
they have equal entitlement to a given drop. These issues mean that decisions must be made about how to
assign rewards from the collective effort.
Responses revealed a range of loot assignment policies within the guilds of players. Two players
mentioned that their guilds used structured reward systems to assign loot after boss kills (cf. Chen, 2008).
These systems reward players with a point-based currency that can be used to ‘bid’ on loot drops. The
highest bidder receives the reward in question. One participant stated that his guild used meters to resolve
tied bids:
“If there were two people who bidded the same amount of [points], then it’d be decided by the raid
leader who would use their information through the DPS/Healing meters.” [P5, 18, M]
A different approach was to consider the item that had been dropped and balance rewards with overall
benefits to the raid group. For instance, a particular item may be a minor upgrade for a regular player but
could be a major upgrade for a weaker member of the team. Meters also factored into such decisions:
“In one of my guilds we use what we call a ‘loot council’...officers in the guild take into account
people’s current gear and their damage and healing on the meter. If it’s a big upgrade for the new
player they will award it to them.” [P3, 19, F]
It is, therefore, not the case that being ‘top of the meters’, which indicates skilled performance and a
significant contribution to the team, necessarily equates to a greater chance of receiving items. Rather,
meters are used as evidence of specific needs or to justify potentially controversial loot assignments.
7.5.3 Sociotechnical Issues
In addition to the generally positive aspects of meters outlined above, we identified various sociotechnical
concerns which, we believe, could have implications for implementing contribution meters in other settings.
7.5.3.1 Promoting Competition over Coordination
Being top of the damage or healing meter is often considered an accolade carrying a certain degree
of prestige. Topping the meters implies that the individual in question has not only made the greatest
contribution but is skilled to the extent that it lifts him or her above the rest of the group. Players appear
to vie for the attention that this status brings, and one interviewee described how the ‘top of the meters’
accolade became a motivating target for members of her guild, creating a level of competition that was
beneficial for progression:
“Someone’s belting away a load of danage and there might be some friendly egging on in raid chat,
like, oh look at me, see who can beat me. And then everyone else tries harder to beat that.” [P2, 23, F]
195
CHAPTER 7. FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS: CONTRIBUTIONS IN COLLABORATIVE GAMING
However, this same participant described how competition could also be problematic in that some
individuals can become overly focused on achieving ‘top of the meters’ status. Two other interviewees
also mentioned this side effect. Clamoring to be top of the meters can lead players to neglect the basic
coordination duties demanded by raiding. Ignoring the optimal strategy just to ensure top placement on
the DPS meter is regarded as dangerous and could lead to a raid wipe:
“Sometimes they’ll go away with blaring DPS, doing as much as they can to show off, and come top of
the DPS meter on everyone’s screen. But they don’t care about the tactics for the boss, or care what
their specific role should be, they just want to show off and be top of the DPS meter. Which should be a
secondary goal, not a main goal.” [P2, 23, F]
7.5.3.2 Meter Content as Limited in Scope
While the information represented in meters is useful during raids and is used to multiple ends, issues can
arise with the way in which this information is interpreted. In particular, meter content can be misleading
because it is limited in scope and does not capture all of the actions that could be filed within an individual’s
‘contribution’. We found several distinctions on this matter, most of which can be linked to the aggregation
of actions.
First, interviewees recounted experiences related to the way in which their contributions had been
misinterpreted by other group members. This is related to the fact that meters are poor at capturing
peripheral and supporting contributions that are not related to damage or healing but are nonetheless
critical to the group. For example, we saw earlier that certain classes have leeway to disappear from the
meters when their role demands it, as when performing ‘crowd control’ on additional enemies. The fact
that meters do not immediately provide evidence of these contributions can make it seem like certain
individuals are doing little work when, in reality, their contribution is critical for success:
“My role was, as a hunter, I was used for a lot of the add work. Misdirecting. Which means that you’re
switching off the main target to control something else and misdirect it... it brings your DPS right
down, so there’s no way you’re going to be top of the meters.” [P4, 46, F]
An additional issue related to misinterpretation is that certain ‘hybrid’ classes blur the boundaries
between ludic roles, i.e. their contributions are spread across both damage and healing meters. This means
that hybrids are often placed relatively low on both meters, which, at first blush, could imply that they are
contributing very little or are perhaps not as good in their defined role as those above them.
Second, simple aggregations of actions can potentially misrepresent the value of individual contri-
butions because information about the quality and relevance of actions is unavailable. For example, a
player may be using certain abilities that are captured by the meter but are ineffective for the task at
hand—an example might be the use of abilities to which the group’s enemies are immune. Meters do not
allow players to detect such behaviour because they simply aggregate performance without accounting for
contextual details. Furthermore, meters can cause certain contributions to be misattributed. This occurs
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when one group member’s actions have knock-on effects that benefit the group as a whole but suppress
the importance of the original contribution. For instance, one character class can bestow others with a
‘blessing’ that gives an extra 10% to each character’s strength. However, the provider of the blessing
receives no credit for this contribution in the meters, whereas the outputs of everyone else are inflated
by the strength increase. While it is important to recognise that groups in WoW are typically aware of
these peripheral contributions, taking meters out of context could make it appear as though one person
has contributed more to the group when, in reality, their contribution was absolutely dependent on the
involvement of others.
Lastly, the value of damage meters as measures of contribution can vary according to features of
specific encounters. This relates to the fact that different classes within WoW can be more or less effective
during certain fights. For example, there are certain enemies that are more susceptible to ranged magical
damage, and thus Mages, Warlocks and Priests are at an advantage during these fights. In other cases,
however, these classes cannot fully contribute because many of their most powerful abilities require the
character to remain stationary—this is problematic during encounters where raiders must make continual
movements to avoid threats in the nearby environment:
“If you had to move a lot, casters would generally be lower down because they’re moving so much
whereas if you’re tanking or if you’re not ranged then it’s easier, so there’re differences depending on
what the fight is.” [P5, 18, M]
The point here is that, as simple aggregations, the contents of meters do not account for subtleties of
different encounters. This means that some raid members are at an inherent disadvantage, but meters fail
to portray this, making it seem as though some players are underperforming relative to others when they in
fact cannot maximise their own performance. Of course, competent raid groups will be aware of these
issues, but one interviewee recounted an example where a group leader had berated her for seemingly poor
performance. In this case, there was a lack of common ground regarding her character’s abilities and the
structure of the encounter:
“The first boss in Icecrown, he does an attack that puts you in a spike if you’re too far away... so
everybody has to run into the boss, apart from hunters because you’ve got an area that’s a deadzone
where we can’t attack, so we have to stand outside of the deadzone, but that means we get spiked...
And we had one of our officers get rather antsy with me a couple of times for getting spiked and not
DPSing... it took our class leader to pull him and say, look, learn the class, you have no idea what
you’re talking about.” [P4, 46, F]
Taken together, these issues mean that it can sometimes be difficult to get a good sense of performance
based on meters alone, primarily due to their limited scope as measures of overall contribution. This is
especially true when efforts are undermined by aspects of an encounter that are beyond a player’s control.
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7.5.3.3 Amplifying Evaluation Apprehension
Our final theme pertains to evaluation apprehension—the fear that contributions will be viewed negatively
by other members of a group, in turn causing individuals to withhold such contributions to avoid criticism
(Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). In the context of WoW, the fact that contributions are aggregated and regarded as
a measure of ‘performance’ may cause individuals to be nervous about the contributions they make and the
way in which those efforts are interpreted by others. Such an experience was recounted by one interviewee
who, as a new raid member, had been worried about performing poorly and being evaluated in a negative
light. (Raids often require new members to undergo a trial period where performance is analysed and
a decision is made on whether the individual can stay.) Her response hinted at an almost self-fulfilling
prophecy, where, because she was nervous about being evaluated, her performance deteriorated below her
usual standard:
“It made me feel anxious before, like I’m being scrutinized. I was worried about how people would
judge my actions, and that made me worse in some ways.” [P2, 23, F]
Evaluation apprehension is likely true of group participation irrespective of the work context, yet
meters may amplify the effect by publicising detailed aspects about individual performance. Any negative
behavioural outcomes may therefore be especially problematic in group settings where each individual
must meet an acceptable level of performance, as was the case in WoW raid groups.
7.6 Discussion
The present study aimed to consider how meters in WoW raiding allow players to make inferences about
contributions and, by extension, the efforts of other raid members. Our study sheds light on a range
of beneficial aspects associated with meters, but also unveiled a series of sociotechnical concerns and
corollaries that suggests meters can, at times, be problematic. These issues may have implications for the
use of contribution meters to assess and manage fairness in other contexts. In the present discussion, we
will first consider our findings in terms of how meters support awareness in WoW raid groups. We then
consider ways in which game designers might productively elaborate on existing meters to alleviate certain
problems made salient by our analysis. Finally, we will consider how contribution meters, as a general
design idea, could be applied to other work-related scenarios in CSCW.
7.6.1 Meters and Awareness in World of Warcraft
At a broad level, our results emphasize the critical importance of awareness during WoW raids, and fall
into line with contentions about the importance of awareness from elsewhere in CSCW (e.g. Schmidt,
2002; Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002). If players do not maintain ongoing awareness of what is going on in
the raid, the risks of individual death and collective failure appear to be heightened. Awareness appears
to operate at several levels. First, a general sense of ‘raid awareness’ seems important—players must
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continually update their knowledge about the interaction between themselves, emergent threats, and the
raid’s primary target. Contribution meters assist players in developing this awareness by offering clues
about who is active and what their overall status is. However, it is important to recognise that meters are
complementary to existing communicational and coordinative practices—most raiders also use voice chat
programs to issue commands and share information. Thus, if a player does disappear from the meters,
players can use other channels to request verbal updates from the person or persons in question about
their non-participation. Additionally, meters support various lower-level aspects of raiding. These aspects
range from allowing players to assess individual progress over time to ensuring that contributions meet the
standards required for a given encounter. These findings, combined with others in our results, help to throw
light on the uses of awareness information within WoW, in turn providing an improved understanding of
individual and team behaviour in collaborating raid groups.
Our initial motivation for studying awareness in WoW was to assess the extent to which meters
are useful for supporting judgements about fairness. Several findings speak to the utility of meters in
this regard. First, raids are better off with a certain degree of equality in contribution—groups that are
capable of achieving roughly equal outputs from their members minimise the risk of failure that can result
from the death of individual characters. Meters help raids strive towards this equality by displaying a
clear threshold for performance and, in line with our contentions, by allowing players to compare the
performance among team members, both publicly and privately. Additionally, meters allow raid leaders to
identify underperformance, which is in turn dealt with as appropriate. As hinted by our responses, meters
also help raid leaders to ensure individuals are contributing in line with expectations about fairness; thus,
just as in other group settings, there is some basic expectation that everyone must contribute ‘something’
and that free-riding behaviour is unacceptable.
However, we found a range of sociotechnical issues that imply differential benefits of meters as
measures of contribution. To recap, our results suggest that meters can:
• emphasize competition over coordination, especially if there is status associated with being high on
the meters.
• obscure peripheral and supporting contributions that underpin task progress.
• fail to inform the reader about whether or not particular contributions are appropriate.
• distort the value of some contributions while suppressing the importance of others.
• amplify the feeling of evaluation apprehension for those new to a group.
While these side-effects are necessarily specific to WoW, in terms of the sorts of behaviours they
promote or discourage, it is possible that similar issues could arise if contribution meters were applied
elsewhere. First we will consider the problems specific to WoW so as to offer resolutions relevant to game
designers. Then we will consider the significance of these issues in light of our design goal of supporting
fairness.
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7.6.2 Implications for Awareness Support in Collaborative Games
Our results initially imply some differential benefits of meters; while they are useful for awareness,
they can cause unintended side-effects which may affect players’ enjoyment of raiding in WoW. This is
potentially undesirable from a user experience perspective. However, it is important to recognise that some
of these issues are probably negated through groups’ appreciation of context—even though individuals
with supporting roles may be relatively low on the damage meters, it is not the case that these players are
ejected from groups. Rather, the issue seems to be one of ensuring that players are appropriately accredited
for individual actions. This seems especially important if collective outputs factor into reward decisions,
as sometimes occurs during the assignment of loot in raiding groups.
One problem is that aggregation of a single job function, as embodied by damage or healing meters,
fails to account for supporting contributions. We suggest that the general idea of ‘meters’ is something
upon which game designers could elaborate. One possibility might be a more general contribution meter
that assigns a uniform rating based on the use of different actions over time, rather than a flat measure
of a single output. For example, the use of crowd control abilities or other supporting behaviours could
be factored into an overall rating so that each player feels that their contribution has been acknowledged.
Alternatively, a meter could be built that suggests an estimated parameter for individual performance based
on the characteristics of a given encounter (cf. Torkel, 2007). A player’s contribution could then be gauged
relative to this parameter, with points awarded or deducted for falling above or below the performance
threshold. The challenge for designers will lie in determining how different actions should contribute
to such a rating. These considerations, as well as the issues identified within this study, are likely be of
clear relevance for interface designers who wish to support both awareness and harmonious working in
collaborative gaming experiences.
7.6.3 Implications for Contribution Awareness
Our findings suggest that meters, as one potential way of implementing contribution awareness, do allow for
fairness judgements and help raid groups to negotiate assignment of rewards. Meters also provide a range
of awareness-related benefits, e.g. in monitoring personal development, and it is possible that similarly
beneficial aspects might emerge if meters were applied in other contexts. However, we must remember that
meters are one way, and not the only way, in which contribution awareness could be implemented—we
regard them as representative of one point in the design space for tracking and visualising contributions.
Below we outline some more general lessons and concerns related to meters and the broader idea of
contribution awareness.
In detailing our design idea, we touched on the fundamental tradeoff between awareness and privacy.
Privacy is not something we asked about specifically in this study, but is nevertheless important because the
extent to which a system infringes privacy can impact its overall acceptance (Plowman et al., 1995). Thus,
any other system that offered detailed awareness information might make its users feel uncomfortable.
One interesting aspect of the present study is that, even though we asked players about the negative
200
7.6. DISCUSSION
consequences of meters, the issue of privacy did not arise in our results. Players do not seem to mind
the presence of meters, which might be regarded as surprising in light of findings from the literature on
‘electronic performance monitoring and control systems’—tools that allow companies to collect, store,
and analyze the performance of employees (Alge, 2001). Such systems are similar to meters but have
been known to cause discomfort and stress among workers due to perceptions about monitoring (Alge,
2001). One possibility is that the groups we studied are unconcerned about privacy because meters are
an accepted, and expected, aspect of the raiding experience. Additionally, meters are not merely used
by the ‘higher-ups’ to monitor subordinates; rather, displaying information about individual efforts has
a clear benefit to the rest of the group. The general lesson here might be that, if a contribution meter
were implemented in another setting, the potential privacy issues associated with increased information
disclosure might be negated by ensuring that there is a clear collective benefit and that monitoring is not
used for its own sake. The acceptance of detailed awareness tools might also depend on the extent to which
equality in contributions is necessary for success, as was the case in the groups we studied.
The present study highlighted the potential for unintended side-effects resulting from public visibility
of contributions. It is obviously quite difficult to predict whether any similar effects would emerge if
contribution meters were applied to other tasks and systems, but there are perhaps some broader lessons
that can we consider. The first concerns the potential influence on group goals. We saw that contribution
meters could shift the focus of some individuals away from the primary task and towards secondary goals,
e.g. competition, that were less appropriate for coordinated task completion. Such an effect is undesirable
and represents something of an unwanted risk from contribution meters. Perhaps designers could find
some way of keeping a group’s focus on the primary task, e.g. through behavioural nudges or evocation of
particular normative standards (cf. Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Another issue concerned the limited scope
of what was displayed in the meters we studied. Damage and healing, as two measures of activity, were
critical for groups’ success, but they were not the only actions important for task progress. Displaying only
one aspect of an individual’s job role meant that certain players appeared to contribute less than others. The
basic implication here is that designers will need to be careful in choosing which contributions to include,
as well as the way in which those contributions are represented. Simple aggregations of action may not
be enough—our earlier contentions about damage meters versus more general measures of ‘contribution’
speak to this need.
7.6.3.1 Broader Design Challenges
In terms of implementing contribution awareness in other systems, there are at least two broader design
problems worthy of consideration. One pertains to the issue of how different contribution types might
be usefully aggregated into a readable metric, and indeed whether different contributions can be usefully
compared at all. Assessing fairness through comparison of contributions could be particularly difficult
when subcomponents of larger projects are inequivalent. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we studied groups
working on their Integrated Project coursework, a task that requires writing, computer programming, and
201
CHAPTER 7. FAIRNESS THROUGH AWARENESS: CONTRIBUTIONS IN COLLABORATIVE GAMING
software design, as well as intangible contributions associated with project management. Comparison
of these subcomponents may lack meaning because it is hard to gauge what each is worth relative to the
next. Perhaps measures like percentage contributions or time on task, as opposed to aggregation of actions,
would be more appropriate—this is something that can only be explored with further work.
A second design problem pertains to the issue of work quality. Our arguments about contribution
awareness are based on the premise of making people aware of actions, and meters enable this idea by
collapsing contributions into one readable metric. However, the issue of contribution quality is something
that meters were seen to obscure. While it is true that ‘quality’ can sometimes roughly equate to overall
output—as with the amount of damage produced by a players in WoW—it can also be measured in terms
of appropriate actions. This highlights a deficiency in the basic blueprint of meters, in that aggregation of
every action irrespective of usefulness could be misleading when applied to other contexts. This might
then be problematic for judging fairness, especially if quality were a critical criterion for success. Of
course, contribution meters could still support some degree of fairness by providing a persistent account of
who contributed what. In tasks where quality is more coarsely defined, identifying ‘good’ from ‘bad’ is
something that may be technically unfeasible and simply has to be left up to the group. These are very
much the sorts of considerations we aimed to highlight through the present study.
Perhaps the next step for exploring contribution awareness would be to investigate how meters, or other
representations, can be used to publicise contributions in other tasks. We do not propose specific designs
here, but there are many cases in which improved contribution awareness could prove useful. Collaborative
document editing is one such example; although many modern applications have commit logs, edit
histories, and tracking of changes (each of which could conceivably be used to gauge contributions)
meters could provide a more concerted visualisation of each person’s contributions to the work. Such a
visualisation might prove useful for appropriately accrediting authors for their work. The literature on
academic authorship suggests that ‘ghost authoring’ and coerced accreditation are pervasive (e.g. Flanagin
et al., 1998) and meters could be used as evidence to help determine author order. However, this idea
touches on our earlier concerns abour how contributions can be aggregated, and indeed whether or not
detailed information would even be desirable. Writing involves not only adding text, but also requires
rewriting, organising content, correcting typographical and grammatical errors, etc. These aspects could be
difficult to represent in a single metric, perhaps warranting the need for several that gauge key outputs. The
question of whether collaborators would even want such information is an open one. Such considerations
only imply the need for further work—we suggest further explorations of the design space and evaluations
of other mechanisms that aim to support fairness through contribution awareness.
7.6.4 Study Limitations & Future Work
This work is not without its limitations. Perhaps the foremost limitation is that our interviewees can not be
considered as representative of the general WoW population. Although we acknowledged this limitation
earlier, it means that we can not make definitive statements about the importance or prevalence of one
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issue over another. While our dataset clearly captured the more salient issues, there may also be other
practices related to meters that were not surveyed in this study.
In limiting our focus to raid groups, this study neglects a specific subset of grouping in WoW: 5-man
instance runs, which we suspect are actually more prevalent than raid groups. It is much less effortful
to form a 5-man group, and the dungeons such groups encounter usually have a much lower threshold
for coordination and time commitment than do raids. While our focus on raids was motivated by their
intrinsically collaborative nature and by our interest in contribution meters, future work could explore
smaller groups to see if any of our contentions could be refuted or adjusted based on the work of smaller
groups.
Another aspect of WoW not covered in this study is player-versus-player (PVP) grouping. In these
settings, players compete in teams of between 2-5 to defeat other players. The emphasis is placed on
fighting other humans rather than in defeating computer-generated challenges. It is unclear whether
contribution meters are relevant to these tasks. Our findings might differ to what is required by players in
such competitive circumstances.
While we have aimed to consider how metrics support grouping, one iteration on this study would
be to employ quantitative approaches to further probe fairness in raid groups. For instance, it would
be interesting to explore whether raid groups featuring more equitable contributions are more satisfied
or successful than those where contributions are more polarised. Such a study could use server logs to
track raiding progress over time (cf. Bardzell et al., 2012) and then compare progress with the contents
of damage and healing meters at particular intervals. This would provide further insight into the relative
importance of equity in raiding contexts.
Lastly, the results of the present study, as well as our contentions about contribution awareness,
pertained to synchronous work. We believe that the idea of contribution meters could easily be applied to
work done asynchronously, but the updated aggregation of work products could prove problematic for
interpreting contributions over time. We believe this is an issue that warrants further work.
7.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has aimed to consider how collaborators could be supported in making accurate judgements
about fairness in contributions. We first considered the importance of awareness in CSCW and the inherent
difficulty of judging fairness within collaborative systems where details about actions are sometimes
obfuscated. We suggested that awareness mechanisms could support fairness by providing detail about
individual contributions and by allowing collaborators to engage in social comparisons so as to observe
deviations from equality. In line with these contentions, we explored the use of existing metrics for judging
contributions within World of Warcraft raid groups. Our analysis revealed a range of potential benefits,
but also highlighted some sociotechnical issues that can result from use of meters. We suggest that the
design ideas embodied by meters could be applied in other collaborative tools that aim to support fairness
preferences.
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The present chapter has several contributions, the first of which is our design suggestion of ‘contribution
awareness’ as a means of supporting fairness in collaborative systems. Second, we have elicited an
improved understanding of the utility and importance of awareness in WoW raid encounters. This
understanding might also be extensible to other collaborative grouping situations, and provides a theoretical
contribution to the literature on virtual worlds. Third, our analysis of meters implies an opportunity for
game designers to expand existing metrics to provide broader measures of ‘contribution’ that are not
confined to a single job role but are instead reflective of a broader range of contributions. Such a meter
would offer improved accountability for peripheral and supporting contributions. Finally, we considered
the extent to which contribution meters could be applied in other settings—of course, further work is
necessary in this regard. Nevertheless, we believe that visualisations of contributions relative to one another
may be a useful step on the the path to improving individual accountability and allowing groups to judge
whether work is being completed fairly. The following chapter considers these contributions alongside





The central aim of this thesis has been to investigate the subjects of fairness and division of labour during
collaborative work, focusing in particular on computer-supported collaboration. We aimed to explore the
issue of how fairness might be relevant to collaboration, as well as the extent to which people strive for
fairness during work assignments. Our studies on this matter highlighted the guiding role of fairness in
division of labour, as well as the apparent difficulties of gauging fairness during computer-mediated work.
Based on this latter premise, we explored one way in which computer systems might allow collaborators
to make more accurate judgements about fairness during the completion of their work.
This thesis was scoped to consider fairness in the division and completion of collaborative work. In
Chapter 2, we aimed to establish conceptual foundations while drawing a link between collaboration,
fairness, and CSCW. We sought to consider appropriate definitions of both collaborative work and fairness,
and considered concepts related to each. We then attempted to explore the relevance of fairness to CSCW
through review of prior work. We found that fairness has not yet received an in-depth consideration within
CSCW and HCI more generally, save a few specific cases where the concept has been mentioned as a
matter of relatively low importance.
In Chapter 3, we conducted a survey of small workgroups to explore the link between fairness
in division and completion of labour and overall satisfaction with a collaborative project. We found
that perceived fairness in the division, and completion, of work was correlated with three measures of
satisfaction (process, products, and performance of colleagues). Correlations were positive and of moderate
strength, and although our approach was mostly exploratory, the findings are suggestive of a relationship
between perceived fairness and overall satisfaction. Participants’ statements were also revealing about the
struggles of non-participation and free-riding, and implied that it may be difficult to assess fairness due to
the absence of information about individual and collective contributions.
In Chapter 4 we introduced a more immediate approach to studying fairness in the shape of an empirical
model based on the classic ultimatum game, an experimental framing of negotiation that has been used to
205
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
study fairness in hundreds of prior studies. We proposed a novel transfiguration of the ultimatum game
such that, rather than bargain over a financial payoff, participants instead bargain over a potential reduction
in workload. One player makes a proposal about how to divide the work, and the other chooses to accept
or reject. In the event of acceptance, players complete the game as agreed. In the event of rejection,
players work alone and do not collaborate. We offered our model, the division of labour ultimatum game
(DLUG), as an explicit framing of the planning phase of collaborative work. This model is then linked
to the execution of work by the fact that participants have to complete the task in line with the outcome
of the game. We proposed to explore our model within this thesis and, to this end, conducted a thorough
review of empirical literature relevant to the ultimatum game. Our review helped to ensure that our own
experiments were built on the strongest possible foundations. We also considered prior use of economic
games within the field of HCI. This allowed us to identify ways in which our model could be used to
elaborate on earlier suppositions, in turn offering meaningful contributions to HCI, CSCW, and the wider
social sciences more generally.
Chapter 5 explored our model in a series of empirical studies. We opted to scope our investigations by
focusing on the subject of synchronous collaborative information seeking, an emerging area of research
in which division of labour is a relevant research problem. Four studies were reported: thesis study 2
offered an exploration of the DLUG in its most basic form, and study 3 explored the extent to which
a more or less attractive search task might impact allocations of labour. Study 4 explored the threat of
rejection as a potential explanation for behaviour in the DLUG, and study 5 explored allocations in the
absence of an explicit allocation procedure. We found a consistent preference for fairness, characterised by
equality in distributive allocations of workload. Based on our analysis of task completion times, we also
found evidence to suggest that participants strived towards achieving equality in the completion of their
work. Our discussion of these results was guided by relevant literature; we argued that fairness in initial
allocation of workloads might be the result of rapid decision making that conforms to social norms while
providing a strong cooperative signal, perhaps implying collaboration readiness. We considered whether
fairness in completion might be tapping so-called ‘effort-matching’ effects identified elsewhere in social
psychology. Finally, we identified strategies used to coordinate division of labour and prevent redundancy
during the search task. Such strategies have immediate implications for the design of collaborative search
systems.
In Chapter 6, study 6 explored the extent to which division of labour and fairness come into play
during the execution of real-world collaborative search tasks. Additionally, we used two existing systems
to explore real-world collaborative search behaviour and examined the extent to which our chosen systems
were appropriate for supporting everyday tasks. Interviews held with participants revealed that, at a
very general level, the two systems were regarded as useful, but collaborators identified a range of
problems related to sensemaking, information overload, and awareness. These problems present immediate
implications for design. Regarding fairness, we found that people were less worried about policing the
equality of contributions in these casual, everyday search tasks, and that there was a variable perception
about the importance of fairness and the work itself. In some pairs, apparent unfairness was tolerated to
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allow for task completion. However, participants did expect their collaborators to at least contribute to
some meaningful standard, and monitoring said contributions was sometimes regarded as problematic due
to limited awareness. This latter finding can be likened to suppositions made elsewhere in the literature
about the difficulty of monitoring collective contributions (Galegher & Kraut, 1990; Gutwin & Greenberg,
2002; Hertel et al., 2003), and runs parallel with findings from study 1, where students regarded it as
difficult to judge fairness due to the ephemeral nature of offline work.
In Chapter 7, we drew on our earlier findings to explore how groups might be allowed to make
judgements about fairness during computer-mediated work. We proposed the idea of contribution aware-
ness, arguing that, to enable more accurate judgements about fairness, systems could provide detailed
information about the ongoing contributions of collaborators. Furthermore, we suggested that systems
should allow for social comparison to facilitate judgements about relative equity in contributions. Study 7
explored the potential of our idea, where we examined the use of contribution meters by groups in the
online game World of Warcraft. We studied the extent to which meters, as an example of how contribution
awareness could be implemented, support judgements about fairness. We also offered insight as to how
awareness supports raid groups more generally. Our study suggested that awareness of contributions can be
appropriate for judging fairness, but raised four potentially negative consequences that suggest designing
for fairness might not be straightforward. We considered the extent to which these issues might apply to
other settings.
In this final chapter we draw the thesis to a close by considering broader implications. We also identify
limitations and opportunities for future work based on the present research.
8.2 Integration and Implications of Thesis Findings
In this section we aim to integrate findings from across the thesis to provide new perspectives on fairness
in CSCW. Our interpretations are positioned relative to the research questions posed in Chapter 1. This
helps to structure our arguments while bringing the thesis work full circle.
We began this thesis by proposing three questions that were intended to frame our studies on fairness
in collaborative tasks. We can now draw on our study results to consider initial answers to these questions
and tease out some of the central themes that have been made salient through our thesis research. In
particular, we identify three themes:
• First, fairness can be a critical requirement for harmonious working in some collaborative situations.
• Second, context effects mean that unfairness is tolerated in other circumstances.
• Third, designing for fairness is a legitimate goal for CSCW, but design for fairness may be tricky to
the extent that there may be occasions where it is better not to design for fairness.
Each of these statements is elaborated and positioned relative to our research questions in the following
sections. In addition we offer a model of division of labour that specifies the questions an individual might
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ask when assessing and monitoring fairness during collaboration. The model may help theorists to reason
about how fairness is realised at different stages of the collaborative process, and might assist practitioners
in thinking about interventions to support fairness.
8.2.1 Theme 1: Fairness can be Critical in Collaborative Work
Research Question 1 was: What is the relevance of fairness for collaboration and collaborative
systems? Having scoped the thesis to consider division of labour, our findings imply that fairness is
strongly relevant to both the division and completion of collaborative work. In thesis study 1, for example,
we found that fairness can be at the forefront of individual concerns throughout the collaborative work
process. Members of student teams appeared to be more satisfied with the work process when they
perceived that fairness in division of labour was high, and unfairness was a source of dissatisfaction for
those who incurred free-riding. The implication here is that failure to comply with fairness norms may lead
to poorer social health for a group. It is not clear whether this deficit would cause groups to underperform
but, based on the related literature, it seems sensible to suggest that performance would be hampered
when certain individuals free-ride (e.g. Brooks & Ammons, 2003). Since fairness is a salient emotional
concern during collaboration, supporting fairness might be seen as a design goal for any CSCW system
that mediates the assignment and completion of work-related tasks.
Turning to Research Question 2, we asked: To what extent do people strive for fairness in the
division of labour? Findings from this thesis indicate that there is a preference for allocating work in line
with fairness norms. Fairness also affects behaviour during the enactment of work, whether that means
adhering to initial commitments or in adjusting workloads to meet emergent challenges. The DLUG
experiments reported in Chapter 5 provide strong evidence of both of these phenomena. In addition,
ensuring fairness in the work process may partly be about pacing workrate so as to acquire overall equity.
The yoking of task completion times can be viewed in terms of compliance with fairness norms (cf. Jackson
& Harkins, 1985). Collaborators may adjust their efforts to ensure equality in the overall outcome of the
work process and this normative standard of workrate may then be retained for future application in work
settings (Kelly & McGrath, 1985). However, this research exposes important theoretical considerations
for fairness in division of labour. One is that a fair allocation does not always involve a direct mapping
to equality. That is, it may not be fair to divide a task evenly if other factors would provide rationale
for legitimate deviation from equality. Groups may invoke other allocation rules in such circumstances.
An example of such a rule would be ‘divide by competency’, as evidenced by the assignment protocols
used by some groups in study 1. In such cases, individuals considered it fairer to match tasks to relevant
skillsets and individual strengths, rather than attempt to ensure identical quantitative workloads. Not only
is this putatively fairer by not requiring people to handle tasks with which they have no competency, it
also saves time in negating the need to learn new skillsets. Groups must therefore balance the subject of
fairness with other issues such as time and efficiency, but further work is required to understand how these
considerations play out in the real world. Other examples of efficiency-related behaviour were evident
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in some of the DLUG experiments, where some individuals kept more work for themselves (instead of
delegating) as they believed that retaining control would allow for quicker task completion. Thus, strict
quantitative equality can be suppressed by allocation rules that bring efficiency to the fore while still
accounting for fairness preferences.
8.2.2 Theme 2: Context Affects Tolerance of Unfairness
Implicit in the preceding discussion is the idea that fairness is critical for harmonious working and that this
requirement may be uniform across a wide array of work settings. Such an argument is called into question
by study 6 of this thesis. In that study, collaborations occured between friends and family, and although
most wanted to work in line with equality, unfairness was often tolerated in favour of task completion.
Thus, a second theoretical implication is that the importance of fairness is not universal; context effects
must play a role in determining the extent to which people care about and ‘police’ fairness preferences.
Based on our results, as well as arguments in the literature (e.g Leventhal, 1980), we suggest that the
extent to which people enforce their preference for fairness is variable depending on the work situation,
the type of work that is being done, and the people with whom one is working. The combined influence of
these factors is likely to affect the salience of particular rules and norms that guide the collaboration and
completion of work. Moreover, effects associated with context may provide rationale that is sufficiently
strong to allow for tolerance of unfairness. To consider this further, it is worth dwelling on how the contexts
studied in this thesis differ.
Studies 1 and 7 looked at existing work situations in which team members had interdependence
and were asked to make contributions to achieve some overall shared goal. Studies 2–5 likely invoked
work-related norms that would be similar to the settings of studies 1 and 7. (We see our DLUG as a tool
that exposes the way in which people think about real-world division of labour and collaboration, just as
the UG can be considered as invoking norms centred around bargaining and exchange). We characterise
these and other task-focused settings as formal contexts in which expectations about participation are
quite specific. Conversely, we characterise the settings of thesis study 6 as an informal work context. We
hypothesize that this informality affects the extent to which compliance with fairness norms is critical
for harmonious working. As a brief elaboration, we can tease apart the extent to which these different
settings might emphasise different rules for evaluating fairness. We delineate the two settings in terms of
the following properties:
• Rules: Workplaces are settings that exist within organisational frameworks that dictate what is
and is not permissable (Holt & Thaulow, 1996). Although tacit rules govern all aspects of human
behaviour, we argue that informal settings are not governed by clearly articulated organisational
rules but are instead guided only by those that have been negotiated or established over time within
the confines of the relationship.
• Rewards: Formal contexts, such as professional workplaces, involve work that is done in pursuit
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of material reward. Informal work can be regarded as a discretionary activity for which there is no
material reward.
• Roles: Formal settings involve roles and responsibilities, as evidenced by job titles and management
hierarchies, that are less evident in informal settings. While personal relationships do promote roles
to organise certain tasks, e.g. division of labour in the home (Mikula, 1998), the structures of power
are less realised and thus people are not typically held accountable to the kinds of expectations about
their role as they might be in formal workplaces.
• Expectations: Workplace relationships exist primarily to serve the needs of the employer and to
complete professional endeavours. Such relationships will be governed by expectations about work
and justice rules, such as the expectation that one will do one’s duty and comply with relevant norms,
i.e. fairness. The relationships that exist in informal settings—such as those between family, friends
or romantic partners—are not formed on the basis of task completion but instead exist as a means of
satisfying mutual social, moral or hedonic needs. There is likely to be a set of expectations about
fairness but they are likely to be oriented towards goals that are not task-oriented.
• Retribution: Formal and informal settings differ in terms of the extent to which sanctions are
imposed if one fails to behave in line with expected rules. In a workplace, failure to perform to an
expected standard (i.e. to contribute fairly) could result in penalties ranging from docking of credit
(as would occur in student workgroups) to the loss of one’s job. Non-participation in the type of
work that was being done in the non-professional settings is unlikely to lead to such sanctions.
These considerations are certainly not exhaustive but at least serve to articulate some of the factors
that would affect the extent to which people enforce fairness norms. Moreover, they help to characterise
the sorts of situations in which unfairness might be socially acceptable, further emphasising the fact that
fairness is not unidimensional—not only do granular perceptions about fairness differ from person to
person, the weight that is assigned to particular rules will differ between contexts. People are known to
selectively apply and adjust fairness rules depending on the circumstances at hand. For example, Leventhal
(1980) describes how justice rules are weighted in accordance with the social situation. More weight is
likely to be applied to the evaluation and comparison of contributions “in settings in which productivity
and task achievement are the primary concern” (p. 10), whereas people assign weight to other rules
when group solidarity and maintaining harmonious relationships are of greater importance. We suggest
that the informal contexts captured in study 6 fit this latter category—although there was undoubtedly
some emphasis on getting the job done, task completion was not to be emphasized over maintaining a
harmonious relationship. And although it could be argued that fairness itself would help to maintain a good
relationship, perhaps there were issues beyond the scope of the study that warranted legitimate deviations
from equality in the collaborative search task. (Such as one individual doing more work in other areas of
the relationship).
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In addition, studies from the UG literature also emphasize that intentions guide conformity to equality.
For example, Nelson (2002) used a truncated ultimatum where the maximum possible offer was capped
at 20% of the pie (recall that offers of 20% or less are typically rejected in ultimatum games). The main
finding was that restricting the maximum possible offer to $4 (20%) significantly increased the number of
participants who were willing to accept the offer, from 17 out of 44 participants in the standard game to 42
out of 44 in the truncated version. In this case, responders know that the proposer has made a best effort
and tried to be as fair as possible in light of the circumstances; thus, it is often ‘the thought that counts’
when evaluating fairness. In the informal settings of study 6, it may be that participants knew their partners
were not contributing equally but that this lack of contribution was not a result of laziness, free-riding, or
spite. Individuals might not have been unfair deliberately but were instead distracted by other concerns,
and this knowledge was enough to relax policing of fairness norms.
In sum, it is clear that fairness rules may be intruded by other variables, e.g. the type of relationship
that exists between the persons involved. Fairness rules are not hard and fast, and appear to be applied
selectively depending on salient characteristics of the situation. This may make fairness a tricky design
goal—not only is fairness malleable but it is often difficult to predict the exact circumstances in which a
given digital technology will be used. This means that any design decision oriented towards supporting
fairness might be evaluated differently from one situation to the next. What we must now consider are the
implications of the preceding discussion, as well as our other results, in terms of how they might impact
the design of CSCW systems.
8.2.3 Theme 3: Fairness as a Tricky Design Goal for Collaborative Systems
Our final theme can be positioned relative to Research Question 3, which asked: How might collaborative
systems be designed to account for fairness preferences in division of labour? In answering this
question, Chapter 7 saw us put forth two propositions. First, we suggested that designers could consider
providing interface elements that display sufficiently detailed information about the ongoing contributions
of each person within a collaborative team. This suggestion arises from the fact that, when making
assessments about fairness, an immediate challenge concerns the collection of information necessary to
make a judgement in the first place. In offline groups, fairness is naturally quite hard to assess because
actions are fleeting and ephemeral. In distributed or computer-mediated work, judgements might be even
more taxing because work is rendered invisible and awareness of colleagues can be low. This means
that fairness judgements, irrespective of the work situation, are always somewhat hazy—people can only
assess fairness based on what they believe about a situation. Digital tools have the power to strengthen
collaborators’ judgements of fairness by providing people with records of action that would not normally
be available. Through proper design, information about collective action could therefore allow for fairness
judgements that are more closely aligned with the realities of a work situation.
Our second proposition emphasised that fairness is assessed through social comparison (e.g. Cohn
et al., 2009). Evidence from thesis study 7 demonstrates the potential benefits of allowing comparison
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of contributions. In our example context (World of Warcraft) players use meters that visualise each
person’s contributions to ongoing collaborative tasks. Meters allow players to make assessments about
their contributions relative to those of the group, allowing for monitoring of individual and collective
performance over time. Meters are also used to mediate the distribution of group rewards and ensure that
individuals are appropriately compensated for their efforts. However, we also saw that meters could prove
potentially problematic because their scope is relatively limited, meaning that certain contributions were
obscured or missing altogether. These consequences raise important questions for thinking about how
designers can tailor CSCW platforms to support fairness. We now detail some especially salient questions
and offer a short discussion of each, before proposing some preliminary guidelines that designers can
follow when thinking about fairness in collaborative systems.
1. What should be displayed in a tool designed to support fairness? The answer to this question will, of
course, depend partly on the nature of the task at hand. In collaborative writing, for example, it would
be prudent to select metrics that are relevant to the task of creating and editing text. But the broader
challenge is unveiled by deeper consideration of the language we used in study 7, where we spoke
of meters showing ‘actions’, ‘efforts’, and ‘contributions’ as if they were interchangeable. Further
reflection suggests that each could be considered as conceptually distinct from the next. Actions
might refer to specific detail about the operations an individual is performing or has previously
completed. Effort might describe the intensity with which those actions were performed, or might
be assessed via a measure derived from actions. (For example, ‘actions per minute’ is a common
measure of workrate in some online games). Finally, Contributions might be positioned as an
aggregation of an individual’s actions and efforts. In WoW meters (see Chapter 7, Fig. 7.2)
contributions are displayed in absolute and percentage terms. A designer might choose to display
both of these, or indeed neither if some other metric is more suitable. Fairness could be assessed in
terms of completed subtasks, percentage of the group’s overall efforts, or by an entirely different
method. These considerations highlight the fact that selecting and displaying the right information
is an ongoing challenge, and its solution will likely differ across a swathe of different collaborative
situations.
2. How is information intended to support fairness used across different settings? We already know
from the literature and the results of this thesis that fairness is not unidimensional. This means that
it will probably be very tricky to reach consistent guidelines about how and when designers should
aim to support fairness. If we think about a concept like awareness, its general nature remains
fairly consistent across settings—fundamentally, it is about knowledge of what is happening in a
workspace, who is around, where objects are, who is using them, and so on (Gutwin & Greenberg,
2002). This means that something intended to support awareness is likely to be successful when
applied across different collaborative contexts. As an example, interface widgets that display
the current location of colleagues are useful in many different CSCW platforms, ranging from
chat rooms like Babble (Erickson et al., 2002) to online games like Warcraft. Moreover, support
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for awareness is relevant to any collaborative context where information about colleagues would
improve one’s understanding of shared action and the work process. Since we know that fairness is
of variable importance across different settings, it is possible that information about contributions
would be extremely useful in one setting but infuriating in another. However, our understanding of
how those contexts differ, beyond the extent to which they are governed by formal rules, is limited
at this time. We see fairness as quite different to the phenomena with which CSCW is used to
dealing. Compared to other concepts that underpin collaborative work—conversation, cooperation,
coordination—fairness is more malleable and and subject to change; it has temporal qualities and
differs in importance from one situation to the next. Only future research can help to remove some
of these ambiguities from our current understanding.
3. Should we even design for fairness at all? We saw in our study of WoW that the information used to
gauge fairness had a number of detrimental consequences for group interaction. Some interviewees
described how metered content about contributions could cause players to focus on competition over
cooperation. Others described how the limitations of meters meant that certain contributions were
obscured or missing altogether. Further still, the value of contributions could be misinterpreted, or
misattributed to the wrong individuals. Not only do these findings specify the limitations of meters
as tools for evaluating fairness, they are enough to suggest that designing for fairness is tricky and
might lead to unanticipated consequences. Our ideas about supporting fairness are underpinned by
the concept of monitoring collective actions, but there may be times when monitoring is distracting
or is costly to the extent that it causes the pace of groupwork to slow down. Perhaps encouraging
people not to reflect, and not to ask questions like “how am I doing relative to everyone else?’ is a
better design goal for some contexts. Designers might therefore wish to avoid supporting fairness in
some situations. This may seem like an odd claim given the subject matter of this thesis, but we
believe that identifying situations where supporting fairness is detrimental to group work is just
as important as identifying those situations where it is critical. Furthermore, information about
contributions might not even be useful in some work processes. Using our earlier example of
collaborative writing, is it really helpful to see all the minor alterations that have been made in a
document? Does knowing that someone spent an hour writing a paragraph only to delete it shortly
after really encourage fairness? Clearly this is a design space that warrants further research.
In addition to these questions, there are broader issues that are raised by the subject of designing for
fairness. For example, have suggested that designers have the choice between hiding or sharing information
that could help or hinder group activity. But should a designer engage in such activity? Is it right or wrong
to make such choices about what people can or cannot see? We suggest that there are important but as
yet unexposed ethical consequences, both for designers and the people to whom their designs cater, that
should be mapped out in future research.
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8.2.3.1 Design Guidelines for Supporting Fairness
Based on the discussion above and the overall findings of this thesis, we offer the following points for
designers to consider when thinking about fairness in collaborative systems.
• The work process involves multiple stages, and fairness plays a different role in each. During the
assignment of work (planning phase), collaborators need to agree on distributions of workload.
Designers responsible for implementing division of labour should try to account for basic notions of
equality but must allow policies to be adjusted in light of group preferences. An example would be
division by competencies versus division by equality.
• However, when thinking about division of labour, designers should be mindful of the fact that fairness
is malleable, and that different rules and norms are followed depending on the work situation, the
relationships between individuals, and the type of work that is being done. It is therefore not possible
to dictate in advance what is and is not fair when implementing policies that guide the assignment
of work. Designers should instead aim to provide people with information that can be used to make
such judgements, rather than attempt to prescribe fairness in advance.
• In the process of completing work (enactment phase) designers should aim to allow people to check
whether collaborators are adhering to commitments. In order to achieve this, collaborators need
information about the work that is being done. Such information can be more or less obscure, but
fairness judgements are likely to be most accurate when contributions are described at a reasonable
level of detail. In addition, fairness is a social judgement, and in order to evaluate fairness in a work
process, designers should allow people to make comparisons between contributions.
• Although supporting fairness can be helpful, a question exists as to whether one should design for
fairness at all. There may be situations in which support for fairness is not required, such as those
where task completion is not the primary focus. Some work settings might actually be hindered by
support that encourages people to reflect upon fairness, especially if reflection leads to dissension or
altercation. Designers should be aware of the limitations of prior examples (e.g. meters in Warcraft)
and consider the potential consequences of making the actions of others public.
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8.3 A Theoretical Model of Division of Labour and Fairness Judgements
In this section we provide a theoretical contribution by offering a model of the process by which individuals
establish and iteratively assess fairness during collaborative work. The model seeks to expose the decision
process an individual would follow when trying to determine an appropriate allocation of work and,
later, the process by which fairness would be evaluated during the enactment of agreed allocations. The
model helps to formalise and draw together our most recent thinking on the subject of how people make
judgements about fairness during collaboration. The model has its roots in theories of collaborative work
and models of distributional justice judgements. In creating this new model we have drawn on our thesis
work to consider how particular findings serve as evidence about particular decision outcomes, and how our
acquired knowledge of fairness can provide a base to understand decisions in the context of collaboration.
The following subsections present the rationale for our model and the decision processes it aims to capture.
Finally, we consider the various stages of the model with respect to our thesis findings.
8.3.1 Foundations
Our model is instatiated by first drawing on the conceptualisation of collaborative work offered by Galegher
& Kraut (1990). Their outline (previously reviewed in Chapter 2 of this thesis) represents a theoretical
position about the different stages involved in collaboration. We use their outline as a starting point because
it draws a clear delineation between planning and enactment of work, allowing us to consider how fairness
might be assessed at each stage. As a brief review, Galegher & Kraut view collaboration as formed of
three stages:
1. Planning, which encapsulates initial division of labour.
2. Enactment, where agreed allocations are carried out.
3. Integration, in which individual work packages are interwoven into a coherent whole.
Our model uses the stages of planning and enacting as platforms for a larger framework that rep-
resents the decision processes an individual might follow when assessing fairness during the division
and completion of collaborative work. It is worth reiterating that these stages may be neither linear nor
fixed; some collaborations might proceed as outlined but others might require transitions where initial
workloads need to be readjusted during enactment. The extent to which task components are coupled will
also affect conformity to this process—it might be possible to contribute loosely coupled bits of work
on-the-fly (as when contributing items to a collaborative bibliography), whereas other work packages
might require careful integration, as might occur in collaborative software development. Our proposed
model can account for this by providing scope for decisions about distributive and enacted fairness to be
taken several times prior to the end of a collaborative process.
In describing this model, our primary aim is to account for the various cognitive checks an individual
would need to perform in order to determine whether the distribution and completion of work is in line with
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perceptions about fairness. Our considerations of distributive fairness in the planning phase of work are
inspired by Gerald Leventhal’s justice judgement model (Leventhal, 1976, 1980). His model articulates the
sequence of steps an individual would follow when trying to evaluate distributive fairness. Our contribution
is one of adapting the decision sequence such that it is directly oriented towards decisions about fairness in
the division of workload. Our conceptualisation of stage 2, Enactment, provides an entirely novel decision
procedure that captures the evaluation of fair behaviour in an ongoing work process. Fair behaviour
in this case is defined in terms of the extent to which an individual can be said to be adhering to their
commitments, as established by the initial division of labour.
The proposed model is described as follows:
1. Planning: Assessment of fairness in division of labour.




2. Enactment: Assessment of fairness in completion of work.
2.1. Identification of commitments and rules.
2.2. Comparison of commitments to task progress.
2.3. Seek explanatory rationale.
2.4. Outcome evaluation.
Because we did not study integration in this thesis, we place it aside and consider it as a task for future
work. In what follows, we elaborate on the stages listed above detail and outline assumptions that support
particular phases of judgement.
8.3.2 Assessing Fairness in Allocation
The planning stage of work involves decisions about division of labour and encapsulates decisions about
who is going to do how much of what, as well as when, where, and how work will be done. Fairness at this
stage is therefore relevant to the assignment of work in line with relevant norms, as well as consideration
of rationale that would provide deviation from said norms. As with our earlier definition of fairness, our
consideration of how individuals assess fairness in the allocation of work is underpinned by the basic
assumption of equality. That is, if no rationale exist to suggest otherwise, the expectation is that everyone
will contribute an equal (or at least very similar) amount of work. From this default position, the following
judgement sequence (cf. Leventhal, 1980) is hypothesised to occur when making an allocation:
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1. Rule collection and weighting: an individual decides which distribution rules are appropriate and
determines the relative importance of said rules. More important rules are assigned a higher
weighting, where weight corresponds to a greater impact on the perception of fairness (Leventhal,
1980). An example of two rules relevant to division of labour would be divide equally versus divide
by competencies.
2. Preliminary estimation: the individual estimates the work that should be assigned based on the rules
that have been determined as relevant to the current situation. This might involve estimations about
the amount and type of work to be assigned. For example, if the equality rule has been invoked, the
individual performs an estimation that creates an equal distribution of work. If competencies are
considered relevant, the individual might estimate which work packages fit best to the skillsets of
particular individuals.
3. Rule combination: the individual combines preliminary estimates with considerations of other
factors to arrive at a final judgement about what is fair. In this case, ‘other factors’ would be those
that provide legitimate rationale for deviations from equality. Such factors go beyond deviations
implied by particular assignment rules and incorporate knowledge about issues including reputation,
perceived entitlements, and mitigating circumstances. For example, if work has been assigned
on the basis of equality, but one individual has been enlisted to work on several other projects
simultaneously, it might be regarded as fairer to lower the person’s workload to restore parity.
However, this might not be acceptable if there are other factors relevant to the situation that would
make such a shift intolerable. In addition, this stage might involve considerations about efficiency—
whether inequitable workloads might provide a balance of effort in relation to time. Thus this stage
is fundamentally about attending to extraneous issues that would give cause for legitimate deviations
from equality.
4. Outcome evaluation: In the final stage of the sequence, the individual assesses the fairness of each
person’s allocation. This involves comparison between estimates and reality in order to assess
whether further iteration on the allocation procedure is required.
If the allocation is considered fair, work can proceed as assigned. However, if the individual perceives
unfairness in the final division of labour, he or she might suggest a different allocation by invoking new
rules, or by adjusting the weights of current rules, to revisit the estimation and combination stages until a
satisfactory outcome is reached. Thus, the decision model has sufficient scope to allow for cycles through
the various stages. In terms of our prior work, we can think about these considerations in terms of an
iterative DLUG—an individual might suggest an allocation, see it rejected, and then propose a second
assignment based on rules relevant to the situation. It should be noted that we regard the overall decision
process as largely implicit, in that it is not something that the individual will necessarily be active in




8.3.3 Assessing Fairness in Enactment
The second stage of the model considers how an individual would assess fairness during the work process.
We introduce this stage with two initial arguments. First, we suggest that this stage is fundamentally
about monitoring commitments, where each person’s commitment is defined as the work that they have
each agreed to enact as a result of the most recent division of labour. Thus, tracking fairness at this stage
involves a process of checking whether people are adhering to their commitments, and this occurs through
natural monitoring of the actions of others. Our second argument emphasises the idea of monitoring as
critical because, based on the literature on collaborative work, it is well known that people actively seek
information to create a sense of awareness during collaboration (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2002, see Chapter
7 of this thesis). Gathering such information not only allows one to understand the actions of collaborators
but also provides a context for one’s own actions (Dourish & Bellotti, 1992). We suggest that, in collecting
awareness information, people naturally make inferences about the work that is being done and, through
making those inferences, may gain sufficient cause to question whether or not the current state of affairs is
in line with agreed allocations. Thus we do not argue that people actively ‘monitor fairness’ but rather that
the collection of awareness information may give cause to question whether each person is adhering to
their commitments, e.g. through cues that suggest something is wrong. This distinction feels important as
we must recognise that fairness is only one motivation among many during collaboration. We suggest that
fairness is a concern that, once established, remains in the background most of the time—if everything
is fair, everything is good, and there is no need to monitor it—but situations may arise that bring the
experience of unfairness to the fore. Thus we regard fairness as similar to coordination in that it tends
to be most evident when it is lacking, and it is at those times that individuals will have reason to make
decisions in an attempt to re-establish harmonious working.
Since no research has previously considered fairness in the enactment of work, the following scenario
is a novel outline of the process an individual might follow when attempting to resolve dissonance between
current behaviour and perceptions about fairness. Based on our arguments about adhering to commitments,
as well the present thesis findings, we suggest that an individual follows these four steps:
1. Identification of commitments and rules: the individual draws on his or her knowledge of the
collaboration to identify each person’s commitments and the rules that were followed to arrive at the
initial division of labour. This represents an attempt at forming an understanding of what the work
process should look like. It may be that in some situations, no explicit allocation was agreed—the
implicit commitment in this setting can be regarded as the defaul of an equal contribution.
2. Comparison of commitments to task progress: this stage involves comparing each person’s commit-
ments to the current status of work in an attempt to identify disjoints between the two. Perceived
disjoints would indicate deviation from commitments. This stage might involve comparisons be-
tween quantitative workloads, but an individual might also form suppositions about the effort that is
being invested into the task, as measured in terms of either quality or workrate.
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3. Seek explanatory rationale: the individual looks for reasons that would explain or legitimise devi-
ations from commitments. This would involve drawing on knowledge about one’s collaborators.
For example, if it is known that an individual has been unwell and thus was unable to contribute,
policing of fairness might be relaxed. This step has sufficient scope to capture a wide range of
scenarios; for example, rationale might be derived from distributions of power, control, or ownership
of task components.
4. Outcome evaluation: In the final stage of the sequence, the individual determines whether the
current state of affairs is acceptable with respect to his or her current understanding of fairness. This
is essentially a test of whether deviations from commitments are tolerable or whether action needs
to be taken to change the current state of affairs and enforce fairness.
If the outcome of the fourth step is positive, the individual can continue working, perhaps with an
updated understanding of what is fair in the current situation. There might be some adjustment of behaviour,
e.g. an increased level of effort, or reassignment of tasks to cope with what is happening. It may be
that mitigating circumstances have affected an individual’s ability to participate in the work process, and
thus some of his or her work should be redistributed. On the other hand, contextual factors might make
deviations from equality highly tolerable.
However, if the outcome of the decision is negative, the individual must take further action on the
person or persons to reinstatiate fairness. The chosen action might be taken from the following options:
• Confront individual. (Make the other person aware of and accountable for their unfairness in an
attempt at repairing the collaboration).
• Defer payment. (Recognise and tolerate the act of unfairness, continue collaboration, but invoke the
act later down the line if unfairness persists).
• Impose sanction. (Penalise the individual by agreeing to withdraw certain rewards, but allow the
collaboration to continue).
• Reciprocate. (Do something similar to the other person, such as exclude them from project meetings).
• Renege on collaboration altogether. (Defect on current situation and avoid working with the person
in future).
These actions range from attempts at conciliatory behaviour to ending the collaboration entirely. It is
likely that the individual will explore less extreme options before choosing to defect. Thus, as with the
process followed during the planning phase, an individual might engage in multiple iterations through the
decision path before choosing to defect. We also suggest that each of the options might be followed by
the reassignment of work—an initial confrontation might be enough to determine that workloads must be
reassigned. What is useful is that the model has sufficient scope to allow for self-confrontation. That is, if
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an individual feels that they themselves are not conforming with fairness norms, they may seek repair by
offering to take work from their colleagues.
This model is, of course, a first attempt at building a theory of how fairness plays out in collaborative
division of labour. There may be issues that are not well-handled by the framework we have proposed, and
thus a challenge for future work will be to identify such issues and refine the model until it can account for
the available evidence.
8.3.3.1 Linking the Present Thesis Findings to the Model
Here we consider how various findings from this thesis relate to different parts of the model. Considering
each finding relative to the model helps to provide further justification for the arguments we have presented.
• In thesis study 1 we found that student workgroups desired fairness in the allocation and completion
of collaborative tasks. Their basic expectation of equality underpins the model, and their use of
other allocation procedures (e.g. assignment by competency) is reflected in step 1.1 of the planning
phase, where individuals are assumed to invoke relevant rules to guide the initial assignment of
workloads.
• In the DLUG studies, participants preferred equal allocations of work, even in circumstances where
they could not be punished for unfairness. This further emphasizes the basic premise of equality in
division of labour. In addition, the fact that several experimental manipulations did not give cause to
sway from the equal allocation suggests that the impact of the variables was not enough to provide
sufficient rationale for deviation from equality. We assume that individuals traversed step 1.3 of the
planning phase model and failed to identify (or simply chose to ignore) other factors that could have
legitimised deviations from equality.
• During completion of the work assigned via the DLUG, some collaborators reworked initial assign-
ments during the process of work. This may be evidence of comparing commitments to task progress
to determine that the assignment of work should be renegotiated (step 2.2 of the enactment phase).
The fact that the majority of pairs did the work as agreed is evidence of adhering to commitments as
a motivating force when completing assigned workloads.
• The yoking of completion times discovered in the DLUG experiments may be evidence of compar-
isons about fairness in workrate. That is, cues about the partner’s efforts may have given sufficient
cause to ask questions about whether the current investment was appropriate for the task at hand. In
some cases, this may have lead individuals to speed up or slow down until an ‘equitable division
of labour’ was achieved (Jackson & Harkins, 1985). The implication here is that a quantatively
equal allocation might also give rise to a norm of equality in the process itself. The checking of such
norms would be encapsulated by steps 2.1 and 2.2 of the enactment phase.
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• We found in study 6 that individuals were highly tolerant of unfairness in casual work settings. This
may be the result of having collected rationale to suggest that the work partner, current context, and
task demands were sufficient to allow deviations from equality to be tolerated. This is captured by
step 2.3 of the model for the enactment phase.
• We suggested in study 7 that designers could support fairness by allowing individuals to monitor and
compare the contributions of their collaborators. This is in line with the foundations of the decision
model at the enactment stage, where we suggest that observation of contributions can give rise to
questions about fairness. Moreover, the statements offered by players in World of Warcraft suggest
that information about individual contributions is collected as a means of checking adherence to
commitments, and gives cause to seek rationale (2.3 of the enactment phase) to explain deviations
from the required standard. Sanctions that are imposed upon players (e.g. temporary exclusion from
future team efforts) would arise as a result of following the decision model and opting to take action
as a result of perceived unfairness.
The model we have proposed may help future scholars to consider the steps employed to evaluate
fairness, but might also be used to implement policies intended for arbitration in collaborative systems.
For example, online marketplaces like eBay require arbitration procedures to resolve disputes between two
or more parties. Our decision model could help designers to think through the steps by which fairness is
evaluated, such that systems can be better designed for fairness. For example, the designer might consider
increasing the salience of particular rationale that would help explain to a buyer while a seller appears to
be deviating from commitments. In situations more relevant to collaborative work, the decision model
could be employed to capture certain types of information that would support the process of fair judgement.
For example, in the knowledge that people are assumed to expect equality and seek rationale to explain or
legitimise inequality, designers could think about showing collaborative contributions in a timeline view
such that an individual’s ability to evaluate holistic contributions is strengthened. Allowing annotation of
lapses in activity might allow individuals to seek rationale from their coworkers, in turn providing cause to
adjust or strengthen their own understanding of fairness and the current work process.
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8.4 Thesis Limitations and Future Work
At the beginning of this thesis (Section 1.2) we described some initial delimitations that were sufficient to
scope the research reported here. For example, while our work on division of labour raised fairness as an
issue, we elected not to consider the issue of retributive fairness. Some study-specific limitations have
also been described within the relevant chapters. This section discusses overall limitations that became
apparent during the progress of this research. We regard these limitations as opportunities for future work.
8.4.1 Participants and Generalizability
One of the main limitations of the research reported in this thesis is the relatively small sample size for each
study. Additionally, all of the participants recruited for our studies were self-selecting, which is a further
limitation given that the behavioural tendencies of self-selecting volunteers may not be representative of the
broader population (cf. Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1969). Finally, many of our participants were undergraduate
students, and there is some contention within the literature as to how well the preferences of students match
those of others in the outside world (e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 2000; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich
et al., 2010; Engel, 2011). These issues mean that we cannot assume that our results are representative of
other populations.
While we do not believe that any of our conclusions are compromised by the low number of participants,
it is possible that some manipulations (e.g. those using the DLUG dictator game, as in Chapter 5) would
have statistically reliable effects in much larger experiments. While the problems associated with sample
size naturally limit our ability to apply our findings to other real-world settings, we do not believe that
they are enough to invalidate the findings of this work. We have been careful to avoid overreaching the
generalisability of our findings, and, where appropriate, we have emphasized that particular findings are
illustrative rather than representative. Beyond relying on co-located human participants, one alternative
approach would have been to use crowdsourcing platforms like Amazon’s ‘Mechanical Turk’38 to reach a
large number of participants from afar. However, Mechanical Turk was not available in the UK at the time
our studies were conducted. Several other platforms have since become available, making a crowdsourced
exploration of the DLUG a viable opportunity for future work.
8.4.2 Fairness in Work: Definitions and Cultural Sensitivities
In drawing attention to the role of fairness and equality in division of labour, our studies necessarily
entailed certain definitions of terms. Our conception of fairness is based on the idea that each person
should be attributed his or her dues in line with perceived entitlements, rights, or needs. Further, the norm
of equality was used as a basis for our understanding of fairness—where no entitlements, rights, or specific
needs exist, fairness ‘defaults’ to the expectation of an equal distribution. In line with this, people use
38Mechanical Turk, see: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
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equality as a decision-making heuristic during the allocation of goods and services (Allison & Messick,
1990).
However, our definitions, as well as the research supporting them, are based on a primarily Western
school of thought. Based on our results, our definition appears to reflect the behaviour of our participants,
most of whom were interested in fairness and expected others to behave in line with equality. Our findings
may be reflective of Western norms but are unlikely to apply to other cultures because what is regarded as
a fair offer in one culture is sometimes perceived quite differently in another. For example, in Chapter 4,
we described how the majority of studies on the classic UG reveal a prevalence of equality over selfishness.
This equality can be regarded as compliance with fairness norms. Yet studies of non-industrialised and
pre-technological socities demonstrate differences in social constructions of ‘fairness’ (Henrich et al.,
2001). In some societies, people are not inclined to make equitable offers and do not punish those who
make low offers, yet in others, people were extremely generous and frequently offered more than half of
the prize to responders (Henrich et al., 2001).
Since expectations about what is fair are not universally consistent, it seems clear that expectations
about fairness in division of labour would also differ between contexts. However, we do not believe these
concerns impact our basic definition; rather, cultural differences mean that expectations about rights and
entitlements are likely to be different, further emphasizing the very subjective nature of fairness. What
they may impact, however, is the basic expectation of equality in allocations. Cultural differences might
also impact the extent to which people are perturbed by deviations from equity in their work process. As a
challenge that was well beyond the reach of this thesis, future work should explore the extent to which our
findings are relevant to other societies.
8.4.3 Factors Affecting Division of Labour
While we did explore some factors that could influence fairness in division of labour, e.g. the potential
threat of punishment, the present work has not been able to account for an abundance of other factors that
will impact division of work in the real world. Such factors would be prevalent in everyday workplace
settings. Examples include, and are certainly not limited to, organisational protocols, power differentials
and status hierarchies (Eason, 1996; Bardram, 1997); perceptions about gender roles (Mikula, 1998); job
roles that prescribe assignment of tasks (Symon et al., 1996); skills, knowledge, and individual expertise
(Grinter et al., 1999); pecuniary incentives (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999); and standard operating procedures
(Grinter, 1996). Such issues are bound to influence the extent to which people perceive a need to conform
with equality during collaborative work.
Of course, such factors are too numerous to explore within the confines of a single thesis. We suggest
that they are instead worthy of exploration in further work, which could be achieved using our DLUG.
Perhaps a more important issue is whether or not the above factors affected our empirical results. On the
whole, we believe this to be unlikely because most of the groups in our studies were egalitarian in their
distribution of power. This is at least true of the student workgroups in Chapter 3 and the pairs in Chapter
223
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION
6. It is also true of the anonymous pairings in Chapter 5, although one might argue that assignment of
roles in the DLUG does imply a certain status difference. Certain elements of this work might have been
affected by knowledge and skills, but any such effect appears minimal given the prevalence of equality in
offer data.
8.4.3.1 Potential Elaborations of the DLUG
Below we offer some specific ideas as to how DLUG model proposed in Chapter 4 may help illuminate
a range of issues relevant to economic decision making and division of labour. Our list is necessarily
selective, and we eschew more esoteric manipulations in favour of those that pertain either directly to the
results of this thesis or to the potential for understanding collaborative work practices.
Iterate the allocation phase of the DLUG. An iterated version of the DLUG might be adopted, where a
rejected offer allows the proposer to revise their offer or end the game (cf. Gneezy et al., 2003). Such
iteration would also bring the model closer to a genuine negotiation process, and might allow for
the investigation of strategy selection (Brenner & Vriend, 2006; List & Cherry, 2000) or deadlines
(Gneezy et al., 2003).
Repeat resolved DLUGs. Experiments where players perform multiple collaborative work tasks would
allow richer investigation of the role of social relations in division of labour. Tying in with our
earlier discussions on competence and expertise, participants might decide maximum efficiency
can be achieved by dividing work differently after a single round of obtaining five items apiece. In
any case, it would be interesting to explore whether people learn to become more self-interested in
division of work, given an absence of other incentives to cooperate.
Impose power differentials. Allocating the roles of proposer and responder according to causal factors,
e.g., relative performance on a prior task (Hoffman et al., 1994), would encourage participants to
interpret the roles of proposer and responder as signalling differences in status. This would play
further on perceptions of entitlement, which could potentially cause participants to shift allocations
in line with fairness norms. Studies of the UG have shown that manipulations of this kind allow
explorations of resource entitlements (Hoffman et al., 1994; List & Cherry, 2000), and such designs
might be leveraged to model status hierarchies in division of labour.
Increase the interdependency of work items. In the present work we focused on collaborative search
tasks. Collaborative search can be characterised as relatively loosely coupled work, in the sense that
none of the work items to be distributed is especially dependent on any of the others. Increasing
interdependency by using different tasks, e.g., collaborative writing or programming, would allow
for comparisons between different work contexts. It might also lead to different observations of
coordinative activity, in the same way that we observed differential strategy use during collaborative
information seeking.
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At a broader level, our DLUG could be used in studies of agent-based negotiation. A common approach
in social science research is to substitute human participants with simulations where agents are paired
off and must negotiate or complete some task. Economic games are used in many such experiments (e.g.
Brenner & Vriend, 2006; de Jong et al., 2008). The DLUG could easily slot into these settings and be
used for novel ends beyond those reported in this thesis.
8.4.4 Task Choices, Work Settings, and Group Construction
Within this thesis, the scope of studies was limited to a few very specific types of work. Our DLUG
experiments focused on collaborative information seeking, which we then carried over into the field study
reported in Chapter 6. While this choice was made for purposes of consistency, and because division of
labour is a relevant problem for collaborative search, our findings are limited by this choice. Future work
must explore division of labour in other collaborative tasks.
A second limitation in this area is that, although there is some overlap within certain studies, the
majority of work in this thesis has focused on synchronous collaboration. Future work could examine how
our findings map to asynchronous work. For example, the matching effect discovered in Chapter 5 might
be more or less prevalent in asynchronous collaboration—if collaborators have information about how
long their colleagues spent on a task, they might use this information as a rough guide to manage their
own working period and investment of effort. On the other hand, collaborators might be more interested in
catching up with their coworkers’ effors rather than striving for equality. If the task structure was kept the
same as in the experiments we reported, asynchronous work could have a radical effect on coordination
problems and strategies (e.g. all the responsibility for non-duplication might fall on later work). The design
ideas and findings presented in Chapter 7 could also be extended to asynchronous interaction. Although
awareness metrics for judging contributions might also be useful in asynchronous work, perhaps the time
lag might increase the need for detail about certain prior efforts over others.
Lastly, findings from the empirical studies in Chapters 5 and 6 were isolated to dyadic interaction.
Managing fairness is likely to be more difficult as a group becomes larger; in particular, diffusion of
responsibility implies a greater risk of loafing behaviour (e.g. Latane et al., 1979; Jackson & Harkins, 1985;
Kravitz & Martin, 1986) and this is likely to be even more problematic in computer-mediated settings
(Kraut, 2003) where identifiability is low and task progress is difficult to ascertain. Our focus on dyads
was partly to minimise difficulties with participant recruitment, but was perhaps also influenced by our
decision to adapt the classic UG, a paradigm that typically involves only two persons. Initial evidence
from our survey study in Chapter 3 implies that fairness remains relevant in larger groups. Future work
should aim to extend our empirical work to groups of three or more.
8.4.5 Research Methods
The studies undertaken in pursuit of this thesis used a variety of approaches, each of which has generated
interesting findings relevant to our topics of concern. Each of these approaches does, however, have its
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limitations. Here we discuss some foremost limitations associated with our choice of methods.
In our explorations of the DLUG, we did not have the opportunity to explore every possible idea, and
thus we aimed for a stepwise approach in the vein of incremental experimentation. While this approach is
ideal for reductionist empirical science, it may be viewed with suspicion by certain researchers in CSCW.
We hope that our findings, especially the matching effect in search times, are enough to suggest that the
DLUG can play a role in developing our understanding of CSCW more broadly.
There are two more general limitations associated with our experimental approach. One is the use
of laboratory methods, which necessarily opens oneself up to the sorts of criticisms aimed towards any
lab-based research. Within HCI in particular, there is an ongoing discourse about the utility of laboratory
methods and their relevance to ‘in-the-wild’ behaviour (e.g. Marshall et al., 2011; Rogers, 2011; Hornecker
& Nicol, 2012). Such accounts argue that laboratory findings are not sufficiently generalisable, and that
experimental setups are typically too rarefied to understand how technologies are used in the extra-lab
world. Based on the latter premise, Rogers (2011) calls for ‘in-the-wild theory development’ based on
in-situ studies that account for social context and the less controllable aspects of human behaviour. This
aligns with broader trends in CSCW, where ethnographic workplace studies are often championed because
they produce detailed accounts of organisational behaviour in the real world. However, what researchers
often fail to recognise is that workplace and other field studies are themselves highly contextualised, which
in turn makes their results difficult to generalise (cf. Kraut, 2003). Moreover, disjoints between theory
and empirical observations usually imply a need for more, not fewer, laboratory studies; it is only then
that theory and data can be reconciled, as is ongoing within the literature on economic rationality and
social preferences from which our DLUG was derived. Nevertheless, our reductionist approach would
be well-complemented by further and more holistic studies of collaborative work. We note that, with the
studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7, this thesis did take some initial steps in this regard, and we hope our
work was made stronger through combining quantitative and qualitative approaches.
A second limitation is related to the very nature of economic models. In Chapter 4 we showed that
economic games have seen prior use in HCI. One benefit of these models is their simplicity. Each allows
for the isolation of individual variables, which can then be systematically manipulated to explore their
effect on fairness (or cooperation, as the outcome is usually operationalised within HCI research). The
downside of these models is their scope—they record a single decision, taken out of context at a particular
moment in time. Our DLUG paradigm offers a small iteration on this limitation; not only did we explore
the planning phase of work using our model, we then studied the enactment of the shared task after a
quantitative allocation had been reached. Yet, as an abstracted version of workload allocation, our model
still neglects issues that would prevalent in the real-world. For instance, it is likely that collaborators
would engage in multiple rounds of workload allocation, contributing and evaluating suggestions until a
suitable allocation is achieved (Freidson, 1976; Strauss, 1985). We note that our DLUG can be expanded
to model these aspects of work assignment. Additionally, work items in the real world will not be so
easily packaged into numeric form, as in our DLUG studies. Tasks are often fuzzy and may contain
interdependent elements that cannot be easily decoupled (Herbsleb & Grinter, 1999). Our experiments had
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to simplify these aspects of work, but perhaps future studies of the DLUG could employ work items that
are of variable difficulty, more or less interdependent, or have other features that we did not test here.
The studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7 used qualitative techniques to analyse interview data. One
limitation of qualitative analysis is that data interpretation is very much dependent on the view of the
analyst—this is not a fundamental flaw but does mean that other interpretations are possible (Sandelowski,
1995; Elo & Kyngas, 2007). However, there is no way of checking which interpretation would be
more meaningful. Both of our studies used unguided, inductive coding. We felt that this approach was
appropriate given that, while we had some broad topics of concern, we were not testing any theories nor
seeking to answer any specific questions about behaviour within the two studies (Elo & Kyngas, 2007). A
downside of our approach is that we cannot make claims about prevalence, nor importance, as would be
possible in a study where deductive coding and inter-rater reliabilities were utilised. Finally, our reliance
on interview data means that both studies were affected by the very nature of retrospective self-reports
(cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). For instance, our results are reliant upon what our participants were able to
recall about their experiences, and might also have been tempered by our choice of interview questions.
8.5 Concluding Remarks
This thesis has investigated the issues of fairness and division of labour in collaborative work situations.
Our findings suggest that the distribution and completion of work is guided by concerns about fairness:
collaborators allocate work so as to reach notionally fair assignments, and then expect those assignments to
be completed in line with fairness norms. However, ensuring fairness can be difficult under circumstances
of limited awareness, as is often the case in computer-mediated settings. We argued that assessment of
fairness is based on the judged legitimacy of deviations from equality, and introduced a design solution
that could support fairness by providing collaborators in a CSCW system with information about the
contributions provided by each team member. We argued that such a mechanism should allow for
comparison of contributions relative to one another, and should provide sufficient detail about said
contributions so as to make social comparisons meaningful.
This thesis has advanced the field by specifying the relevance of fairness to division of labour during
collaborative work, as well as to CSCW more generally. Our efforts have united several previously
disparate literatures, and our investigations have resulted in a number of pragmatic, theoretical, and
empirical contributions. These contributions are not solely related to division of labour but also touch on
other research areas, including collaborative information seeking and collaborative gaming within virtual
worlds. Additionally, we presented an economic approach to studying fairness in the division of labour,
offering a methodological contribution that is novel to scientific inquiry. Yet despite these contributions,
we regard the work of this thesis as only the first step towards a more complete understanding of how
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Contents: Department of Computer Science 13-point ethics checklist, and our responses.
A.1 Completed Ethics Checklist: Overview
This checklist was reviewed prior to each experiment. The overview we give here is retrospective
to show how particular issues were handled. An official copy of this checklist can be found at http:
//www.cs.bath.ac.uk/Leon/files/EthicsChecklist.pdf.
1. Have you provided a briefing script for volunteers?
All of our studies had briefing scripts that describe the purpose of the study. All participants are
aware that they can terminate their participation without consequence.
2. Will the participants be using any non-standard hardware?
No. Participants in study 6 used non-standard software applications with which they were unfamiliar.
However, these tools pose no immediate physical or mental risks to participants. This is true of all
other software used in this thesis.
3. Is there any intentional deception of participants?
No. Our DLUG studies did not use deception but the precise purpose of the work was withheld
until after participants had completed the experiments. This was necessary to prevent knowledge of
our focus impacting behavioural decisions—such knowledge would invalidate the findings of the
studies. The study was presented to participants as a study of division of labour in collaborative
information seeking, a statement that is true but obfuscated our focus on the DLUG outcome. All
participants were given full debriefing about the purpose of the study after they had completed the
experimental task.
4. How will participants voluntarily give consent?
All experimental studies used paper-based consent forms to obtain consent. Our survey study (Study
1) was conducted online, and participants gave consent on the first page of the survey. In Studies 6
and 7, consent was obtained verbally by reading the consent form aloud in cases where interviews
were conducted over the telephone.
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5. Will participants be exposed to risks greater than those encountered in their ordinary working life?
No.
6. Are you offering any incentive to the participants?
Yes. Such incentives were our primary method of recruiting volunteers, as opposed to coercion
or forced participation. No participants were forced to participate in our studies. The payments
we offer do not encourage participants to risk physical or mental harm beyond what they would
encounter in everyday life.
7. Are any of your participants under the age of 16?
No.
8. Do any of your participants have an impairment that will limit their understanding or communica-
tion?
No.
9. Are you in a position of authority over any participants?
In some cases, yes. This was true of Study 1, where we recruited undergraduate students that the
author had previously tutored. However, we were careful to ensure that students did not feel forced
to participate, as evidenced by the fact that not all students responded to our survey. Additionally, we
made sure that students were aware that responses would not affect their marks. We also offered cash
prizes as a thank you to the students for giving up their time to participate in our survey. Students
were not requested to provide identifying information, which we hoped would put them at ease for
the purposes of our survey.
10. Will the participants be informed that they can withdraw at any time?
Yes. Our consent forms make this explicitly clear.
11. Will the participants be informed of your contact details?
Yes. These are available at the bottom of all consent forms and instructions.
12. Will participants be debriefed?
Yes. All participants received verbal (Studies 6 and 7), digital (Study 1) or paper-based debreifings
(Studies 2, 3, 4, 5).
13. Will the data collected from participants be stored in anonymous form?
Yes. No participants are identifiable in digital materials representing results. Additionally, paper-
based materials are kept in a locked drawer inaccessible to anyone other than the author. Consent




Contents: Survey transcript and briefing materials.
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B.1 Survey Transcript
This survey was hosted using Qualtrics survey software.39
Page 1—Briefing Script
Thank you for your interest in this study. This is a survey study where you will be asked to reflect on your
experiences during the Integrated Project unit. The purpose of the study is to explore your satisfaction
with your Integrated Project group, focusing in particular on the way in which your group organised and
completed its work. The survey has 5 pages and should take roughly 10 minutes to complete.
The information below is about confidentiality and how the data we collect will be analysed. Please take a
moment to read through the information before progressing to the next page.
—
During the survey you will be asked to express opinions about your coursework group. All of your
responses are entirely confidential. Your group members will NOT be informed about your individual
responses, and you will not be informed of theirs.
Your responses to this questionnaire will NOT impact your mark in any way. If, for example, you admit
here that you did not contribute fully to the group or that someone else not participate, this information will
not be used to adjust your individual or group mark in any way whatsoever. We would like your honest
opinion, so please feel free to be frank, open, and honest.
There are 10 prizes of £10 on offer for completing the survey. If you wish to be included in the prize draw,
you will be asked to provide your Bath email ID at the end of the survey. This is for winner identification
purposes and all IDs will be removed from the dataset prior to analysis. Prize winners will be drawn
at random and notified privately by email. Entry into the draw is contingent upon completion of the
questionnaire.
—





As mentioned previously, we are interested in exploring your overall satisfaction with your Integrated
Project group. During the survey you will be asked to express your agreement with a series of statements
about your group. The scales are labelled from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. Consider the
midpoint between these as a neutral response.
We would like to stress that although we ask for your IP group number, we are primarily interested in
group-level phenomena and you will not be identified as individuals during analysis or presentation of
data.
Hereafter, there are only 3 pages of questions. Some questions require an answer. Optional questions have
‘(Optional)’ written alongside them.




Page 3—About your group
We would like to begin by asking you to think about your group and express your agreement with a number
of statements.
Thinking about your experiences with your Integrated Project group, to what extent do you agree with the
following statements?
(Statements from the following measures were then presented in two separate blocks of 11 statements
each, with order of statements randomised for each participant. Participants gave their response on
a seven-point scaled, labelled at the leftmost end with ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ at the
rightmost. Statements with *** were reverse scored.)
Open Communication, 4 items (Stokes, 1983)
• My group avoids saying anything that might upset someone.***
• My group is very straightforward with me.
• There are certain topics about our work that my group avoids talking about.***
• Most people in my group are careful not to reveal too much of themselves to the group.***
Task Motivation, 4 of 6 items (Zaccaro & McCoy, 1988)
• Performing well is a top priority for my team.
• My group members expect high effort and commitment from me.
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• Only a high level of performance is acceptable to our group.
• Our group is highly task-oriented.
Group Viability, 3 items (Hackman, 1988)
• As a team, this work group shows signs of falling apart.***
• Members of my team care a lot about it, and work together to make it one of the best.
• Working with members of my team is an energizing and uplifting experience.
Group Cohesion, 5 items (Stokes, 1983)
• If I were to participate in another group like this one, I would want it to include people who are
very similar to the ones in this group.
• Most of the people in the group are not the kind of people I would enjoy spending time with outside
the group sessions.***
• There are not many people I like as individuals in my group.***
• Even if we stopped meeting as a group, I would still want to see the people in this group as often
as I could.
• I wish I had more time for socializing with other group members.
Satisfaction With Group – (Hackman, 1988), 3 items
• Generally speaking, I am satisfied with my team.
• I frequently wish I could quit the team.***
• I am generally satisfied with the work I do on the team.
Social Loafing – (Druskat & Wolff, 1999), 3 items
• We have some team members that don’t put much effort into their work.
• Every member of our team does his/her share of the work.***
• There are some individuals on our team who dont do much work.
If you wish to clarify, explain, or say anything else about any of your ratings on this page, please use the
space below. (Optional)
Free text response box here.
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Page 4—The division of work in your group
The following statements are about the way in which your group went about organising its work, and
whether or not you believe the division of work was fair.
Thinking about your Integrated Project group, to what extent do you agree with each of the following
statements?
(Statements from the following measures were then presented, with order of statements randomised for
each participant. Participants gave their response on a seven-point scaled, labelled at the leftmost end
with ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ at the rightmost. Statements with *** were reverse scored.)
Fairness in Division of Labour, 3 items
• My team made an effort to ensure that work was distributed fairly among members.
• In my opinion, the division of work among my group members was fair.
• When dividing up tasks, some members of my group were given an unfair amount of work.***
Fairness in Completion of Work, 4 items
• I believe that, by the end of the project, everyone in the team completed roughly the same amount
of work.
• One or more people in my group did significantly more work than others.***
• Everyone in the group contributed an amount of work that I consider fair.40
• Compared to the average amount done by other group members, I did more work.***
Method of Dividing Work
• All members of my group contributed similar amounts of the various subtasks required by the
assignment (writing, design, programming, etc).
If you wish to clarify, explain, or say anything else about any of your ratings on this page, please use the
space below. (Optional)
Free text response box here.
40Originally, before pilot: Everyone in the group contributed a fair amount of work towards the project.
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Page 5—Your satisfaction with your group
The following statements are about your overall satisfaction with your team members, the products of your
group, and your satisfaction with the way in which work was organised.
Thinking about your Integrated Project group, to what extent do you agree with each of the following
statements?
(Statements from the following measures were then presented, with order of statements randomised for
each participant. Participants gave their response on a seven-point scaled, labelled at the leftmost end
with ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Strongly Agree’ at the rightmost. Statements with *** were reverse scored.)
Satisfaction with product:
• Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the reports our group produced.
• Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of the system our group produced.
Satisfaction with procedure:
• I am satisfied with the way in which work was allocated among group members.
• Overall, I am satisfied with our chosen method of allocating work to the members of our group.
Satisfaction with performance:
• The quality of work produced by the other members of my group was satisfactory to me.
• Overall, I am satisfied with the collective performance of my team members.
Do you have any other comments or anything else you would like to add regarding your satisfaction with
the performance of your group members?
You may reference individual group members by name, if you wish. To maintain anonymity in the data,
any names you mention will be replaced with pseudonyms during analysis and presentation.
Free text response goes here.
Is there anything else you would like to add about your Integrated Project group that was not covered by
the survey? if so, please use the space below to provide details.
For example, if one group member did not contribute any work and had a detrimental impact on your project,
you may wish to provide details of that experience here. You may also describe any other experiences or
issues that you encountered during the IP unit that may help us to understand your responses.
Again, any names you mention will be replaced with pseudonyms during analysis and presentation.





If you wish to be included in the prize draw, please enter your Bath username so that I will be able to
contact you:
Please click the ’Next’ button to record your responses.
Thank you very much for completing this survey.
If you have any comments or questions, please drop me an email at: r.m.kelly@bath.ac.uk
Otherwise, good luck in your exams!
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Contents: Consent form, briefing scripts, instructions, and questionnaires.
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C.1 Consent Form
This consent form was used in all experiments reported in Chapter 5.
Consent Form
Study Overview
This is a study of workload division during collaborative search on the Web. For your participation
today you will be paid £5 in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the study you will be working with another person who is located in a separate room elsewhere
on campus. You will not be told who the person is either during or after the experiment, and they will not
be told who you are either during or after the experiment. The person you will be working with is real and
is not the experimenter.
The task you will be working on requires you to complete an information-seeking task involving simple
Web searches. During the experiment we will be recording one of your screens using screen-recording
software. The software only records information on your screen and it will not be possible for anyone to
identify you from this recording.
Important Information
• All data collected during this study will be recorded such that your individual results are anonymous
and cannot be traced back to you.
• Your results will not be passed to any third party and are not being collected for commercial reasons.
• Participation in this study does not involve physical or mental risks outside of those encountered in
everyday life.
• All procedures and information can be taken at face value and no deception is involved.
• You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time and to have any data about you destroyed.
If you do decide to withdraw, please inform the experimenter.
• You will be reimbursed for your time upon successfully completing the study.
By signing this form you acknowledge that you have read the information given above and understand the
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Experimenter: Ryan Kelly, Dept. of Computer Science. RMK22@bath.ac.uk
Supervisor: Professor Stephen J. Payne, Dept. of Computer Science. s.j.payne@bath.ac.uk
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C.2 Study 2 Instructions
C.2.1 Proposer Instructions for DLUG
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to form a reading list for a night
class. The reading list must contain 10 reliable sources. Rather than complete this task alone, you have the
opportunity to work with another person who is located elsewhere on campus. This other person will be
given the same research topic as you and also has to create a reading list containing 10 sources. You will
not be told who the other person is either during or after the study, and they will not be told who you are
either during or after the experiment.
The first part of this study involves making a proposal about how to divide the workload between the two
of you. On this occasion, you have been given the opportunity to make a decision about how to divide the
work. You can do this by specifying how many sources you want the other person partner to look for. You
will then be responsible for finding any remaining sources towards the required total of 10.
The way you should do this is as follows:
• The minimum number of sources you can ask the other person to find is 1, and the maximum is 9.
You should privately decide how you want to divide the work. Please keep the decision to yourself
and do not inform me (the experimenter) of your decision.
• You will see a chat window on your screen. You should specify the allocation by typing in the
following style: “I want you to find sources”.
• The other person will then have the opportunity to review the allocation you have proposed. They
will respond to your allocation with the word ‘accept’ or ‘reject’.
• If they accept the allocation, any sources that you both obtain will be shared and your findings will
contribute jointly to the required 10 sources.
• If they reject, you will each have to find 10 sources separately.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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C.2.2 Responder Instructions for DLUG
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to form a reading list for a night
class. The reading list must contain 10 reliable sources. Rather than complete this task alone, you have the
opportunity to work with another person who is located elsewhere on campus. This other person will be
given the same research topic as you and also has to create a reading list containing 10 sources. You will
not be told who the other person is either during or after the study, and they will not be told who you are
either during or after the experiment.
The first part of this study involves making a proposal about how to divide the workload between the two
of you. On this occasion, the other person has been assigned the task of dividing the workload, and it is up
to you to respond to their allocation.
The way you should do this is as follows:
• You will see a workload allocation appear in the chat. This is the number of sources that the other
person wants you to find. The minimum number of sources they will ask you to find is 1 and the
maximum is 9. The other person will then be responsible for finding the remaining sources for
the required total of 10. The allocation will appear in the following style: “I want you to find
sources”.
• If you accept their allocation, any sources that you both find will be shared and your findings will
contribute jointly to the required 10 sources.
• If you reject the offer, you will both have to find 10 sources separately.
• You should privately decide whether or not you want to accept their allocation. Please keep the
decision to yourself and do not inform me (the experimenter) of your decision.
• If you are happy with the allocation, please answer: “Accept”.
• Or, if you do not accept their allocation, please answer: “Reject”.
Please do not type anything else in response to their allocation.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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C.2.3 Web Search Task Instructions
Web Search Task Instructions
The next part of this study requires you to actually create the reading list, in accordance with the outcome
of your allocation procedure. The reading list should contain sources that could be used to answer the
following question:
“To what extent can design be considered a psychological process?”
To do this you should use the Web to find sources, which can be anything you consider as relevant to the
research topic (so books, journals, websites—it is up to you to decide). Each time you find a source you
should record it using the chat. You should include a snippet of relevant text from the source material, as
well as a hyperlink to the source. The other person will be doing the same during the study.
The only criteria are that:
• Each information source must be unique, so you cannot complete the study by using the same source
multiple times.
• You cannot use the same Web page more than once, though you may use multiple pages from the
same site (for example, Wikipedia).
• You cannot use items your partner has already shared, but you can search using the same search
engines or on the same websites.
• And finally, you can communicate with your partner in any way you wish during this task but you
must not reveal any identifying information about yourself.
Once you have completed your own allocation, you will have finished the experiment. Please inform me
(the experimenter) when you are finished.
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C.3 Study 2 Questionnaires
C.3.1 Proposer Questionnaire
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
Did you understand what you were required to do in the study today? (Yes / No)
Using the space below, please describe what you had to do during the study today. If you did not understand
the study, please describe why.
With regard to the allocation you chose to make...
Why did you choose to allocate the work in the way that you did?
Did your partner accept or reject your allocation?
Why do you think they chose to accept / reject?
Did you communicate about the task in order to organise your search activities?
With regard to the question you were asked to research...
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
With regards to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
Do you have any other comments on the study or recommendations for how this study could be improved
in the future?
Thank you for taking the time to complete this study. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the
experimenter.
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C.3.2 Responder Questionnaire
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
Did you understand what you were required to do in the study today? (Yes / No)
Using the space below, please describe what you had to do during the study today. If you did not understand
the study, please describe why.
With regards to the allocation you were presented with...
Why do you think your partner chose to allocate the work in the way that they did?
Did you accept or reject your partners allocation?
Why did you choose to accept / reject?
Did you communicate about the task in order to organise your search activities?
With regards to the question you were asked to research...
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
With regards to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
Do you have any other comments on the study or recommendations for how this study could be improved
in the future?





Contents: Briefing scripts, instructions, and questionnaires.
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D.1 Study 3 Instructions
D.1.1 Proposer Instructions for DLUG, Pop Music Condition
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about artists or bands that shaped the history of popular music
in the 20th century.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person has been given the same research topic as you and also has to
create a reading list containing 10 sources. The first part of this study involves making a proposal about
how to divide the workload between the two of you. On this occasion, you have been given the opportunity
to make a decision about how to divide the work. You can do this by specifying how many sources you
want the other person partner to look for. You will then be responsible for finding any remaining sources
towards the required total of 10.
The way you should do this is as follows:
• The minimum number of sources you can ask the other person to find is 1, and the maximum is 9.
You should privately decide how you want to divide the work. Please keep the decision to yourself
and do not inform me (the experimenter) of your decision.
• You will see a chat window on your screen. You should specify the allocation by typing in the
following style: “I want you to find sources”.
• The other person will then have the opportunity to review the allocation you have proposed. They
will respond to your allocation with the word ‘accept’ or ‘reject’.
• If they accept the allocation, any sources that you both obtain will be shared and your findings will
contribute jointly to the required 10 sources.
• If they reject, you will each have to find 10 sources separately.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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D.1.2 Responder Instructions for DLUG, Pop Music Condition
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about artists or bands that shaped the history of popular music
in the 20th century.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person has been given the same research topic as you and also has to
create a reading list containing 10 sources. The first part of this study involves making a proposal about
how to divide the workload between the two of you. On this occasion, the other person has been assigned
the task of dividing the workload, and it is up to you to respond to their allocation.
The way you should do this is as follows:
• You will see a workload allocation appear in the chat. This is the number of sources that the other
person wants you to find. The minimum number of sources they will ask you to find is 1 and the
maximum is 9. The other person will then be responsible for finding the remaining sources for
the required total of 10. The allocation will appear in the following style: “I want you to find
sources”.
• If you accept their allocation, any sources that you both find will be shared and your findings will
contribute jointly to the required 10 sources.
• If you reject the offer, you will both have to find 10 sources separately.
• You should privately decide whether or not you want to accept their allocation. Please keep the
decision to yourself and do not inform me (the experimenter) of your decision.
• If you are happy with the allocation, please answer: “Accept”.
• Or, if you do not accept their allocation, please answer: “Reject”.
Please do not type anything else in response to their allocation.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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D.1.3 Proposer Instructions for DLUG, Slime Mold Condition
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person has been given the same research topic as you and also has to
create a reading list containing 10 sources. The first part of this study involves making a proposal about
how to divide the workload between the two of you. On this occasion, you have been given the opportunity
to make a decision about how to divide the work. You can do this by specifying how many sources you
want the other person partner to look for. You will then be responsible for finding any remaining sources
towards the required total of 10.
The way you should do this is as follows:
• The minimum number of sources you can ask the other person to find is 1, and the maximum is 9.
You should privately decide how you want to divide the work. Please keep the decision to yourself
and do not inform me (the experimenter) of your decision.
• You will see a chat window on your screen. You should specify the allocation by typing in the
following style: “I want you to find sources”.
• The other person will then have the opportunity to review the allocation you have proposed. They
will respond to your allocation with the word ‘accept’ or ‘reject’.
• If they accept the allocation, any sources that you both obtain will be shared and your findings will
contribute jointly to the required 10 sources.
• If they reject, you will each have to find 10 sources separately.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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D.1.4 Responder Instructions for DLUG, Slime Mold Condition
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person has been given the same research topic as you and also has to
create a reading list containing 10 sources. The first part of this study involves making a proposal about
how to divide the workload between the two of you. On this occasion, the other person has been assigned
the task of dividing the workload, and it is up to you to respond to their allocation.
The way you should do this is as follows:
• You will see a workload allocation appear in the chat. This is the number of sources that the other
person wants you to find. The minimum number of sources they will ask you to find is 1 and the
maximum is 9. The other person will then be responsible for finding the remaining sources for
the required total of 10. The allocation will appear in the following style: “I want you to find
sources”.
• If you accept their allocation, any sources that you both find will be shared and your findings will
contribute jointly to the required 10 sources.
• If you reject the offer, you will both have to find 10 sources separately.
• You should privately decide whether or not you want to accept their allocation. Please keep the
decision to yourself and do not inform me (the experimenter) of your decision.
• If you are happy with the allocation, please answer: “Accept”.
• Or, if you do not accept their allocation, please answer: “Reject”.
Please do not type anything else in response to their allocation.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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D.1.5 Web Search Task Instructions, Both Conditions
Web Search Task Instructions
The next part of this study requires you to actually create the reading list, in accordance with the outcome
of your allocation procedure.
To do this you should use the Web to find sources, which can be anything you consider as relevant to the
research topic (so books, journals, websites—it is up to you to decide). Each time you find a source you
should record it using the chat. You should include a snippet of relevant text from the source material, as
well as a hyperlink to the source. The other person will be doing the same during the study.
The only criteria are that:
• Each information source must be unique, so you cannot complete the study by using the same source
multiple times.
• You cannot use the same Web page more than once, though you may use multiple pages from the
same site (for example, Wikipedia).
• You cannot use items your partner has already shared, but you can search using the same search
engines or on the same websites.
• And finally, you can communicate with your partner in any way you wish during this task but you
must not reveal any identifying information about yourself.
Once you have completed your own allocation, you will have finished the experiment. Please inform me
(the experimenter) when you are finished.
As a reminder, the task is:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about artists or bands that shaped the history of popular music
in the 20th century / the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
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D.2 Study 3 Questionnaires
D.2.1 Proposer Questionnaire
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
With regards to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
With regard to the allocation you chose to make...
Why did you choose to allocate the work in the way that you did? What factors, if any, influenced your
decision?
Did your partner accept or reject your allocation?
Why do you think they chose to accept / reject?
Did you consider making a different offer to the one you eventually proposed? If so, what did you consider?
On reflection, and having now completed the work, would you have made a different offer? Why?
How did you feel about the topic you were asked to research? What was your reaction when you first saw
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the topic?
With regard to the question you were asked to research...
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
How interesting did you find the topic?
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
How interesting was the experience of searching for information about the topic? (nb. This refers to your
feelings about the task itself, not the topic you were presented with).
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
Do you have any other comments on the study or recommendations for how this study could be improved
in the future?
Thank you for taking the time to complete this study. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the
experimenter.
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D.2.2 Responder Questionnaire
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
With regards to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
With regard to the allocation you chose to make...
Why do you think your partner chose to allocate the work in the way that they did?
Did you accept or reject your partners allocation?
Why did you choose to accept / reject?
What factors, if any, influenced your decision when responding to your partners allocation?
On reflection, and having now completed the work, would you accept the offer they made a second time?
Why?
How did you feel about the topic you were asked to research? What was your reaction when you first saw
the topic?
With regard to the question you were asked to research...
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
How interesting did you find the topic?
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
How interesting was the experience of searching for information about the topic? (nb. This refers to your
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feelings about the task itself, not the topic you were presented with).
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
Do you have any other comments on the study or recommendations for how this study could be improved
in the future?
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E.1 Study 4 Instructions
E.1.1 Dictator Instructions, Complete Information
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person must also create a reading list on the same topic as you in order to
earn their £5. The first part of this study involves making a proposal about how to divide the workload
between the two of you. On this occasion, you have been given the opportunity to make a decision about
how to allocate the work. You can do this by specifying how many sources you want the other person to
look for. You will then be responsible for finding any remaining sources towards the required total of 10.
The way you should do this is as follows:
• You must first decide how many sources to allocate to the other person. Any allocation between
0 and 10 is perfectly legitimate for the purposes of this study. This means that you can choose to
allocate all 10 sources, none at all, or any number in between. Whatever your allocation, you will be
responsible for finding any remaining sources for the required total of 10. Keep in mind that you
will not meet the other person and that the allocation does not affect your payment—you will be
paid £5 regardless of how much work you leave for yourself and you do not need to wait for them
while they work.
• As an example, if you allocate 0 to the other person, you will be required to find 10 by yourself,
whereas if you allocate all 10, you will not be required to find any at all and you can leave the study
with your money right away. Your task at this point is to decide how much work each person should
do to earn his or her £5.
• You should privately decide how you want to divide the work. Please keep the decision to yourself
and do not inform me (the experimenter) of your decision.
• You will see a chat window on your screen. You should specify the allocation by typing in the
following style: “I want you to find sources”.
• Please do not type anything else when making your allocation.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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E.1.2 Dictatee Instructions, Complete Information
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person must also create a reading list on the same topic as you in order to
earn their £5. The first part of this study involves making a proposal about how to divide the workload
between the two of you. On this occasion, the other person has been assigned the task of allocating
the work. They will specify how many sources they would like you to look for, and they will then be
responsible for finding any remaining sources towards the required total of 10.
The way this will be done is is as follows:
• You will see a workload allocation appear in the chat—this is the number of sources that the other
person has decided to allocate to you. This number will be between 0 and 10.
• The allocation will appear in the following style:
• “I want you to find sources”.
This will be the amount of work you are required to do to get your £5 payment. Note that they may assign
all of the workload to you, in which case they will not respond via the chat when you begin your work on
the task.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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E.1.3 Dictator Instructions, Incomplete Information
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person must also create a reading list on the same topic as you in order to
earn their £5. The first part of this study involves making a proposal about how to divide the workload
between the two of you. On this occasion, you have been given the opportunity to make a decision about
how to allocate the work. You can do this by specifying how many sources you want the other person to
look for. You will then be responsible for finding any remaining sources towards the required total of 10.
The way you should do this is as follows:
• You must first decide how many sources to allocate to the other person. Any allocation between
0 and 10 is perfectly legitimate for the purposes of this study. This means that you can choose to
allocate all 10 sources, none at all, or any number in between. Whatever your allocation, you will be
responsible for finding any remaining sources for the required total of 10. Keep in mind that you
will not meet the other person and that the allocation does not affect your payment—you will be
paid £5 regardless of how much work you leave for yourself and you do not need to wait for them
while they work.
• As an example, if you allocate 0 to the other person, you will be required to find 10 by yourself,
whereas if you allocate all 10, you will not be required to find any at all and you can leave the study
with your money right away. Your task at this point is to decide how much work each person should
do to earn his or her £5.
• You should privately decide how you want to divide the work. Please keep the decision to yourself
and do not inform me (the experimenter) of your decision.
• You will see a chat window on your screen. You should specify the allocation by typing in the
following style: “I want you to find sources”.
• Please do not type anything else when making your allocation.
Before making your allocation, you should also be aware that the other person does not know the total
number of sources required for the reading list. Instead, we have told them that they must find some
number of sources and that you will be allocating the work to them. This means that when you make the
allocation, they will know their own assignment but will have no way of being certain about yours.
Once you have made your allocation, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to
the second part of the study.
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E.1.4 Dictatee Instructions, Incomplete Information
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have
reliable sources containing information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person must also create a reading list on the same topic as you in order to
earn their £5. The first part of this study involves making a proposal about how to divide the workload
between the two of you. On this occasion, the other person has been assigned the task of allocating
the work. They will specify how many sources they would like you to look for, and they will then be
responsible for finding any remaining sources towards the required total.
The way this will be done is is as follows:
• You will see a workload allocation appear in the chat—this is the number of sources that the other
person has decided to allocate to you. This number will be between 0 and 10.
• The allocation will appear in the following style:
• “I want you to find sources”.
This will be the amount of work you are required to do to get your £5 payment. Note that they may assign
all of the workload to you, in which case they will not respond via the chat when you begin your work on
the task.
Once you have done this, please inform me (the experimenter) and you will be introduced to the second
part of the study.
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E.1.5 Web Search Task Instructions, Both Conditions
Web Search Task Instructions
The next part of this study requires you to actually create the reading list, in accordance with the outcome
of your allocation procedure.
To do this you should use the Web to find sources, which can be anything you consider as relevant to the
research topic (so books, journals, websites—it is up to you to decide). Each time you find a source you
should record it using the chat. You should include a snippet of relevant text from the source material, as
well as a hyperlink to the source. The other person will be doing the same during the study.
The only criteria are that:
• Each information source must be unique, so you cannot complete the study by using the same source
multiple times.
• You cannot use the same Web page more than once, though you may use multiple pages from the
same site (for example, Wikipedia).
• You cannot use items your partner has already shared, but you can search using the same search
engines or on the same websites.
• And finally, you can communicate with your partner in any way you wish during this task but you
must not reveal any identifying information about yourself.
Once you have completed your own allocation, you will have finished the experiment. Please inform me
(the experimenter) when you are finished.
As a reminder, the task is:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
[In the Incomplete Information condition, the passage given to responders read: You have been asked to
form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have reliable sources containing
information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.]
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E.2 Study 4 Questionnaires
E.2.1 Dictator Questionnaire, Complete Information
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
With regards to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
With regard to the way you went about completing this study:
Why did you choose to allocate the work in the way that you did? What factors, if any, influenced your
decision?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied were you with the
allocation of work?
On reflection, and having now completed the task, would you have organised the work differently? If so,
why?
Did you consider making a different offer to the one you eventually proposed? If so, what did you consider?
If you did not do any work on the search task then please skip the next three questions.
Did the task you were asked to complete remind you of any real-world tasks that you have done to find
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information in collaboration with other people?
Did you pay attention to the activities of your partner during the study? If so, what did you do?
Did you feel influenced by the activities of your partner during the study? If so, how?
Regarding the topic of mycetozoa slime mold:
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on this topic:
How interesting did you find the topic?
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
How interesting was the experience of searching for information about the topic? (nb. This refers to your
feelings about the task itself, not the topic you were presented with).
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on the topic:
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
quality of the sources produced by your partner during the study?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
speed at which your partner worked during the study?
Was their speed too fast, too slow, or about right?
Thank you for taking the time to complete this study. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the
experimenter.
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E.2.2 Dictatee Questionnaire, Complete Information
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
With regards to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
With regard to the way you went about completing this study:
Why do you think the other person chose to allocate the work in the way that they did?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied were you with the
allocation of work?
Imagine that this study had been as follows: the other person makes you a workload offer, and you either
accept or reject it. If you accept, you each do the work as assigned. If you reject, you each obtain 10 items
separately. Given the allocation that the other person made to you today, would you accept or reject it in
such a setting? Why?
If you had been responsible for dividing the work in this study, what would your allocation have been?
If you did not do any work on the search task then please skip the next three questions.
Did the task you were asked to complete remind you of any real-world tasks that you have done to find
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information in collaboration with other people?
Did you pay attention to the activities of your partner during the study? If so, what did you do?
Did you feel influenced by the activities of your partner during the study? If so, how?
Regarding the topic of mycetozoa slime mold:
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on this topic:
How interesting did you find the topic?
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
How interesting was the experience of searching for information about the topic? (nb. This refers to your
feelings about the task itself, not the topic you were presented with).
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on the topic:
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
quality of the sources produced by your partner during the study?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
speed at which your partner worked during the study?
Was their speed too fast, too slow, or about right?
Thank you for taking the time to complete this study. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the
experimenter.
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E.2.3 Dictator Questionnaire, Incomplete Information
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
With regards to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
With regard to the way you went about completing this study:
Why did you choose to allocate the work in the way that you did? What factors, if any, influenced your
decision?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied were you with the
allocation of work?
On reflection, and having now completed the task, would you have organised the work differently? If so,
why?
Did the fact that the other person did not know the amount of work required affect your allocation? Why?
Did you consider making a different offer to the one you eventually proposed? If so, what did you consider?
If you did not do any work on the search task then please skip the next three questions.
Did the task you were asked to complete remind you of any real-world tasks that you have done to find
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information in collaboration with other people?
Did you pay attention to the activities of your partner during the study? If so, what did you do?
Did you feel influenced by the activities of your partner during the study? If so, how?
Regarding the topic of mycetozoa slime mold:
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on this topic:
How interesting did you find the topic?
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
How interesting was the experience of searching for information about the topic? (nb. This refers to your
feelings about the task itself, not the topic you were presented with).
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on the topic:
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
quality of the sources produced by your partner during the study?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
speed at which your partner worked during the study?
Was their speed too fast, too slow, or about right?
Thank you for taking the time to complete this study. If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the
experimenter.
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E.2.4 Dictatee Questionnaire, Incomplete Information
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
With regards to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
With regard to the way you went about completing this study:
Why do you think the other person chose to allocate the work in the way that they did?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied were you with the
allocation of work?
Imagine that this study had been as follows: the other person makes you a workload offer, and you either
accept or reject it. If you accept, you each do the work as assigned. If you reject, you each obtain 10 items
separately. Given the allocation that the other person made to you today, would you accept or reject it in
such a setting? Why?
If you had been responsible for dividing the work in this study, what would your allocation have been?
If you did not do any work on the search task then please skip the next three questions.
Did the task you were asked to complete remind you of any real-world tasks that you have done to find
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information in collaboration with other people?
Did you pay attention to the activities of your partner during the study? If so, what did you do?
Did you feel influenced by the activities of your partner during the study? If so, how?
Regarding the topic of mycetozoa slime mold:
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on this topic:
How interesting did you find the topic?
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
How interesting was the experience of searching for information about the topic? (nb. This refers to your
feelings about the task itself, not the topic you were presented with).
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on the topic:
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
quality of the sources produced by your partner during the study?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
speed at which your partner worked during the study?
Was their speed too fast, too slow, or about right?





Contents: Briefing scripts, instructions, and questionnaires.
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F.1 Study 5 Instructions
F.1.1 Pop Music Topic
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about artists or bands that shaped the history of popular music
in the 20th century.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person has been given the same research topic as you and also has to
create a reading list containing 10 sources.
You must use the Web to find sources for the reading list. Sources can be anything you consider as relevant
to the research topic (so books, journals, websites—it is up to you to decide). Each time you find a source
you should record it using the chat. You should include a snippet of relevant text from the source material,
as well as a hyperlink to the source. The other person will be doing the same during the study.
The only criteria are that:
• Each information source must be unique, so you cannot complete the study by using the same source
multiple times.
• You cannot use the same Web page more than once, though you may use multiple pages from the
same site (for example, Wikipedia).
• You cannot use items your partner has already shared, but you can search using the same search
engines or on the same websites.
• And finally, you can communicate with your partner in any way you wish during this task but you
must not reveal any identifying information about yourself.
Once you have completed your own part of the task, you will have finished the experiment. Please inform
the experimenter when you are finished.
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F.1.2 Slime Mold Topic
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about the life cycle of mycetozoa slime molds.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person has been given the same research topic as you and also has to
create a reading list containing 10 sources.
You must use the Web to find sources for the reading list. Sources can be anything you consider as relevant
to the research topic (so books, journals, websites—it is up to you to decide). Each time you find a source
you should record it using the chat. You should include a snippet of relevant text from the source material,
as well as a hyperlink to the source. The other person will be doing the same during the study.
The only criteria are that:
• Each information source must be unique, so you cannot complete the study by using the same source
multiple times.
• You cannot use the same Web page more than once, though you may use multiple pages from the
same site (for example, Wikipedia).
• You cannot use items your partner has already shared, but you can search using the same search
engines or on the same websites.
• And finally, you can communicate with your partner in any way you wish during this task but you
must not reveal any identifying information about yourself.
Once you have completed your own part of the task, you will have finished the experiment. Please inform
the experimenter when you are finished.
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F.1.3 Art Crime Topic
Instructions
In this study you are required to search the Web for information in order to complete the following task:
You have been asked to form a reading list for students of a night class. The reading list must have 10
reliable sources containing information about subject of international art crime, focusing on instances of
fraud or theft in the international buying and selling of art.
Rather than complete this task alone, you have the opportunity to work with another person who is located
elsewhere on campus. This other person has been given the same research topic as you and also has to
create a reading list containing 10 sources.
You must use the Web to find sources for the reading list. Sources can be anything you consider as relevant
to the research topic (so books, journals, websites—it is up to you to decide). Each time you find a source
you should record it using the chat. You should include a snippet of relevant text from the source material,
as well as a hyperlink to the source. The other person will be doing the same during the study.
The only criteria are that:
• Each information source must be unique, so you cannot complete the study by using the same source
multiple times.
• You cannot use the same Web page more than once, though you may use multiple pages from the
same site (for example, Wikipedia).
• You cannot use items your partner has already shared, but you can search using the same search
engines or on the same websites.
• And finally, you can communicate with your partner in any way you wish during this task but you
must not reveal any identifying information about yourself.
Once you have completed your own part of the task, you will have finished the experiment. Please inform
the experimenter when you are finished.
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F.2 Study 5 Questionnaire
This questionnaire was spread over three pages and participants had ample room for free-text responses.
Questionnaire
With regard to your computer expertise...
How would you rate your computer expertise?
Novice, Intermediate, Expert
On average, how often do you use the Web to search for information?
Once every couple of months, A few times per week, Once per day, Several times per day
With regard to the way you went about completing this study:
On reflection, and having now completed the task, would you have organised the work differently? Why?
What factors, if any, did you consider when deciding how to organise the work?
Did you monitor or pay attention to the activities of your partner during the study? If so, what did you do?
Did you feel influenced by the activities of your partner during the study? If so, how?
To what extent did you feel pressured by the activities of your partner during the study? For example, did
you feel the need to speed up or slow down your own work rate in order to match their speed?
How did you decide whether or not a source should be included in the reading list?
Was your decision to include sources affected by the speed at which you and your partner were working?
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If so, how?
Regarding the topic you were asked to research:
How familiar are you with the subject matter of the topic you were asked to research?
Very unfamiliar, Slightly unfamiliar, About average, Slightly familiar,Very familiar
How difficult was it to find sources relevant to this topic?
Very easy, Slightly easy, About average, Slightly difficult, Very difficult
How interesting did you find the topic?
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
How interesting was the experience of searching for information about the topic? (nb. This refers to your
feelings about the task itself, not the topic you were presented with).
Very dull, Slightly dull, About average, Slightly interesting, Very difficult
If you worked alongside the other person on the topic:
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
quality of the sources produced by your partner during the study?
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is highly unsatisfied and 7 is highly satisfied, how satisfied are you with the
speed at which your partner worked during the study?
Was their speed too fast, too slow, or about right?





Contents: Briefing script and semi-structured interview protocol.
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G.1 Interview Briefing Script
The following script was read to each participant prior to the commencement of each interview.
Thank you for participating in our study, today I will be asking you questions based on your use of
Coagmento/Diigo. I’ll be asking questions about a range of issues, including the process you followed
during your searches, how you communicated with your partner, and I’m also interested in your opinions
of the tool we gave you. Before beginning, I would like to tell you a few things about the interview —
nothing bad, just some information to put you at ease.
• First of all, please feel free to be frank and honest when talking about your experiences with the
system. We didn’t build the tool and we have no reason to be offended by anything you say about
it, so please feel free to speak truthfully and be honest about your experiences. Your opinions are
valuable to us.
• Also, there are no right or wrong answers in this study. So please feel free to share your opinions
and ideas, even if you think they might be silly. They probably aren’t.
• I have basic framework of 32 questions but sometimes they get answered during conversation, so I
may not need to ask all of them. The interview shouldn’t last more than an hour in total. We can
follow up on your experiences if there is something particular that you want to talk more about.
• Is it okay if we record the interview? [Await confirmation]. We will not share the recording with
anyone and when your responses are transcribed it will not be possible for anyone to identify you
from the transcript.
Do you have any questions before we begin?
G.2 Interview Questions
The list of questions here was informed by the literature on CIS reviewed in Chapter 6; the list of questions
used by Capra et al. (2010); and the salient concerns of this thesis. (Fairness, division of labour, awareness,
etc.) Please note also that these are guideline questions; invariably, some would be answered during the
course of talking about other questions, and were therefore not asked.
Overview of the Project
I’d like to start by asking you some general questions about your search activity during the study.
1. What type of information were you and your partner looking for?
2. What was the overall goal of the project? Why were you searching?
3. Where did most of the searches take place?
4. Did you search at the same time as your partner or at different times? Were you together or apart?
5. How long did it take to complete the task?
6. How many search sessions were there? (Ask for rough guess if the participant struggles, then verify
the guess by cross-checking with search logs and partner’s statements).
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7. How would you normally go about looking for information when doing tasks like the one you did
during the study? If you weren’t participating in this study, what would you do? (Try to return to
this question when participant talks about behaviours during the interview).
Information Seeking
Let’s talk about the process you followed when searching for information.
8. Can you give me a general idea of your approach towards achieving your goal? For example, how
did you get started on the task?
9. How did you organize the task? Was there any sort of division of labour at all?
10. What challenges, if any, did you encounter related to searching and managing results found?
11. What did you do with information once you had found it?
12. Did you encounter any problems during the execution of the task?
13. How did you resume your searches from previous sessions? How did you remember where you had
left off?
Communication
Let’s talk about how and your partner communicated and exchanged information regarding your chosen
task.
14. How did you share information with your partner?
15. How did they share information with you?
16. How did you and your partner communicate during the time you were working on your tasks? For
example, what methods did you use to discuss what you had found?
17. Did you ever communicate *during* searches?
18. How easy was it for you to understand what your partner had already looked at during their work?
Tool Use
Let’s talk about the tool.
19. Thinking back to your use of the toolbar, which features did you use most frequently? (Ask them to
elaborate on what they used them for. Ask them about each bookmarking feature and whether or not
they used them).
20. Do you remember choosing not to use any particular features? (If so, why didnt they use them?)
21. Did you use any of the toolbars communication features, for example the chat or sidebar?
22. Did you encounter any problems during your use of the system? (If so, what were they?)
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23. Were there any ways in which the tool did not support your activities?
24. Was there anything you felt the tool did badly?
25. Did you use any other tools or methods to capture information? (e.g. paper notes)
26. Can you give me an opinion of what you thought about the toolbar, overall?
Ending the Process
27. Would you say that your workloads during this task were roughly equal?
28. Was fairness important to you? Were you concerned about the amount of work completed by each
person?
29. How did you decide that the quantity of information you found was enough? (As in, at what point
did they decide to terminate information seeking activities? )
30. How did you achieve consensus regarding the outcome of the work? As in, how did you decide
which option to choose? (Which hotel or destination to select)
31. Overall, how would you describe your success in achieving what you wanted to achieve by using
the tool?




Contents: List of web streams observed, briefing script, and semi structured interview protocol.
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H.1 List of Web Streams
These streams were observed by the author of this thesis to learn more about raiding in Warcraft at the
time of study (August 2013). Note that consent was not obtained to observe these players as they are
broadcasting via public channels, i.e. they invite and encourage observation of their activity.
Channel for observation of groups doing player versus player battlegrounds.
www.twitch.tv/braindeadly





H.2 Interview Briefing Script
The following script was read to each participant prior to the commencement of each interview.
Thank you for participating in our study. I will be asking you questions based on your experiences of
playing World of Warcraft. I’ll be asking questions about a range of issues, including the roles you assume
while raiding and your responsibilities in your group, how you stay aware of team members’ contributions,
and the issues that arise through use of various interface metrics. Before beginning, I would like to tell you
a few things about the interview—nothing bad, just some information to put you at ease.
• First of all, please feel free to be frank and honest when talking about your experiences. There are
no right or wrong answers in this study, so please feel free to share your opinions and ideas, even if
you think they might not be relevant.
• I have a basic framework of 29 questions but sometimes they get answered during conversation, so I
may not need to ask all of them. The interview shouldn’t last more than an hour in total. We can
follow up on your experiences if there is something particular that you want to talk more about.
• Is it okay if we record the interview? [Await confirmation]. We will not share the recording with
anyone and when your responses are transcribed it will not be possible for anyone to identify you
from the transcript.
Do you have any questions before we begin?
H.3 Interview Questions
About your Warcraft Character
I’d like to start by asking you some general questions about you and your experiences with WoW.
1. What is your age?
2. What is your gender?
3. Which country is your current permanent place of residence?
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4. For how long have you been playing Warcraft? (Years/months please estimate).
5. What is the race of the character you play most on Warcraft? (i.e. your primary character that you
use for raiding purposes).
6. What is the class of the character you play most on Warcraft? (again the character you use for
raiding purposes).
7. Are you currently in a guild?
8. How big is the guild?
9. How would you describe the guild? (e.g. casual raiding guild, medium sized raiding guild, hardcore
raiding guild).
10. Are you in a position of authority within that guild? (E.g. guild officer).
11. How frequently do you participate in raids with members of that guild?
12. What is your functional role while raiding? (Damage dealer, healer, tank, other - If other, how would
you describe the role?)
13. Do you have an organizational role while raiding? (E.g., raid leader, communications officer).
14. What are the demands of this role? What does it require you to do while raiding? What are your
chief responsibilities?
General Awareness Issues
Let’s talk about more specific aspects of raiding now.
15. While you are on a raid, what are the primary duties for you in your class role?
16. While you are on a raid, to what extent is it necessary for you to pay attention to what your team
mates are doing? Why?
17. How do you stay aware of what your team mates are doing? What sort of information are you
looking for / monitoring?
18. How does knowing what they are doing help you on a raid?
Interface
19. What interface elements do you use to support your raiding activities, if any?
20. How do these elements help you? (Specifically what aspects of raiding do they support?)
21. Do you use damage / healing / threat meters?
22. How do these meters help you during a raid?
23. Have you encountered any issues surrounding use of these meters? E.g. positive or negative side
effects?
309
APPENDIX H. STUDY 7 MATERIALS
Participation and Contributions from Team
24. When you’re raiding, how do you decide how much effort should be invested at any given time?
25. How do you ensure that everyone is participating in a raid?
26. How does your raid group or guild decide how drops and loot should be assigned? How do you
decide who gets which item?
27. Do the contents of the damage or healing meters help you to determine who should get which loot
drops?
28. Is it important that all team members contribute equally? How do you know whether someone is
making an appropriate contribution to the raid?




AN EXAMPLE RAID ENCOUNTER
Contents: Description of the Onyxia raid encounter from World of Warcraft.
Defeating Onyxia: An Example Raid Encounter
Since the reader may not be familiar with the nitty-gritty of raiding in Warcraft, we offer a short account
of how a typical boss encounter plays out. We describe an encounter with the dragon Onyxia, as pictured
in Figure I.1. This helps to illustrate the coordination challenges experienced during raid encounters. The
Onyxia encounter is from the classic version of Warcraft, and plays out as follows:
• Phase One: This involves a simple ‘tank and spank’ task where the group’s primary tank engages
the boss and the rest of the raid deals damage to lower the dragon’s health. Because the dragon has
some abilities that can potentially harm the raid—for example, she can breath conical fire and can
apply cleaved damage with her claws and tail—two very simple coordinated behaviours are required.
First, the main tank draws the dragon towards a wall to prevent her from hitting other raid members.
Second, DPS classes will attack the dragon from its sides, rather than behind; this minimises the
chance of dying from the dragon’s tail swipe.
• Phase Two: When Onyxia’s health is lowered to 65%, she takes off and becomes airborne in the
centre of the room (as depicted in Fig. I.1). At this point, she begins shooting fireballs at random
members of the raid, and smaller dragon whelps begin to spawn from either side of the cave. The
raid must therefore divert much of their attention away from the main boss and kill the whelps
before the room becomes overwhelmed. This task is typically dedicated to tanks and melee-based
DPS characters. The remainder of the raid then continues to inflict damage to Onyxia using ranged
attacks.
• Phase Three: When Onyxia’s health reaches 40%, she flies to the ground and adopts the same pattern
of behaviour as in Phase One. However, the raid is faced with two additional challenges: Onyxia
bellows an intermittent roar, which causes all members of the raid to be ‘feared’ for up to three
seconds (a feared character runs around randomly and cannot be controlled by its user until the fear
wears off or is removed). The raid must overcome this by removing the main tank’s fear status as
soon as possible to ensure that Onyxia does not wander around and begin killing other raid members.
A second challenge is that, when Onyxia roars, eruptions of flame appear through cracks in the floor.
Thus raid members are susceptible to increased damage while feared, placing extra pressure on the
raid’s healers.
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Figure I.1: A Warcraft raid in progress. A large group of players is attempting to slay the dragon Onyxia.
In addition to these three phases, Onyxia has a special ‘deep breath’ ability that can inflict massive
damage to the raid. Onyxia is rumoured to be more likely to perform this ability if the raid members
clump together; thus, players must try to ensure equidistant spacing throughout each of the aforementioned
phases. If the raid is successful in navigating these phases, the raid should defeat Onyxia and will be able
to obtain loot from her corpse. Onyxia is actually one of the more simple raid encounters, harder raids may
present more difficult coordination challenges by, for example, requiring players to position their avatars
in specific places, change positions during the raid, switch from damage to healing, or to perform actions
in prescribed sequences.
Once Onyxia’s health points reach zero, she dies and the raid is successful. Players can loot her corpse
to obtain their rewards.
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PHOTOGRAPH AND IMAGE CREDITS
Contents: List of necessary accreditations and attributions for images used in this thesis.
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Figure 6.1, Coagmento is a copyright (c) of Chirag Shah, 2012.
http://www.coagmento.org




From Erickson, Halverson, Kellogg, Laff, & Wolf (2002), copyright (c) Association for Computing
Machinery.
Other
Figure I.1, “Onyxia raid” copyright (c) by aigarius on Flickr.
http://www.flickr.com/photos/aigarius/4351914262
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